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PREFACE

The significance of this study lies in the importance of the
times, the institution, and the historiographical issues involved.
The times are the years of American participation in the cataclysm of
World War I.

The institution is the House of Representatives, the

65th session of which along with the Senate, voted for war and then
sought legislation to win and end the conflict.

The historiographical

issues evolve out of some fifty years of work by historians on the
war years and on the "Progressive Era" in general.

The combination of

the three elements— of time, institution, and historiography— present
a number of issues for study.

These can be summarized as follows:

the institutional character of the 65th House, the response of the
House to war mobilization, the attitudes of the House toward aliens
and dissenters, the actions of the House on such important measures as
Prohibition, and the relations between the President and the House.
In studying members of the House to determine their ideas on
issues and their actions as a body, I have relied on traditional nonquantitative sources, such as personal papers of individual Congress
men and the Congressional Record. At the same time, I have combined
these sources with quantitative data obtained from computer analysis
in order to identify groups within the House.
As a preliminary to such analysis, my first chapter deals with
the historiography and methodology that provide the foundation for my
iii

discussion of House meiribership and the House as an institution.

I

then analyze the three sessions of the 65th House, covering the basic
issues dealt with by each session.

I conclude the dissertation with

a summary of the more cogent findings.
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ABSTRACT

In this study the technique of roll call analysis has been
combined with traditional non-quantitative sources in order to deter
mine and analyze the response of the 65th House of Representatives
to a broad range of issues.

Particularly at question is the response

of representatives to intervention in World War I; their attitude
toward internationalism, mobilization of the economy and aliens and
dissenters; their alignment and ideas on issues of a progressive
nature; and their actions on such important measures as prohibition
and women's suffrage.

Secondarily, an effort has been made to

investigate the party system, the organization of the House, and
the prosopography of its membership.

Voting records of the House

were analyzed through use of the OSIRIS III package of computer
programs, which was employed to correlate roll calls and to construct!'
Guttman scales.
When judged by their response on recorded roll-call votes and
by their expression of views on issues, representatives responsed to
the war crisis in a variety of ways.

The victory of House Democrats

in 1916 on the issues of peace and progressivism placed them in an
ambiguous position once Wilson asked for war and they shelved reform
for the war's duration.

Structural weaknesses also existed in the

leadership and party systems of the House, a fact which helps account
for its inability to forge an effective war or postwar program.
xi

Instead, President Wilson had to step in to direct the House into
war, and, once in the war, to outline the basic war program.

The

fact of Presidential leadership often did not please the Republican
members.

As a result, the bi-partisan prowar coalition, which, sup

ported the war mainly because of the havoc wrought by the German
U-boat but also because of economic, regional, and security factors,
soon melted away.

It failed to form a consistent voting bloc that

supported war measures during the conflict and internationalism
after the war.

In a similar fashion, progressive issues, such as

taxation, railroads, prohibition, women's suffrage, and water power,
created only a series of single issue coalitions.

Progressivism was

a definite force in the 65th House, but it had no general ideology
and its influence was limited.

Moreover, there was no postwar

flowering of progressive initiatives or ideas as some historians
have indicated.

Progressivism's relation to parties was ambiguous

with the Democrats at times adopting the progressive stance and on
other occasions the Republicans so doing.

Yet, contrary to the usual

thought, the Republicans more often supported the progressive position
n’
than the Democrats. Overall, regional and party factors were more
important than progressivism in shaping House deliberations and House
roll calls.

These factors had significant roles in determining roll

calls on the Revenue Bill, the Water Power Bill, prohibition, women's
suffrage, and farm measures.

Party and regional interests, attitudes

toward Presidential leadership, and orientations toward international
ism and progressivism all helped mold the House's reaction to war
mobilization

and reconstruction plans.
xii

The House never appreciated

the rationalization and centralization affected by war mobilization.
As a result, when peace returned, representatives only desired to aid
economic stability and to restore prewar patterns rather than enact
new schemes of government planning and regulation.

Directly related

to the House's desire for the restoration of normal conditions was
its attitude against aliens and dissenters. ‘Republican apprehensions
during the first few months of the war had moderated some administra
tion proposals on aliens and dissenters, but by the end of the war
the Alien Deportation Bill and the Sedition Act were enacted with
little opposition.

The House played no small part in the ironic

tragedy of the war for democracy that led initially to the Red Scare
and eventually to "normalcy."

xiii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Summoned by President Woodrow Wilson to hear his address on
grave questions of peace and war, members of the House of Representa
tives gathered in their chamber on the night of April 2, 1917.1

They

awaited the President's speech with expectancy, for Congressmen knew
neither what Wilson would demand of them nor what course of action
the nation should pursue.3

Wilson had shared these uncertainties, but

as he now appeared before Congress, he read his decision with deter
mination and strength.3

Declaring that the United States had no

other course than to wage war with all power and force possible, he
first spoke of the causes that compelled this action.

He named as

reasons German espionage in the United States, the Zimmerman intrigue,
and, above all else, the submarine warfare against American commerce

^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, pt. 1, 118.
Fiorello LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent, An Autobio
graphy, 1882-1919 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1948), 138.
Joseph Daniels, The Life of Woodrow Wilson (Will H. Thompson, printer,
1924), 277. New York Times, April 2, 1917, 1. The Times reported that
"Gussie" Gardner (Rep., Mass.) had introduced a resolution calling for
war. But according to LaGuardia, probably a majority still favored
'peace. New York Times, April 13, 1917, 1.
JArthur Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era (New York:
Harper and Row, 1956), 277. John M. Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the
Politics of Morality (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1956), 121-30.
Both authors write of Wilson's deep distress before he reached his
decision; however, once he made up his mind, he buried his doubts.
1

and lives.

These hostilities against the United States, he maintained

were not simply a violation of American rights but also were a vio
lation of all law and justice.

It was a "warfare against all nations,

in which neutrality no longer afforded isolation and where the ways
of peace had to give way to the demands of war.

To prepare for war,

he pointed out, would require a number of measures, some of which
would need, the approval of Congress.

He proposed a much larger army

and navy, a selective service system, huge appropriations for military
armaments, loan credits for both the United States and her new allies,
and taxes heavy enough to finance the war "by this present generation.
Then, he abruptly turned to a discussion of the issues and objectives
for which the nation would fight.

Chief among them was the destruc

tion of "selfish and autocratic power,” which threatened liberty and
all future peace.

In what became the most famous sentence of the

speech, he stated, "The world must be made safe'for democracy."

The

United States had no desire, Wilson added, for conquest, dominion or
indemnities for itself and did not fight against the German people,
but against their rulers.

As to the German people in the United

States, he professed his belief that they were most loyal but warned
that disloyalty would be treated "with a firm
sion...."

hand of s t e m repres

Wilson drew his message to a close with a ringing perora

tion:
It is a fearful thing to lead this
great
peaceful people into war, into the most
terrible
and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself
seeming to be in the balance. But, the right
is more precious than peace, and we shall fight
for the things which we have always carried near
est our hearts— for democracy, for the right of
those who submit to authority to have a voice in
their own governments, for the rights of liberties

3

of small nations# for a universal dominion of
right by such a concert of free peoples as
shall bring peace and safety to all nations and
make the world itself at last free. To such a
task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes,
everything that we are and everything that we
have, with the pride of those who know that the
day has come when America is privileged to spend
her blood and her might for the principles that
gave her birth and happiness and the peace which
‘ she has treasured. God helping her, she can do
no other.4
The Wilsonian ideals, as expressed in the conclusion of his
war message, removed the lingering doubts of many congressmen and gave
them hope for the future.*’ Yet, the members of the House knew that
past conditions would combine with the myriad problems of warfare to
form a new test of their convictions and abilities.

The prewar

vacillation might have been removed for many by Wilson's message, but
other urgent problems, which Wilson had suggested in his April 2
*>

speech, now required decisive action.
Representatives immediately faced the task of voting for or
against Wilson's call for war upon the German Empire.

Their decision

either to support or to oppose the war resolution raised three questions
for consideration. :Firstly, what motivations, reasons, or arguments
did representatives offer for either sustaining or rejecting the
resolution for war?

Secondly, what- kind of groups supported either

4Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 281. See Cong.
Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 118-20, for Wilson's
speech.
^LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 137-40. LaGuardia main
tains that many Representatives were undecided as to the course that
the United States should pursue. The President's message helped them
reach a decision. Blum, Woodrow Wilson, 129-30, stresses the in
spirational quality of Wilson's speech, noting how it overcame
the doubts of many Americans and gave them a belief that, after
their tribulations, there would be a new freedom.

4

position?

Thirdly, what implications did congressmen see for American

foreign policy because of involvement in the European war?

Previous

historical studies of American entrance into the war offer little,
if any, information on these questions, since virtually all such
studies have focused on the background to Wilson’s war message and
have ignored the House after April 2, 1917.

Given this limitation of

past analyses, it appears in order to categorize the various inter
pretations of American entry into war in relation to the three questions
raised above.
Directly after the end of the First World War, historians split
into two schools of interpretation on the causes of American interven
tion.

One argued that German plots against American liberty caused the

United States to enter the war.

The other school asserted that muni

tion manufacturers, holders of European bonds, and their allies in the
press pushed the country into a war to protect their economic interests.
To these schools, the war represented a struggle to secure either
world liberty or American prosperity.

A third set of historians in

the 1930's suggested that the ruthless German submarine warfare
against the United States forced American intervention.

After World

War II, a fourth group of historians advanced the view that interven
tion came only when Wilson realized the danger to American security
from domination of Europe.6
g
Paul Birdsall, "The Second Decade of Peace Conference History,"
Journal of Modern History, XI (September, 1939), 362-78; Richard W.
Leopold, "The Problem of American Intervention," World Politics, II
(April, 1950), 405-25; Selig Adler, "The War Guilt Question and American
Disillusionment, 1918-1928," Journal of Modern History, XXIII (March,
1951), 1-28; Daniel M. Smith, "National Interest and American Inter
vention, 1917: A Historiographical Appraisal," Journal of American
History, LII (June, 1965), 5-24; and Warren I. Cohen, The American

5

As to the second question— which relates to the groups favoring
or opposing intervention— several historians have delineated conflicting
elements.

John Milton Cooper, in a monograph on the pre-war pre

paredness controversy, sees the existence of two main positions on
American involvement before April 1917, with both positions including
two sub-groups.

One main group he labels isolationists, while the

other he calls internationalists.

Each group consisted of two sub

groups, with isolationists and internationalists falling into both
idealist and ultranationalists camps.

He does not argue for an exact

and neat dichotomy, because these prewar groups o v e r l a p p e d . ^

The

tendency of individuals, he maintains, was to fall into groups
opposing involvement in world affairs or advocating a larger role in
world affairs for reasons either having to do with American ideals
or American self-interest.®
Besides naming isolationist and internationalist groups, his
torians have also investigated the activities and positions of pro
gressive elements.

In an article, William E. Leuchtenburg, who bases

his view on a study of non-Congressional progressives, argues that

Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago:
University, 1967).
^John Milton Cooper, The Vanity of Power: American Isolationalism and the First World War, 1917-1919 (Westport Ct: Greenwood
Publishing Corp., 1969), 1-3.
®Ibid., 86-99, 132, 195-99. Cooper names a number of Congress
men who served in the 65th Congress. Their activities as to U. S.
entry into the war and as to American policy toward Europe will be
traced in the body of the dissertation. Lloyd Ambrosius, "Wilson, the
Republicans and French Security After World War I," Journal' of American
History, LIX (September, 1972), 341-52, rejects the implication of
Cooper's thesis that Republicans began to coalesce around an iso
lationist position in opposition to Wilson's internationalism.

6

most progressives were imperialists.

The reason he gives for this

conclusion is that progressives held a nationalistic belief in the
American mission.

A few years after the appearance of the Leuchtenburg

article, Arthur Link offered the contesting thesis that instead of
being interventionists, the progressives were isolationists.

In his

book Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, he wrote of the progres
sive belief that since America had a special mission to purify herself
and offer herself as an example, the United States should remain aloof
from a decadent Europe.

Also pulling them toward isolationism, he

writes, was their assumption that munition makers, bankers, and
special economic interest groups started wars.^
The wide divergence between Link and Leuchtenburg can be traced
to the fact that they studied different progressives— Leuchtenburg
non-congressional figures and Link mostly congressmen.

Historians

who have written since Link and Leuchtenburg's work appeared, bear out
this distinction between the attitudes of progressives inside and out
side Congress.

Thus, J. A. Thompson, on the one hand, finds most

progressive publicists of the war era coming to support intervention
as a means of furthering reform.^

On the other hand, several

^William E. Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The
Progressive Movement and Foreign Policy," Mississippi Valley Historical
Review, XXXIX (December, 1952), 482-504; Link, Woodrow Wilson and the
Progressive Era, 180-82; and Eric Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, A
History of Modern American Reform (New York: Knopf, 1952), 270-73,
241-^2, agrees with Link. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform,
From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Knopf, 1956), 293-94, follows
Leuchtenburg, but Hofstadter does note a pacifist agrarian wing of
progressivism opposed to war.
1°J. A. Thompson, "American Progressive Publicists and the First
World War, 1914-1917," Journal of American History, LVIII (September,
1971), 364-83. Walter Trattner, "Progressivism and World War I,"
Mid-America, XLIV (July, 1962), 131-45 concludes that it is
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historians agree that congressional progressives maintained a non
interventionist orientation.

To these writers— who include Walton

Sutton, Howard Allen, Barton J. Bernstein, Franklin A. Leib, and John
M. Cooper— most congressional progressives thought that preparedness
and intervention were as likely to insulate reform as to stimulate it.
With their convictions stronger for reform than for preparedness,
congressional progressives reached a consensus opposing preparedness
and American entry into war.
On the third question (about congressmen's thoughts on America's
long-term foreign relations), historians have not offered many comments.
Congressmen could not escape considering the question, however, for
a war originating in Europe and requiring American troops in Europe
raised completely novel problems to most congressmen.

Either they

realized this when they voted on the war resolution, or they increasingly

anachronistic to talk about the progressives and World War I. See
also, Charles Hirschfield, "Nationalist Progressivism and World
War I," Mid-America, XLV (July, 1963), 139-56. Allen F. Davis,
Spearheads for Reform (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971),
219-20, studied the social welfare side of progressivism, adds the
interesting note that many social workers came to wholehearted support
of the war once it began, even though they had originally opposed
American involvement. Cf. J. A. Thompson, "An Imperialist and the
First World War: The Case of Albert B. Beveridge," Journal of
American Studies, V (August, 1971), 133-50.
■^Walter Sutton, "Republican Progressive Senators and Prepared
ness," Mid-America, LII (July, 1970), 155-76; Howard Allen, "Repub
lican Reformers and Foreign Policy, 1913-1917," Mid-American, XLIV
(October, 1962), 222-29; Barton J. Berstein and Franklin A. Leib,
"Progressive Republican Senators and American Imperialism, 1898-1916:
A Reappraisal," Mid-America, L (July, 1968), 163-205; and John M.
Cooper, Jr., "Progressivism and American Foreign Policy: A
Reconsideration," Mid-America, LI (October, 1969), 260-77.

became aware as the war ground toward a conclusion.12

Even if the

congressmen understood how the decision for war would affect American
foreign policy, the question becomes one of whether or not they agreed
with the Wilsonion vision of the future.

Publicists at the time and

historians since have doubted that most congressmen agreed with Wilson'
goals.

It is, however, a question which has not been studied in
I O

relation to the House.
The historiographical literature on the entrance into the war,
although it does not often touch directly on the war House, is a de
finite aid for this study.

By making use of this literature as a

background, this study will delineate the thought and the groupings
of the House on the issues of war and peace.

First, quantitative

techniques and non-quantitative sources can be used to locate indi
vidual and group opinion on questions of war and foreign policy.
Second, groups will be studied for regional, partisan, and ideological

12It is difficult to measure the exact distinction congressmen
made between American entry into war and aims of the war. One
Congressman, C. William Ramseyer (R-Iowa), in a personal letter did
make this distinction when he noted in April, 1917, that Wilson has
set the war on a high plane for democracy and for the democratization
of autocratic Germany. C. William Ramseyer to personal (no name),
April 29, 1917, Ramseyer Papers, Archives, Iowa State University
Library. In the House debates, usually causes and aims are not often
clearly distinguished. Of course, as the war drew to a close, all
Congressmen became aware of Wilson's goals.
13Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic, XII (August 4,
1917), 21, reported that very few Congressmen either understood Wilson'
war aims or supported them. The historiographical debate over Wilson's
aims, particularly for the League of Nations, and the response of
Congress to his plans has centered on the Senate. Little has been
written on the House. See Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables; The
Fight Against the League of Nations (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1970) for one study concentrating on the Senate. For
historiography on the League of Nations controversy, see ibid., 189195.
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characteristics.

Once these are defined, the thought and behavior

of each group can be characterized and compared.
Besides raising the issue of involvement in war and the future
course of American foreign policy, Wilson's war message had implications
for progressive reform at home.

On one level, Wilson in his message

called for the subordination of all the nation's energies to the over
riding purpose of winning the war.

At the same time, Wilson also

fashioned progressive ideals to the service of the war and interna
tionalism.

This ambivalence— his shelving of domestic reform for the

duration of the war, while at the same time proclaiming the aims of
the conflict in the language of progressivism— has troubled his
torians, since they can find evidence that the war ended progressive
reform at home but also that it extended the reform mentality to the
world— at least to E u r o p e . W h e t h e r reform gained strength, suffered
an irreversible set-back, or changed into "liberalism" are some of
the questions they have forwarded.

However, they have not studied

these questions in relation to the 65th House.
Historians are sharply divided over the war's impact on reform.
In a review article, Hebert Margulies notes that some historians,
among them Eric Goldman and Richard Hofstadter, see both an in
tellectual and political decline even before the start of the war.

l^This ambivalence is one of the most basic issues for the entire
war. It took several different forms and cut across issues in varying
ways. Thus, the war could be for democracy, yet there could be re
pression at home. Or war measures were not advocated for their own
sake but for the necessity of war; yet they would also be promoted as
progressive. Or the nation would go all out to win the war, yet long to
return to "normal" conditions. Groups in Congress became supporters
of measures they would not normally support, and opponents of measures
they normally supported. The resulting tension did not help clarify
the House's response to the post-war world.

10
By linking the war to Progressive values, Hofstadter argues, Wilson
insured not only a decline, which was already occurring, but also
disillusionment and r e a c t i o n . T a k i n g an opposing view is Stanley
Shapiro, who argues that the war stimulated a period of positive in
tellectual growth for the movement.

Many citizens realized, as they

never had before, the deepness and complexity of many social ills.
Charles Hirschfeld adds the thought that the war experience also gave
the ones having this new awareness a sense of the method by which
government action and planning could handle the problems.

He and

Shapiro conclude that the ground work for a new "liberalism," which
would fully develop in the 1930's, was thus laid.^®

Robert Wiebe,

the author of the important interpretation, The Search for Order,
agrees that the period was one of development for the movement.

But

since he has a different interpretation of Progressivism, he does not
see the war as launching new reform plans.

Rather, the progressive

:V
movement seized the war in order to discipline American society to the

Hebert Margulies, "Recent Opinion on the Decline of the
Progressive Movement," Mid-America, XLV (October, 1963), 250-68;
Hofstadter, Age of Reform, 272-82. See Charles Forcey, The Cross
roads of Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961),
278-90, for a discussion of the disillusionment of three leading
progressive intellectuals, Herbert Croly, Walter Weyl, and Walter
Lippmann.
■^Stanley Shapiro, "The Twilight of Reform: Advanced Progres
sives After the Armistice," Historian, XXXIII (May, 1971), 347-64.
In another article Shapiro develops the argument of a brief flowering
of reform in terms of a particular group and condition, namely labor
and labor relations. See Stanley Shapiro, "The Great War and Reform:
Liberalism and Labor, 1917-1919," Labor History, XII (Summer, 1971),
323-44. There are others who take this line; for example, see Allen
Davis, Spearheads for Reform, 219-22; also Charles Hirschfeld,
"National Progressivism and World War I," Mid-America, XLV (July,
1963), 154.
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emerging bureaucratic order.
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Similarly, but from different per

spectives, James Weinstein and Gabriel Koklo speak of the war as
offering the progressive movement new opportunities, either as a "full
scale testing ground" for the new corporate liberalism, or as "the
triumph of business in the most emphatic manner possible."

18

Finally,

some historians see the war and the period shortly thereafter as a
time in which the progressive Wilsonion coalition split into discon
nected and ineffective splinters.^®
All of these viewpoints, in one manner or another, suggest this
problem:

were the measures decided, the roll calls voted, the ideals

phrased, and the post-war reconstruction plans formulated in the
context of an ongoing progressivism or in the context of a reaction
against progressive reform?

Once such a question is raised for con

sideration, a more basic one inevitably demands attention:

did

varieties of pre-war Progressivism exist, and, if so, did they find
spokesmen in the war-time House?

All writers recognize diversity in

the Progressive Movement; all those who argue for a central nature
also concede the coexistence of groups separate from the main
17

Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order (New York:
Inc., 1966), 287, 293.

Hill and Wang,

James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State
(Boston: The Beacon Press, 1968), 214, 218. Gabriel Koklo, The
Triumph of Conservatism (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963),
287.
19Burl Noggle, Into the Twenties (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1974), 194. Also David Burner, "The Breakup of the Wilson
Coalition," Mid-America, XLV (January, 1963), 18-35. There are some
writers who maintain that progressivism continued even into the 1920's
though on a reduced scale. See Arthur S. Link, "What Happened to
the Progressive Movement in the 1920's," American Historical Review,
LXIV (July, 1959), 833-51.
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A recent article, however, so emphasizes the theme of

diversity that the very reality of an entity called "the Progressive
Movement" is called into doubt.

In a provocative article, Peter Filene

cogently argues that great confusion exists in the historiographical
literature as to various ideals and supporters of the movement.

Since

he thinks the snarl cannot be disentangled, it is, he concludes, time
to write an obituary for the movement.2^
For this study's purpose, it is premature to recite a eulogy.
Instead, it is more fruitful to pursue the lines suggested by three
other recent writers, John Buenker, Howard Allen, and Jerome Clubb.
Like Filene, they agree that the diversity of progressivism poses
methodological problems for the historian, but the solution, Buenker
states, is not to dismiss progressivism as non-existent.

Preferably,

historians should delineate the divergent reform groups, carefully
defining the characteristics of the different groups.

Since none

of these groups formed a majority by itself, the next job of the

20An example of a book which notes the diversity but still
finds a basic commonality is Otis L. Graham, Jr., An Encore for Reform:
The Old Progressives and the New Deal (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1967), 4-5, 14.
21Peter G. Filene, "An Obituary for the Progressive Movement,"
American Quarterly, XII (Spring, 1970), 20-34. Filene argues that
the whole problem of historiography on the Progressive Era is that
historians are trying to define something which never existed. His
torians, he maintains, in support of this view, have failed to under
stand what is meant by the word "movement," which he says is a collec
tivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist change and
which has a program, values, membership, and supporters. In these
terms, he concludes that historians have never been able to find any
common denominators for the progressives. The trouble with Filene's
view, even though it correctly points out the great variety within
progressivism, is that it only establishes another definition for
progressivism— a methodological definition rather than a substantive
one. Such an approach fails to deal with the period.
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historian is to analyze how these distinct groups united into coali
tions for legislative reform.22
Buenker's solution to the problem of diversity is simply to turn
from studying the whole to researching individual groups.

Allen and

Clubb take up this idea and apply it to the study of several of the
Congresses during the Progressive Era, though they did not include the
65th House.

In one sense, they argue that Congress itself constituted

a special group within the Progressive movement.

This was because

congressional progressives viewed reform in light of their constituents'
interests.

Since most House progressives' constituents were largely

non-urban, representatives did not often favor the proposals of urban
progressives.

In a second sense, Allen and Clubb note that congres

sional progressivism was also split between parties.

Although this

division created problems for reform, Republican and Democrat pro
gressives did at times overcome the dictates of partisan concerns and
joined together to pass reform legislation.23
Buenker, Allen, and Clubb suggest that the job of the historian
of the Progressive Movement is to carefully define groups within the
movement.

It is, however, necessary to go beyond this and show the

connection between the groups.

For example, the connection between

the major parties and progressive groups is of primary importance.

22John D. Buenker, "The Progressive Era:
thesis," Mid-America, LI (July, 1969), 175-93.

A Search for a Syn

2^Howard W. Allen and Jerome Clubb, "Progressive Reform and the
Political System," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, LXV (July, 1974), 13133, 136-37. Another recent article with a similar conclusion as to the
clustering together of groups for reform is David Thelen, "Social
Tensions and the Origins of Progressivism," Journal of American
History,LVI (September, 1969), 323-41.
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It has been already noted that progressives were split between parties,
but Allen and Clubb also point out that most progressives were in the
Democratic party.

Also, if progressivism had its adherents in the

House, conservatism had its supporters, too.
sives from conservatives?
geographical divisions.

What separated progres

Finally, progressivism showed certain
In particular, writers have emphasized that

the South often acted as a distinct group in opposition to other
regions.

They are less sure, however, of the extent of progressive

leanings among Southern congressmen.

In many respects, therefore,

progressivism cannot be treated in isolation from other possible House
groupings.24
24

The following listing is not meant to be exhaustive either in
terms of possible divisions (groups) in the House or of possible
sources. Many other divisions exist such as ethnic, agricultural, and
urban groups, but this study will not be able to analyze them in any
great detail. As to the studies to be named in this footnote, all
particularly errqphasize certain groups.
Seward W. Livermore Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 1916-18
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), 36, 49, the only full
length book on the War Congress, develops one of the main divisions,
the partisan one. He also notes the existence of other divisions,
such as conservatives and reactionaries. For the role of urban masses
during progressivism, see J. Joseph Hutchmacher, "Liberalism and the
Age of Reform," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIX (September,
1962), 231-41. For geographical and ideological divisions, see I. A.
Newby, "States Rights and Southern Congressmen During World War I,"
Phylon XXIV (September, 1963), 34-50. This, by the way, is the only
journal article written directly and exclusively on the War Congress.
Several articles focus on the South and reform: Dewey Grantham,
"Southern Congressional Leaders and the New Freedom, 1913-1917," Journal
of Southern History, XII (November, 1947), 439-59; Dewey Grantham,
"Southern Senators dnd the League of Nations," North Carolina Histori
cal Review, XXVI (April, 1949), 187-205; Richard Abrams, "Woodrow Wilson
and Southern Congressmen, 1913-1916," Journal of Southern History, XXII
(July, 1956), 417-37; Ann Scott, "A Progressive Wind From the South,"
Journal of Southern History, XXIX (February, 1963), 53-70. For a more
general discussion of geography and reform, see Howard Allen, "Geo
graphy and Politics: Voting on Reform Issues in the United States
Senate, 1911-16," Journal of Southern History, XXVII (May, 1961),
216-28. Also, "Progressive Reform and the Political System," ibid.,
134.
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As evidenced by this review, recent historiography on progres
sivism has focused on the many overlapping and divergent reform groups.
This emphasis on the variegated nature of progressivism suggests the
difficulties in defining progressivism's overall nature and even in
naming its individual components.

One approach to this problem is

to locate progressive issues and progressive groups supporting the
issues.

If this method (which includes the use of the computer to

analyze voting records) uncovers progressive elements, then the
effects of the war on progressivism and the characteristics of pro
gressivism can be discussed.
Wilson suggested in his war message a basic subject for the
House's attention, namely, the legislation necessary for the mobili
zation of the populace and the economy against the German enemy.
Historians are unsure of the role of the House in the formulation of
the war program.

Many see the House as simply an obstacle in the way

of the Administration's proposals, or as of little importance in the
creation of the war program.

Such views not only overlook the fact

that Wilson had to seek Congressional authority for most war measures,
but they also ignore the substantial service the House rendered in
the evolution of the war program.

pc

One phase of the war program

involved

the outliningof general

plans for the mobilization of the economy. Robert Cuff, in a book on
the War Industries Board, implies that the House only grudgingly

2^Daniel Beaver, Newton B. Baker and the American War Effort,
1917-1919 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 27-30,
discusses the conscription bill in
relation
to the
House,but assigns
it no particular role in creating the measure. See, also, M. F.
Dimock, "Wilson as Legislative Leader," Journal of Politics, XIX
(February, 1957), 17.
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supported the Administration's war industry policy.

Although the

Administration sought a centralized and integrated war economy, ele
ments in Congress, which Cuff identifies as progressive and Bryanite
groups, remained hostile to giant economic management.

He concludes

that these elements obstructed plans of the war agencies, resisted
certain Administration bills in Congress, and in general balked at
the whole idea of close government and business interaction.

26

Other historians hold a much different viewpoint of congressional
reaction to war planning.

James Weinstein writes that a basic prin

ciple of war-time mobilization was the replacement of obsolete compe
tition between companies in favor of cooperation between them.

He

indicates that the House expressed its approval of the shift by passing
such measures as the Webb-Pomerene Commerce Act, which permitted
corporation combinations in foreign trade.27

In separate books, Wiebe

and Kolko support Weinstein's argument, concluding that the war en
couraged Congress to accept centralization of the economy and largeA n

scald cooperation-between government and busin&ss.
Another phase of the war program involved the enactment into law
by the House of many particular war measures.

The demands of the war

26Robert Cuff, The War Industries Board (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1973), 3, 104-07, 243-44. Cuff's book only occassionally looks at the reactions of Congress to war planning. This can
be said also of the other books that are cited on this topic. They often
have decided viewpoints, but the evidence for the position is very thin.
27Weinstein, The Liberal Ideal, 218.
28wiebe, The Search for Order, 293, 297-98; Kolko, The Triumph
of Conservatism, 280-287. Making a similar connection to the post
war world is Paul Koistinen, "The 'Industrial Military Complex' in
Historical Perspective: The Interwar Years," Journal of American
History, LVI (March, 1970), 819-39.
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on the economy created varied and often novel proposals for House
consideration.

For example, the fundamental requirement of adequate

war finances resulted in the passage of two revenue acts by the House.
In another area of war management, Representatives passed acts to build
housing in order that industries might care for war workers.29
A third phase of the war program involved issues which had ante
cedents long before the war.

One such measure was for the harnessing

of water power, now needed for national war industries.30

A more

important matter of long standing was the women's suffrage amendment.
Its advocates promoted the amendment by claiming that it would spur
the patriotism of women and fulfill the democratic ideals of the
•31

war.

Similarly, the debate on the Prohibition amendment, which of

course had its origins long before the war, transpired in the
context o f .the advantages or disadvantages for the war program.
For both of these amendments, the war affected the debates on them
29

On taxes, see H. Larry Ingle, "The Repeal of the Revenue Act
of 1918," North Carolina Historical Review, XLIV (Winter, 1967),
72-88.
30On water power, see J. Leonard Bates, "Fulfilling American
Democracy: The Conservation Movement, 1907-1921," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, XLIV (June, 1957), 29-57; and Samuel P. Hays,
Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation
Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 1-4,
261-75. Both of these works on conservation direct some comments to
the 65th Congress. The significant thing, however, is their opposing
viewpoints: Bates argues that supporters of conservation were battlers
against special interests and business control in the interest of
democracy, while Hays maintains that conservationists were concerned
with science and efficiency, not democracy, and often had the support
of large business groups.
31
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. pt. 1, 769. Opponents also
used the war as a reason to oppose the amendment. There are few
direct studies on the passage of the women's amendment; in particu
lar, there are no vote analysis studies.
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and probably influenced the choices of those voting for and against
them.32
In his war message, Wilson also directed the vigilance of the
House toward the problem of disloyalty and dissent during wartime.
Implying that war required a new sense of devotion to the United
States, Wilson both praised the fealty of the German population in
America and also warned them against any lapses from loyalty.

He

concluded that "a hand of s t e m repression" would be promptly lifted
against any who would impede the war effort by word or action.

33

Shortly after the President's speech, Administration supporters
introduced the Espionage bill, which provided for the punishment of
spies and dissenters.

Historians have studied this bill both for its

32

The historiographical literature supplies some useful ideas on
prohibition and classifications of prohibitionists. Wiebe, The Search
for Order, 287, places prohibition in the context of progressivism
and the period's effort to discipline aliens, slum dwellers, and
Negroes to the demands of industrial society. Prohibitionists are
classed as repressive. Similar is John Kobler, Ardent Spirits; The
Rise and Fall of Prohibition (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1973),
180-199. Placing the ideas of prohibition and the prohibitionist in
a different and more positive classification are: Paul Carter,
"Prohibition and Democracy, The Noble Experiment Reassessed," Wisconsin
Magazine of History, LVI (Spring, 1973), 189-201; Robert Hohner,
"Prohibitionists: Who Were They?," South Atlantic Quarterly, LXVIII
(Autumn, 1969), 491-505; J. C. Burnham, "New Perspectives on the
Prohibition 'Experiment' of the 1920's," Journal of Social History,
II (Fall, 1968), 51-68; S. J. Mennell "Prohibition: A Sociological
View," Journal of American Studies, III (December, 1969), 159-175;
and James H. Timber lake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement,
1900-1920 (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 1-3, 178-81. Timberlake connects
prohibition to both Progressivism and the war. He has little direct
analysis, however, of the prohibition debates and votes in the House.
The classic study of the passage of prohibition, Peter H. Odegard,
Pressure Politics, The Story of the Anti-Saloon League (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1929), 20, 32-3, 98, 166-74, emphasizes
the Protestant nature of the movement, but goes little beyond this
in describing groups for or against it.
33Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, pt. 1, 120.
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impact on the violation of civil liberties and for its reflection of
the attitudes of various groups in American society toward aliens
and dissenters.

William Preston traces the wartime loyalty laws

passed by the House to a longstanding conflict between two traditions,
one favoring openness, mobility, diversity, heterogeneity, and variety
of opinions, the other demanding unity, conformity, and homogeneity.
The second tradition won an increasing number of victories from the
1890's on, culminating with its triumph in World War I as intolerance
of aliens and political radicals surged over all moderating restraints.34
Agreeing with Preston on the triumph of the repressive tradition
during the war, H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite as joint authors of
Opponents to War divide Preston's group into several components.

These

included Rooseveltian nationalists who wanted a role for the United
States in world affairs, moral fundamentalists who saw the struggle
as between God and the devil, superpatriots who placed the war above
any moral considerations, and self-interested patriots who wanted
repression for economic reasons.

By the end of the war, the combi

nation of these groups passed the Espionage and Sedition laws plus
restrictive alien and immigration acts through the House.35
Even the armistice, many historians maintain, did not bring
an end to the intolerance.

Instead it persisted, helping to propagate

many of the cultural aberrations common during the 1920's.

Into the

Twenties by Burl Noggle sees the war generating long-term impulses

34William Preston, Jr., Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppres
sion of Radicals, 1903-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1963), 6-8.
35H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, Opponents of War, 1917-1918
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), 12-16, 214-16.
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against radicals, so-called subversives, and conscientious objectors.
Only a few scattered congressmen, he writes, evidenced any concern
for the fate of the dissenters.

An article by Paul Murphy also

points to the emotions fanned by the war as one of the basic sources
for the proliferation of bigoted and repressive organizations during
the 1920's.

It was not, he writes, that the war created intolerant

attitudes, for they had long existed.

Instead, the war, by demanding

extreme national unity and by failing to meet expectations, created
a climate in which antipathies toward minorities could flourish."*®
The role of the House in the evolution of this emotional atmosphere
will be a prime consideration.
36

Burl Noggle, Into the Twenties; The United States from Armistice
to Normalcy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 84-85, 95.
Paul Murphy, "Sources and Nature of Intolerance in the 1920's," The
Journal of American History, LI (June, 1964), 60-76. A review article
on the subject of liberty and repression during and after World War I
is John Braeman, "World War One and the Crisis of American Liberty,"
American Quarterly, XVI (Spring, 1969), 104-112. The war also raised
questions as to the position of another important minority group, the
Negroes. See Jane Scheiber and Harry N. Scheiber, "The Wilson Admini
stration and the Wartime Mobilization of Black America," Labor History,
X (Summer, 1968), 433-458. This article gives some attention to Con
gress and their reaction toward Blacks in wartime; for-examplep-itnotes racist fears as one reason for opposition to conscription.
Other sources, which focus on persons and institutions other than the
65th House, suggest some lines for inquiry. Richard Sherman, "Republi
cans and Negroes: The Lessons of Normalcy," Phylon, XXVII (Spring,
1966), 63-79; and Richard B. Sherman, The Republican Party and Black
America from McKinley to Hoover, 1896-1933 (Charlottesville: University
of Virginia, 1973) 118, 132-35, suggest, by implication, that a study
of the House ought to include a look at Republican party attitudes
toward the Negro. Many studies suggest that Progressives ought to
be studied for their racial attitudes. See, for example, Howard
Allen, Aage R. Clausen, Jerome M. Clubb, "Political Reform and
Negro Rights in the Senate, 1909-1915," Journal of Southern History,
XXXVII (May, 1971), 191-212; Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., "The Progres
sive Movement and the Negro, 1898-1918," South Atlantic Quarterly,
LIV (October, 1953), 461-477. This study will include some consi
deration of the Negro and attitudes of the 65th House toward him.
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In his war message and later statements, Wilson attempted to
control one of the normal House sentiments when he appealed for an end
to partisanship.

After the speech, both Republican and Democratic

national party leaders echoed the call for the tabling of partisan
animus.

In the House, Champ Clark, after his election to the Speaker

ship, declared that in this crisis "politics finds no place in this
House."

When the first session of the war House was drawing to a close,

Clark claimed that, in fact, partisanship had "been temporarily
banished from this House."37
Despite remarks such as Clark's, historians have widely dis
agreed over whether, in truth, the usual Republican and Democratic
partisanship vanished in a great swell of patriotic ardor.

On one

side of the issue, Malcolm Moos maintains that partisan opposition to
war measures was practically unknown during most of the war.

As

evidence for this burial of partisanship, Moos argues that Republicans
gave at least as much support to Administration war measures as did
Democrats.

Partisanship only revived, he continues, in October, 1918,

when Wilson called for the election of a Democratic Congress.

38

Selig

Adler agrees with Moos that partisanship abated for awhile, but he
thinks its revival came before October, 1918.

In fact, it appeared

37Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, pt. 1, 108; ibid.,
pt. 8, 7918. Other Congressmen voiced similar hopes. Speaking for
the Republicans, Thomas S. Williams (111.) claimed that his party
had loyally supported the Administration's war measures. Another
Republican in a private letter also said "there has not been and
will not be any partisanship in this House." C. William Ramseyer
to (no name), May 5, 1917, University of Iowa Library, Ramseyer
Collection.
38
Malcolm Moos, The Republicans, A History of Their Party
(New York: Random House, 1956), 306.
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some time before Wilson again pleaded in May, 1919, for another
adjournment of political infighting.30
Seward Livermore, in his book on the War Congress, rejects the
contention of these authors that partisan politics ever adjourned at
any time.

Making the question of partisanship the very center of his

study, Livermore argues that although the war did restrain undue
factionalism in rhetoric for awhile, partisanship was only camouflaged.
Wilson never enjoyed harmonious bi-partisan cooperation; instead,
Republicans continously assaulted him with "instrumentalities" for
curtailing his war powers.40
Adler and Livermore have established the importance of partisan
ship and its relation to the battle for control of the war program
and to the struggle for political supremacy.

Still, they have failed

to ask the further question of how divisive partisanship was for rollcall votes on issues of war and peace and domestic policy.

In other

words, past research on the War House has failed to discuss the degree
of partisanship that existed on individual measures and on a set of
similar roll calls.
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39Selig Adler, "The Congressional Election of 1918," South Atlan
tic Quarterly, XXXVI (October, 1937), 447-65. George A. Mayer, The
Republican Party, 1854-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967),
350, offers a similar view. ,
40Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 1-5, 15-16, 48.
Livermore's book is a very well-written account of partisan politics.
However, his concern is both broader and narrower than this study's.
He traces Congressional campaigns which this study will not cover. He
also covers most of the major issues in Congress, looking at their
implications for partisanship. He does not, however, ask if the voting
on an issue and on all issues together reflects partisan voting
patterns. Livermore, Woodrow Wilson, Chapters 2-8.
41

There has been some statistical calculation of roll calls in
the House. See Moos, The Republicans, 306. Here Moos states that on
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When the issue of partisanship is viewed in this manner, several
studies on previous Congresses suggest possible results.

Howard Allen

and Jerome Clubb argue that Congresses during the Progressive era dis
played high partisan voting on roll calls.

They further add that the

partisan voting reflected meaningful differences on issues.42

However,

Allen and Clubb's contention must be checked very carefully as to the
existence of differences between parties on issues.

This is because

the parties, although they might oppose each other, may not support
a consistent policy on the issue but, rather, may swing back and forth
for purposes of partisan advantage.43

Finally, studies on partisanship

suggest that parties are the most significant group in explaining voting
patterns of the House.

David Brady concludes from his study of the

McKinley Houses that political parties better explain divisions on
roll call votes than do geographical divisions, urban-rural splits,
and ethnic conflicts.44

fifty-one roll calls between April, 1917 and May, 1918, Republicans sup
ported seventy-two percent of the roll calls on war measures, while
Democrats supported the same roll calls sixty-seven percent of the time.
42
Jerome M. Clubb and Howard W. Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Pro
gressive Years: The Senate, 1909-1915," Journal of Politics, XXIX
(August, 1967), 567-84. Clubb and Allen, "Progressive Reform and the
Political System," ibid., 132-33, repeats the same point on the level of
partisanship. Their articles, plus the work of their students, have
covered the voting records of many of the Congresses during the Pro
gressive Era, but none of the studies include the 65th Congress.
43Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty: The Senate, 1909-1915," 575.
Their study does not include the 65th House. See W. Wayne Shannon,
Party Constituency and Congressional Voting: A Study of Legislative
Behavior in the United States House of Representatives (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University, 1968), 44-75, for a discussion of the degree
of policy content in party opposition.
44
David W. Brady, Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era, A
Study of the McKinley House and a Comparison to the Modern House
(Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1973), 5-9, Ch.
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Given conditions in past Congresses and the evidence from his- '
torians on the 65th House, it is likely that Wilson's call for poli
tical unity was not heeded.

Undoubtedly, partisanship greatly in-

i

fluenced the atmosphere of the wartime Congress and also the votes on
House roll calls.

Thus, this study will focus on partisan divisions

as one of the main groups influencing the actions of the House.
Wilson in his address stated that he would take the liberty from
time to time to present war measures for congressional consideration.
i
Noting that Congress would have a role in the war effort, he emphasized
the need for it to evaluate closely the proposals of the Executive
departments.

In effect, he advocated Executive leadership of the war,

with Congress assuming the function of advising and consenting to
Executive proposals.
To note Wilson's belief in Presidential leadership of Congress
is to raise the specific question of Wilson's influence over the
legislation of the war House and of Executive-House relations in
general.

Congressmen in April, 1917, feared that they would have

. little part in the framing of the war program.

They insisted that

II. Brady statistically studied several groups besides parties as to
their importance in roll call voting. This study will be able to
include only one such group, geographical divisions.
45

Several articles discuss Wilson's conception of Executive
leadership and of party leadership in relation to Congress: See Arthur
S. Link, "Woodrow Wilson and The Democratic Party," The Review of
Politics, XVIII (April, 1956), 146-56; A. W. MacMahan, "Woodrow Wilson
as Legislative Leader and Administrator," American Political Science
Review, L (September, 1956), 641-75; and Dimock, "Wilson as Legislative
Leader," 3-19. All these articles describe Wilson as having a strong
conception of the President's role. They, moreover, maintain that
he was highly successful in both controlling his own party and in
gaining passage of legislation.
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they would not simply dissolve and go home; instead, they maintained
that the Administration must draw them into its confidence.4®
Historians, however, have tended to think that the House in the
end failed to do much in the shaping of war measures. M. E. Dimock,
recognizing that the legislative process requires compromise by both
the President and the Congress, nonetheless stresses Wilsonian leader
ship in directing war plans.

Even stronger in his stress on Wilson's

role, Henry Turner argues that Wilson dominated the War House.

He

concludes that all major legislation of the war years originated in
the Executive Branch and that Congress passed the laws substantially
as the White House desired.47
Prom what has been written, it appears that Congress, rather
than shaping or offering war proposals of its own, simply endorsed
Wilson's.

If this is true— and the position requires further study—

Executive ascendancy has implications for another important aspect of
Presidential-House relations, namely the degree of friendliness or
animosity in the relations between the President and the House.

This

issue is the very thrust of Livermore's Wilson and the War Congress
and its emphasis on partisanship.

Undoubtedly, if partisanship were

both as extreme and as bitter as he suggests, it would explain much
of the catastrophe of Versailles and after.4®

^Throughout the 65th House comments were made on the House's role
in the war program. For some early examples, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
1 Sess., Vol. 55, pt. 1, 496-99.
47M. E. Dimoch, "Wilson as Legislative Leader," 4, 17, and Henry
A. Turner, "Woodrow Wilson: Exponent of Executive Leadership,"
Western Political Quarterly, IV (March, 1951), 98, 111.
AO

Livermore, Woodrow Wilson, 245-47.
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While historians have studied the basic features of Wilson's
address— as it relates to war and peace, Progressivism, civil liberties
and dissenters, Prohibition, partisanship, and Presidential-House
relations— in studies of other Congresses they have largely ignored
the wartime House of Representatives in their analyses.

Richard

Hofstadter and George Mowry have assumed that many of the issues with
which they were concerned lapsed before the war commenced or shortly
afterwards.

Other historians, lacking specific studies to attack,

have overlooked the 65th House.

But the 65th House, the link between

the Progressive years and the disillusioned twenties, has received
little scholarly attention.

49

The 65th House is deserving of attention, not only to test the
validity of a number of historiographical theses, but also to examine
the composition of the House and the manner in which it operated.

Many

issues have been suggested and investigated in studies of other Con
gresses during the Progressive period.

To overlook the wartime House

would be failing to test fully the issues suggested in these other
works.

Even if this were not so, the House is still worthy of research

because of the importance of its institutional character and because
4
it convened in times both chaotic and momentous for the nation.

49Direct studies on the House are very few, apart from Seward
Livermore's Woodrow Wilson and The War Congress, and I. A. Newby's
article on "States Rights and Southern Congressmen." A few disserta
tions are either being written now or have been recently finished. A
few studies touch on the House peripherally, such as Fite and Peterson,
Opponents of War, and Odegard, Pressure Politics: The Story of the AntiSaloon League. Most other studies go right up to the 65th Congress and
either stop there or skip to the next Congress. As is obvious from this
historiographical review, these studies, however, did raise basic ques
tions, which, when reshaped to fit the 65th House and the requirements
of this dissertation, have provided the basis for most of the issues
for research.
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In the present study several basic techniques have been used to
determine the behavior of 457 congressmen who served during the 65th
House.

First, biographical material on social status, occupations, and

political experience has been collected on each member.

This data has

been coded on computer cards and then correlated for the purpose of
describing, the backgrounds of members and comparing Democratic and
Republican members.

It will also allow some comments on the institu

tional qualities of the House.
A second method used to study the House has been the scaling of
congressmen on certain issues.

A statistical test called Guttman

scaling was used to rank members on an issue.

The use of scaling re

quires the existence of a closely-related group of roll calls.

Such

roll calls can be ranked on an ordinal scale.from easiest-to-accept
(the lowest scale position) to hardest-to-accept (the highest scale
position).

The technique rests on the assumption that "each legislator

has a more or less fixed attitude on each issue and that he votes
against measures that are too strong for him to accept.

50

If the

assumption is correct and a scale of roll calls can be properly
defined, then each legislator may be assigned a scale position, based
on his voting record on a particular set of issues.
Another method employed is a simple tabular presentation showing
the regional and party divisions occurring on selected roll calls.
Theoretically, it would be ideal if all roll calls could be placed in
a scale, but many roll calls will not correlate with other votes.
50

In

Charles M. Dollar and Richard J. Jensen, Historian's Guide to
Statistics; Quantitative Analysis and Historical Research (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971), 116.
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these cases, simple tables can be used, thereby allowing some analysis
of the roll calls.5*1'
Finally, non-quantifiable sources such as newspapers, manuscript
collections, and government documents have been surveyed to evaluate
the content and meaning of the members' actions on roll calls and non
roll call matters.

These sources will not merely determine the meaning

of roll calls but will also aid in the location of groups within the
House membership.

The purpose of utilizing this particular approach

is that it facilitates delineation of groups regarding both voting
records and thought processes.52
In the following chapters the results of the combination of quan
titative data and non-quantitative sources are presented.

The initial

concern is to examine the Representatives as a body and as individuals.
Chapter II is an institutional and biographical profile of the House
and its members.

5^The biographical, scaling, and tabular methods will be explained
in greater detail when they are first used. All the methods require
the use of the computer.
52For a survey of the application of quantitative methods in
history, see Robert P. Swierenga, "Computers and American History:
The Impact of the 'New' Generation," Journal of American History, LX
(March, 1974), 1045-70.

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION AND PROSOPOGRAPHY OF
THE 65TH HOUSE

The House of Representatives, when it convened in April, 1917,
was subjected to severe institutional stresses.

The 1916 election

campaign had fomented division in the country over the issues of war
and progressivism, though it also produced a winning coalition for
Woodrow Wilson and his Democratic party.

Since these issues carried

over into the sessions of the 65th House, they helped to shape the
ideologies and the structures that thereafter developed.
When the voters went to the polls, many cast their ballots on
the issues of neutrality, American rights, and preparedness.1

Within

Republican ranks, the former Rough Rider and Bull Mooser Teddy

^ink, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 240; and George E.
Mowry, The California Progressives, (Chicago: Quadrangle Paperbacks,
1951, 1963), 243-250. Link writes of the campaign in terms of progres
sivism and peace. Mowry stresses the progressive aspect on the state
level in California. Josephson, Jeanette Rankin, 59, in a discussion
of the first woman representative, shows the issues in a local Con
gressional district campaign: The progressive ones of protection of
children, social justice, and, of course, women's suffrage. Josephson
does not mention the peace issue though ironically Rankin would vote
against American entry into the war. See, also, John C. Board, "The
Lady From Montana," Montana, XIII (July, 1967), 4-5. Livermore,
Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 5-6, emphasizes the preparedness
issue. He also brings out a sectional issue that Republicans used very
effectively in the North against the Democrats. Ibid., 9-10. The con
sensus of the historiography suggests that the basic issues were
peace and progressivism.
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Roosevelt spoke of a fierce defense of American rights against German
violations, a position that attracted the support of pro-allied voters.
However, the basic Republican platform and many individual GOP con
gressional candidates called for a "straight and honest" neutrality,
a stance that appealed to some German and Irish Americans.2

Though

initially uncertain of his stance, President Wilson allowed his reelection supporters to trumpet the slogan "he kept us out of war."

By

the end of the caitpaign Wilson and his party had adopted the peace
theme to such an extent that it became the accent of their addresses.
Many groups, such as hyphenated Americans and women voters, selected
Wilson and Democratic congressional candidates because they more
clearly favored peace than the Republicans.3
Also influencing the electorate was the position of party and
congressmen on progressivism.

By the fall of 1916 Wilson and the

Democrats could claim that they had enacted into law nearly all planks
of the Progressive Party of 1912.

As a result Wilson declared in his

campaign speeches that the Democratic party stood for justice and the
working people because progressivism had enacted such measures as the
child-labor law and the eight-hour-day limitation for railroad workers.4
In the opposition camp, the issue of progressivism proved confusing and
divisive.

The Republican's presidential candidate, Charles Evans

Hughes, never effectively fashioned a positive program and at best

2Ibid., 5-8.

Link, Woodrow Wilson, 230.

2Ibid., 247, 241; Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Con
gress, 8.
4Link, Woodrow Wilson, 241; Washington Post, November 3,
1916, 1.
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offered fumbling criticism of Wilson's progressive leadership.®

To

many voters# such as laborers, farmers# former Progressive party
supporters, and a large minority of Socialists# the election finally
became a contest between progressive and conservative ideals, neces
sitating a vote for Wilson and against Hughes.®

Only future events

would tell if the Democratic victory in this campaign over peace and
progressivism, which made the party accountable to the public for their
stewardship of these issues, hid pitfalls for them.

In the meantime,

the confused and divided Republicans could only hope for developments
that might unite them and weaken the Democrats.
Even in triumph the Wilsonian coalition showed signs of weakness,
as the Democrats lost seats to the Republicans in the House elections.
The result was that for the first time in history elections for the
House ended in a dead heat between the two major parties.

Each had

215 seats, and the balance of power lay in the hands of five minorparty members:
Progressives.

a Socialist, an Independent, a Prohibitionist, and two
In the previous House the Democrats had a majority of

twenty-three (228 to the Republicans' 205), but in 1916 the Democrats
suffered significant lossed in the Midwest, especially in Illinois,

^Link, Woodrow Wilson, 244; Moos, The Republicans, 287-88; George
H. Mayer, The Republican Party, 1854-1964 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1967), 343-45; and Washington Post, November 4, 1916, 1.
®Link, Woodrow Wilson, 241; Mowry, The California Progressives,
243-50.
^John J. Broesamle, "The Democrats from Bryan to Wilson," The
Progressive Era, ed., Lewis Gould (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1974), 112. Statistics on House elections can be found in the U. S.
Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States,
Colonial Times to the Present, Bicentennial Edition (Washington, D.C.,
1975), 1804. The Republicans won 7.8 million votes to the Democrats'
7.4 million in the House elections.
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Indiana, and Wisconsin.

Adding to the Democratic setbacks were the one

or two seats garnered by the Republicans in New Jersey, Main, and
Oklahoma.

Democrats, nonetheless, retained strong hopes of organizing

the next House when they offset these nearly disastrous losses with
gains of several seats in Ohio and California and scattered individual
p
seats across the country.0
Clearly revealed by the House election results was the sectional
nature of the Democratic coalition.

Although the coalition consisted

of various social, economic, and issue-oriented elements such as
agrarians, urban workers, small businessmen, immigrants, women, and
socialists, which cut across the country, its sectional basis was more
notable than its national qualities.

To Arthur Link, the Presidential

electoral results demonstrate that the Wilsonian coalition represented
a fight of the South and West against the industrial Northeast.9
On the House level, this sectional support is also evident.

Table 2-1

shows that the Democrats failed to penetrate appreciably into the
industrial Northeast.

Instead, forty-five percent of the Democratic

House members elected in 1916' came from the states of the Old Confede
racy.

If the Border states are added to the sections total, Southern
Q

Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 10-11; Washing
ton Post, November 7, 1916, 2; ibid., November 11, 1916, 3. Historical
Statistics, 1083, gives different line ups for the Democrats and the
Republicans from Livermore. For 1915-1917, they list 230 Democrats,
196 Republicans, and nine independents. For 1917, Historical Statis
tics shows 216 Democrats, 210 Republicans, and six independents. See
footnote 10 on the numbers in the House.
9Arthur s. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace,
1916-1917 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 161-64; Link,
Woodrow Wilson, 250-51; Mowry, The California Progressives, 243-73;
Broesamle, "Democrats from Bryan to Wilson," 111-12; and Livermore,
Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 240.

TABLE 2-1
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION AND PARTY

NE

Democrat
Republican

MA

ENC

WNC

SS

BS

MS

PS

TOTAL

%
2

#
6

%
13

#
30

%
12

#
27

%
4

#
10

%
45

#
103

%
16

#
36

%
3

#
8

%
2

#
5

225

12

29

28

65

28

64

13

31

1

4

5

13

2

6

5

12

224

Totals for each region include all individuals seated by the House of Representatives including
partial term replacements for members who died or resigned during their term and those who lost their
seats during their term through a challenge of their seat. The House in 1917 had a limit of 435; special
elections and appointments added twenty-two more members who sat sometime during the session. Several
deaths occured, but some notable members resigned such as Carter Glass to become Secretary of the Treasury,
and Irvine Lenroot to become a senator from Wisconsin. The source of the table is the Osiris III package,
available for use at the Louisiana State University Computer Center; it is designed by the Inter-University
Consortium for Political Research (ICPT), University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. The regional codes in this
table and all subsequent tables are a modified version of the ICPR codes. NE (New England) includes
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. MA (Middle Atlanta) includes
Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania. ENC (East North Central) includes Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin; WNC (West North Central), includes Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, North
Dakota, South Dakota. SS (Solid South) includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia. BS (Border States) includes Kentucky, Maryland,
Missouri, Oklahoma, West Virginia. MS (Mountain States) includes Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New. Mexico, Utah, Wyoming. PS (Pacific States) included California, Oregon, Washington. The original
source used by the ICPR for this information on a Congressman's region was Lawrence F. Kennedy (comp.),
Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1971 (Washington, 1971), hereinafter cited as
Biographical Directory.
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Democrats constituted more than sixty percent of the party's House
membership.

City machines in certain areas, however, did give the

Democrats some strength in the Midwest and North Atlantic regions.

Of

course, the table also shows that the Republicans almost completely
failed to muster any electoral strength in the South; but they did have
strength across the rest of the country.

The electoral pattern was not

insignificant to the 65th House, since the Republicans would use the
uneven sectional support of the Democrats, particularly their reliance
on the South, as an effective propaganda tool against the Democrats.10
To overcome the Republican appeal, the Democrats would have had to
construct policies favorable to the Plains States, Midwest, and East.
The 1916 election alignments fitted into the electoral patterns
which emerged after the watershed election of 1896.

On the national

level this meant that the Wilsonian coalition, although showing some
differences from the Bryanite alliance in that it contained more urban,
labor, and liberal elements, continued the earlier reliance on the
South and West.11

Similarly, the 1916 national Republican party

evidenced few differences from the McKinley coalition.

On the con

gressional level, the 1916 election returns followed a stable pattern
relative to party competition within districts.

In perhaps as many as

thirty states no competition existed between parties.

Only in the

10For evidence of the sectional appeal see Cong. Rec., 65th Cong.,
1 Sess., Vol. 55, pt. 5, 5073; and ibid., Pt. 7, 7261. Livermore,
Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 9, 169-176, notes Republicans found
the appeal of sectionalism against the Democrats a beneficial weapon
in both the 1916 and 1918 contests. Further, Leah Marcile Taylor,
"Democratic Presidential Politics: 1918-1932," I (unpublished disser
tation, Louisiana State University, 1973), 14-17, notes the problems
and divisiveness that sectional balances had for issues and patronage
from 1916 on in the Democratic Party.
11Broesamle, "Democrats from Bryan to Wilson," 84-85, 110-12.
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Border states, a few Midwestern states, notably Indiana, Ohio, and
Illinois, and two Northeastern states, New Jersey and New York, did
real competition continue.

12

The basic alignments were firmly fixed

in 1896, and the 1916 election results showed no significant devia
tion.
The decrease of competition meant that fewer new members entered
the House.

In fact only seventy-one new members were elected to the

65th House, the fewest in twenty years.3*3

For Congressmen who had

served one or more terms, re-election in 1916 proved to be relatively
easy.

Table 2-2 presents a breakdown of an incumbent's likelihood

of return.^

It demonstrates that members with one or two terms

usually faced serious electoral opposition.

As a congressman's

tenure became longer, his re-election became progressively easier,
although it is true that constituents at times could reject long-term
incumbents.

It should also be noted that not all of the forty-two

i

defeated members were turned out of office by the opposition party.
Rejection by the party at the nominating stage reduced to thirty-five
the number of seats that actually changed hands between the two parties. 3

^2Ibid. Charles 0. Jones, "Inter-Party Competition for Congres
sional Seats," Western Political Quarterly,' XVII (September, 1964),
461-75, discusses several different time periods, noting the number
of changes in the House composition. Turnover has decreased even
more since 1932.
^Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic, X (March 31,
1917), 261-62. The number of seventy-one is at the time of election.
^ T h e table's breakdown on defeated members and their length of
service at the time of defeat was compiled from the Biographical Direc
tory. See Randall B. Ripley, Congress; Process and Policy (New York:
W. W. Norton and Co., 1975), 193-95, for a discussion on incumbent's
re-election success over the years.
•^Washington Post, November 10, 1916, 2.
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TABLE 2--2
RETURN OP MEMBERS OP THE 64th HOUSE
TO THE 65th HOUSE

Term

Returned

Retired

Defeated

1st - 2nd

181

7

25

3rd - 4th

71

10

9

5th - 6th

39

5

2

7th - 8th

30

3

4

9th - 10th

20

2

2

11th - 12th

8

2

13th and more

7

—
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The election of 1916, though a heated contest, did not produce a
significant turnover either of individuals or of parties.
Low electoral competition and high stability of tenure had
several implications for the House.

First, the knowledge of House

operations, procedures, and mores was high among the membership since
most had acquired House experience.

Second, the.membership was accus

tomed to the organized procedures of the House.

New members, on the

other hand, had less time to become disciplined to following the rules.
Consequently, they would more likely act in an unpredictable manner,
thereby disrupting House procedures.

Longer tenure can, however,

have destabilizing effects, as older members carve out their own
fiefdoms on committees, holding at arm's length the party leaders.
At the very least, their influence on policy matters increases.

Thus,

they might weaken the President's influence with Congress and might
block his legislative program.

In any event, the 1916 election

results sent to the House a membership and leadership who had secure
tenure and long experience.
In this House membership, a variety of backgrounds were en
compassed.

All members, of course, had formed their outlooks on

politics and on issues from their social, educational, and political
experiences.

If these formative experiences had been highly diverse,

instability in House operations could ensue.

Diversity, however,

could be moderated through the recruitment procedures of political

^Jones, "Inter-Party Competition," 476, evaluates the decline
in competition as meaning increased institutional stability in terms
of policy and leadership.
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parties.

The experience of members, as filtered through political

parties, affected House stability.

17

Most of the 455 Congressmen left little substantial material
regarding their personal and political backgrounds.
even lesser figures have merited biographies.
wrote autobiographical accounts of their lives.

Some leaders and

In a few cases, members
For the vast majority

tiie main source of information is the Biographical Directory of the
American Congress.

Several other sources do offer biographical infor

mation, but these were used mainly to check the Biographical Directory
and to supplement missing evidence.*-®

These sources serve as the basis

for the biographical remarks.
When representatives entered the House for their first term, a
number could look back to subsistence environments that did not suggest
future success or importance.

Instead, their families were hardly

able to provide for their own necessities, let alone furnish opportuni
ties for their off-spring to advance in life.

There were no surplus

funds to provide for an education, no personal friends to offer crucial

l^David J. Rothman, Politics and Power, The United States Senate,
1869-1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 135-36, argues
that Senators of the Guilded Age went through an apprenticeship in
which they learned to accommodate to party leadership and institu
tional process. Much of his argument is based on the similarity in
their backgrounds.
My own dissertation includes biographical data because I believe,
as Rothman argues, that one source of unity or diversity derives from
congressmen’s backgrounds. Allen and Clubb, "Progressive Reform and the
Political System," 137-39, includes a discussion of biographical charac
teristics of reformers and conservatives, though not of congressional
ones.
*-8The other main biographical sources are The National Cyclopedia
of American Biography, XVI-LIV (Clison, New Jersey: James T. White
and Co., 1917-1973); and U. S. Congress, Congressional Directory,
Congressional Document, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., January 1919.
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aid, no family name to open opportunities.

These future House members

struggled by themselves (Table 2-3).
Congressmen from these subsistence families had similar experi
ences in growing-up.

During one House debate, Otis Wingo (D-Ark)

digressed from the normal proceedings in order to remind his colleagues
of their common hardships as sons of farmers.

He recalled that as

a youth he awoke at daylight and went out barefooted to hoe sweetpotato hills all day long, "the meanest work a boy ever did, unless
it be 'suckering' tobacco."^9

Others could remember equally hard farm

eiqperiences, but some grew up in city and labor class backgrounds.
Homer Snyder (R-N.Y.), who was to become a leading manufacturer of
bicycles, had no help from laboring parents, and was compelled to
leave school after a primary education to work in a factory.

20

For

these Congressmen their earlier experiences instilled a deep desire
to acquire profitable skills enabling them to climb up into the
ranks of the successful.
A somewhat larger percentage of members (forty-eight percent)
were reared in more substantial settings.

Whether rural or urban,

skilled laborer or professional, the families of these members were
able to assist their sons.

Though incapable of providing luxury,

^ C o n g . Rec., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 56, Pt. 4, 3541.
Enrique Lopez-Mena, A Biography of Homer Synder (New York: Van
Rees Press, 1935), 2. James B. Aswell's (La.-D) parents were poor
cotton farmers who gave this future state superintendent of education
no aid toward an education. Sandra Stringer, "James B. Aswell: Edu
cation and Politician" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Louisiana State
University, 1970), 1-2. Naturally others had fathers who were sub
sistence laborers, such as Frank Greene (R-Vt.) and Kenneth Keating
(D-Col.). Finding evidence on parents' occupation and status is
difficult since the Biographical Directory provides no such in
formation .
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TABLE 2-3
HOUSE MEMBERS’ SOCIAL ORIGINS
(Percent)

Subsistence

Substantial

Elite

Members

34

48

18

Number

(34)

(48)

(18)

See Appendix A

Undetermined

(355)
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such families were prepared to supply fvmds for education.

Some of

the families earned a less tangible asset, good reputations, which
would facilitate entry into occupations.

Nevertheless success had

to be earned.
Most members from substantial backgrounds had known a father who
was hard working and who had often demanded industry from them at an
‘yy*~
early age.

Their advantage over the members from subsistence families

was not the avoidance of labor, but some assistance in their future
careers.

John Nance Garner's (D-Tex.) father was a relatively pros

perous farmer who played a leading role in a small community.

He

also worked hard on farm activities, and he made John help him with
the jobs.

21

Similarly, many others from substantial farm backgrounds

could recall long hours of doing farm chores.

Towns and cities pro

vided fewer domestic tasks, but this did not mean that jobs could
not be found.

In the case of Carter Glass (D-Va.), his father, who

wrote and edited the local newspaper, was successful only to the extent
that he could provide Carter with a primary education.

After that,

Carter had to go to work in his father's profession as a newspaper
printer.

22

Circumstances were eased and some doors were opened, but

success was still largely the result of individual initiative.
The percentage (eighteen) from elite backgrounds is signifi
cantly smaller than from subsistence and substantial ones.23

York:

2^Bascom R. Timmons, Garner of Texas, a Personal History (New
Harper, 1948), 5.
22

James E. Palmer, Jr., Carter Glass, Unreconstructed Rebel
(Roanoke: The Institute of American Biography, 1938), 16-17.
23The percentage of members from elite backgrounds is perhaps
inflated. Material as to social backgrounds was not readily available
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Of course, eighteen percent represents a greater number of affluent
families than in the total American population, which indicates that
affluence eased the pathway to the House.
social backgrounds:

Elite members had atypical

their birth into wealthy and notable families

afforded them many opportunities denied to most Americans.

The family

wealth and status of August Peabody Gardner (R-Mass.) permitted him
an education at Harvard where he studied law.

He never practiced

law, however; instead, he managed his estate.

At the same time, he

married the daughter of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, fought in the
Spanish-American War, and entered politics.24

Although those from

privileged families could not win respect from other members without
a display of abilities, their affluence gave them freedom for political
activities.
Educational backgrounds varied significantly among House mem
bers (Table 2-4).

While two congressmen received little or no formal

school training, eighty-five either went through the primary grades
or through high school.

For most, their experiences included at

least some exposure to a college and a professional curriculum (368
members).

In acquiring their educations, members attended a variety

of educational institutions.

On the lower grade levels, some went to

the classic one-room school house or the "old field schools" of the

for most congressmen. The ones for which evidence was found were
usually the more well-known leaders. It is possible that most leaders
came from elite backgrounds, while the average member more likely
sprang from subsistence or substantial backgrounds. If that was the
case, the members from elite families are over-represented by the
eighteen percent figure.
24Washington Post, January 15, 1918, 1.
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TABLE 2-4
EDUCATION OF HOUSE MEMBERS
(Percent)

Members

Number

1. No formal Education

.4

(2)

2. 1st - 8th Grades

.9

(4)

17.8

(81)

9.5

(43)

5. College with possible
professional training

30.3

(138)

6. College Graduate and
Professional training

41.1

(187)

3. High School
4. High School Graduate
and/or Reading Law

See Appendix A
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South.

One attended an Indian agency school, while others received

their education from graded city schools or private academies.
Those with more advanced education attended schools ranging from small
rural colleges such as King College (Bristol, Tennessee) to pres
tigious institutions such as Yale and Harvard.

During a period when

there was no standard procedure for the education of lawyers, their
training varied from reading law in an attorney's office to studying
in law schools.2®
The most striking fact about the members1 education was the large
percentage who at least attended college.

A full seventy percent had

enough desire to advance their training as far as college.

In a period

when few Americans went beyond the primary grades, such an interest
reflected the ambition and the tenacity of the future congressmen.
Included within this group of college students is a significant number
from subsistence families (Table 2-5).

Fully fifty percent of the

group managed to find the resources necessary for a college education.
One example was Fiorello LaGuardia (R-NY), whose musician father died
before Fiorello could attend college.
corps after high school.

He entered the diplomatic

Following a tour of duty in Europe from

1902 to 1906, he returned to New York where he translated Italian and
other languages at Ellis Island in the day and attended New York
University law school at night.
age twenty-eight.2®

He eventually was graduated at

Future congressmen from substantial backgrounds

found access to college is easier than did LaGuardia, with only

2®Source of information on education experience was the
Biographical Directory.
Biographical Directory, 1255-56.
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TABLE 2-5
EDUCATION AND SOCIAL ORIGINS
(Percent)

Substantial

1. No formal

—

—

—

—

2. 1st - 8th Grades

—

—

—

—

3. High School

41

13

—

(20)

9

10

—

(8)

5. College plus

29

35

44

(35)

6. College Graduate plus

21

42

56

(37)

4. High School plus

See Appendix A

Elite

Number

Subsistence

46

twenty-three percent deciding that college was not what they desired.
That 100 percent of the members from elite families attended college
indicates both the value that elite members placed on a college
education and the ease with which they could acquire it.

Ultimately,

social origins for most members became less important than a common
educational experience and a common achievement in accomplishing a
task.
Once a suitable education was acquired, the future congressmen
launched into their careers.

A survey of members' vocations shows

that the majority either engaged in the practice of law exclusively or
in a combination of law and some other pursuit (Table 2-6).

Sixty-one

percent were so employed, while the next most popular activity, a
combination of business, commerce, and agriculture, involved only
twenty percent.
of activities.

Under this heading were members with a wide variety
Franklin Mondell, an influential and conservative

Republican member from Wyoming, engaged in mercantile pursuits, mining,
railway construction, oil exploration, and town development.

27

No

doubt he was exceptional, but a number of members acquired versatile
backgrounds before they came to the House.

The other nineteen percent

of the House membership earned their incomes in the professions such
as medicine (1.1 percent), finance-banking (two percent), commerce and
trade (7.3 percent), manufacturing (2.6 percent), industrial labor
(four percent), and agriculture (0.7 percent).

The last figure is

surprisingly low, particularly when it is realized that roughly forty
percent of the total population in 1916 still engaged in agriculture.
The percentage does, in fact, underestimate the members involved in

27Ibid., 1424.
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TABLE 2-6
OCCUPATIONS
(Percent)

Occupation

Lawyers

Members

Numbers

50

(231)

Other Professions

1.1

(5)

Finance-Banking

2

(9)

Commerce-Trade

7.3

(33)

Industry

2.6

(12)

.7

(3)

Agriculture
4

(18)

Law and Other

11

(50)

Multiple Activities

20

(94)

Laborer

See Appendix A
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agriculture, since the proper figure is obscured by agriculture's
integration into multiple occupations.

When this is taken into account,

the total number of agriculturalists increases to 5.6 percent.

Even

with the larger figure, it is quite clear that agriculturalists were
underrepresented by the House membership.

On the other hand, the

legal profession was overrepresented in comparison to the total
population.

This high percent of lawyers increased uniformity of

experiences and added respect for legal and organized procedures.
Before election to the House, most members had won election to
city, county, or state positions.

A number of House members, all of

whom were lawyers, had been prosecuting attorneys (Tables 2-7 & 8).
With numerous opportunities for capturing the public eye, the position
of prosecuting attorney proved attractive to many ambitious lawyers.
Lawyers continued to be influential in other political offices, but
the other occupations now fully participated in the holding of poli
tical offices.

Through election to local positions such as a city

councilman and city mayor, businessmen, agriculturalists, and even
laborers could find opportunities for political experience.

If the

door to Congress did not open after a stint in local government, the
aspiring politician could seek office at the state level.

In fact,

many House members from all occupations had served in both local and
state level political positions.

A small number of lawyers (ten

altogether) held positions of prosecuting attorney, county or city
official, and state representative before moving on to Congress.28
More commonplace was the experience of real estate operator William
F. James (R-Mich.), who entered city government in Detroit, became

28Ibid., 1859
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TABLE 2-7
POLITICAL EXPERIENCE
(Percent)

Political Position

Yes

Prosecuting Attorney

15

(72)

84

(383)

Local Government

30

(.138)

69

(317)

State Government

49

(226)

50

(229)

99.1

(451)

52

(238)

Governor

Nuiribers

0.9

(4)
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Party Official

217

No

Nuiribers

See Appendix A

TABLE 2-8
OCCUPATIONS AND POLITICAL EXPERIENCE
(Percentage)

Occupations

Prosecuting
Attorney

Local
Government

State
Government

Party
Official

35

55

50

Professions

20

20

20

Finance-Banking

33

77

44

Commerce-Trade

21

45

45

Industry

25

33

58

Agriculture

33

66

66

Laborer

38

33

44

34

48

50

19

42

41

Lawyers

Law and Other
Multiple Activities

24

20

mayor, and then won election to the state senate.^®

An honor won by

very few, regardless of occupation, was election as governor of a
state.

Only four members of the 1916 House had served terms as
i

governors before going to Washington.

Many members from most occu

pations acquired training from tenure on a party committee or from
election as a delegate to a national convention.

An interesting occu

pational exception is the professions other than law, where four of
the five professionals had acquired no party experience before their
House election.

The small number preconcludes definite remarks, but

it is possible that the. four professionals who failed to hold party
positions viewed politics not as a career but as a means to enact
various policies.

Congressmen from the other occupations, as indica

ted by the large number (forty-seven percent), who served in party
posts, considered politics a profession and election to the House as
the apex of a career.
The degree of professionalism of the House membership is also
reflected in the extent of their political experience (Table 2-9).
Before election to the House, very few members (2.6 percent) had
received extensive training in politics.

They could not, as did

Andrew Montague (D-Va.), claim election to the top state positions as
governor and attorney general, appointment to diplomatic conferences,
and selection to national party conventions.

A greater number (28.8

percent) could claim an average amount of party experience at the state
or local level.

For example, Irvine Lenroot (F.-Wis.) spent six years

in the State House of Representatives, serving in four of those as
speaker of the House.

29 Ibid., 1182.
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TABLE 2-9
EXTENT OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCE
(Percent)

Considerable

Average

Moderate

Little or None

Members

2.6

28.8

' 45.5

23.1

Number

(12)

(131)

(207)

(105)
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The majority of the 1916 group came to the House with a moderate
amount of political experience (forty-five percent).

Data from the

Biographical Directory undoubtedly minimize the experience of a
congressman.

For example, Jeff McLemore (D-Tex.) published a newspaper

and served in the State House of Representatives for four years while
at the same time serving on the Austin city council.

He also held the

post of State Democratic Secretary for several years.
he was counted as having only moderate experience.

Nonetheless,

Some representa

tives (twenty-three percent) did, in fact, come to Congress with little
experience.

A good example of such members is William Kettner (D-Cal.),

who had won only a one-year term on the city council of Visulia before
on

he ran successfully for a House seat in 1912. w

Most representatives,

however, by the time they arrived in Washington had served relatively
long apprenticeships in politics.

Invariably, they came to the House

not as amateurs or dilettantes but as professionals.

Their experience

had equipped them to succeed in a legislative system.
Diverse backgrounds need not cause disruption in Congress,
I
especially when variety functions to increase skills necessary for
tasks facing the institution.

Other structural forces also operated

to prevent institutional instability.

The House membership revealed

a clear demarcation between the representatives with status and the
newer, less important members.

Although such a situation would

apparently foment disruptive rivalry, it instead generated deference
toward seniors by juniors as the latter hoped to inherit the power
of the former.

30Ibid., 1425-26; 1283; 1388; and 1230.
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When freshmen Congressman— the first Congresswoman— Jeanette
Rankin claimed her seat, sh“ told the press that she did not intend
soon to engage the attention of the House by long speeches or to
participate in the give-and-take of debates.

Rather, she deemed it

advisable as a new member to begin slowly, allowing herself time to
develop opinions and a grasp of House operations.31

Most other new

members apparently followed this reasoning with the notable exception
of Fiorello LaGuardia (R-N.Y.).

This future mayor of New York City

entered the House in 1917 after narrowly winning election in a normally
I
safe Democratic district. In such a circumstance, he was forced to
compile an impressive record quickly.

Besides, as he wrote in his

autobiography, he could see no reason why he should not participate
in House debates.

Soon taking part in debates, he also even offered

amendments to bills.

Republican party leaders might have been more

accommodating to him because of his immigrant background and his close
district.

LaGuardia, in any event, was not a typical low status

freshman representative.

32

With 435 members in the House, unrestricted debate on a given
bill was impossible.

For example, a special rule restricted debate on

31Washington Post, April 2, 1917, 2.
32LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 132, 133, 134; and Howard
Zinn, LaGuardia in Congress (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958),
13, 15. Leaders did seem to allow LaGuardia a great deal of leeway;
at least he took advantage of any openings to become involved. The same
is also true of Miss Rankin. She did not participate much in debate,
but leaders gave her special recognition. For example, when the House
established a special committee to hear bills on women's suffrage,
Rankin campaigned for the Republican nomination for chairman. She lost
only because a strong anti-suffragist and party leader in the Republican
caucus, Joseph Walsh (Mass.) demanded that seniority be followed. See
New York Times, December 13, 1917, 9.
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the Women's Suffrage Amendment to an afternoon, preventing such a
senior member as Henry Cooper (Wis.), the ranking Republican member
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, frbm receiving time to speak.

33

Congressmen often sought to circumvent the time restrictions by asking
for unanimous consent to extend their remarks in the Record.

However,

leaders at times would prevent younger members from abusing this
privilege by objecting to their extension of remarks.34
Some statistical evidence demonstrates that freshmen did not
speak very often on the House floor as compared to the veteran member
and party leaders (Table 2-10).

35

The Congressional Record list

all occasions- on which a member spoke on the House floor.

By counting

the number of times a member addressed the House and then placing the
number on a scale from the most (code 1) to the least (code 4), the
speaking habits of a member can be compared with those of other mem
bers.

Random selections of freshmen members, of party leaders and

finally of all members irrespective of their positions were made.
An average for each classification of legislator was computed, thereby

Henry Allen Cooper to Miss Mattie French, October 22, 1918,
Archives of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Cooper Papers.
34Representative Joseph Walsh (R-Mass.) had a reputation as one
who objected to extension of remarks. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol.
56, 2 Sess., Pt. 8, 747.
33The statistics for the table were compiled from the indexes
of the Congressional Record. The method was to select every fifth
freshman member and every fifth average member. Every party leader
was included in the survey. Who the leaders are is explained on
page 65a and 74. Moreover, only two of the three sessions were sur
veyed, the first and third. Of course, random selections are not as
good as a complete survey, but time would not permit more than a
sampling. The codes and the numbers under the code are arbitrary.
They do appear to produce meaningful results, ones that allow com
parison between members.
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TABLE 2-10
FREQUENCY OF SPEAKING ON
THE HOUSE FLOOR

Frequent
(100 or More)

Code 1
Randon Selection
of Leaders
Random Selection
of all Members
Random Selection
of Freshmen

Moderate
(50 to 90)

Little
(20 to 49)

Code 2

Code 3

Hardly at All
(0 to 19)

Code 4

1.86

3.10

3.86

f

I
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allowing comparison between groups.
men were more seen than heard.

The results indicate that fresh

Unfamiliarity with House rules and

desire for more experience restrained the freshman's verbosity.

On

the other hand, figures show that the leaders spoke frequently, an
average of 1.86 with 1 the most and 4 the least.

The average for all

the House membership was greater than the freshmen average, 3.10 as
compared to 3.86.

Prom the speaking patterns of the House, it can

be seen that men of experience and position dominated debates, with
the average freshman and even the average member only occasionally
joining the discussion.

36

Besides maintaining a low profile in speaking, freshmen did not
propose new pieces of legislation (Table 2-11).

This may have been

because they were not confident that their measures would gain a
hearing.

In any event, first term members introduced fewer bills and

resolutions into the House and offered fewer motions during debates
them other members.3^
time introducing bills.
bills.

Apparently, the leaders did not spend their
Instead they concentrated on passing a few

The average member introduced more bills than did those in

3®This conclusion must be taken with the qualification that since
there were only a few leaders (thirty-seven), compared to ninety-two
freshmen and 336 other members, floor debates saw much more of the
average than is inplied by the remarks. The point is made in terms
of proportions. There is a significant difference between a member
who speaks at least one hundred times and one who speaks less than
twenty times.
3^On the bills introduced and motions offered, the same basic
techniques of selection were followed as on speaking practices.
Military pension bills were not counted. Since Congressmen often
introduced many such bills for individual veterans and their widows,
it was not deemed a sign of activity on the part of a Congressman but
only the expected thing to do. Pension legislation, therefore, was
not counted in computing the averages.
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TABLE 2-11
FREQUENCY OF INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND
OF MOTIONS OFFERED
(Nuiribers)

Frequent
(30 or More)

Moderate
(20 to 29)

Little
(10 to 19)

Hardly at All
(0 to 9)

Code 1

Code 2

Code 3

Code 4

Random Selection of
Average Members
Random Selection
of Leaders
Random Selection
of Freshmen

2.7

3.1

3.7

58

the other classifications/ probably because he had developed legisla
tive experience in the passage of bills.

On the other hand, he had

not yet come into positions of authority which would direct his
attention toward floor debates and more significant pieces of legis
lation.

The data on the introduction of bills only indicates again

the significance of experience and tenure in House operations.
To understand the differences between members with varying
lengths of tenure and different levels of status, it is necessary to
examine also the committees on which members served.

Here most clearly

the principle of seniority became manifest, since seniority in House
membership usually resulted in the better committee assignments.

In

the eight most important committees of the House, only eight positions
-

were filled by first term members.

30

No freshmen were appointed to

- Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules, usually considered the three
most weighty assignments.

As the importance of a committee decreased,

more freshmen would appear on the committee's roster.
found their way onto the second-rank committees,

39

Thirty-five

but freshmen, such

as Alvan Fuller (Prog.-Mass.), in most cases found themselves relegated

^®The eight most important committees were: Appropriations,
Banking and Currency, Rules, Ways and Means, Judiciary, Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, Military Affairs, and Naval Affairs. The
selection is arbitrary, but it is based on the amount of business
they conducted on the House floor. The information was collected
from the Congressional Directory, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 1919, p. 195-204;
U. S. Congress, Congressional Directory, 64 Cong., 2 Sess., 183-92.
At the same time the eight freshmen found their way to these prestigious
committees, fifty members with longer tenure were appointed. The im
balance is another indication of importance of experience on assign
ments .
*3Q

The second rank committees were: Agriculture, District of
Columbia, Post Office, Rivers and Harbors, Immigration and Naturali
zation, Indian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Labor.
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to such third rank committees as Expenditures of the Interior Depart
ment.

What made Puller notable was not his lowly niche, but the fact

that he protested his assignment.

In his protest, Fuller wrote Speaker

Clark a tart letter on the worthlessness of the committee.

Fuller's

revolt, instead of gaining him a better seat, caused several older
members to dress him down on the House floor.^0

His humiliation

served as an abject lesson for others aspiring to advance more swiftly
than the system would tolerate.
Seemingly, such a situation would result in conflict between the
generations.

No revolt arose, because freshmen accepted their insig

nificant role in House operations, believing that they had to secure
a firm understanding in House ways first.
advantages of the different rankings:

Freshmen also saw the

they envisioned that they

would eventually gain some of its benefits.

If they did not personally

profit, the low status member could at least see possible benefits
to his region and party from seniority.41

For these reasons low
7

status members did not attempt to disrupt House activities.

Their

exclusion from leading roles on the floor and in the committee rooms
functioned to increase the influence of experienced members.
The diverse background, experience, and status of House members
flowed into the parties.

A common populist image of the early twen

tieth century pictured the Republican party as the party of business

40cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 56, Pt. 3, 2738-43.
Washington Post, February 26, 2. Ibid., February 28, 6.
^ C . William Ramseyer (R-Iowa) to Grimes, January 19, 1919, C.
WilliamRamseyer Papers, University of Iowa Archives, was a second
term congressman, who saw the Midwest as gaining much from seniority
in the next Congress. See Randall B. Ripley, Congress in Process
and Policy,63-65, on seniority and apprenticeship.
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and wealth.

If this image is correct for the World War I period,

the Republican ranks should include many members from elite back
grounds.

Furthermore, the party's membership should count among

its number more industrialists, businessmen, and financiers than
lawyers.

Finally, the populist view would imply that these elite

members would have temporarily abandoned their enterprises for a
short tour in Congress in order to protect their profits.

The

Democrats, on the other hand, ought to include more members from
modest, even deprived beginnings, more lawyers and agrarians, with
longer careers in politics than the average Republican.

In short,

the membership of the two parties was supposedly drawn from contrasting
milieus, thereby reflecting the clas.s conflicts in American society.
Actually, this popular image bears only a small resemblance to
the reality.

The popular view of Republicans as business men would

argue two possibly contradictory theses.

Either the Republican ought

to come from subsistence families (as in the tradition of Horatio
Alger) or from elite families.

Though the sample is only partial,

statistics do not indicate either possibility (Table 2-12).

Instead,

both parties recruited their cadres from all social classes on the same
percentage scale.

In one sense the popular view does have some vali

dity because the classifications do hide some family differences worth .
noting.

The Democratic elite members included at least three Vir

ginians from families of the old Southern planter aristocracy:
Kitchin, Andrew Montague, and Walter Watson.
member had similar planter connections.

Claude

No Republican elite

Likewise, Democratic and

Republican subsistence families probably varied, with more Democrats
from poor tenant farm families, and more Republicans from poor
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TABLE 2-12
SOCIAL STATUS AND PARTY
(Percent)

PARTY
Republicans

Democrats

Elite

19

18 '

Substantial

47

48

Subsistence

34

34

(58)

(42)

Origin

Number
Number Unknown

(355)
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itinerant peddler parentage.42

Yet, the similar percentages do

demonstrate that, as organizations seeking to win elections, political
parties endeavored to recruit men who would perform well for the
organization, not necessarily ones from certain class origins.
Educationally, more differences between the parties are to be
found, but similarities still predominate (Table 2-13).

The Republi

cans selected more of their members with only high school education
(twenty-two percent against twelve percent of the Democrats).

Fewer

Republicans, consequently, attended college or pursued post-graduate
professional training, but the variation is not as great as in the
lower grades (thirty-seven percent of the Republicans and forty-five
percent of the Democrats).

As an explanation for the variance in

education, the Democrats inclined more toward occupations that were
more likely to require a college education (law) than Republicans,
who displayed more preference for diversified activities (Table 2-14).
To a degree, the divergence also comes from a geographical influence.
In comparison to other regions, the Southern and Border States,
which provided the Democrats with a large portion of their members,
sent delegations consisting mostly of lawyers (Table 2-15),43 Though

42The data in Table 2-12 and in the following tables on party and
member backgrounds was compiled from Biographical Directory. For
information on the family backgrounds of Kitchen, Montague, and Watson,
see Alex M. Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1937), 4; William E. Laren, Montague of Virginia
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965, 4-6; and Walter
Watson, Nine Notes on Southside Virginia (Richmond: State Library,
1925), 264. The comments on subsistence families were not drawn
from any particular source. Rather, they were based on the occu
pational characteristics of the North and South.
43The Southern and Border states did send significantly more law
yers than some regions, though some others are relatively similar. Also,
the Republican's and Democrat's variance on lawyers is not as noticeable
in some regions, particularly in the East North Central Region.
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TABLE 2-13

•

EDUCATION AND PARTY
(Percent)

PARTY
Education

Republicans

Democrats

None

0.9

—

First - Eighth

0.9

0.9

22

12

8

10

College Plus

29

34

College - Graduate

37

45

High School
High School Plus

Number

(223)

(226)
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TABLE 2-14
MAIN OCCUPATION AND PARTY
(Percent)

PARTY
Occupation

Lawyer

Republicans

31

Democrats

62

Professions

0.9

1.3

Finance-Banking

2.2

1.8

Commerce-Trade

6.7

7.5

Industry

4.5

0.9

Agriculture

0.4

0.9

Laborer

4.9

3.1

Law-Other

12.6

8.8

Multiple Activities

28.7

13.3
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TABLE 2-15
MAIN OCCUPATION, PARTY AND REGION
(Percent)

Occupation

NE

Lawyer

28

Professions

—

MA

21
1.6

REPUBLICAN (Region Party)
ENC
WNC
SS
BS

54

59

50

—

31

—

—

—

Finance-Banking

3.6

Commerce-Trade

7.1

9.4

4.7

Industry

3.6

6.5

4.7

3.1

6.3
—

MS

23

33

33

7.7

—

—

—

7.7

—

—

—

7.7

—

25

7.7

—

Agriculture
Laborer

PS

8.3
—
8.3

7.1

6.3

3.1

Law-Other

14

10

14

Multiple Activities

35

43

15

NE

MA

Lawyer

50

40

Professions

—

—

—

—

9.3
21

25
—

3.4

22

23

75

—

Finance-Banking
26

7.7

DEMOCRAT (Region Party)
ENC
SS
WNC
BS

51

—

15

63

8.7

16

16

50

25

MS

PS

50

80

1.0

2.8

—

—

2.9

2.8

—

—

12.5

—

2.8

—

—

2.8

12

—

13

22

1.0

—

—

1.0

—

Commerce-Trade

16

Industry

—

3.3

Agriculture

—

3.3

Laborer

16

3.3

Law-Other

—

10

10

—

8.7

13

—

—

Multiple Activities

16

13

13

44

9.7

11

25

20

6.9

11

—
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differences existed on education between the parties, more notable
was the similarity.
Occupationally, the variance between parties becomes significant.
The Democrats, who came more from the rural Southern states, sent to
Congress a high percentage of small-town lawyers.

The Republicans,

coming more from the industrial areas, nominated more businessoriented elements.

This is clearly seen in the category of multiple

occupations (Table 2-14), with the Republicans having twice as many
so engaged as the Democrats (twenty-eight percent of the Republicans
to thirteen percent of the Democrats).
contained an element of truth.

The popular view of the parties

Even so, more than fifty percent of

the Republicans had law-related backgrounds.

By 1917 the political

parties were seeking out men with similar occupational attainments,
probably because the parties agreed that a certain type of man was
better disciplined to the organized practices of the parties and of
the House.
Politically, the types of political experience and the extent
of political experience again emphasizes the similarity between party
member backgrounds.

Interestingly enough, the higher percent of

lawyers in the Democratic ranks did not result in proportionally a
higher ratio for Democrats in comparison to Republicans as prosecuting
attorneys (Table 2-16).

There was a leveling of differences, because

only fifty-eight percent of the Democratic lawyers became prosecuting
attorneys when seventy-one percent would have equaled their proportion
to all Democrats.

A variation is found in the larger number of Demo

crats elected to local government positions, but experience in the
state posts and in party positions again was similar.

The Republicans
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TABLE 2-16
POLITICAL EXPERIENCE AND PARTY
(Percentage)

PARTY
Political Experience

Republicans

Democrats

Prosecuting Attorney

13

18.6

Local Government

21

39

State Government

45

54

Party Official

43

53

(223)

(226)

Number
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did tend to have fewer of their numbers in these positions, but the
difference is not significant.
The GOP encompassed a larger percentage with little or no
political experience (twenty-nine percent versus the sixteen percent
of the Democrats, Table 2-17).

Offsetting this was a higher percent

of Democrats who had moderate prior exposure to politics in comparison
to Republicans (fifty-one percent of Democrats versus forty percent of
the Republicans). As a result both parties had nearly equal percen
tages in the lower two categories, sixty-nine percent of the Republi
cans in comparison to sixty-seven percent of the Democrats.

The

popular view of Republicans as businessmen who took time out of a
career for politics may be true.
did exactly the same thing.

However, an equal number of Democrats

In the higher categories, approximately

equal numbers of both parties had received extensive tours in politics
(thirty-three percent of the Democrats and thirty percent of the
Republicans).

As to prior political experience, the popular image has

little validity.

Neither party had its ranks filled with political

novices, but sent to Congress cadres with at least moderate levels
of political training.
Statistics on the length of service in the House also showed
that both parties were equally determined to retain members for long
careers in the House (Table 2-18).

In the early days of the Republic,

the esteem with which members held their positions was evidently low.
Rather than serving for long periods, they declined re-election or
they often simply resigned from the Congress to which they won election
in order to take up a state post.44

By the 65th House, attitudes

44This remark is not based on any statistical evidence but

69

TABLE 2-17
EXTENT OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCE
AND PARTY
(Percentage)

PARTY
Experience

Considerable

Democrats

Republicans

2.2

3.1

Average

28

29

Moderate

40

51

Little or None

29

16

TABLE 2-18
LENGTH OF SERVICE IN THE
HOUSE AND PARTY
(Percentage)

PARTY
Length of Service

Republicans

Democrats

1st Term

22

18

2— 3

44

35

4— 5

12

19

6— 7

5.8

8— 9

5.8

7.5

10— 11

4.0.

4.9

12— 13

3.1

0.4

14-

0.9

2.2

11
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toward holding a seat had changed, and lengths of service had in
creased as more Democrats and Republicans saw the value of longer
service.

Those with the longest periods of tenure (eight to fourteen

terms or longer) come almost equally from the two parties.

In the

range from four to eight terms, a difference between the parties
becomes noticeable as the Democrats retained more members than did
the Republicans.

A possible explanation for this is that the Re

publicans’setback of 1912 cost many Republicans their seats, including
such party stalwarts as Uncle Joe Cannon, William B. McKinley (111.)
and Nicholas Longworth (Ohio).

These men were able to regain their

seats in 1914, but most who lost in 1912 found themselves permanently
ousted from the House.

In any event, the variation of tenure afforded

neither party an advantage.

Both parties were equally committed to

developing well-trailved members who were accustomed to the demands of
House and party organization.
While the backgrounds of congressmen often transcended party
lines, other structural features of the House revealed the influence
of partisan divisions.

Traditionally, the voting behavior of the House

has been studied along party lines with the implication that political
affiliation is the chief determinant of voting patterns.

The utili

zation of quantitative methods has not altered this emphasis on the
party.

Robert P. Swierenga, in a review of the quantitative litera

ture on legislative voting behavior, concludes that political parties
are the main influence on voting behavior.^

Explaining the

simply from a perusal of the Biographical Directory.
^Robert P. Swierenga, "Computers and American History: The
Inpact of the 'New' Generation," Journal of American History, LX
(March, 1974), 1053.
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institutional behavior of the House exclusively in terms of political
party has limitations.

Yet, the role of party in the roll call voting

of the House cannot be denied.

,

In assessing party voting in the 65th House, I have used several
basic devices.

Although these devices do not involve complex statis

tical computations, some explanation of them is desirable.

The first

statistical device seeks to determine the frequency with which one
party voted against the other.

This is done by arbitrarily estab

lishing some percentage level for what is called a "partisan vote."
Such a vote occurs when at least a majority of a party votes yes and
at least a majority of the second party votes no.

Over the years,

researchers have set different criteria regarding what constitutes
the proper percentage for a partisan roll call vote in a particular
Congress.

In order to compare the 65th House with the findings on

these other Congresses, the percentage level for calculating a par
tisan vote has been established at two different ranks, ninety versus
ninety percent, and fifty versus fifty percent.

All the roll call

votes of the 65th House were reviewed to determine the degree of par
tisanship in the vote.

Once this was found, the percentage of roll

calls that fell into each category was determined.4®

46Lawrence Lowell was the first political scientist to estab
lish a percentage for partisan opposition. He set the percentage
at ninety versus ninety percent. Most writers believe this is too
rigorous for American parties and, instead, use the much lower
fifty percent versus fifty percent as the definition for party
voting. Unless otherwise noted, when this study refers to a party
vote, it is referring to the fifty percent versus fifty percent
convention. See W. Wayne Shannon, Party, Constituency and Con
gressional Voting,(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1968), 3-5, 10-11.
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A second device utilized to assess party voting patterns finds
party cohesion within individual parties on House roll calls.

The

particular cohesion device here employed was originally developed by
Stuart Rice, and it simply shows the difference in percentage terms
between the number of members of a party who voted "yea" on a par
ticular vote and those in the party who voted "nay."

When interpre

tating the Rice Index, the score of the two parties should not be
inferred as implying that the two parties voted against each other.

In

fact, it is possible that both parties voted together since the Index
only measures unity within one party.4^

Another statistical tool

finds the percentage of party members voting with the party majority
on a roll call.

Once a percentage is found for all roll calls, an

overall average percentage of votes with the party is calculated.

The

purpose of the device is the same as the Rice Index, to determine
cohesion within a party.

A fourth device used in assessing the voting

of parties involves tabulation of the times that party leaders voted
with the majority of their party.

By this device, a cumulative

"party loyalty score" was calculated for the party leaders of the
65th House.48
In evaluating the results obtained from these devices, a certain
factor must be considered.

Since the war brought before the House a

47See Anderson, et al., Legislative Roll Call Analysis, 32-35,
for a discussion of the Rice Index. The Rice Score can vary from
zero to one-hundred.
48

The last two measures of party unity were suggested by Clubb
and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years," 567-69. The
percentage was included because Clubb and Allen calculated it for
several Congresses, not because it added anything to the finding of
the Rice Index.
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large number of war measures, the voting on a roll call was often
.
49
unanimous or nearly so.

All Houses have a certain number of votes

that are unanimous, since some votes are simply procedural, or the
issues are not very divisive.

However, it seems that war measures

increased the number of indivisive ballots.

The truth of this point

is evident when a comparison of the three sessions of the House, the
first two in wartime, the last after the war, is made as to the
numbers of unanimous roll calls (Table 2-19).

The first and second

sessions have similar percentages of about thirty but the last session
drops to nineteen percent.

Throughout the first two sessions the

Administration presented measures as necessary for the war effort,
and though Republicans may not have liked them, they voted for them
nonetheless.

With the return of peace, Republicans dropped their

support of Administration proposals and unanimous voting declined.
In short, war-induced patriotism increased the number of unanimous
roll calls in the first two sessions.

When peace returned, patriotism

wanned and unanimous voting fell significantly.
Obviously, these devices permit only limited analysis.

Still,

they do allow comparison with other Congresses that political scientists
have already studied, thereby allowing classification of the 65th
House as to the degree of its unity within parties and conflict be
tween parties.

From the classification of party leaders' loyalty,

some comments on their role in unifying or disrupting the party can
be made.

Also, by making a classification of general legislative

49A unanimous vote is defined as occurring when less than one
out of twelve voted against the majority. The ratio of twelve to
one is a recognized statistical convention in determining unani
mity.
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TABLE 2-19.
UNANIMOUS ROLL CALLS

1st Sess.

Percentage of
Unanimous
Roll Calls

2nd Sess.

3rd Sess.

Total

29%

31%

19%

26.6%

Number of
Unanimous
Roll Calls

(14)

(45)

(12)

(71)

Number of
Roll Calls

48*

(146)

(63)

(266)

*The number of roll calls includes all ballots after the
organizing ballots. The first nine ballots of the first session were
votes organizing the House and were, therefore, partisan votes.
These "unrepresentative" organizing votes were deleted from the
statistics. With them included the percentage of unanimous votes
drops to twenty-four percent.
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issues and by ascertaining the Rice Index cohesion scores of parties,
it will be possible to identify issues that tended to jeopardize
party unity.
The first device-one measuring the number of times that a
majority of Democrats voted in opposition to a majority of Republicans
— shows the "party votes" in comparison to such votes in other Houses
(Table 2-20).

Given the general call for unity in wartime, the

number of partisan votes should decline.

On the fifty versus fifty

level of party voting, the 65th House recorded fewer partisan votes
(forty-seven percent) than any other Congress.

Only the first Cleve

land Congress (54th), when Congress experienced confusion from depres
sion, free silver, and populism, and the first Kennedy Congress (87th),
evidenced nearly as low an incidence of party votes.

Most of the

other Congresses were significantly higher in party voting, though
the turmoil of the last Taft Congress (62nd) produced a vote more
comparable to that of the 65th.

On the level of the much more

rigorous standard of ninety versus ninety, partisan voting in the 65th
is still the lowest, with only ten percent of its roll calls dividing
along party lines.
the 65th:

Two Congresses, however, are very comparable with

the third Roosevelt Congress of 1937 (twelve percent) and

the Roosevelt War House of 1943 (eleven percent). At the other end
of the spectrum are the McKinley House (fifty-one percent) and the
Harding House (twenty-nine percent) both of which show a significant
variation from the Wilson House.

By any standard of comparison, there

was a severe decline in partisan voting in the War House of 1917-18.
One might view the low partisan vote by the war time House as
a reflection of "discord" that a party was sinply unable to agree

76

TABLE 2-20
PARTY OPPOSITION VOTES
(Percent)

Percentage of
Roll Calls Which
Are Party Votes

65

90 Percent of
Democrats Versus
90 Percent of
Republicans

10.9

50 Percent of
Democrats Versus
50 Percent of
Republicans

47

54

53

Congresses*
55 61 62 63

67

51

29

76

79

60

75

70

87

1st
Session
75

2nd
Session
78

12

11

52

♦Congress includes the Senate. All the percentages of the fifty
versus fifty level except the 65th come from Senate voting records.
The results do not exactly compare, though there is no reason to
suppose a great variation in the House in relation to the Senate.
This level does not refer to the combined House and Senate, but to
the House alone for the 65th Congress and the Senate alone for the
other Congresses. The ninety versus ninety percentages are all on
the House and do not include the Senate. The computations at the
ninety and fifty percent levels for the 65th House were compiled for
this study. The statistics at the ninety percent level were drawn
from W. Wayne Shannon, Party, Constituency, and Congressional Voting;
A Study of Legislative Behavior in the United States House of Repre
sentatives (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968),
5-10. The other figures at the fifty percent level were drawn from
Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years," 571.
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on a position and, hence, rarely voted as a united bloc.

This

appears to be a sound interpretation of the last Cleveland Congress
(1895-1897) and the last Taft Congress (1 9 1 1 - 1 9 1 3 ),50 t»ut its appli
cation to the 65th House is inaccurate.

Partisanship declined due

to greater unity of the parties, as both agreed in large measure to
the war program.
each other.

They were not voting against each other but with

Evidence for this fact is found in the high percentage

of unanimous voting and also in the high cohesion rate for each party
as recorded by the Rice Cohesion index and by the high average per
centage of votes within each party.

Despite the partisan voting that

did occur, and whatever the degree of partisanship carried on covertly,
the House during the war period was not rent by partisan conflict
over roll calls.
Comparison with the voting records of other Congresses indicates
the high internal party cohesion in the 65th House (Table 2-21).
During the first McKinley Congress and the first Harding Congress
Republicans showed higher cohesion.

For the other Congresses they

were less united, particularly during the other Congresses of the
Progressive Era.

In comparison to the Republicans, the Democrats

were slightly more unified in the 65th House.

Compared with Democrats

of other Congresses, they were very cohesive.

Only during the first

Taft Congress, when the Democrats were diligently striving to capi
talize on Republican disunity, had they evidenced higher unity.

The

degree of Democratic cohesion is impressive particularly in comparison
to the last Cleveland Congress (54th) and the first Kennedy Congress.
(87th)

50Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years, 571-73."
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TABLE 2-21
AVERAGE PARTY UNITY SCORES

Congresses*
61
63

67

87

78

70

71

57

85%

91%

86%

85%

78%

57

80

64

62

71

62

79%

88%

83%

83%

84%

83%

65

54

55

Average Cohesion
Score

73

51

71

Average Percentage
of Votes With Party

86%

76%

Average Cohesion
Score

67

Average Percentage
of Votes With Party

83%

Democrats

Republicans

*The Table consists of the 65th House with all the other statis
tics based on Senate roll call voting. The cohesion figures for the
65th House were compiled for this study. All the other statistics
were compiled by Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive
Years," 571. The interpretation of the statistics for those Congresses
comes from Clubb and Allen.
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Seemingly, the spirit of wartime helped to increase Republican
unity and to maintain the high unity of the Democrats, while at the
same time it tempered normal party differences.

In the face of war,

the House became as one, more than it ever had before.

The Democrats

were more successful than were Republicans in organizing party cohesion
in the face of the war emergency, but this was to be expected.

After

all, the Administration was in the hands of the Democrats, and
the natural tendency would be for the Democrats to support their
Administration.
pressures.

In contrast, the Republicans faced conflicting

In normal times, the dictates of partisanship and the

desire to regain control of the government would have helped unite
the Republicans against the Democrats.

However, since the times

were in no sense usual, the Republicans could not afford to oppose
the Administration's war measures.

If all Republicans had turned to

support of the Administration's war measures, their cohesion average
would have undoubtedly been higher.

On various roll calls, however,

some Republicans could not endorse all measures suggested by the
Administration.

On other roll calls, some Republicans found it im

possible to support a partisan Republican vote on a war measure be
cause they reasoned that the measure truly was needed for the war
effort.

In either event, Republicans' cohesion was lowered in

comparison to the Democrats'.
Besides determining the average cohesion score on all roll calls,
this study also computed an average cohesion score on individual
issues.

In order to ascertain this score, roll calls were arranged

into sixteen categories in terms of the general issues to which they
were relevant (Table 2-22).

Then, the cohesion score was calculated
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TABLE 2-22
AVERAGE PARTY COHESION ON SELECTED ISSUES

REPUBLICAN
Average
Average Percentage
of Votes
Cohesion
Score
With Party

DEMOCRAT
Average
Average Percentage
Cohesion
of Votes
Score
With Party

Number of
Roll Calls

War Contracts

55

77%

61

80%

. 4

Prohibition

68

84%

52

75%

5

Postal Services

61

81%

69

85%

5

Revenue

40

70%

88

94%

5

Railroad

51

75%

85

93%

3

Women's
Suffrage

65

82%

10

54%

6

Conservation

40

70%

77

85%

11

Rivers and
Harbors

37

69%

65

79%

13

Draft Votes

49

74%

49

74%

11

Veterans

58

79%

71

95%

5

Labor

61

80%

53

77%

14

Farm

47

74%

54

78%

17

Progressive

56

81%

63

84%

75

War

64

82%

72

87%

92

Economic

57

77%

54

77%

57

European Relief

35

67%

84

92%

2

Note. Determining which roll calls go into each issue category
was done through evaluation of debates on the roll calls. Some roll
calls may be misplaced, but the margin of error is probably small.
The Rice Cohesion Index and percentage voting with the party in this
table must be read differently from the table on average party unity
scores. The statistics in this table will show lower unity on most
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issues than the average on all roll calls for two reasons: first,
many of the unanimous votes which are included in Table 2-21 are not
included in this table, because they were on procedural votes or were
on trivial issues; second, the unanimous votes on the sixteen issues
were excluded in this table, but not in Table 2-21.
Each issue was defined so as to logically include similar roll
calls. Some roll calls fell into two or more of the issue categories.
After a definition was decided for each issue, all the 266 roll calls
of the 65th House were studied, usually by reading the debates in the
Congressional Record before the roll call. Thus, the roll call could
be determined as to which issue category it belonged. The definition
of issues and examples of roll calls that went into an issue category
are as follows: war contract were a set of roll calls over a bill to
give relief to contractors who had entered into verbal contracts
during the war. Postal service includes the Burleson-Creel censorship
and several roll calls on bills dealing with the postal service.
Revenue was defined as all roll calls on the 1917 Revenue Act. Rail
road included three roll calls over the bill for the operation of the
railroads under government control. Conservation was defined as all
measures effecting the proper use of resources or wild life or water.
Draft votes were defined as roll calls on the original conscription
law and later roll calls which modified the original bill. Labor was
defined as bills effecting the hours, wages, and conditions of govern
ment workers or of all workers. Farm included all agricultural
appropriation roll calls and other votes effecting the production of
food. Progressive includes a number of different issues but the cri
teria for inclusion was whether or not historians have labeled an
issue progressive. Some examples of the roll calls included under
progressive are: prohibition, women's suffrage, revenue, labor, the
declaration of war, conservation, aliens, draft, water power, and
civil liberties. War was defined as any roll call which would not
have occurred if there had not been the war. This includes many
issues, from direct military bills, to revenue, to farm measures.
Economic was defined as bills which involved increased government
expenditures. All war measures were excluded, and it included mostly
uninportant bills on House operations along with military pension bills.
European relief was a bill to provide food relief for Europe after
the war.

on each issue, which thereby made it possible to find the issues
that unified on divided parties.

Both parties had high cohesion on

the postal service and war legislation, and moderately high unity on
the war contract, labor, progressive, draft, farm, and economic
issues.

On the first two issues the parties demonstrated nearly as

high a cohesion as on all roll calls (See note on Table 2-22).

On the

latter six issues, the unity of the parties was nearly fifty or above,
which shows a general agreement within the parties on the issues.

In

the case of the prohibition, railroads, and veteran issues, the parties,
though united on the issues, were separated by ten or more points.
On the revenue, women's suffrage, conservation, rivers and harbors,
and European relief issues, one or the other of the parties evidenced
high disunity.

The Republicans found unity elusive on revenue,

conservation, rivers and harbors, and European relief measures.
Democrats found it similarly difficult to maintain any semblance of
unity on the Women's Suffrage Amendment, and, in fact, recorded the
lowest score for either party on an issue.

But this was clearly the

exception to the general Democratic tendency toward higher party
solidarity than the Republicans.
In their study of the Congresses during the Progressive Era,
Howard Allen and Jerome Clubb conclude that divisive issues, while
decreasing unity within parties from the high unity of the McKinley
years, did not conspicuously affect party cohesion on roll calls.51
the case of the 65th House, voting on roll calls transpired in times
demanding unity, while simultaneously placing a premium on partisan

51-Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years,"
570-75.

In
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activity as each party jockeyed to benefit from the war.

As a first

result, partisan voting on roll calls declined from earlier Wilson
Congresses, though it continued as a factor in nearly half the roll
calls.

As a second consequence, intra-party cohesion increased as

cross-party division declined.

In peace time, a party seeks high

internal unity in opposition to the other party, but this was not
the case during the 65th House.

Instead, the high degree of unity

flowed not from opposition but from agreement.

Yet, this did not

mean a real agreement on policy, since in wartime, when almost all
measures of the first two sessions were billed as war measures, even
greater unity might be expected.

Partisanship in voting continued,

but in more subtle forms.
The Republicans and Democrats organized their party activities
through similar structures, consisting of a caupaign committee, a
steering committee, a party caucas, party whips, and party leaders.
If political parties are nothing else, they are at least machines
for the election of their members.

To this end, each party organized

congressional campaign committees, staffed by a chairman and several
workers.
For the Republicans, Frank Woods (Iowa) served as chairman
until the summer of 1918 when he was pressured out of his position.
Woods had voted against the war resolution, which naturally rendered
him a questionable leader of a party that hoped to attack the Wilson
Administration for lax prosecution of the war.

Adding to his de

ficiency was his lame-duck status after his failure to gain
re-nomination in the Iowa primary of August, 1918.

Simeon
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Fess replaced him, a man whose war record could not be ques
tioned.52
On the Democratic side, Scott Ferris (Okla.) replaced Frank
Doremus (Mich.) in March, 1918, because of Doremus' poor management
of the last two congressional elections.

In their positions, Fess

and Ferris worked to raise campaign funds, develop campaign issues,
and place campaign influence in the districts where it would most
count.53
For the House, campaign chairmen and election campaigns had
their influence.

The chairmen themselves gained a measure of party

status and a higher rank in the House.

During the tenure of Woods

and Doremus, the chairmen, however, were sources of embarrassment for
the parties, decreasing their ability to develop effective campaign
issues.

This weakness was overcome with the appointments of Ferris

52

See the following on the removal of Woods: New York Times,
July 3, 1918, 8; July 7, 1918, 22; August 24, 1918, 5; August 28,
1918, 13; September 2, 1918, 5. Woods had no desire to retire, but
resigned only after being charged as pro-German by a Republican
member, and shortly before the rest of the campaign committee demanded
his resignation. See, James Robertson, "Progressives Elect Will H.
Hays Republican National Chairman, 1918," Indian Magazine of History,
LXVI (September, 1968), 185-90, for a discussion of not only the Old
Guard-Progressive split in the Republican party but also of the plans
of Hays to harmonize the party behind a strong war program and to
attack the Administration for its war program. By the time the actual
fall campaign had rolled into full form, this issue had shifted from
the war program to the Wilson peace program. Fess fitted party needs
well here also since he was a strong opponent of Wilson's League of
Nations. See John Lewis Nethers, "Simeon D. Fess: Educator and Poli
tician" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1964),
232-33, 235-40, for a discussion of Fess as canpaign chairman and of
his view on the League.
53See Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 112, 191,
206, 218, for a discussion of Ferris's elevation to chairman and
of the activities of the party chairman.
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and Fess, both of whom became assets to their respective parties.
In the case of Fess, the Republican triumph in the 1918 congressional
elections caused a short boom for him as Speaker among the newlyelected Republican freshmen.
The whole process of winning elections also colored the atmos
phere of the House, with the parties periodically taking time out of
debates on House bills to extol their own virtues and castigate their
opponent's.

55

Elections were never far distant from the considerations

of members, but other structures of the parties entered more directly
into House operations than did the campaign committees.
Each party had a mechanism by which it assigned members to com
mittee posts.

The Republicans made appointments through a Committee

on Committees, chaired by Minority Leader James Mann (111.). Apparent
ly, the Committee also had party-housekeeping and policy-suggestion
responsibilities.

These latter activities, however, were insigni-

ficant, at least as far as can be determined from the sources.

56

Operating under a different arrangement from the Republicans, the
Democrats appointed committees through the Democratic members of the
Committee on Ways and Means.

Because of the doubling of function,

Ways and Means was the most important of House committee assignments
for the Democrats, and its chairman Claude Kitchin (N.C.) served also
as majority leader.

57

S^Nethers, "Simeon D. Fess," 240.
S^See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 56, Pt. 9, 9601-06,
9656, 9856-62, for some examples of partisan speech making.
^Richard Bolling, Power in the House; A History of the Leader
ship of the House of Representatives(New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.,
1968), 100; Washington Post, February 8, 1917, 2; February 26, 1917,
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Placing party members on committees was a difficult job for
party leaders.

It nonetheless proved a useful means by which to

punish or placate the recalcitrant members, as the case demanded,
and to reward the faithful.

It was also a means by which party

leaders could adjust geographical imbalances if they so desired.5®

in

the case of the Democrats, leaders had to balance the power between
states by downgrading the committee assignments of the South and Border
states.

Table 2-23 demonstrates that Democratic party leaders con

sidered geography in making committee assignments.

Only two committees,

Judiciary and Foreign Affairs, favored the South and the Border states,
and the Judiciary imbalance can be explained by the greater percentage
of lawyers coming from these areas as compared to other regions.
For the most important committees of Ways and Means, Rules, and Appro
priations, the South and Border states were unrepresented.

Obviously,

the Democratic leadership was aware of the geographical imbalance,
with the consequence that they adopted a conscious policy of mini
mizing the Southern predominance.
reveals less design.

Republican geographical strategy

In making assignments, the members of the Com

mittee on Committees tended to over represent the Middle Atlantic and

2; June 2, 1917, 6. Newspaper accounts noted the establishment of
the Committee on Committees in February and later the selection of
a steering committee in June, but after that there is little or no
evidence of its activities.
^Bolling, Power in the House, 90.
1917, 1.

Washington Post, March 31,

88Bolling, Power in the House, 65, 92. George Goodwin, The Little
Legislators, Committees of Congress (Amherst: University of Massa
chusetts Press, 1970), 70-71. As an example of these criteria being
cited on the House floor for the selection of a new committee, see
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 56, Pt. 1, 848-50.
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TABLE 2-23
GEOGRAPHICAL BALANCE OF COMMITTEES

Republicans

Percentage
of Members

1

__________ Committees* (Percent)
2
3
4
5
6
8
9
7

10

11

12

NE

12

11

11- 11

11

11

—

22

11

11

25

22

11

MA

28

22

11

44

33

33

25

33

44

33

37

22

22

ENC

28

33

33

22

22

33

50

11

22

11

25

44

22

WNC

13

33

22

11

22

11

25

22

—

22

12

11

22

—

11

SS

1

BS

5

MS

2

—

11

PS

5

—

—

Democrats

11
11

11

Percentage
of Members

11

—

11

11

3

8

18

8

—

—

16

16

25

17

—

8

16

12

8

—

18

8

—

12

8

9

50

42

45

41

50

37

50

8

16

—

8

8

12

8

8

8

__

NE

2

MA

13

8

—

18

ENC

12

25

16

WNC

4

8

SS

45

BS

16

MS

3

PS

2

—

—

11

11

Committees* (Percent)
5
4
8
9
6
7

2

1

—

22

10

11

12

8

8
9

16

17

9

8

8

8

18

23

—
—

—

9

8

54

50

58

36

46

18

25

16

27

7

8
9

*Committees: 1 = Argiculture; 2 = Appropriations; 3 = Banking and
Currency; 4 = Post Office; 5 = Rivers and Harbors; 6 = Rules; 7 = Mili
tary Affairs; 8 = Naval; 9 = Judiciary; 10 = Foreign Affairs; 11 =
Interstate and Foreign Commerce; 12 = Ways and Means. Source of the
information is Congressional Directory, 65 Cong., Sess. 3, 195-204.
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East North Central states, but the imbalance was not noticeable,
except perhaps on the Rules and the Banking and Currency committees.
Both parties faced difficulty in assigning seats to the Mountain
States and Pacific States, probably because of the low percentage of
members from these regions.

These two regions could feel a justi

fiable slight by the assigning committees of both parties.

Any elec

toral advantages a party won by geographical appeals would have to be
based on factors other than the geographical distribution of seats.
The nucleus of the two parties' organization was the caucus.
Before 1917, its exact function and significance for each party as a
unifier had varied greatly, but by 1917 the dissimilarities between
the parties' caucuses had decreased.

After the overthrow of Speaker

Cannon's system in 1910 and 1911, the Republicans tried several new
methods.

From 1912 to 1917, the party held open-public sessions

instead of closed caucuses.

These seldom met, because little unani

mity on policy existed between the Progressive and Old Guard factions.
By early 1917, attitudes were changing, as conservatives pushed for a
return to closed meetings and progressives demanded a stronger caucus
to adopt a party platform.

Closed sessions were revived, but no party

platform resulted from their return.
For Democrats, the caucus had entailed much more than merely a
means of selecting leaders, which was more the case for the Republicans.

^Bolling, Power in the House, 99-100; Washington Post, January
12, 1917, 6; and January 25, 1917, 2. The Post stated that since the
overthrow of Cannonism, the Republicans had not been able to harmonize
differences, which prevented them from presenting an elective counter
program to the Democrats. The caucus as a result became unimportant.
But in 1917, A. J. Gardner (Mass.), a Progressive, and J. H. Moore
(Penn.), a Conservative, attempted to revive the caucus as a means of
creating policy.
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When the Democrats had combined .successfully with insurgent Republicans
to overthrow Cannon, they superseded his power with the authority of
the caucus.

Speaker Champ Clark (Mo.) and Majority Leader Oscar W.

Underwood (Ala.) devised the binding caucus in 1913 as a new means to
formulate party policy and to hold the Democratic rank-in-file to it.
The system operated successfully, but when Underwood moved over to
the Senate and Kitchin replaced him in 1915 as majority leader, the
caucus declined as a means of mobilizing Democratic majorities.

The

reasons for this are not absolutely certain, but it appears that first
of all Kitchin declined to utilize the binding caucus because he
opposed the Administration on preparedness measures; and, second,
President Wilson took a more personal role in directing House
Democrats.

60

Therefore, in 1917, the caucus, though diminishing in

significance for the Democrats and gaining in importance for the
Republicans, did not fully serve either party as a tool to mobilize
party majorities or to develop party policy.
Also ineffectively used by both parties to activate members was
the position of party whip.

Speaker Clark spoke of the whips as the

right hands of the minority and majority leaders, with their main
function being to ensure attendance of members when the party needed
60

Randal Ripley, Majority Party Leadership in Congress, (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1969), 61-62. Caucus rules stated that when twothirds of the party voted in favor of a measure, all members had
to vote for it on the floor. Also Broesamle, "Democrats from Bryan
to Wilson," The Progressive Era, 103.
®*The Democrats held caucuses on policy matters, but these
did not appear too effective. For example, they met early in the war
and agreed to pass only war measures during the special war session.
But when they got down to a specific "hot potato," in this case the
Rivers and Harbors appropriation bill, they could not make a decision
that they could enforce. See New York Times, April 20, 1917, 6.
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it.

Yet, curiously enough, during the 65th House the Democrats had

no member formally designated as whip.

From investigation of floor

debates, it appears that Democrats utilized the chairman reporting
the particular bill under discussion as a whip.

The Republicans

did have a whip, Charles M. Hamilton (N.Y.), but he was not very active
in carrying out the responsibilities of the position, probably because
the Republicans were in a minority and did not have much need for a
whip.63
Similar to the whips were individuals who performed different
liaison functions and who closely watched debates.

For the Democrats,

the most notable person of this type was John Nance Garner (Tex.).
Because of Kitchin's poor White House relations, G a m e r served as
contact man for the Administration in the House.

Besides holding

conferences with Wilson regularly, he also funneled information
between departments and the House and informed House Democrats of
the Administration position.
For the Republicans, two members, J. Hampton Moore (Penn.) and
Martin Madden (111.), performed actively on the House floor.

Moore

was a member of the prestigious Ways and Means Committee and was also
one of the five members of the Republican steering panel of the
Committee on Committees.

Madden was a leading Republican member of

the Postal Committee who had wide influence on many policy matters.
With a combination of self-assurance and partisanship, Moore and Madden

62Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations," New Per
spectives on The House of Representatives, ed., Nelson Polsey and
Robert Reabody (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1969), 199-201.
63Ripley, "The Party Whig Organizations," 199-201; and
Washington Post, Jan. 12, 1917, 6.
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addressed themselves to a wide variety of topics.

In fact, they spoke

to such a degree that only Minority Leader Mann equalled in quantity
their speaking habits.

64

Another leader very visible in the party system and in floor
debates was the chairman of a committee.

A common thesis is that

since the overthrow of Cannon, the independent power of chairmen
had increased.

The corollary to this view argues that the decreased

control of the Speaker over chairmen weakened party discipline
over the voting behavior of members.

64

That there had been some de

crease in party voting since 1910 cannot be doubted, but it is questionable if the expansion of the chairman's power was responsible.

65

A method for determining the chairmen's possible negative influence
is available by computing their party loyalty score.

If their

own voting records were less cohesive than the average member's, it
would indicate that their independence was disruptive of party soli
darity.

However, if the opposite is true, some other factors must be

sought for the decrease in party voting (Table 2-24).

64 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 499. For
an instance of Moore's partisanship, see his remarks about civil
service appointments to the diplomatic service: That such appoint
ments meant that only Democrats need apply. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 2, 1883-85. For Madden's attempt to dis
comfort the Administration over its exemption of draft-age employees,
see Washington Post, June 22, 1918, 6.
^Boiling, Power in the House, 105.
6^Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years,"
572, note the decrease party voting since 1910 and particularly
since 1945. There was a decline in the Progressive years in party
loyalty from the McKinley years, but more recent times show an even
greater decline.
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TABLE 2-24
COMMITTEE LEADERS'* LOYALTY

REPUBLICAN
Average Loyalty Leaders Loyalty

85

80

DEMOCRAT
Average Loyalty Chairman Loyalty

85

84

*Not all committee chairmen were computed, only the more impor
tant ones. The selection of whom to include as important committee
chairmen was necessarily an arbitrary process. The House had many
committees which met rarely and conducted few hearings, such as the
expenditure committees on executive departments. Others may have held
hearings, but their subject area was not of national or House importance
— such as the ones on pensions. The important committees were: Agri
culture, Appropriations, Naval, Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, Ways and Means, Merchant Marine, Military
Affairs, Public Lands, Rules and Rivers and Harbors. Democratic
chairmen were: Asbury F. Lever, J. Swagar Sherley, Thetus W. Sims,
Daniel E. Garrett, Edwin Y. Webb, Joshua W. Alexander, S. Herbert'
Dent, Jr., Lemuel P. Padgett, Scott Ferris, John H. Small, Edward
W. Pou, and Claude Kitchin. Republican leading members were: Gilbert
N. Haugen, Frederick H. Gillett, Everis Hayes, Henry A. Cooper, Frank
P. Woods, Philip P. Campbell, Andrew J. Volstead, Julius Kahn, Joseph
W. Fordney, and John J. Esch. In determining the party leaders'
loyalty score, a random selection of roll calls was made. On this
selection, the Rice Cohesion Index score was computed. The same pro
cedure was followed for the average member's score. The chairmen
and ranking members headed committees during the 3rd Session of the
65th. Several chairmen had resigned by then. They are included on
the general cohesion index of party leaders.
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Committee chairmen were partisans, but to a lesser degree than
the average party member.

Even so, there is very little difference

between the chairmen and the other members within the Democratic
party (eighty-five for average members and eighty-four for committee
leaders).

In the Republicans' case, the difference is somewhat

greater (eighty for chairmen, eighty-five for the average member).
The Democratic chairmen, then, were more loyal to the party, while
Republican chairmen showed more independence.

Possibly, the average

Republican member, when he occasionally voted against his party, could
feel justified because he could point to the votes of ranking committee
members against the party.

However, probably no disruption flowed

from the slightly lower party cohesion of committee leaders.

Nonethe

less, their occasional independence did not increase party loyalty.
The majority and minority leaders also vitally affected the co
hesion and direction of their parties.

The average member, who tended

to identify the leaders with the party position, looked upon the
leaders' actions as the signals for party policy and voting.

Part

of the reason for this was that the majority and minority leaders
possessed formidable power, consisting of the right to make committee
assignments, to call a party caucus, and to direct floor debates.

As

in the case of Majority Leader Kitchin, who was chairman of the Ways
and Means Committee, the leader might augment his power by important
committee positions.66

Nonetheless, Kitchin, though liked by Democratic

66A s an example of a freshman Congressman looking to the main
party leaders, see the remarks of Louisiana Representative Aswell in
Sandra Stringer, "James B. Aswell," 63-64. Minority Leader Mann did
not have any committee assignments, probably because he wished to
direct all his attention to floor debates. See Congressional Directory,
65 Cong., 3 Sess., January 1919, 216. Minority and majority leaders
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members and a man of great financial acumen and debating brilliance,
confined his power to limited areas.

67

Since he voted against the

war declaration and opposed the conscription law, his relations with
the White House were strained.

At those times when he followed an

independent course, he turned the direction of the party over to
another member in sympathy with the Administration.®8
failed to use the binding caucus.69

Kitchin also

A further restriction of his

influence resulted because Kitchin limited his important floor
activities to advancing only those bills which came from his committee.
By so doing, he considerably decreased his presence on the House floor
and hampered his direction of a general party program.

made committee assignments with the aid of other inqportant members and
also with guidelines established by seniority, geography, and abilities.
See G. Goodwin, The Little Legislatures, 70-71. Congressman James A
Frear of Wisconsin wrote to James Mann asking for a change in com
mittee assignment, arguing that he was qualified to serve on the Rules
Committee because of experience, devotion to his work, and the support
of the Wisconsin delegation. Frear to Mann, January 6, 1919, Frear
Papers, Archives State Historical Society of Wisconsin (Madison).
6^Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillian Co., 1948), p. 93; Champ Clark, My Quarter Century of American
Politics (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1920), 339; and James
Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York: Harper, 1958), 33. Byrnes
and Hull write that Kitchin was one of the finest characters they
ever knew, as well as a dangerous debater. Byrnes also relates a
story of Kitchin's unfriendly relations with G a m e r and Postmastergeneral Albert S. Burleson. This resulted because Garner and Burleson
were able to push a man onto the Appropriations Committee whom Kitchin
opposed. Such a personal conflict also limited a leader's effec
tiveness. Kitchin's biographer praises his abilities. See Arnett,
Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies, 26, 84-85.
68
After his vote against the war resolution, some newspaper
reports said that there was a move afoot to replace him. This never
got off the ground if, in fact, there ever was such a movement. Kitchin
did, however, limit his standing with the White House by voting against
war. See Washington Post, April 11, 1917, 1; New York Times, April 9,
12; and Arnett, Claude Kitchin, 236-37.
69Broesamle, "Democrats from Bryan to Wilson," 103.
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Radically different from Kitchin's style was that of Minority
Leader Mann, who actively participated in debates on a wide variety
of topics.^

Another difference between Mann and Kitchin was the type

of emotion they evoked in fellow party members.

Unlike Kitchin,

Mann was not loved, mainly because he could display a harsh demeanor
and showed no tolerance for mistakes or laziness.

71

He, .nonetheless,

commanded the respect of his contemporaries of both parties.

They

wrote that Mann was an extremely diligent and precise student of
legislative matters who paid great attention to issues and to parlia
mentary procedure.

In his autobiography, LaGuardia described Mann as

the greatest parliamentarian of his or any other period.
Notwithstanding these abilities, his success as a party leader
had its definite limitations.

During the prewar period he had taken

a moderate non-interventionist position which had aroused the hostility
of the Roosevelt interventionist faction of the Republican membership.
When the war started, many thought his past record disqualified him for
leadership in wartime.

He also incurred the displeasure of some mem

bers by pursuing a generally conservative policy and by keeping most

^°Mann did allow the ranking Republican minority member of the
committee reporting the bill to lead the debate, but he did not sit on
the side lines without commenting as Kitchin usually did. As a result
some members thought he robbed them of opportunities that were theirs on
the House floor. Washington Post, January 15, 1917, 1; and February
26, 1917, 2.
71
Hull, Memoirs, 55, writes that Mann spoke in his "usual per
verse tone and demeanor." For an example of his harshness toward a
fellow member, see Cong. Rec., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 111.
72

LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 135; Clark, My Quarter
Century of American Politics, 342. For the examples of Mann's skills
as a parliamentarian, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 2,
2077; and Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 644-45.
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policy decisions in his own hands.73

More progressive Republicans

pressed for an innovative program and greater participation in policy
making, but no changes were forthcoming.74

Most important in limiting

his leadership was a serious illness he suffered in July, 1917.

Since

he remained in Johns Hopkins hospital for the rest of the session and
most of the next, the Republicans had to improvise leadership.

What

finally emerged consisted of co-minority leaders, Frederick G. Gillett
(Mass.) and Irvine L. Lenroot (Wis.).

Certain individuals, such as

Uncle Joe Cannon (111.) and leading committee members, played major
supporting roles as directors of individual bills.

These men were not

without skill, particularly Lenroot and Ex-Speaker Cannon, but the
absence of Mann caused uncertainties in the direction of the party.7^

73"Republican Chairman," Nation, CVI (February 21, 1918), 200-01.
This article refers to Mann as a Republican liability because of his
moderate position on intervention and his conservatism. Such stances
raised the ire of "Gussie" Gardner (R.-Mass.) along with other less
clearly identified members. See also Washington Post, January 12, 1917,
6; and February 26, 1917, 2, for activities of Gardner to push a party
program. Mann had been associated with Cannon when Cannon was Speaker.
See Blair Bolles, Tyrant From Illinois; Uncle Joe Cannon's Experiment
with Personal Power (New York: Norton, 1950), 55, 57.
74The failure of the Republicans to develop a party program
probably reflected the difficulty of developing a program out of the
divisions within the party. But just as likely was the Republican
realization that as they allowed war events to take their course, they
would be able to use events against the Democrats. In short, the Repub
licans simply had to stay up with developments and let the Democrats
make mistakes. For evidence of the Republican approach of using the
war against the Democrats, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55,
Pt. 8, 7857.
75New York Times, November 24, 1917, 6; November 26, 1917, 8;
Washington Post, November 25, 1917, 11. According to one Republican
member, Mann was "forty times" more skilled than Gillett, who eventually
took the main job of leadership when Lenroot went to the Senate in
April, 1918. William Ramseyer to Grimes, February 19, 1919, Ramseyer
Papers, University of Iowa Archives. LaGuardia, in his autobiography,
wrote that cannon was still extremely able though he was in his 80's.
LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 135.
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In the end, the divisiveness caused by Mann's pre-war positions and
anti-reform sentiments, plus his long-term absence, undermined his
effectiveness in unifying the party.

He failed to win renomination

as party leader in 1919.
The most important House leader, at least in theory, was Champ
Clark, the Speaker, who had held the office since 1911.

After the close

election of 1916 both parties claimed that they could elect the Speaker
and organize the House.

In fact, neither party was sure of the out

come because five independents held the balance of power.

The inde

pendents— Thomas D. Schall (Minn.), Alvan T. Fuller (Mass.), Charles H.
Randall (Cal.), Whitmell P. Martin (La.), and Meyer London (N.Y.)—
conferred several times during February and March, 1917, attempting to
map out a course which would gain them leverage with the major parties
on issues that they supported and for committee assignments that they
desired.

In the end they agreed to no common strategy, though four

of the five cast their ballots for Clark rather than Mann.76

Also

increasing the doubt of both the Democrats and Republicans as to the
outcome of the race was the possible defection of members of their
own party to the opposition.

In the Democratic ranks, dissatisfaction,

which foreshadowed the cultural tensions in the Democratic party of
the 1920's, existed among representatives from the big Eastern urban
machines, particularly from Massachusetts and Tammany Hall.

They were

distressed over their, committee assignments and over the prohibition
tendencies of the party.

Although several boycotted the Democratic

76Washington Post, January 31, 1917, 2; February 18, 1917, 2;
March 11, 1917, 3; March 10, 1917, 2; March 13, 1917, 2; New York
Times, March 5, 1917, 1; March 8, 1917, 10; and Washington Post, April
3, 1917, 2. The fifth, Fuller, voted for Rep. Irvine Lenroot (R.-Wis.).
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caucus on March 31, they voted for Clark on April 2, apparently be-

77
cause the leadership agreed to give them better committee positions.
On the Republican side, a number of progressives and interven
tionists were unhappy over Mann's failure to develop a party program
and over his prewar non-interventionist position.

There had been

talk of a bipartisan organization of the House by certain Republicans,
but members of this faction— who included Gardner (Mass.), Edward Gary
(N.J.), Frederick Dallinger (Mass.), Reuben Haskell (N.Y.), and Frank
James (Mich.)— were inspired in their opposition by Mann's policies,
not by desires to offer a bipartisan gesture.

When it came to the

voting, although the Republican caucus did make some concessions,
these five voted for other Republicans.^8

By the time of the roll

call, a combination of Democratic unity and independent support, plus
Republican dissension, handily gave Clark the Speakership for the
7 Q

fourth time.'
Clark retained a post that had been much diminished in status
and power since the overthrow of Cannon.

Clark did not retain the

^Washington Post, March 26, 1917, 2; New York Times, March 30,
1917, 5; March 31, 1917, 4; Washington Post, March 31, 1917, 1. Eastern
representatives did receive some good committee assignments in the 65th
House: James A. Gallivan (Mass.) to Appropriations, Thomas F. Smith
(N.Y.) to Banking and Currency; Joseph V. Flynn (N.Y.) to Judiciary;
Daniel J. Riordan (N.Y.) to Rules; and John Carew (N.Y.) to Ways and
Means. Whether or not this was a result of the pre-speakership trading
is difficult to tell. For source on committee assignments, see Congres
sional Directory, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., January, 1919, 183-92.
^^ashington Post, January 15, 1917, 1; March 7, 1917, 1; New
York Times,March 11, 1917, 1; Washington Post, March 22, 1917, 2;
March 24, 1917, 2; March 26, 1917, 2; March 28, 1917, 2; April 1,
1917, 1; New York Times, April 1, 1917, 6. Two other Republicans
did make a bipartisan gesture and voted for Clark.
^Washington Post, April 3, 1917, 2; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1
Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 105-16.
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powers to appoint standing committees and to control the House Rules
Committee that Cannon had earlier employed.

He, nonetheless, retained

considerable power, since he still held the right to assign bills to
committees, to decide questions on rules during floor debates, to
appoint special and joint committees, and to select the presiding
officers of the House.

80

Whether these powers gave the Speaker

sufficient ability to direct a legislative program is debatable.

In

actual practice Clark exercised his power in the limited fashion
of the chief presiding officer, leaving others to direct the legislative
program.
The leadership structures of the House did not augur well for
a unified party or a coherent party program.

The voting behavior of

leaders did not help unify their parties (Table 2-25).

Leaders of

both parties continued to display lower loyalty than other party mem
bers.

At times, the disloyal votes of leaders, such as Speaker

Clark's on the conscription bill, were disruptive for their parties,
besides difficult to explain to the public.

Further, party instability

was increased by the disjointed fashion with which the leadership
structures fitted together.

Neither party had formally operating

88Bolling, Power in the House, 50-63; Ripley, Majority Party
Leadership in Congress, 52. For an example of some of the Speaker's
powers in the operations of the House, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 2
Sess., Vol. 56, Pt. 4, 3390.
8^Bolling, Power in the House, 93-4, writes that when Underwood
was Majority Leader, he, rather than Clark, was the real leader. I
found no comments contrasting Kitchin to Clark. However, one Congress
man in a letter, probably reflecting the way Clark ran the speakership
rather than its inherent potentialities, maintained that the speaker
acted simply as a moderator. William Ramseyer to Grimes, February
19, 1919, Ramseyer Papers. A general study of leadership in Congress
does maintain that the majority leader was now more important. See
Ripley, Majority Party Leadership, 52.
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TABLE 2-25
PARTY LEADERS'LOYALTY*

REPUBLICAN
Average Loyalty Leaders' Loyalty

85

80

DEMOCRATS
Average Loyalty Leaders1 Loyalty

85

84

*For the names of the leaders who were chairmen or leaders of
committees, see Table 2-24. The ones not named in the previous table
but included in this one ares Democrats— William C. Adamson, James
F. Byrnes, Joseph W. Byrns, Champ Clark, John J. Fitzgerald, John N.
Garner, Carter Glass, Cordell Hull and Henry T. Rainey; Republicans—
Joseph G. Cannon, Simeon D. Fess, Irvine L. Lenroot, Nichols Longworth,
James R. Mann, Frank W. Mondell, and J. Hampton Moore. The same
random selection method was used in selecting roll calls as in the
committee leaders' loyalty table.
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whips, party caucuses met but failed to formulate policy, and com
mittee chairmen operated in their own narrow domains.

The top leader

ship, who suffered from personal and policy deficiencies, unintentional
ly limited their direction of party members to a restricted nuiriber of
policy areas.
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These structural limitations could be overcome,

either by groups with clear ideological positions or by presidential
intervention in House activities.

The war and its aftermath would

test the institutional qualities of the House as never before, deter
mining its ability to handle issues of a national crisis.

82Democratic leadership was also weakened by the resignation of
several key leaders: John J. Fitzgerald, chairman of the Appropriations
Committee, William Adamson, Chairman of Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee, and Carter Glass, Chairman of the Banking and Currency
Committee. The exact results of the resignations would be difficult
to determine, but all were party loyalists, particularly Glass who
strongly defended the Administration.

CHAPTER III

FIRST SESSION OF THE 65TH HOUSE
*

President Wilson's call to arms before a joint session of
Congress on April 2, 1917, provoked a dramatic House debate.

Although

opponents of war fought courageously, they could not block the declara
tion of hostilities.

Once the war resolution passed, the Administra

tion and the House hastily developed a war program.

On one level, the

war program required the forging of a military machine by raising
an army and funding armaments.

Similarly, mobilization involved the

censorship of press and speech, the suppression of radicals, the
organization of industry and agriculture for war purposes, and the
adoption of policies for financing the war.

On another level, the war

program created fundamental ideological, partisan, geographical, and
institutional conflicts.

These divisions within the House influenced

much of the legislation that was enacted, but they remained largely
hidden from public view behind a bi-partisan facade of unity.

Though

the war induced an ostensible agreement in favor of the war programs,
complex partisan, regional, and ideological forces undermined the
apparent harmony.

Resolution For War
Immediately after the organization of the House on April 2,
representatives took up Wilson's proposal for intervention, a subject
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upon which many members had often demonstrated definite tendencies
toward non-intervention.

Not more than a year before, during an

earlier German-American crisis in 1916, many congressmen rallied behind
a resolution introduced by Jeff McLemore, a Texas Democrat, which for
bade American travel on armed merchant ships in submarine-infested
*

waters.
it.

Before the roll call a majority of Democrats probably favored

However, strong pressure from the chief Executive forced all but

a handful of recalcitrant Democrats to vote against the resolution.
When it came to a vote, three out of four of the 142 representatives
who voted for the resolution were Republicans.

Even after the break

in diplomatic relations with Germany on February 3, 1917, House
isolationists, commanded by Henry A. Cooper (R-Wis.), sought to re
strict administration action.

They proposed an amendment which pro

vided that American ships, which an administration bill intended to
arm, could not carry munitions to the Entente Powers if armed.
Denounced by the Administration as another McLemore resolution, the
Cooper amendment rallied only token support and went down to defeat,
293 to 125.

2

Given past House actions, it was not surprising that when

the Foreign Affairs Committee introduced the war resolution to the
floor two of the Committee's members rejected the majority report in
favor of war, one of whom was Cooper, the leading Republican member
of the committee.

As the House undertook the task of deciding

•1-Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement, 211-14. See,
also, Tim G. McDonald, "The Gore-McLemore Resolutions: Democratic Re
volt against Wilson’s Submarine Policy," Historian, XXVI (November,
1963), 50-74.
2Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 13.
3New York Times, April 5, 1917, 1.
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for or against war, non-interventionists stood prepared to withstand
the clamor for war.
In the opening debate on April 5, which took place before a
full House and jammed galleries, Henry Flood (D-Va.), chairman of
the Foreign Affairs Committee, phrased the necessity for war as a
challenge..."thrown at our feet by the arrogant autocracy of Germany."
The thrust of his argument for war, often repeated in the long hours
of debate ahead, rested on an enumeration of German violations of
American independence.

Specifically, Flood charged that Germany had

spied on the government and people of the United States, had disre
garded its pledges to restrict submarine warfare, and had murdered
"innocent women and children."

His argument and similar ones also

included a listing of ships sunk by Germany.

At this point, opponents

injected that England had similarly violated American rights.

Floor

countered by maintaining that British violations were of a different
nature altogether, since no American lives were taken by her violations.
His conclusion, endorsed by later speakers who followed his reasoning,
was that America must stand up and defend herself against a power which
was already waging war against American rights and citizens.4
Added to pro-war arguments was a technique that appealed to the
emotions of patriotism and belligerent chauvinism.

A mild form of

this sentiment maintained that in a crisis the Congress had to stand

4Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, Sess. 1, Pt. 1, 307-09. For
similar arguments see ibid., 970, 344-48; C. William Ramseyer to
Frank Shane, February 26, 1917; and Ramseyer to personal (no name),
April 29, 1917, Ramseyer Papers; and Don Stephens to Matt S. Hartman,
April 6, 1917, Box 26, Folder 199, Stephens Papers, Archives of
the Historical Society of Nebraska.
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by the President.5

In a more robust form, William Good (D-Ark.)

declared that German actions ought to make the blood of American
patriots boil for a fight.

He also insinuated that the patriotism of

the anti-war members left much to be desired.6

Pat Harrison (D-Miss.)

unleashed an abusive diatribe against opponents, declaring that a
preceding anti-war speech would have been more appropriate if delivered
in the German Reichstag.

Similarly, Thomas Heflin (D-Ala.) charged

that non-interventionist speeches undoubtedly pleased Count von
Bernstorff, the former German Ambassador to the United States.

Both

diatribes reflected a virulent nationalism which asserted that the
United States could not tolerate mistreatment from Germany.

As

Harrison stated, the German "outrages" could not be accepted by a
great nation which had "not forgotten the teachings of our fathers."7
Harrison and Heflin's patriotism combined an inplied distrust of the
loyalty of war opponents with a direct threat of intimidation of all
opponents, American and German alike.
A much different appeal for war came from members who envisioned
the conflict as a great clash between ideals of government.

That

advocates of war, particularly Wilson, demanded American entry because
of idealistic values has largely been discounted by such historians as
Arthur Link.

According to Link's view, Wilson did not reach his

6Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 375-76.
6Ibid., 331.
7Ibid., 315-16, 348. Another remark by Heflin indicates the
connection of patriotism to a sense of manhood. He said that "we
were drawn into war, and no nation with any self-respect, no nation
with an ounce of courage, no nation with a particle of national
honor, would have endured longer the insults of the murderous
Kaiser."
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decision for war because he wanted to protect democracy, but only later
cloaked the rationale for war in idealistic terms.8

Even if Wilson

came to an idealistic position after reaching his decision for war,
it does not follow that all idealistic advocates evolved their position
in a similar fashion.

In any event, a few congressmen did phrase their

support in idealistic terms.
The idealistic argument included two facets— one conservative,
the other revolutionary.

Augustus Gardner (R-Mass.) argued that though

the German submarine warfare directly pushed the United States into war,
the real spark came from another source:

the American people realized

that a life and death struggle was occurring in which democracy's
survival Rung in the balance.

If the United States did not respond

to the challenge, it would become impossible, Gardner argued, to
preserve American ideals and democratic government m

Europe.

Q

But

for George O'Shaunessy (D-R.I.) the war offered the opportunity
for the revolutionary overthrow of tyrannical governments rather than
the mere maintenance of democratic government.

In his pro-war speech

he called for the removal of all kings, starting with the German
Kaiser but not exempting even the King of England, and for the forward
march of the masses.10

In a less provacative fashion, Charles Linthi-

cum (D-Mo.) also advocated the uprooting of autocracies and the
O
Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement, 277-79, 281.
Link modified this thesis in a later book when he noted a strong
desire by Wilson to influence the peace settlement after the war in
the direction of a world community. See, Link, Woodrow Wilson:
Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 410-415.
8Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 668-69.
10Ibid., 391.
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establishment of free republics."^

Both O'Shaunessy and Linthicum

reflected the feelings of oppressed European ethnic groups who hoped to
harness American democracy to the cause of national self-determination.
Rising in opposition to the crusade, a determined minority
resolutely denied that war was justified.

Claude Kitchin, majority

leader of the Democrats and the most prominent opponent of war, elabo
rated what has been called the "un-neutrality thesis."

Holding that

Wilsonian policies were un-neutral from the start, Kitchin insisted
that they consequently drew the United States into the maelstrom.
Moreover, there was no justification for American involvement since
it was strictly a war for European dominion.

Additionally, both sides

had equally violated American rights, but the Administration had
scarcely offered an audible protest to Entente violations.

As a

corollary to this argument, Kitchin insisted that the un-neutrality
of administration policy permitted profiteers to wax rich, thereby
enmeshing the country more deeply in the conflict.

American traders,

his argument continued, were given a free reign without proper controls.
As a consequence, Germany took retaliatory action via the only weapon
at her disposal, the submarine.

Kitchin implored the House not to

send American boys to die in order to protect American trade and
profiteers.

In sum, the un-neutrality thesis, as stated by Kitchin

and others, stressed administration favoritism, British highhandness, and American trade entanglements.

10

11Ibid., 324, 319.
•^Ibid., 332-33, 314, 345, 376, 327. See Arnett, Claude Kitchin
and the Wilson War Policies,47-48, for a discussion of Kitchen's
view on the war crisis.
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The anti-war sentiment, which flowed from a sense of the proper
role of America in world affairs, expressed itself in two differing
lines of thought:

a nationalist and idealist.

Like the pro-war

nationalists, the anti-war nationalists argued that the United States
should defend its rights against German aggression.

But the sphere of

defense should be confined to the oceans, with the United States acting
independently.

To join an European alliance would, Frank Rearis

(R-Nebr.) maintained, cut America from her traditional isolationists'
moorings and violate the warning of Washington's Farewell Address on
the dangers of entangling alliances.^

these isolationists, a

defense of American rights involved unilateral action against Germany
on the high seas, without encumbering European ties.14
From the nationalistic perspective of isolationism, the emphasis
in the argument shifted to the upholding of high ideals.

Seeing war

as the "greatest crime against the human race," these isolationists
supported their viewpoint with various ethical ideals.

Edward King

(R-Ill.) cited the teachings of Jesus, while William LaFollette (R-Wash.)
appealed to the liberal ideals of human civilization.

These war

opponents also portrayed America as an example that ought to uphold
democracy and humanity without the shedding of blood.

Meyer London

(N.Y.), the lone Socialist in Congress, argued that involvement not
only would harm America's liberty.but would also adversely affect the
development of German democracy.

He believed in the liberation of

13Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 356, 372-73.
14Ibid., 318, 363-64, 353. The discussion and terminology on
isolationism is partly influenced by Cooper's, The Vanity of Power,
2-4, 88, 99. Opponents of war can, to a degree, be placed in his
classifications of idealist and ultranationalist orientations.
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oppressed peoples as did O'Shaunessy, but to him war did not advance
the masses because they were the real sufferers in any conflict.15
London's interpretation of idealism stood in direct contrast to the
international idealism of Wilson, who advocated an aggressive advance
ment of democracy throughout the world.
That the debates, influenced the votes of members cannot be denied.
Equally true, many cast their ballots for reasons other than those
revealed in the debates.

Marvin Jones (D-Tex.) wrote later that more

representatives objected to war in the cloak room than on the floor
and that many only voted reluctantly for war.1®

There were several

reasons for this conduct, but the most important of these was the
emotionally charged atmosphere in which congressmen reached their
decision.

From the vantage point of C. William Ramseyer (R-Iowa),

the war atmosphere had set in motion processes of fate or history
which all but dictated the choice for war.

Never enthusiastic to

enter the war, because he believed that it meant entangling alliances
and protection of munition makers' profits, Ramseyer nonetheless felt
that "destiny" demanded war.1^

Similarly, Edward W. Saunders (D-Va.)

stated during the debates that an "inexorable compulsion" created
circumstances that House members must simply follow.

18

In a less

15Cong. Rec., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 335, 341, 371, 329; and
Pt. 2, 1149.
15Marvin Jones, Marvin Jones Memoirs, 33, voted for war, so his
comment is not a critical remark by an opponent of war. Kitchin's
biographer makes a similar point; see Arnett, Claude Kitchin, 236.
17

Ramseyer to P. T. Grimes, January 6, 1917; to Homer A. Roth,
February 10, 1917; and to Robert Lumsdon, March 10, 1917, Ramseyer
Papers.
1®Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 345.
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fatalistic tone, Dan V. Stephens (D-Neb.), a Bryanite in sympathies,
believed that the President dictated the path the country would follow.
To stand in his way

meant that one would "be branded a traitor."'1'9

Part of this pressure that Stephens detected operated upon
Jeannette Rankin (R-Mont.), who nonetheless still voted against war.
Her brother argued the justice of the war and warned that a negative
vote would end her political career.

Women's suffrage leaders

gravely conferred with her regarding the harm that a nay vote would
have on the movement.

She held her ground, however, for her dread of

sending American boys to death was greater than her fear of political
defeat.

20

But in most instances, congressmen followed Philip Campbell's

(R-Kans.) course.

He knew that the war resolution would pass.

A nay

vote then would do no good, but in the circumstances might be construc
ted as comforting the enemy.

He voted yea.2-1- Of course, many pro-war

advocates were firmly convinced that American honor, rights, and ideals
demanded war.

For a minority, however, support was the result of

political and historical conditions that they could not oppose.
Factors shaping a member's vote on the war resolution can also
be approached by quantitative analysis.

Such an analysis suggests

dimensions of pro-war and anti-war groups which would otherwise be
obscure.

The starting point is to correlate the war roll call with

1Q

Dan Stephens to Frank Fowler, February 16, 1917, Box 25,
Folder 193, Stephens Papers.
20Josephson, Jeannette Rankin, 73-77.
21

Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 410. See
Louis C. Crampton to Earl G. Fitz, April 11, 1917, File L, Folder
lOd, Louis C. Crampton Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University
of Michigan, for an expression of a viewpoint similar to Campbell's.
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all other relevant roll calls.

By doing this a better definition of

the issues that pro-war and anti-war legislators supported may be
revealed.

However, correlating the war vote with other war-connected .

roll calls may show that it related to few other roll calls.

In fact,

this is the case, because the war vote associated at a level of statis
tical significance with only eight out of 120 roll calls, which as a
group did not all associate among themselves (Table 3-1 and note on
page 113).

Two of the roll calls dealt with prohibiting strikes during

wartime, while another two granted a $50 million appropriation to pur
chase seed grain for farmers during wartime.

The four others included

a draft vote, a vote on permitting associations in trade, and one to
establish a commission on unemployment insurance.

The final vote dealt

with charges of treason against two members who opposed the war.
Although the war roll call correlates with these eight votes, an
analysis of this relationship must be restrained.

First, the votes do

not correlate with each other at a level of statistical significance
(See note on page 113).

Second, since the war groups purposely came

together only eight votes out of 120 votes, it indicates that they
did not consistently work together in future votes.

Given these

qualifications, the opponents of war were members who rejected placing
restraints on the rights of workers to strike and who favored pro
viding seed for farmers.

They further endorsed a volunteer rather

than a conscripted army, desired an investigation of unemployment
insurance, voted against trade associations, and protested charges
of disloyalty because of their vote on the war resolution.

In contrast

most supporters of the war resolution took counter positions on these
issues.

In terms of attitudes and group orientations, opponents of
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TABLE 3-la
BILLS AND MOTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
ROLL CALL ON THE WAR RESOLUTION

Correlation
Yule's Q

Motion

±.750

To agree to the amendment to H. R. 3545, (May 18, 1917),
authorizing the President to increase temporarily the
United States military establishment, which amendment
eliminates the clause authorizing the President to call
for 500,000 volunteers, so as to permit the increase to
be made by a selective draft rather than through volun
teers. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong. Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2,
1555.

±.634

To pass a bill H. R. 2316, promoting export trade.
pt. 4, 3584.

±.763

To expunge certain remarks from the record regarding
Bill H. R. 4961, (40 STAT-217, August 10, 1917, providing
further for the national security and defense by en
couraging the production, conserving the supply, and
controlling the distribution of food products and fuel,
by eliminating certain words referring to two represen
tatives as being traitors and in treason with anarchists
and charging them with stirring up enmity to the draft
law. Ibid., Pt. 6, 5757.

±.716

To strike out the Enacting Clause in H. R. Res. 189,
providing for a commission to inquire into the advisa
bility of establishing national insurance against un
employment, invalidity, and sickness. Ibid., Pt. 1, 906.

±.642

To amend S. 383, (40 STAT-533, April 20, 1918), punishing
the destruction or injuring of war material and war
transportation facilities, by fire, explosives or other
violent means and forbidding the hostile use of property
during time of war, by including persons with intent to
injure, interfere with or obstruct the U. S. or any
associate nation in carrying on the war, and who conspire
to prevent the erection or production of war premises,
war material or war utility. Ibid., Pt. 3, 3124.

±.725

To amend S. 383, by making it lawful under the act for
employees to agree together to stop work with a bona fide
purpose of securing better wages or conditions of employ
ment. Ibid., Pt. 3, 3126A.

±.631

To amend H. R. 7795, by eliminating the Enacting Clause.
Ibid., Pt. 4, 4179.

Ibid.,

113

±.694

To amend H. R. 7795, which appropriates $50,000,000 for
the purchase of seed grain and feed for live stock, to
be supplied to farmers and stockmen and to create boards
in the respective states to assist in carrying out pro
visions of this act, by amending Section 4 thereof, so
as to provide that the Secretary of Agriculture, at the
next session of Congress, make a detailed report regarding
all proceedings under the act. Ibid., Pt. 5, 4296.

aThe procedure followed in correlating the war resolution
roll call and all subsequent roll calls is as follows: The OSIRIS
social science computer package offers a program called Correl which
allows a researcher to correlate up to sixty roll calls at one time.
I first selected a number of roll calls which had some practical or
logical relation to the war resolution.Not all votes
would have any
relation to each other and were not correlated. The ones that did
appear to have a possible relation were coded into the Correl program
for statistical analysis with the war vote. The Correl program
printed out both a matrix of the correlations(Yule's Q) and a card
matrix. I then did two things: first, I ran a second Osiris program
called Cluster which placed in groups all similar-correlating— roll
calls; second, I traced by sight the war vote with all other roll
calls in the printed Correl program. Both methods are designed to
find high correlations between roll calls. After correlating with
over a 120 roll calls, only eight other votes were found that correlate
with the war vote at a level of statistical significance. Significance
is defined as a Yule's Q ranging from .700 to 1000 but it is permissible
to drop to .600. Four of the votes correlate with the war vote at the
.600 level, indicating a relation but not a great one. It must be
emphasized that while the war vote correlates with the eight, the
votes do not all correlate with each other. This procedure was
followed on other roll calls. Many votes did not correlate with other
roll calls or with only a few votes. In particular few votes fitted
into a group of roll calls in which all simultaneously correlated or
clustered with each other. The ones that did not correlate could at
least be placed into party and regional tables, as was done with the
war resolution vote. For those that correlated they could be further
evaluated by the Gscore program. This program will be explained
later.
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war favored labor and fanners, resisted militarism in the organization
of the army and monopolism in the conduct of the export trade.

It

can be concluded that the anti-war element, at least when it voted
together, indicated progressive tendencies.
An evaluation of the war roll call in relation to party and
region yields more precise results (Table 3-2).

Since the resolution

passed by a wide majority of 373 to fifty, both parties overwhelmingly
favored American entry into the war.

A variation between parties none

theless existed, in that twice as many Republicans (thirty-two) as
Democrats (sixteen) voted against war.

An explanation of the greater

Republican opposition demonstrates the importance of leadership in
the reaching of House decisions.

None of the top Republican leadership

opposed the war, but Democratic Majority Leader Claude Kitchin reso
lutely fought American entry into the conflict.

However, his influence

with fellow Democrats was offset by President Wilson, the national
leader of the party.

A vote against Wilson by significant numbers of

Democrats would have immobilized Wilson and his party.

Democrats, who

in their personal convictions abhorred war, feared more the political
repercussions of a negative ballot.

Similar restraints operated on

the Republicans, but since their party did not occupy the White House,
more ventured to vote as their conscience dictated.
Greater variation exists regionally than politically.

On the one

hand, the New England and the Middle Atlantic regions united in a
common support of the war.

On the other hand, the Midwestern states

(ENC and WNC) harbored nearly all the Republican opponents of war.
Western states (MS and PS regions) for both parties expressed higher
than average opposition.

In short, the isolationist and the

The

TABLE 3-2
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION OF S. J. RES.
1: DECLARATION OF WAR*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

Yea

6

MA

ENC

WNC
D
R

SS

R

D

R

D

R

25

25

62

23

45

8

18

94

1

16

2

12

5

Nay

D

BS
R

3

MS

PS

TOTAL
D
R

D

R

D

R

D

R

29

10

6

4

3

10

194

177

2

2

2

2

16

32

D

R

D

R

TOTAL
D
R

75

67

60

83

92

85

26

33

40

17

8

15

4

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

Yea
Nay

NE

MA
D

R

WNC
D
R

96

74

80

60

95

4

26

20

40

5

ENC

D

R

D

R

100

100

100

100

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., 412.

SS
D

BS
R

100

D

88
12

MS
R

100

PS
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rural-oriented Midwest furnished the greatest number of opponents.

The

Western states, which were geographically far removed from the Euro
pean conflict, were hesitant to support the war.

On the other hand,

the South and Border states were second only to the industrial North
east in their emphatic support of the war.

Raising Men and Money
Passage of the war resolution dictated the future direction of
the first session and the legislative action of the House membership.
The opponents of war would now have to shelve their anti-war convictions
if they were to avoid being branded traitors.

Since none wanted such

a label, they agreed with Kitchin that the war required opponents to
enter into the task of creating a war program even if their misgivings
continued.22

The supporters of the resolution more readily tackled

the job of forging a war program.

Still they realized that war measures

would often violate their peacetime convictions.

In the case of either

war supporters or opponents, many occasions would arise whereby wartime proposals would provoke disenchantment.

23

Immediately after disposal of the war resolution, the House
quickly adopted a multi-billion dollar loan for the American and
Allied war efforts.2^

But the foremost question crowding the House for

a quick decision involved the raising of an army.

The regular army

22Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 332-33.
23That both sides agreed to support the war program is seen
in these articles: Washington Post, April 8, 1917, 1; April 9, 1917,
1; April 11, 1917, 2; April 20, 1917, 1. Much less agreement existed
over the specifics, such as how the army was to be raised or who was
to be taxed.
2^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 630, 650, 690.
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and militia were grossly undermanned for waging a world war.

The

Administration hoped to correct this dangerous situation by recruiting
an army of two millian via conscription.

Although it violated American

tradition, Weir Department advisors justified this departure on the
grounds that not enough men would forsake the lure of good jobs and
high wages without compulsion.2^

Many House members rejected the

military's viewpoint and looked upon conscription with a jaundiced
eye.

In 1916, the House membership had firmly defeated a War Depart

ment proposal for a Continental Army which hinted at the draft concept.

26

Influential members such as Edward Pou (D-N.C.), Chairman of

the House Rules Committee, advised Wilson of present House sentiment,
warning him that conscription could not pass without first a trial of
the volunteer system.

Wilson, agreeing with his War Department advisors,

could not be deterred and had the conscription bill introduced.2^
The bill first went to the House Military Affairs Committee,
a caldron seething with opposition.

The Administration tried to

counter the opposition by sending Secretary of War Newton D. Baker
before the Committee.

He argued for the efficiency of the draft, but

he found determined opposition from two types of volunteer advocates.
One element resisted the whole concept of a drafted army.

Such com

mitteemen listened sympathetically to anti-conscription advocates,
among them Grant Hamilton of the American Federation of Labor and Jane

2^New York Times, April 6, 1917, 1; April 7, 1917, 3.
26Link, Woodrow Wilson and Progressive Movement, 184.
27

Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 6, 16-17;
Washington Post, April 12, 1917, 1.

Addams, a leader of humanitarian causes.

The second group did not so

much oppose the draft as support the establishment of a special volun
teer division for former Rough Rider Teddy Roosevelt.

Representative

Daniel R. Anthony (R-Kans.), who had charge of the Colonel's interests
in the Committee, pictured the Roosevelt division as a quick means to
•

place American troops m

the European trenches by fall.

28

In the face of the impending revolt, Wilson held several con
ferences with Hubert S. Dent (D-Ala.), head of the Military Affairs
Committee, along with other leaders.

Also active was the Administra

tion's chief lobbyist Albert Burleson, the Postmaster General.

None

theless, these administration effort's in the end proved ineffective
when the Military Affairs Committee reported, thirteen to eight, a
bill that provided for use of the volunteer principle first.

If this

failed, only then could the draft be implemented by the President.29
With the defeat of the Administration in the Committee, the House
debates opened in an environment of confusion and tension, with the
outcome in doubt.

Reflecting the unusual conditions, the ranking

Republican of the Committee, Julius Kahn (Cal.), directed the forces
for the Administration's position.

In the opposing camp, Chairman Dent

along with the two chief Democratic leaders Kitchin and Clark, who had
also deserted the President, led the forces in favor of the volunteer
28

Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic, X (April 7, 1917)
294-295; New York Times, April 8, 1917, 1; and U. S. Congress, House
Committee on Military Affairs, Increase of the Military Establishment,
Hearing on H. R. 3545, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3, 42-43, 17, 20.
29New York Times, April 10, 1917, 1; April 12, 1917, 1; April 17,
1917, 1; April 18, 1917, 1; April 17, 1917, 1; and April 20, 1917,
1.
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principle.

30

Dent and his like-minded colleagues argued repeatedly

that the volunteer system represented the historical tradition of the
United States which at least ought to be given an opportunity to prove
itself.

Representatives in agreement with this viewpoint cited the

"history of the Anglo-Saxon race," and the experience of the Revolu
tionary and Civil Wars.31
According to this traditionalist argument, the fighting abili
ties of volunteers were superior because they fought as men who had
freely consecrated their lives to their country.

As former Civil War

officer Issac Sherwood (D-Ohio) stressed, very few draftees during the
Civil War ever made good soldiers.33

The strength of the army, the

traditionalist argument continued, would also be boosted as localities
volunteered together to form regiments in which neighbors drew courage
from fellow neighbors.

Finally, the traditionalist viewpoint believed

that the volunteer system drew vitality from the patriotism of the men.
The draft system, according to Speaker Clark, was a reflection against
American youth, saying that they could not be trusted to volunteer.
The truth, Clark added, was that American men wished a free means
through which to express their patriotic sentiment.

Without idealism,

without patriotism, the American army, the proponents of the volunteer
system argued, would lack the fervor necessary to win the war.
30
.
New York Times, April 25, 1917, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 55, Sess. 1, Pt. 2, 1182.
31See ibid., 1376, 1378, 1120-21, 1104 for examples of the
traditionalist's argument.
32Ibid., 1201-03, 1205.
33Ibid., Pt. 1, 973, 962-63, 1029, 1037, 977; Pt. 2, 1119,
1099, 1147; and New York Times, April 25, 1917, 1.
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Linked with the traditionalist and patriotic argument was the
fact that voluntary advocates had a strong distrust of the military
in Ameri$jjjn life.

This view first of all encompassed a desire to pre

vent an impersonal military bureaucracy from taking away a person's
choice.

If men were not to become mere tools of the military, the

argument ran, they must be allowed freedom of selection.

Secondly,

the argument questioned how a democratic country could employ auto
cratic methods to wage war.

Carl Hayden (D-Ariz.) summarized this

feature of the anti-militarist viewpoint when he stated, "Let us
not pay Prussian militarism, which we are seeking to destroy, the
compliment of adopting the most hateful and most baneful of its in
stitutions.3^

Finally, the anti-militarists played upon the fears of

congressmen by insisting that the draft was part of the military's
long-term plan.

Several volunteerists maintained that the "mili-

tarists" did not want the draft just for war, but also for peace.

35

In the debates on the draft, two conflicting conceptions of
American society battled for mastery.

On one hand, the opponents of

the draft drew on the ideals of anti-militarism and on visions of a
voluntaristic and agrarian American society.

On the other hand,

supporters of the draft founded their argument on an organized and
industrial American democracy.

This argument, which can be labeled

the modernist position, maintained first of all that American society
had irreconcilably changed from the past.

To them the volunteer

system never functioned as well as the misty memories of Civil War
i

3^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, Sess. 1, Pt. 1, 1052; and
Pt. 2, 1377, 1106-07.
35Ibid., 1091-92; and Pt. 1, 1028.
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veterans recalled, but now more than ever it would not work.

Modem

war required a wide variety of skills more complex than simple military
ones.

Secondly, in the m o d e m system, according to conscription pro

ponents, each member of society served as part of the military machine.
It was not a system run by sentiment or spirit, but one run on scien
tific and technical principles.

Manpower had to be carefully placed

in the right positions, particularly in certain key industries.
Correspondingly, only the draft could allot men where they best served
the war effort.

The machine could not allow some to escape obligations

while others served.

At this point, the modernist argument branched

off into a consideration of the "slacker" and of democracy, which it
phrased as a question of equality.

Captain Percy Reginald of the

British army, before the Military Affairs Committee, maintained that
the draft was the democratic method because all were obligated by the
system.

Congressmen picked up the point.

As William Bankhead (D-Ala.)

stated it, the country formed one fabric indivisible and homogeneous,
which functioned as a unit with rights and obligations for all.
Citizens would equally serve the nation, with slackers forced to do
their part.36

-

Finally, the modernist argument claimed that the draft also
operated in the most efficient manner.

The proponents, having a

greater faith in experts and military specialists than the opponents,
insisted that the voluntary system had not functioned well in past
wars.

It had not proved efficient in England either, since the best

36Ibid., Pt. 2, 1368, 1035, 1056, 1060, 1127; U. S. Congress,
House, Increase of the Military Establishment, Hearings, 3; and Cong.
Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 1033, 972, 1097.
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of her citizens volunteered and then went to their death.

England

eventually replaced the system, and America, they concluded, should not
heed the call of sentiment or tradition.

Instead^draft supporters

insisted that American democracy could organize scientifically as a
m o d e m industrial and nationalistic state and must do so immediately.

37

When the draft debates commenced, the supporters of the volun
tary system believed that they commanded a majority in the House.38
By the time the roll call was taken, however, the volunteer principle
suffered an overwhelming non-partisan defeat, 313 to 109.

To a degree

the turnabout reflected the persuasiveness of the arguments of the
draft supporters; but other factors also operated against the advo
cates of volunteerism.

First, they were divided among themselves.

Some were advocates of volunteerism only because they wished to secure
room for Roosevelt’s outfit.

Other advocates of the volunteer system

rejected the whole idea of the Roosevelt division.

In the Committee

of the Whole House, the Roosevelt plan suffered an easy defeat.

After

this loss some Roosevelt advocates switched from the voluntary plan to
the draft position.

Anti-conscriptionists also suffered from advoca

ting an argument that could only be weakened by time.

At first it did

not appear that the United States would need to send troops to
Europe, and many representatives thought that the volunteer plan ought
to be given at least a trial.

Progressively they became conscious

of the implications of modern warfare and the need for American troops

37Ibld., 974-77, 979, 983, 985, 969, 1066; and Pt. 2, 1368,
1200, 1213-15, 1229.
38Ibid., Pt. 2, 1376; and Stephens to C. D. Marr, April 28,
1917, Box 27, Folder 213, Stephens Papers.
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39
in Europe.

As a result, momentum for greater mobilization increasing

ly pushed aside half-way measures.
Another factor that orignally influenced congressmen's attitudes
was the South's opposition to conscription of the Negro.

The Adminis

tration quieted their anxieties as the debate progressed.^®

Further

more, draft opponents could not effectively counter the charge that
they were "living in the cobwebs of the past."

Not only were they

going against the military experts and the President, they were also
setting up an agrarian, nineteenth-century view of American society
against a vigorous and disciplined industrial twentieth-century view.^
Finally, the draft opponents' appeal to traditional American democratic
ideals was countered by the draft supporters.

Postulating a democratic

and equalitarian ideal that better meshed with a modern industrial
society, the conscriptionists won an easy victory over the volunteerists.

Espionage and Censorship
Following passage of the Conscription Act, the House immediately
took up another highly controversial measure, The Espionage Bill.

Late

in the last session of the 64th Congress, the Administration had in
troduced similar legislation, which provided penalties for spies and
39
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1380-89; Arnett,
Claude Kitchin, 246; Hull, Memoirs, 89; U. S. Congress, House, Increase
of the Military Establishment, Hearings, 221; and Charles Merz, "At
the Capital," 294-95.
^®Fears of the effect of the draft on white supremacy caused some
congressmen to vote against the draft. See, Ibid.; 294-95; and Beaver,
Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 31.
Stephens' to C. D. Marr, April 28, 1917, Box 27, Folder 213,
Stephen Papers, expressed his views of the draft opponents in these
terms. That considerations of following the President affected votes can
be seen in Cong. Rec., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 987, 554.
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individuals supplying war information to the enemy.

It would have

passed if it had not became enmeshed in the last-minute legislative
tangle.

Consequently, administration supporters reintroduced the bill,

now modified by two amendments.

The first new section established

newspaper censorship and granted the President wide latitude in the
detection and the punishment of violators.

According to the Justice

Department, which wrote the original draft of the bill, newspaper
censorship was designed to suppress information worthwhile to the
enemy.

The second amendment provided that every letter, circular,

postal card, pamphlet, or book in violation of the act or treasonable
or "anarchistic" could be banned from the public mails.42

While the

original espionage provisions stirred few misgivings with congress
men, the newspaper and mail sections sparked lively apprehensions for
the safety of American rights.
Before the bill reached the House floor, the Justice Committee
held a short public hearing on it.

A number of witnesses voiced

alarm over the censorship provisions.

Jane Addam^ the famous social

worker, wondered if this bill would restrict advocacy of a postwar,
international body for peace.

In this case, the chairman of the Com

mittee, Edwin Y. Webb (D-N.C.), reassured Miss Addams that the bill
did not restrict support for that cause.

Since other aspects the

bill's application was less clear, many witnesses, along with news
papers of the country, demanded changes in the bill's wording.

The

Committee made a slight concession to the opponents when it added a

42New York Times, February 6, 1917, 3; Washington Post, April
3, 1917, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1591,
1595.
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provision that required the President to issue a proclamation which
would list prohibited subjects.4^
House debates on the revised bill revealed a variation in the
ideas and motives of the censorship supporters.

On one hand, they

mistrusted the self-restraint of the press in the publication of in
formation.

In essence, the argument maintained that the press would

publish any information that it could so long as it sold newspapers.
As evidence, Thaddeus Caraway (D-Ark.) cited newspaper stories during
the Civil War that had irresponsibly revealed military secrets.44

On

the other hand, they expressed a profound respect for the President.
Chairman Webb, who argued that since wartime created special restraints
on liberty, somebody simply had to be trusted to do the right thing.
He added that he placed his faith in the President rather than the
press. 45
3
All supporters of censorship necessarily argued that the rights
of the press were not unlimited.

In the case of some, their emphasis

centered on the limitations of free speech and press.

As a premise,

they reasoned that the press did not stand above the law or have
special rights above the people.

Given this, they contended that since

citizens could not harm the nation, neither could the press.

In wartime

the danger to the nation was particularly acute, thereby necessitating

4^U. S. Congress, House, Espionage and Interference with Neu
trality, Hearings on H. R. 291, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 50, 53, 18, 20, 46;
New York Times,April 13, 1917, 3; April 16, 1917, 3; April 20, 1917,
1; April 25, 1917, 7; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess.,
Pt. 2, 1590.
44Ibid., 1770, 1754, 1605, 1601, 1695.
4^Ibid., 1590; and Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic,
XI (May 12, 1917), 52.
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the imposition of strong restraints.

Though never directly stated,

proponents of this restrictive thesis of press rights implied that more
than spies and indiscreet editors should be arrested.

With censorship

broadly defined, radicals and pacifists might well also find themselves
entangled in the bill's restrictions.46
The House conducted the Espionage debates in a charged atmos
phere, which surged with partisan infighting.

To the Democrats the

press was a Republican bastion which sought every opportunity to em~
barras the Administration.

If Congress could enact press controls, a

major source of divisive criticism could be silenced.

For the Repub

licans, the situation was reversed because they believed that an un
fettered press could more easily attack the Democrat's management of
the war.

Consequently, Republican opponents of censorship insisted

that criticism prevented corruption, exposed incompetency, and stopped
abuses of power.

However, not all objection to the censorship pro

visions as a restriction on the revelation of corruption came from
partisan motives.

Fiorello LaGuardia objected strenuously because he

wanted to prevent conniption of the type which allowed contractors
during the Spanish-American War to sell the army the contaminated
meat that killed his father.47

4^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1710, 1809.
Debates left unclear congressional intentions, but the following
sources offer some inclination of attitudes: Stephens to Otto Ulrich,
August 22, 1917, Box 29, Folder 231, Stephens Papers; and U. S. Congress,
House, Espionage and Interference With Neutrality, Hearings, 19-20,
26, 8. The debates and hearings, however, do indicate a good deal of
confusion in the minds of supporters of censorship as to what the bill
would include. For a general discussion on civil liberties and
congressional attitudes in war-time, see Peterson and Fite, Opponents
of War, 1917-1918, particularly pages 4-7, 12-13, 51, 61.
47Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1719, 1601,
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A more general argument rested on a constitutional foundation.
Harold Knuston (R-Miss.) argued that the censorship section violated
constitutional guarantees and meant nothing less than the stifling
of American liberty.

In a more moderate form/ this argument said that

the Constitution, though permitting wartime restrictions, required that
restrictions be carefully and fully defined.

In either case, the argu

ment found its substance in a fear of unlimited power.

Minority

Leader Mann, in commenting on the postal provisions, thought that they
conferred autocratic powers on the Postmaster General.

LaGuardia,

who had a vivid appreciation of the abuse of power, suspected that
even Wilson who would not resist becoming a despot if given the
opportunity.
After four days of debate and amendment, the House started the
final votes on the bill.

Efforts to amend the mail provisions failed

in committee, and no member attempted to overturn the decision by a
formal roll call.

Free access to the mails rallied only a few congress

men, mainly because no major interest group felt its privileges at
stake, while opposition to the censorship provisions came from the
nation's press outside of Congress and the Republican party within.
The Republicans demanded a roll call, on which a few Democrats, moved
■'
i
by constitutional scruples, voted with the Republicans. The combi
nation proved adequate to defeat the provision, 221 to 167 (Tablje
i
I
3-3:A) . Democratic floor leaders reacted quickly by offering the Gard

1699, 1700.
this point.

At least one Democrat did agree with the Republicans on
See ibid., 1764. Mann, LaGuardia, The Fighter, 80.

^8Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1704, 1717,
1821, 1700, 1750, 1753, 1706, 1824, 1779.
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TABLE 3-3:A, B, C, AND D*
VOTE BY PARTY ON H. R. 291:

ESPIONAGE ACT9

A.

Remove Censorship Provision
_____________Party (Percent)
Vote
Democrat

Republican

Yes

27 (53)

86 (168)

NO

73 (142)

14 (28)

B.

;

Agree to Gard Amendment
Party (Percent)

Vote

Democrat

Republican

Yes

89 (169)

13 (24)

No

11 (20)

87 (166)

C.

Pass Espionage Bill
Party (Percent)

Vote

Republican

Democrat

Yes

95 (172)

47 (86)

No

5 (10)

53 (97)

D.

Remove Censorship Provision
Party (Percent)

Vote

Democrat

Republican

Yes

22 (39)

94 (155)

No

78 (147)

6 (10)

*The numbers in the tables will not exactly match the statistics
given in the body. This is the result of two factors: first, the
table statistics include only Republican and Democrats while the ones
in the body include minor party members; and second, the tables include
party members who did not vote but who indicated they would have voted
either yea or nay if present.
aCong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 1816, 1819, 1841; and
Pt. 3, 3144.
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Amendment as a compromise.

Since the amendment specifically stated

that censored information must relate to national security, it molli
fied several Democratic opponents.

With their support, the conpromise

won a narrow victory, 191 to 185 (Table 3-3:B). A few Republicans
joined the Democrats, but most Republicans (eighty-seven percent)
could not distinguish a difference between the Gard amendment and the
original provision.

A final roll call adopted the bill 260 to 107

(Table 3-3:C). The greatly reduced opposition came almost exclusively
from the Republicans.^®
The bill sped on to the Senate where the original censorship
provision was reattached.

In the conference committee, the House and

Senate conferees agreed to a compromise.

When the bill returned to

the House, Webb claimed that the conference's provision better pro
tected freedom of the press than the Gard Amendment.

The Republicans

rejected his contention as spurious, held a caucus, and reached a
non-binding decision to oppose censorship.

In what was shaping up

as the first major partisan contest of the legislative session, Presi
dent Wilson conferred with Democratic leaders, refused compromise
amendments, and insisted that Democrats vote for the conferees'
amendment.

4Q

A party caucus followed, which concluded a non-binding

On the original censorship provision, fifty-three Democrats
voted with the Republicans, which represented twenty-seven percent
of all Democrats voting. Twenty-eight Republicans voted with the
Democrats. See ibid., 1816. Voting on the Gard Amendment saw only
twenty Democrats voting with the Republicans, while twenty-four
Republicans voted with the Democrats. See, ibid., 1819. On the
final vote only nine Democrats voted with the Republicans, while
eighty-six, or forty-seven percent, of the Republicans voted with
the Democrats. See ibid., 1841; and New York Times, May 5, 1917,
1.
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decision to support the President.^0

Nonetheless, thirty-six Demo

crats, including the author of the Gard Amendment, doubted the wisdom
of the provision.

The combination of dissentient Democrats and Re

publicans defeated the amendment, 144 to 184 (Table 3-3:D). Ten
Republicans, who stated that they distrusted the press' ability to
practice self-restraint, voted with the main body of Democrats.

The

newspaper censorship provision suffered a well-publicized defeat, but
the restrictive mail provisions quietly entered the law books.

51

Conscription and Volunteerism Again
Shortly after the passage of the original Espionage Bill, a
conference report on the conscription law created more partisan con
flict.

After the draft law left the House in April, the Senate added

provisions for raising the Roosevelt division that friends of the old
Rough Rider had envisioned.

Going next to the conference, the bill

provoked a protracted wrangle as the House conferees opposed the Senate
on the volunteer division.

In May, one of the Senate conferees

eventually retreated, allowing the bill to return to the House with
the Roosevelt provision deleted.

During the original House debate,

the Roosevelt division had lost easily on a non-roll call vote, with

^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3131, 3140,
3144; New York Times, May 23, 1917, 1; May 26, 1917, 1; May 31,
1917, 5; Washington Post, May 23, 1917, 6; May 23, 1917, 2; May 26,
1917, 2; and May 28, 1917, 2. Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the
War Congress, 34, states that the Republicans reached a binding
caucus decision. He quotes the New York Times, but the Times for
May 31, page 1, states they reached a non-binding decision.
^ N e w York Times, June 1, 1917, 1; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol.
55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3133, 3144, 3136-38. Some congressmen continued
to express concern about the mail provisions, but not enough to force
a roll call. See ibid., 3132.
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such important Republican leaders as Mann opposed.

Since then the

Republicans had united, while significant numbers of Democrats, who
had voted for the voluntary system but not the Roosevelt division, saw
the colonel's army as the last hope for volunteerism.

Also promoting

some changes from the first vote was the knowledge that the British
and French looked with favor on the Roosevelt plan.

So when the House

voted to approve the conference report, the Roosevelt supporters formed
a partisan and ideological coalition large enough to carry the division
against administration opposition, 215 to 178.

The vote proved, how

ever, of no avail, as the second conference committee, under the
strong pressure of the White House, made the voluntary division a
matter of discretion with the President.

Since Wilson had no intention

of placing a political rival over a special outfit of troops, he frus
trated Colonel Roosevelt's and the House's desires by never estab
lishing the division.

The whole affair ended with Roosevelt admirers

charging Wilson with pettiness and Wilsonians accusing Republicans of
partisan spite.^2
The roll calls on the draft mirrored the shifting currents be
tween the debates in April and the conference report in May.

On the

first vote, which rejected the volunteer principle, non-partisan
factors determined the breakdown of

the ballot.

Both partieswith

near equality supported and opposed

the bill, though

slightlymore

^ Washington Post, April 18, 1917, 1; May 8, 1917, 2; May 12,
1917, 2; New York Times, April 28, 1917, 1; May 10, 1917, 1; May 11,
1917, 1; May 13, 1917, 1; May 15, 1917, 8; May 16, 1917, 1; May 19,
1917, 1; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol.
55, 1 Sess., Pt.
2, 1380;Pt. 3,
2200-05, 2215; Ramseyer to Personal
(no name), April
29, 1917,
Ramseyer Papers; to Don McGriffin, May 31, 1917, Ramseyer Papers;
and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 20-21, 26-30.
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Democrats as compared to Republicans voted against the draft (Table
3-4).

One of the non-partisan influences came from sectional divisions.

In the Northeast (the NE and MA regions), the parties solidly favored
the draft.

A fourth to a third in the Midwest (MEC and NWC regions)

and in the Southern and Border states voted against conscription.

The

greatest opposition to selective service surfaced in the Mountain and
Pacific states.

Another non-partisan force shaping the ballot was a

congressman's attitude toward the war.

The draft roll call was cor

related to a number of war measures, in particular to other draft
votes.

No important correlation was discovered, even with the

Roosevelt division roll call, except with the roll call on the war
resolution.

Abhorrence of sending American boys to war resulted in

opposition to drafting them to fight the war.

It is tempting to

speculate that an anti-war coalition, though a minority and unable
to prevent passage of war measures, was forming.

Such is not the case,

however, since the same configuration never joined again in opposition
to war measures.

Opposition to the war and the draft engendered

similarily compelling obligations for displays of conviction.

In the

months to follow, the onward thrust of the war program neither created
nor permitted similar demonstrations again.
Far different from the draft vote, the vote on the Roosevelt
division largely followed partisan rather than geographical lines
(Table 3-5).

Eighty-five percent of the Republicans supported their

former standard bearer while seventy-seven percent of the Democrats
opposed him.

Regionally, Republicans and Democrats who voted contrary

to the party opposition fell into no overall significant pattern.
A variation from the party norms for the Democrats is found in the

TABLE 3-4
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 3545: AN ACT TO
INCREASE THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

Yea
Nay

6
—

MA
R

D

R

ENC
D
R

25

24

61

18

40

7

20

60

2

26

8

5

3

2

1

2

6

21

3

10

39

1

8

4

3

3

3

—

WNC
D
R

SS
D

BS
R

D

MS
R

D

PS
R

D

TOTAL
R

D

R

8

148

167

4

63

45

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE

MA

D

R

Yea

100

100

Nay

—

—

ENC

D

R

D

R

WNC
D
R

D

SS
R

D

BS
R

D

R

D

R

TOTAL
D
R

96

97

75

66.

70

67

61

67

77

67

63

50

40

67

70

79

4

3

25

34

30

33

39

33

23

33

37

50

60

33

30

21

MS

PS

*Cong. Rec. , 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1555.
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TABLE 3-5
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 3646:
ROOSEVELT VOLUNTEER DIVISION*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

D

R

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

SS
D

BS
R

Yea

2

17

4

46

10

50

1

29

17

Nay

4

5

17

11

11

10

7

1

76

MS

D

3

R

4

D

3

11

PS
R

D

5

5

29

TOTAL
R

R

D

3

7

44

168

2

3

151

30

Region and Party (Percent)

NE

MA

D

R

D

R

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

D

Yea

33

77

19

81

48

84

13

97

18

Nay

67

23

81

19

52

17

87

3

82

VOTE

SS

BS
R

100

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2215.

D

12
88

MS
R

100

D

38
62

PS
R

100

TOTAL
R

D

R

D

60

70

23

85

40

30

77

15
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East North Central states and the Pacific States.

Similarly, the

Motintain, Border, Southern, and West North Central regions provide,
more wholehearted support for the Republican position.

No conclusion

is possible except that the Far West, an old Roosevelt stronghold,
accorded him more support than other areas.

Correlation with other

similar roll calls revealed no important connections.
vote united a temporary coalition of the dissatisfied:

The Roosevelt
Democrats

determined to support the volunteer principle, Republicans resolved
to satisfy the ambitions of their most popular national leader, and
Westerners remembering the Spanish-American War . ^ 3

Financing the War
Interspersed with the controversial measures were the more
conventional military appropriation bills.

Though involving vast

expenditures of money and effecting tremendous reorganization of in
dustry, they provoked less divisiveness in House business.

Such

measures as the appropriation bills for 1918 and the new military and
naval supply bills received unanimous support in record-breaking
time.

54

The measures did, however, force changes in House practices

and foment controversy at times.

For example, the unprecedented

demand for fast action resulted in the consolidation of the appropria
tion procedures of the House.

No longer did several committees, par

ticularly the military and naval committees, consider appropriation

53 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3031-20; Wash
ington Post, February 16, 1917, 4; May 1, 1917, 2; New York Times,
April 16, 1917, 1; May 1, 1917, 3; and Link, Woodrow Wilson and the
Progressive Movement, 273.
3 ^Cong.

285, 299.

Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 120-21, 165,
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bills.

Instead/ the Appropriations Committee took over their functions.

Both parties agreed to the step/ but some discontent on the by-passed
committees accrued.^

The Administration's desire to lump-sum appro

priations also created a hostile reaction in the House.

Since represen

tatives considered the Congress as the constitutional body for appro
priating funds, they felt that such a method would threaten theirintegrity as an institution.

In particular, Minority Leader Mann

protested Wilson's request for $100 million secret fund.

Mann

thought that it ignored the powers of Congress; but Congressional
leaders, including most Republicans, agreed with John Fitzgerald
(D-N.Y.), chairman of the Appropriations Committee, who argued that
C7
secret service operations required it. '
At times the military appropriation process also sparked divisive
voting on roll calls.

In one incident, critics demanded that the

government hire the new employees provided for by the appropriation
through the civil service.

This quickly became a partisan matter,

as ninety-one percent of the Democrats opposed eighty-nine percent of

5% e w York Times, May 2, 1917, 3; April 8 , 1917, 1; April 10,
1917, 2; and Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic, XIII
(December 15, 1917), 186.
56
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 5, 5105-06; 5130,
3189, 1693, 3279, 496-99. In committee hearings, members displayed
a concern for exactly what was being funded and how it was to be spent.
See U. S. Congress, House, Urgent Deficiency Appropriation on Account
of War Expenses, Hearings, on HR 3971, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 224-26,
182, 327, 722-23, 353. Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic,
X (April 21, 1917), 352-53, maintains that the criticism of lump-sum
appropriations came from the congressmen's desires to force the military
to spend some of the money in their own local districts. Some members
did introduce bills requiring expenditures in their areas, but probably
few really thought in such narrow terms.
^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 496, 730; and
Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 8 , 7905.
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the Republicans— the most partisan vote of the first session (Table
3 - 6 ) . More than mere partisanship had a role, however, as civil
service reformers such as LaGuardia dreaded the war's impact on
administrative practices.5®

in a second incident, opposition de

veloped to the Navy’s purchase of land along the James River in
Virginia.

Republican critics of the proposal charged that only land

owners and not the Navy would benefit .8 9

The majority agreed with the

critics, and though the voting divided on partisan lines, thirtyeight percent of the Democrats sided with the Republican position
(Table 3 - 7 ) .
Wartime appropriations generated institutional and partisan
tensions, while the actual financing of the appropriations fomented
questions of good public policy and social justice.
divided on both questions,

the first of which involved the proper

ratio between the money to be raised
borrowed by bonds.
the balanced budget.

The House

by

taxes and the sum to be

In normal times, both parties stood squarely for
In wartime, however, they realized that a

balanced budget represented an impossible goal.

To what degree the

balanced budget should be abandoned became the question.

Linked

closely with the first question, the issue of social justice involved
the problem of who should pay the taxes.

In 1913 progressive groups

triumphed over reactionary elements with the adoption of the income

5 8 Ibid.,

Vol. 5 5 , 1 Sess., Pt. 3 , 3 0 6 3 , 3 0 8 7 -8 8 ,

3123.

S^ i b i d . f 3 2 8 4 , 3 2 8 7 , 3 2 9 3 , 3 2 9 6 , 3 5 3 9 . The Navy Department had
first asked for the appropriation for the land; later Wilson wrote
Chairman Padgett of the Naval Committee that he supported the purchase.
That many Democrats still sided with the Republicans showed the
apprehension as to the soundness of the appropriation.
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TABLE 3-6
VOTE BY PARTY ON H. R. 3932:
CIVIL SERVICE*

Party (Percent)
Vote

Democrat

Yes

9 (11)

No

91 (158)

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3123.

Republican

89 (143)
11

(16)

TABLE 3-7
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 3971:
JAMES RIVER LAND PURCHASE

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

Yea

1

Nay

5

D

4

5

6

1

38

9

34

6

9

1

17

1

WNC
D
R

ENC
D
R

R

SS
D

4
19

BS
R

57

D

2

20

MS
R

D

PS
R

15

1

4

11

4

3

D

5

TOTAL
D
R

R

1

3

93

21

3

8

58

125

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

D

ENC
R

D

R

WNC
D
R

D

SS

Yea

17

6

90

10

36

15

14

17

74

Nay

83

94

10

90

64

85

86

83

26

BS
R

100

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3296.

MS

D

R

D

58

20

57

42

80

43

PS
R

100

TOTAL
R

D

R

D

25

27

62

14

75

73

38

86
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tax amendment to the Constitution.

To progressives, the income

tax represented a social equalizing tool which placed the tax burden
on those capable of bearing it.

60

Increasingly the revenue bills

after 1913 reflected this philosophy.

Thus, the February 1917 Revenue

Act placed stiff levies on wealthy individuals.

A new feature in

the 1917 law was an excess profits tax on ballooning corporation in
come .6 1

Advocates of graduated taxes controlled past policy and the

momentum of war demands favored their continued domination.
In the Ways and Means Committee, which received guidelines from
the Administration and wrote the specifics of the bill, several mem
bers, led by Republican ranking member Joseph W. Fordney (Mich.),
were less than pleased by past policy.

Their distress was increased

when Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo announced the Adminis
tration' s plan .for raising $1 . 8 billion more by new corporation and
income taxes.

In place of this proposal they advocated a scheme which

would raise more by bonds.

Their argument, which conservatives

repeated frequently during the debates, stressed the baneful inhibition
that high taxes would produce on business initiative.

Since they

dominated the subcommittee that drafted the original bill, they pro
vided only $1 billion more in taxes.

This figure would require that

at least three-fourths of the war cost be financed by bonds.

In the

Committee as a whole the thinking contrasted sharply with that of the
subcommittee.

Chairman Kitchin and leading Democratic members such

66New York Times, April 12, 1917, 2; and Link, Woodrow Wilson:
Campaigns for Progresslvism and Peace, 1916-1917, 60-65.
61New York Times, January 17, 1917, 8 ; March 2, 1917, 7;
Washington Post, January 20, 1917, 1; March 2, 1917, 4; and Link,
Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement, 194-95.
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as Cordell Hull (Tenn.) pressed for a plan in which the government
financed at least fifty percent of the war by taxes. 6 3

The other

Democratic and Republican members, though less sure of the exact
percentage, nonetheless, desired to raise the full $1 . 8 billion as
recommended by McAdoo.
draft, rewrote the bill,

The committee threw away the subcommittee's
and increased excess profit, inheritance, and

income taxes so as to provide the required funds.

At the same time,

the Committee agreed to an across the board ten percent hike in the
tariff, a move which mollified the extreme protectionist sentiments of
Fordney.

Other proposals such as a tax on cotton sparked acrimonious

discussion, but the committee eventually resolved all differences.
For the first time in fifty years, the revenue bill emerged with the
unanimous approval of the committee. 6 3
Debates on the House floor revealed a determined advocacy for
the bill along with a resentment that the taxes were needed in the first
place.

The consensus was that never in peacetime would supporters vote

for taxes such as those contained in the bill.

Nonetheless, the

proponents of the bill maintained that, as demanded by justice, the
war had to be financed by progressive taxes and by the present genera
tion to do otherwise; argued two Iowa Republicans, William Green and
William Ramseyer, would condemn the Congress in the eyes of future
generations.6^

It would also place the burden on the members of the

62New York Times, April 4, 1917, 2; April 12, 1917, 2; April
28, 1917, 4. Hull, Memoirs, 89-90; Washington Post, April 9, 1917,
1; April 16, 1917, 1; and April 27, 1917, 4.

May

8

6 3New York Times, May 2, 1917, 6 ; May 2, 1917, 1; May 6 , 1917, 13;
, 1917, 2; May 9, 1917, 1; and Washington Post, May 16, 1917, 2.
64New York Times, May 12, 1917, 1; Ramseyer to D. W. Matheny,
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community least able to pay taxes.

In the meantime, the war manufac

turers and speculators would reap huge profits from the blood of
American boys.

Arguments for justice became spiced with anger direc

ted toward those profiteers thought to have caused the war.

Claude

Kitchin, who voted against the war resolution, was the chief proponent
of this contention for high taxes.

He and other former anti-war

opponents made it abundantly clear that munitions manufacturers
should pay for the war.

But even strong supporters of war could agree

with Kitchin since ostensibly America waged the war for democracy and
not selfish profit.

Opponents were unable to mount an effective counter

argument, although they insisted that taxes ought to be added on cotton,
CC

trade, and poorer income groups.

3

After the general debate on the bill, the House started the com
plicated process of amendment.

Insurgents contested the income pro

visions because they failed to tax the income of the rich sufficiently.
Edward Keating (D-Col.), demanding that wealth ought to be conscripted
as well as men, offered an amendment to impost a
income over $150,000.

100%

duty on all

Though it attracted a few adherents, few

congressmen could agree with its radicalism.

66

More realistic and also

more successful was the amendment offered by Irvine Lenroot to increase
income rates twenty-five percent on incomes over $40,000.

At first

May 2, 1917, Ramseyer Papers; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1
Sess., Pt. 3, 2225-26, 2124, 2806.
65flew York Times, May 11, 1917,
250-51, 261; Stephens to N. L. Locke,
Stephens Papers; Cong. Rec., 65Cong.,
and Pt. 3, 2402, 2418-20, 2342, 2287,

1; Arnett, Claude Kitchin, 241,
May 13, 1917, Box 27, Folder 208,
Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2,2142;
2294, 2303, 2485-86.

^6New York Times, May 17, 1917,4; and Cong.
55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2403, 2303.

Rec., 65Cong.,

Vol.
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Kitchin, who acted as floor manager of the bill, opposed all income
boosts as an underhanded trick to later remove taxes on special inte
rest.

During the debate on the amendment, Kitchin received a call

from Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo.

Informed by McAdoo that the

Revenue Bill needed to raise more than $1.8 billion, Kitchin dropped
his opposition to the increase, though not his dislike of it.

In

the roll call that followed, the hike in taxes on large incomes passed
easily, 345 to sixty.

67

Both parties supported the income provision, but fifty of the
sixty opponents came from Republican ranks who voted against their
fellow party member's amendment (Table 3-8).

Besides this partisan

variation, geographical differences are noticeable as all but seven of
the fifty Republicans represented the northeastern regions (NE, MA, and
ENC).

That Democrats of the same regions did not join the Republicans

probably indicates that partisan influences held them in line.
also relate to different types of local constituencies.

It may

Less expli

cable is the fact that eight of the ten Democrats in opposition came
from the South.

A possible reason is that Kitchin, who did not want

a trade-off between higher income tax supporters and lower postal
rate advocates, voted against the amendment.

His action likely in

fluenced several fellow southerners to side with him.

In general, the

voting pattern marshaled northeastern Republicans, who thought the
other regions were stealing their wealth, against the tax.

On the

other hand, both parties in the rest of the country favored a more
graduated income tax.
?New York Times, May 17, 1917, 1; May 18, 1917, 1; Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2419, 2462, 2482, 2815,; and Charles
Merz, "At the Capital," The New Republic, XI (May 26, 1917), 108-09.
6

TABLE 3-8
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4280:
RATES ON INCOME TAX

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

R

D

MA
R

ENC
D
R

Yea

5

14

24

37

21

47

Nay

1

10

—

23

—

10

WNC
D
R

10

SS
D

BS
R

D

28

87

1

1

7

2

MS
R

32

D

7

8

3

PS
R

D

5

—

1

R

5

10

D

TOTAL
R

191

150

8

50

—

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE

MA

D

R

Yea

83

58

100

62

Nay

17

42

—

38

*Cong. Rec.

D

R

ENC
D
R

.1 0 0
—

83
17

WNC
D
R

100

SS

BS

D

R

97

93

33

3

7

67

, 65 Cong./ Vol. 55/ 1 Sess./ Pt. 3, 2815.

MS

D

R

100

73

100

27

—

D

PS
R

D

R

83

100

100

17

—

D

TOTAL
R

96

75

4

25

145

The amendment process next took up the tax schedules on corpora
tions.

Martin Madden opposed the whole section, arguing that its

basic source of revenue, the excess profits tax, imposed unjust rates.
Most other opponents of the section thought that adjustments, such as
choosing a different base year on which to rest capital investment,
would erase the defects.

A majority of the House did not agree with

Madden or even with the more moderate critics.

They easily defeated

all amendments in the Committee of the Whole House.

When the Committee

resolved back into the House, opponents made a final effort to change
the corporation section.

They forced a roll call on an amendment that

delayed collection of the basic five percent corporation tax until a
corporation earned an eight-percent profit.
close vote of 173 to 235.88
supported the amendment.

It lost on the relatively

Seventy-one percent of the Republicans

At the same time, eighty-six percent of the

Democrats opposed it (Table 3-9).

From a geographical perspective,

the roll call demonstrated that Democrats of the Northeastern regions
(NE, MA, and ENC) tended toward supporting the Republican position.

In

the rest of the regions except the Pacific states the Democrats aligned
close to the party average.

Republicans who broke party ranks came

more from the New England States and the West North Central region.
Generally, the Northeast areas and the Pacific states desired lower
taxes, while the West North Central, South, and Border states fought
to retain stringent taxes on business profits.
The final amendment vote came over a hotly contested provision
on postal rates.

The provision affected the newspaper, magazine,

8 8 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2278, 2130,
2545-51, 2816.

TABLE 3-9
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4280:
MANUFACTURERS TAX*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

D

R

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

SS
D

BS
R

Yea

3

9

8

43

6

53

1

15

6

Nay

3

15

16

17

16

4

9

14

89

D

MS
R

3
33

PS
R

D

D

TOTAL
R

D

R

8

1

5

3

7

28

143

3

7

1

1

3

174

57

Region and Party (Percent)

NE

MA

D

R

D

R

ENC
D
R

Yea

50

38

33

72

27

93

10

52

6

Nay

50

62

67

28

73

7

90

48

94

VOTE

WNC
D
R

BS

SS
D

R

D

100

100

MS

PS

TOTAL
R

R

D

R

D

R

D

73

13

83

75

70

14

72

27

87

17

25

30

86

28

* Cong. Rec., 65 Cong. , Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt . 3, 2816.
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and mall order industries by both establishing zone rates and by in
creasing overall rates.
types of members.

Support for it manifested itself among two

The economy-minded favored the amendment, because

higher rates would decrease the postal service's ninety million
dollars a year loss on publications.

Support also drew substance from

members, mostly Democrats, who disliked the great publishing houses of
the East for their unfair criticism of the Administration.6 9

The

opponents of the zone system adopted as their main counter thrust a
nationalist argument:

a free, vigorous national press would foster a

non-regional market place for the exchange of ideas . 7 0

The division

over the amendment split the House closely, with the result that in
the Committee of the Whole House opponents eliminated the objectional
provision.

However, on final passage, Kitchin forced a roll call

where the zone system now won, 256 to 150.

71

As in the case of the corporation tax roll call, the postal
vote followed partisan lines (Table 3-10).

The Democratic position

triumphed because of greater unity in their ranks, for ninety percent,
as compared to sixty-five percent of the Republicans, voted with the
party majority.

Democrats also succeeded because a larger percentage

of their members voted in comparison to the Republicans.

Geographically,

the postal zone system carried because most regions opposed the domi
nation of the Eastern (NE and MA) publishing houses.

Republicans who

69Stephens to J. P. O'Furery, January 22, 1917, Stephens Papers;
and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2133, 2153, 2118.
70New York Times, May 19, 1917, 1; May 23, 1917, 1; and Cong.
Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2278.
71Xbid., 2817.

TABLE 3-10
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4280: RATES AND ZONE
SYSTEM FOR SECOND CLASS MAIL*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

MA

NE
D

R

D

R

D

ENC
R

WNC
D
R

10

Yea

2

8

9

12

21

28

Nay

4

15

14

48

1

28

16

SS
D

BS
R

96

13

3

MS
R

D

31

2

1

9

PS

D

R

—

8

D

R

4

4

1

6

6

TOTAL
R

D

181

70

21

128

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE

MA

ENC

D

R

D

R

D

R

Yea

33

35

39

20

96

50

Nay

67

65

61

80

4

50

WNC
D
R

100

SS
D

55

100

45

—

BS
.R

100

*Cong. Rec./ 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2817A.

PS

MS
D

D

R

97

18

100

3

82

—

R

100

TOTAL
R

D

R

D

80

40

90

35

20

60

10

65
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broke with the party tended to come from the Midwest (ENC and WNC).
Democrats who parted from their party's majority represented New
England and Middle Atlantic states.

In stun, the voting pattern

divided along party lines, with variations from partisanship coining
from the high support given the publishing interests by members of
both parties of the Northeast.
The final two roll calls on the Revenue Bill consisted of
efforts either to recommit the bill or to defeat it.

The first roll

call combined nearly all elements which desired revisions in the law.
If the bill had been returned to the Ways and Means Committee, un
doubtedly income, corporation, and postal revisions would have re
sulted, thereby gratifying desires for changes in the bill.

From

another viewpoint, the roll call can be seen as a Republican effort
to change the bill, since almost all House members voting for the motion
were Republicans.

The breakdown on this roll call, where seventy-seven

percent of! the Republicans voted for the motion and ninety-eight per
cent of the Democrats opposed it, indicated the high partisanship
(Table 3-11).

The twenty-two percent of the Republicans siding with

the Democrats followed no clear-cut regional pattern.

There was a

tendency among the East and West North Central Republicans to oppose
the motion, but the variation was not significant.

Specifically,

twelve of the dissident Republicans were members of the Ways and Means
Committee which wrote the bill.

Documentary sources provide no clear

evidence for their dissent from the party majority, which also appeared
on the other roll calls.

However, an explanation perhaps can be found

in the compromises reached in Committee.

There trading occurred,

especially over the tariff, tobacco, and sugar provisions, which

TABLE 3-11
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4280:
MOTION TO RECOMMIT*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

D

ENC
R

D

R

Yea

1

17

1

52

2

34

Nay

5

6

23

9

19

18

WNC
D
R

SS
D

20

10

9

MS

BS
R

—

D

R

3

97

—

D

12

34

PS
R

6

D

TOTAL
R

—
5

8

D

R

7

4

156

3

201

45

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE

MA

D

R

D

Yea

17

74

4

Nay

83

26

96

R

ENC
D
R

86

10

68

14

90

32

WNC
D
R

100

BS

SS

MS

PS

TOTAL
D
R

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

69

—

100

—

100

—

100

—

70

2

78

31

100

100

30

98

22

31

100

100

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2817B.

150

151

perhaps mollified Republicans.7 2

At least several Republican opponents

of the bill charged that the secret sessions held by the Committee had
allowed them to conclude several underhanded trade-offs.

Another

possibility is that Fordney, who always said that he disliked the bill,
yet supported it, wanted the Republicans to gain some credit if the
measure proved popular.

In the case it did not, Minority Leader Mann,

who directed Republican opposition, could then claim honor for his
party.

73

In any event, the alignment on the recommitment motion

indicates abnormal voting by the Republican Ways and Means members.
The last roll call on the Revenue Act was largely a formality,
demanded by Mann.

The bill passed the House by a wide margin of 329

to 76, as all opposition came from the Republicans.

Of five roll

calls on the Revenue bill, the last four form a scalogram (Table 3-12
and note on page 153).

Measured by the scale is the readiness of

representatives to accept higher taxes and to accept the Revenue bill.
Sixteen percent (sixty-four members) opposed all tax provisions,
twenty-four percent (ninety-five members) accepted one or two, and
sixty percent supported three or four of the tax votes.

Of the sixty-

four congressmen unable to agree on acceptance of higher taxes, all
were Republicans.

The greatest number of these Republicans represented

the Northeastern regions outside of New England (MA and ENC), though
the highest percentage of opponents came from the Border states.

At

the medium rank of support, eighty-six came from the Republican party,

72New York Times. May 12, 1917, 1; May 20, 1917, 1; May 21, 1917,
1; Washington Post, May 11, 1917, 1; May 7, 1917, 6 ; May 8 , 1917, 2; and
May 9, 1917, 1.
73Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 2124; and Pt. 3,
2806.

TABLE 3-12:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON THE
REVENUE BILL: H. R. 4280

Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE
POSITION

NE
D

Low
Medium
High

MA
R

D

R

21

32
18
9

24

59

2

TOTAL

3
3

13

9

21

6

3

ENC
D
R

SS

WNC
D
R

D

20

10

12

96

22

56

10

28

96

2

12

D

3

4

14
28
14

M
M

BS
R

—

3

PS

MS
R

D

7
3

mm

R

D

M
M

1

-

5

—
33

1

8

33

11

8

TOTAL
D
R

R

M
M

1

1

7

4

5

M
M

6

M
M

64
86

2

9
195

10

204

194

44

Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE
POSITION

Low
Medium
High

NE

MA

D

R

„

10

50
50

62
29

D

R

__

54
31
15

13
88

ENC
D
R

9
91

25
50
25

WNC
D
R

100

14
43
43

R

—

100

—

100

MS

BS

SS
D

PS

D

R

D

R

M
M

64
27
9

M
M

17
83

100

100

M
M

D

TOTAL
R

R

D

10

M
M

20

70

80

20

4
96

33
44
23

The order of the roll calls is 37, 35, 36, 34
Percent at each point on the scale 16, 16, 8 , 12, 48
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .952
152

153

TABLE 3-12:B
SCALEOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4280

Scale
Position

Notion

1

VAR 37

To pass H. R. 4280. 329-76; f = yea. Cong. Rec./
65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2816.

2

VAR 35

TO amend in the nature of a substitute for section
1201, H. R. 4280, by reducing the rates for second
class mail and applying to that class the zone system
now in use for parcel post. 256-150; + = yea.
Ibid., 2817A.

3

VAR 36

To recommit H. R. 4280 to the committee on Ways and
Means. 161-247; + = nay. Ibid., 2817B.

4

VAR 34

To amend H. R. 4280, by prohibiting the collection
of five percent tax until the manufacturers enu
merated shall have earned a profit of eight percent
upon the actual capital invested. 173-235; + = nay.
Ibid., 2816.

A NOTE ON SCALE CONSTRUCTION
The roll-call votes used for scale construction in this study
were taken from the roll-call data sets for each House compiled by the
ICPR. The computer programs used for scale construction were those
in the ICPR's Osiris II package. By examining the content description
of each roll call in the ICPR data set and the Congressional Record,
all roll calls relating to similar issues in each House were listed
to form a "preliminary universe of content." From this universe, a
series of subsets relating to specific issues (e.g., the war, civil
liberties, taxation) were selected. The uni'verse was then recorded
by subset and the roll-calls were recoded and subjected to a program
to compute Yule’s Q correlation coefficient for each pair of rollcalls in the universe. Yule's Q (which ranges from -1 to +1) is
the generally accepted measure of the scalability of a pair of roll
calls. A high value of Q between a pair of roll calls indicates that
they scale— that is, few (if any) members will be found who reject an
easler-to-support item and than accept a harder-to-support item. Every
roll-call in a given subset was required to have a Q value of above
+.7 with every other measure in that subset to be considered scalable.
The Q limit was lowered to ± . 6 on several occasions in order to include
certain desired items within a scalable subset, but in all cases the
mean Q for each subset exceeded .7 and in most cases it exceeded .85.
The computer-generated matrix of Q coefficients for the universe was
then examined to determine which measures scaled within each subset and
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within the whole universe. To double-check the manual "clustering" of
scalable roll-calls the matrix was subjected to a computer program to
produce clusters of scalable votes on a particular issue. Those rollcalls in each cluster with negative Q values were "reflected"— the
yeas and nays reversed to produce the correct response category
indicating the positive position.
Each cluster of roll-call votes was then subjected to a scaling
program which ordered the items in the cluster in a rank from largest
passing set to smallest passing set and assigned a scale position to
each member. In most cases, members who were absent for more than
thirty percent of the votes in a scale were excluded from that scale.
Similarly, those with more than one inconsistent vote (e.g., voting
for a harder-to-accept proposition after rejecting an easier-toaccept proposition) were usually excluded from the scale except when
the scale size could legitimately accommodate more than one incon
sistent vote (referred to as an "error"). Careful use of the Q
Coefficient and proper controls on errors and absences consistently
yield valid scales. A further customary check on the adequacy of each
scale is its coefficient of reproducibility which measures the per
centage of responses on scale items that could be correctly predicted
from a member's position on the scale. Scales with a coefficient of
reproducibility above .9 are generally considered to be satisfactory.
For a discussion of scaling methods, see Lee F. Anderson,
Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call
Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), ch. VI; and
Charles M. Dollar and Richard J. Jensen, Historian1s Guide to
Statistics: Quantitative Analysis and Historical Research (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971), especially 116-21.
The explanation on scale construction has been adapted from Terry
Seip, "An Economic Analysis of Southern Representatives During Recon
struction,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana State University,
1974), 143-44. The format used to present the scale results has been
adapted from Seip, "An Economic Analysis." The initial table (A) in
each act gives the distribution of scale scores by region and party
the coefficient of reproducibility, the order of roll calls, and the
percentage of each point on the scale. The second table (B) in each
set identifies the items in each scale position, the vote, the positive
position, and the citation to the Congressional Record.
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while only nine wore the Democratic label.

Regionally, these Repub

licans fell into a noticeable pattern, since they come from New England,
East North Central, Mountain, and Pacific States.

At the final rank

of support, forty-four Republicans voted in favor of higher taxes.

The

West North Central (forty-two percent) followed by the East North
Central (twenty-five percent) voted in this category.

The contrast

between Republicans and Democrats on the bill reveals itself best at
this level, as all but nine of the Democrats supported the graduation
taxation.

In summary, advocacy of the Revenue Bill created no tension

for almost all Democrats as they overwhelmingly backed a progressive
tax policy.

Though the majority of Republicans only moderately

supported the bill, a number did break ranks, particularly from the
Midwest (ENC and WNC regions).

By so breaking ranks, these Mid-

westerners indicated an ideological position in favor of a high tax
to bond ratio and in support of stiff taxes on corporations and indi
viduals.

On the other hand, a number of Republicans, mostly from the

Middle Atlantic, East North Central, and Border regions, showed de
cided conservative tendencies.
A singular combination of motives and ideas operated in the
writing and passage of the Revenue Act.

Narrow and often petty sec

tional, partisan, and special interest considerations swayed the debates
and amendment process.

However, the popular portrayal of the bill as

one written by the agrarian South so as to place taxes on the indus
trial wealth of the Northeast is only in a limited sense true . 7 4

No

doubt the South favored the bill, but other regions advocated it also ,

7 4 Ibid., 2298-98, 2661, 2467, 2609, 2611; and Arnett, Claude
Kitchin, 261.
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most notably the Midwest.

Moreover, such a criticism of the bill

ignored the .motivations of many of its proponents.

For one thing,

considerations of justice and public policy underlined the debates
and in fact governed the outcome.

Otherwise, a coalition of Democrats

and insurgent Republicans could never have formed.

These elements,

though not wholly satisfied, believed that much had been accomplished
in creating a judicious system.

As one Congressman wrote, the war

had acted as an instrument which prodded members toward progressive,
even socialistic, positions. 7 5

For a second reason, the bill fulfilled

the requirements for proper war financing as established by the Treasury
Department.

Many observers did not agree that it served good public

policy, claiming that it would stir up immense amounts of class and
sectional animosity.

Workers and farmers were unconvinced that wealth

was taxed enough, and business resented being made to carry much of
the burden.

In the House, several members believed the measure crude

and even "monstrous," and hoped that the Senate would rewrite the
bill.

Still, no congressmen advanced better proposals, and the revenue

bill eventually played an important part in the securement of a firm
financial structure for war.

7fi

Besides raising taxes, the House sought to mobilize the financial
resources of the Federal Reserve System.

Carter Glass (D-Va.),

chairman of the Banking Committee, with the cooperation of the Treasury

7 5 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2272-74, 2294;
and Stephens to Frank Dolegal, May 15, 1917, Box 24, Folder 189,
Stephens Papers.

75New York Times, May 23, 1917, 1; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol.
55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2806-11; Carter Glass to D. B. Ryland, May 23,
1917, Box 107, Folder 1917— War Revenues Bill, Carter Glass Papers,
University of Virginia Library; and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the
War Congress,61.
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Department, wrote a bill.

Originally Glass introduced it in the 64th

House, but it failed to pass.

The Treasury Department during the 65th

House demanded action on it as necessary war emergency legislation.
Its provisions contained features to expand the financial capabilities
of the Federal Reserve System and the nation's banks.

First, it

changed the required reserve of country banks .(i.e., banks not in the
major banking cities) from twelve percent to seven percent, all of
which now had to be carried in Federal Reserve banks.

Further, the

first provision also reduced the required reserves of banks in central
reserve cities from eighteen percent to fifteen percent.

The law's

purpose on this provision was to increase funds for lending.

The

second main section provided for the liberalization of entry rules
into the Federal Reserve System.

77

These two features made up the

bill as written by Glass, but a third provision not authored by Glass
became the center of controversy during House debates.
Criticism of the bill came from advocates of the country banks.
Ebenezer Hill (R-Conn.), member of the Banking Committee, argued that
Glass designed the liberalization rules so as to drive state banks
into the Federal Reserve System.

He also saw a danger to country

banks due to the removal of the reserve requirements. 7 8

Few repre

sentatives agreed with Hill, but many other country bank supporters
criticized the bill because Glass failed to include a check exchange
provision.

Sponsored by Kitchin, this amendment allowed country banks

77Glass to T. James Fernley, February 7, 1917, Box 99, Folder
Glass Papers; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2,
1577-80.
78Ibld., 1874.
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to charge an exchange fee on checks not to exceed ten cents per hundred
dollars.

The virtues of the amendment, according to a bipartisan

coalition, sprang from its aid to c o mtry banks.

Joseph Cannon and

Louis McFadden (R-Pa.), both with personal financial interests in
country banks, argued that without the check charge the banks would be
forced into bankruptcy.

79

provision into his bill.

Glass bitterly opposed the intrusion of this
Proponents of the Kitchin amendment, nonethe

less, persisted in advocating it and thereby transformed a war measure
into a battle between special interest groups.
Glass, with the aid of such Republicans as Nicholas Longworth
(R-Ohio), maintained that an exchange fee lodged an excessive and unjust
charge on industry.

William Howard (D-Ga.) voiced similar conclusions

from a farm-oriented perspective when he remarked that country banks
made enough profit— out of farmers— already. At the first stage of
the legislative process, Glass succeeded in having the Kitchin Amend
ment thrown out on a point of order.

The bill then passed without

a roll call . 8 0
In the Senate, Senator Hardwick secured the adoption of his
check exchange amendment.

In this form, the Senate passed the revised

Glass bill and sent it to the conference committee.

Before the House

appointed its conferees, supporters of the Hardwick amendment demanded
that the House instruct the conferees on the amendment.

They forced

a roll call and won an easy victory over Glass and his adherents,
240 to 117.

Glass, who remained unalterably opposed to the amendment,

79

Ibid., Pt. 4, 3522, 3526, 3604.

80

Ibid., 3526, 3533, 3543, 3614; and Pt. 2, 1584-85.
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headed the House conferees.

Not surprisingly, given Glass's hos

tility, the conference changed the Hardwick amendment substantially.
In its new form, the amendment vested the Federal Reserve Board with
the power of deciding if member banks could charge check exchange
fees. ® 2
A new phase of the row erupted when the conference report
returned.

Frank Mondell (R-Wyo.) charged Glass with "flagrantly and

contemptuously" disregarding the instructions of the House.

Glass,

who obviously played a subtle game throughout, denied the charges and
told the House that he had only tried to perfect a crude amendment.8 3
New instructions to rewrite the conference report followed, but this
time Glass defeated the country bank advocates, 170 to 159.

One factor

in the shift in voting may have come from the knowledge that Glass
favored the President's vetoing the bill if the Hardwick amendment was
made mandatory.

Fear that Glass's influence would prompt Wilson in

fact to veto the bill caused some representatives, who reasoned that
"half a loaf" was better than nothing at all, to accept the revised
Hardwick amendment.

Another pressure came from a Glass-inspired

lobbying campaign by commercial and industrial elements.

84

A final

83,
Ibid., Pt. 2, 2078; Glass to William McAdoo, no date but
probably late May, 1917; Box 102, Folder Hardwick Amendment, Glass
Papers and to W. P. G. Harding, February 1, 1917, Box 99, Folder 1,
Glass Papers.
8 2 Cong.

Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3524-26.

QO

Ibid.; and Palmer, Carter Glass;

Unreconstructed Rebel, 131-33.

8^Glass to William McAdoo, no date but late May 1917 likely date,
Box 102, Folder Hardwick Amendment; to George McRay, May 8 , 1917,
Box 99, Folder Kitchin Amendment; to Thomas A. Fernley, April 20, 1917,
Box 99, Folder 1; to George G. McRay, May 8 , 1917, Box 99, Folder Kit
chin Amendment; to Scott Ferris, May 19, 1919, Box 102, Folder Hardwick
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roll call agreed to the conference report, 240 to 117.88
Analysis of the three roll calls by a scalogram demonstrates
that the House closely divided over the check exchange provision
(Table 3-13).

Thirty-one percent of the House found it impossible to

support the Hardwick amendment in any fashion.

These strong opponents

came from both parties in about equal numbers, with fifty-eight Demo
crats following the leadership of Glass and forty-eight Republicans
joining.

A geographical breakdown indicates that the highest per

centage of opponents were located in the Northeast area (NE, MA, and
ENC).

Twenty percent found it possible to vote once in favor of the

Kitchin Amendment, but then turned against the Senate's Hardwick
amendment on subsequent votes.

As the crucial swing group, they voted

to sustain Glass's action in the conference.

They came equally from

both parties, thirty-five apiece, which again indicates the bi
partisan .nature of the voting.

The Hardwick amendment gathered its

least enthusiastic support in the Middle Atlantic region.

Here, most

of the members completely opposed the amendment or veered into the
opposition camp after an initial favorable vote.

High percentages

within the Border and Pacific states were also in this swing group.
The final forty-nine percent, who represented both parties in nearly
equal numbers, voted in support of the check exchange fee.

Geographical

ly, the Far West (Ms and PS), the South, and West North Central provided

Amendment; and E. S. Underhill, May 19, 1917, Box 102, Folder Hardwick
Amendment, Glass Papers. The last three letters demonstrate Glass'
hostility to the amendment, though he stated that he abided by the ori
ginal House roll call in the conference. They actually reveal he in
tended to "work things out" in the conference. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3620.
85Ibid., 3621.

TABLE 3-13:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON KITCHIN
AND HARDWICK AMENDMENTS: H. R. 3673

Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE
POSITION

Low
Medium
High

NE
D

MA
R

3

R

ENC
D
R

12

9
5

7

17

6

21

1

6

2

17

4

20

15

55

—

TOTAL

D

3
5

20

17
14

WNC
D
R

SS
D

20

5
3
1

7
19

16
32
44

51

9

26

92

MS

BS
R

2
—

2

D

R

D

PS
R

D

TOTAL
D
R

R

13
12
2

1
3
3

1

1

1

3

1

1

1

2

3

4

2

3

27

7

5

6

4

8

58
58
60

48
55
72

176

175

Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE
POSITION

D

R

D

R

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

Low
Medium
High

75
—
25

45
25
30

47
40
13

31
38
31

60
15
25

56
33
11

17
35
48

—
100
—

48
44
7

14
43
43

20
20

17
17
67

25
25
50

38
26
38

34
33
33

NE

MA

33
28
39

The order of the roll calls is 30, 48, 49
Percent at each point on the scale 31, 20, 12, 37
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .985

—
27
73

SS

MS

BS

60

PS

TOTAL
R

27
32
41
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TABLE 3-13:B
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 3673

Scale
Position

Motion

1

VAR

30 To instruct the managers of the conference committee
on H. R. 3673, (40 STAT-232, June 21, 1917), amen
ding an act approved December 23, 1913, known as the
Federal Reserve Act, as amended, to have the House
agree in conference to the Senate amendment, authori
zing any Federal Reserve Bank to receive checks or
drafts on Non-Member Banks or Trust Companies,
providing these Non-Member Banks maintain sufficient
balance with the Federal Reserve to offset the items
in transit held for its account by Federal Reserve
Bank. 240-117? + = Nay. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol.
55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 2078.

2

VAR 48 Oto recommit H. R. 3673, (40 STAT-232, June 21, 1917),
amending the Federal Reserve Act, to the committee
on conference with instructions to report relative
to Non-Member Banks and trust companies and their
accounts with Federal Reserve Banks. 159-170; + =
Nay. Ibid., Pt. 4, 3620.

3

VAR 49

To agree to the conference report on a bill, H. R.
3673. 188-130; + = Yea. Ibid., 3621.
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average or above average support for the Hardwick amendment.

Carter

Glass, in a letter to a fellow representative, stated that "many banks
in the South

and West are insisting upon having" the "petty graft"

which they would

acquire by charging for exchange of checks.8 6

He

correctly identified the South and West as basic building blocks of
the Hardwick coalition, while overlooking the Republicans of the West
North Central region who should also be named as strong advocates of
the amendment.

Food For War
At the
to providing
allies.

end of May, 1917, the House turned from financing the war
for the food supplies of both the UnitedStates and her

Originally the Administration introduced an omnibus food

bill, but the House Agriculture Committee divided it into two bills.
The first measure empowered the Agriculture Department to carry out
a food survey and seed distribution program.

The second and more

important piece guaranteed the price of wheat and regulated food
prices, liquor production, flour production, and food transportation.
With food supplies running low, prices sky-rocketing, and with the
allies suffering grave food shortages, many believed that the food
situation confronted the nation with its most immediate crisis.

07

86Glass to Augustine Lonergan, May 19, 1917, Box 182, Folder
1917-Hardwick Amendment, Glass Papers.

87u. s. Congress, House, Food Production, Conservation, and
Distribution, Hearingson H. R. 4188, H. R. 4125, H. R. 4630, 65
Cong., 1 Sess., 1917, 17; Washington Post, April 21, 1917, 1; April
22, 1917, 10; May 1, 1917, 1; May 2, 1917, 2; New York Times, May
4, 1917, 8 ; and Raraseyer to R. R. Ramsell, April 14, 1917, Ramseyer
Papers.

During the hearings on the food survey bill. Administration
spokesmen and farm experts argued that the survey's necessity arose
from war-induced conditions.

On the other hand, critics of the bill

denied its ability to improve conditions.
came from different assumptions.

The divergent viewpoints

For those in favor, a survey would

determine the quantity of American supplies and disclose the supplies
of speculators.

The seed distribution by farm agents would increase

production by aiding needy farmers and by supplying production infor
mation.

To the bill's critics, the requisite efficiency for the

survey would never materialize, with the result that money would be
lost.

Gilbert Haugen (Iowa), ranking Republican member and chief

critic of the bill, also showed a rural hostility toward the farm
experts of the Agriculture Department.

He pictured the Department

as hiring "experts" who knew little of farming and who would go "joy
riding" in cars at the taxpayers expense.8®

In one sense, the survey

bill divided Agriculture Department supporters and skeptics of the
Department because of attitudes about the efficiency and the economy
of the measure and the value of experts.
Floor debates and the roll call revealed other dimensions of
the survey issues.

Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.) objected to the extensive

entry and subpoena powers granted the Secretary of Agriculture.

In

this instance, Agriculture Committee Chairman Asbury F. Lever (D-S.C.),
who acted as floor manager for the bill, agreed to an amendment re
stricting the Secretary of Agriculture's power.

The criticisms

from the hearings were heard again and opponents offered amendments

8 8 U. S. Congress, House, Food Production, Hearings, 41, 92, 95,
80-81, 55, 39, 116.
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incorporating the objections.

As true in the Committee, the opposition

continued to have little success in changing the bill.

When the motion

to recommit was taken, the bill's supporters easily turned aside the
opposition, 221 to eighty -one.

89

Though majorities of both parties

voted in favor of the bill, the opposition came almost exclusively
from the Republicans (Table 3 - 1 5 ) . Only fifteen Democrats agreed with
sixty-six Republicans that the bill needed revision.

Geographically,

no discernible pattern of support for recommitment emerged, except
that the Republicans of the West North Central region provided
slightly higher advocacy than average for the motion.

Haugen, the

leader for revision, came from this region and Midwestern Republicans
may have been supporting his leadership.

More likely, as a farm

region they may have agreed with his rural skepticism.

90

In short,

a number of Republicans rejected the measure as ineffective, an im
position on storage dealers, and a costly increase of the Agriculture
Department's payrolls.
The food regulatory bill was presented by Secretary of Agri
culture David Houston to the Agriculture Committee in April.

Two

main features of the bill granted the President power to control
prices and to establish a food administration.

James Young (D-Tex.)

strongly opposed the price section, arguing that at just the moment
farmers started to reap "magnificent" profits, the government proposed

89Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 5 5 , 1 Sess., Pt. 3 , 2 9 0 3 , 2 8 8 6 8 7 , 2 8 9 1 , 3 0 0 8 , 3 0 1 1 , 3012; and Pt. 4 , 4 1 0 0 .
90The two roll calls with which the food survey bill correlates
are on increased funding of agriculture research. These votes, along
with the food survey, raise questions of economy as much as agriculture.
See ibid., 2 Sess., Pt. 2 , 1 6 0 0 -0 1 .

TABLE 3-14
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4188:
FOOD SURVEY BILL

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

Yea

NE
D

MA
R

4

—

Nay

6

ENC
D
R

D

R

—

23

1

20

15

17

28

9

13

WNC
D
R

D

—

18

13

2

1

4

1

2

8

73

1

24

5

5

3

9

SS

BS
R

D

MS
R

D

PS
R

D

TOTAL
D
R

R

—

2

5

7

16

75

148

80

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

Yea
Nay

NE
D

—
100

MA
R

ENC
D
R

D

R

24

—

60

6

42

76

100

40

94

58

WNC
D
R

100

SS

BS

PS

MS

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

TOTAL
D
R

69

15

67

4

44

17

40

—

22

10

49

31

85

33

96

56

83

60

100

78

90

51

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3012.
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to rob them of their gain.

Other critics, notably Haugen, charged

that Secretary Houston favored city interests over farm interests.
If farmers must submit to this burden, he maintained that, city ele
ments ought to agree to price controls on the products that they sold
to farmers.9-*The bill's provision on the food administration drew a different
volley of criticism.

In the Committee, Young charged that the bill

granted dangerous.and arbitrary powers to the food administration.
Others on the Committee disagreed, because they thought that the food
administration required dictatorial powers in order to prevent hoarding
and speculation.

In fact. Chairman Lever and Sidney Anderson (Minn.),

a leading Republican, favored granting virtual arbitrary powers to
the food administration.

As a consequence, Lever, the Agriculture

Department, and the proposed Food Administrator, Hebert Hoover, found
the original bill deficient and drafted a new and more centralized
measure.

Lever introduced it May 23, 1917.

QO

Since the Agriculture Committee did not report the rewritten
bill to the floor until June 18, President Wilson's wrath was aroused
by the slow progress of the bill.

The massive inflation of over ninety

percent in less than a year, the crying needs of the Allies, and the
general dislocation of the ‘
economy created a popular demand for action.
Q1

New York Times, June 16, 1917, 6 . U.S. Congress, House, Food
Production, Conservation, and Distribution, Hearings, 3-4, 196-99. For
a general discussion of the agricultural issue, see Tom Hall, "Wilson
and the Food Crisis: Agricultural price Control During World War I,"
Agricultural History,XLVII (January 1973), 25-46.
9 2 U. S. Congress, House, Food Production, Hearings, 39, 289, 209,
170, 215, 543, 424, 325. New York Times, April 12, 1917, 2; May 23,
1917, 1; and Washington Post, June 6 , 1917, 4.
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Employing this for purposes of speeding Congress, the President held
conferences repeatedly with Lever and Haugen, seeking to overcome the
bottlenecks in the legislative process. 9 3

Meanwhile, in early April,

1917, Wilson appointed Hoover to head the food section of the National
Council of Defense.

Late in May, Wilson issued a plan on the use of

food, vesting Hoover with control in this area.
indirect criticism of Congress.

Wilson's action was

Shortly before the House took up the

bill, Wilson, even without formal legislation, told Hoover to begin
the food saving campaign and ordered an embargo on food to neutral
countries.

As a final gesture, he wrote Representative William Borland

(D-Mo.) that congressional delay was aiding food speculators.

Even,

though the Administration as well as Congress was responsible for the
leisurely pace, Wilson used it to mobilize tremendous pressure for
the bill .9 4
The House disliked Wilson's tactics but Wilson had created too
much momentum for the development of organized opposition.

The Repub

licans called a party caucus, heard critics of the bill such as
Haugen, but decided.not to make the bill a partisan issue.9^

None

theless, some individuals still attempted to modify the bill by
amendment during House debates.

Haugen continued to claim the real

aim of the bill was to lower food prices, not to stimulate food

93New York Tiroes, April
12,
1917, 2; June 7, 1917, 1;June 17,
1917, 1; and Washington Post,May 11, 1917, 2; and June 16, 1917, 2.
94New York Times, April
12,
1917, 2; May 20, 1917, 1;June 17,
1917, 1; June 19, 1917, 1; June 20, 1917, 1; Washington Post, June 16,
1917, 2; and June 17, 1917, 1.
^ Washington Post, June 18, 1917, 4; and June 22, 1917, 2.
New York Times, June 19, 1917, 1.
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production.

Like-minded colleagues argued the virtues of a free market

system and pointed to the evils of price controls.

Other critics of

the price-control provision voiced a city instead of rural viewpoint.
J. Hampton Moore, a Philadelphia Republican, argued that laborers
received no guaranteed wages such as those which the bill proposed
to give farmers.

Similarly, city spokesmen reminded rural supporters

that prices were already too high.

All efforts to change the price

section, however, in favor of either rural or city elements failed.
Supporters of the price section stifled dissent because they claimed
that it would stimulate farm production and still protect the ur
banite .9 6
As in the Committee, the provisions on the food administration
drew fire.

Irvine Lenroot attacked the section licensing food com

panies, claiming that it unconstitutionally delegated powers to the

.
Q7
President.

Supporters retorted that during wartime the Constitution

allowed the granting of increased powers to the Chief Executive.

To

Speaker Clark, who maintained that the President could— and should—
summarily arrest food speculators, the security of the nation came
first.9 6

Lever rejected an amendment that Lenroot offered to limit

the Executive's powers, but a similar provision offered by fellow
Democrat Andrew Montague (Va.) won Lever's and Lenroot's approval.
It provided that the section's powers were delegated, not granted,
and that they would only operate during the war period.

Since supporters

9 6 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 4034, 3859,
4147-51, 3802, 4045, 3874-75, 4043-45, 3859, 3871-72.
9 7 Ibid.,

3802, 4075-79, 4091, 4096, 4147, 4152, 3896, 3937.

"ibid., 3821, 3901, 3832, 3848, 3816-17; and Pt. 3, 2842.
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believed that the Food Administrator required dictatorial powers for
his job, they refused to accept other amendments restricting this
delegation of authority.99
Another provision, heretofore not discussed, raised the highly
volatile subject of prohibition.

Inevitably the bill, since it

contained food conservation provisions, raised the liquor, question.
Opening their drive toward a national amendment, 1 0 0 prohibitionists
or "drys" claimed that prohibition would save the cotintry one hundred
million bushels of grain a year.

The Agriculture Committee wrote into

the food bill a restriction on future manufacture of liquor, but not
all prohibitionists were pleased.

William Howard (D-Ga.) wanted not

only the manufacture but also the sale of liquor with over three per
cent alcoholic content banned.

The chair ruled an amendment he

offered to strengthen the prohibition section out of order .1 0 1

Not

surprisingly, anti-prohibitionists or "wets" vigorously opposed the
102

section.A

A heated debate flared-up between antagonists.

In the

frenzy, two members, Jacob Meeker (R-Mo.) and Clyde Kelly (R-Pa.),
exchanged personal insults which had to be struck from the Record.
A vote followed and an amendment to strike out the prohibition section

" i b i d . , Pt. 4, 4077-79.
100A leading prohibitionist, Charles Randall (ProhibitionistCal.) had earlier attempted to add an amendment to the Espionage bill
to prohibit the manufacture of liquor during the war. He went so far
as to force a roll call, but only twenty members voted for it while
336 voted against it. Evidently, most prohibitionists did not see
the Espionage Bill as the appropriate bill to ±tach a rider to. See,
Pt. 2, 1840.
101

102

Ibid., Pt. 4, 4153, 4161.

One wet, Leonidas C. Dyer (R-Mo.), favored the section because
it would lessen pressure for the national amendment. See ibid., 3880.
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failed, 152 to 136.

"Wets" did not force a formal roll call, probably

fearing that a prohibition victory would accelerate the movement for
a national constitutional amendment.

103

Opponents never effectively mounted an attack on the bill, with
the result that when it came to a roll call vote, it passed 365 to
five.

Few could afford to oppose this essential war measure, but the

bill's success also extended to the defeat of most amendments.■L 0 4

An

explanation for this comes first from the weakness of the opposition
and second from the vitality of the supporters.

The basic means of

opposing a bill, partisanship, failed to materialize as Republicans
declined the role of opponents.

Critics like Haugen were left without

a starting base, and they were further weakened by internal divisions.
For example, they had no common plan for perfecting the price control
section, as some opposed the section altogether while others wanted
to add manufactured products to the section.

The bill's supporters,

on the other hand, had a concrete proposal advocated by the President
and by the chairman, who both adamantly pushed the m e a s u r e . T h e
bill also drew strength from wartime conditions.

Even if a congressman

rejected the measure, he could not deny that conditions were abnormal.
In particular, most congressmen were up-in-arms over the sinister
dealings of food speculators and hoarders.

Finally, though the bill

was strictly a war measure, the hoarding and speculation provisions
drew added support because a number of members saw them as establishing

103ibid., 4164, 4182; and Washington Post, June 24, 1917, 1.
1 0 4 Cong.

Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 4190.

1 0 5 Ibid.,

3793.

a precedent for peacetime.
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Unknown at the time, however, the bill's

price-control provisions spelled future danger for Wilson and his

Transportation and Communication
War mobilization also required the organization of the nation's
internal and foreign transportation systems.

The fast shipment of

goods had become a problem even before the war started, and after
April

6

, all signs indicated that matters would.grow worse.

Eastern

railways and ports, the designated points for the shipment of supplies
and of troops to Europe, were threatened by labor strikes, which their
jammed conditions could not tolerate.

Moreover, the transportation

problem included the simple proposition that without the construction
of more ships neither supplies nor men would be able to reach the
battlefield.

In this context the House took up a series of measures

for transportation regulation during the first session.

108

The first controls on shipping were included in the Espionage
Bill.

One section provided that the President could declare a national

shipping emergency wherein he could formulate rules regulating the
movement of all ships.

Another provision granted to the President

power over the movement of a neutral nation's ships if he thought
that the ship might travel to a belligerent country.

During the

1 0 6 Ibid., 3794, 3816, 4035, 4055, 3808; and Zinn, LaGuardia
in Congress, 23-25.

^Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 48-50;
New York Times, June 16, 1917, 6 ; and June 22, 1917, 3.
108New York Times, March 17, 1917, 1.
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Espionage debates these sections received little attention as most
interest focused on the censorship and mail provisions. 1 0 9
Another bill, written by the Justice Department, covered trade
with the enemy and indirect shipments to Germany, plus other subjects
relating to Germany such as German patent rights, alien enemy-owned
property, and censorship of mail and telegraph services from the
United States to foreign countries.

A final provision added by the

Senate required that German language papers in the United States
print English translations of war criticism. 1 1 0

The bill's basic pur

pose, as presented to the Interstate Commerce Committee by Secretary
of State Robert Lansing, was to control exports.

In particular, it

sought to prevent exports from an American company to a German company
in a neutral country.

Moreover, other purposes aimed to secure the

profits and property that Germans held in the United States and to.
stop the flow of any profits to an enemy in Germany.

To accomplish

these latter intentions, an Alien Property Office was established.
Little opposition surfaced in the Committee, but what did centered
around the constitutionality of the bill.

Several committeemen

conjectured that it granted unconstitutional powers for peacetime.
When other members argued that war conditions required different
standards of constitutionality, they quickly conceded that the bill
was constitutional. 1 1 1
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1917,

Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1599.

110New York Times, April 14, 1917, 20; May 26, 1917, 18; July 10,
; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 7419.

8

1;
1 1 U. S. Congress, House, Direction of Exports in Time of War,
Hearings on H. R. 3349, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3-4, 8-10; and ibid.,
Trading with the Enemy, Hearings on H. R. 4704, 65 Cong., 1 Sess.,
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Criticism became more Intense on the House floor as several
provisions drew energetic objection.

Minority Leader Mann questioned

the definition and classification of an "enemy alien," wondering if
it did not include German citizens in the United States.

LaGuardia,

who thought the definition encompassed even naturalized citizens,
called it "vicious."

112

In like manner, the definition of "enemy

trading" raised questions in the mind of a third Republican, Irvine
Lenroot.

He thought that it was overly broad and in fact violated

international law.

The center of criticism, however, focused on the

mail and telegraph censorship provisions.
torial nature of the powers granted.

Mann emphasized the dicta

He also asserted that the

Administration saw a "spy behind every doorstep. " 1 1 3

In general the

opposition reflected a particular concern for legal processes and
personal rights.

Supporters of the bill either denied any dangers

or maintained that the President ought to control aliens in order to
prevent harm to the war effort.

Apparently, the critics presented

valid objections since the House agreed to several clarifying amend
ments and completely struck out the mail and telegraph section.

The

bill then passed without a roll call. 1 * 4

3, 43, 53, 58, 64, 21, 7-8.
1 1 2 Cong.

Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 5, 4865, 4916,

4846-47.
1 1 3 Ibld., 4848, 4856; New York Times, July 11, 1917,
Washington Post, July 11, 1917, 4.

8

; and

1 1 4 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 5, 4912, 4915,
4976, 4989; and New York Times, July 13, 1917, 13. The mail and
telegraph regulations were written back in by the Senate. The House
agreed to the Senate's action without dissent. Mann was ill by then—
September 20, 1917. See Cong. Rec., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 7420;
and New York Times, September 21, 1917, 1.
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Two other shipping measures were passed during the first session,
the first to increase ship tonnage and the second to foster the com
petitive trade position of American companies.

A shipping act in

1916 established the Shipping Board with a capital of fifty million
dollars.

Its purpose was to build ships for the American merchant

marine.11^

Shortly after April

6

, 1917, Joshua Alexander (D-Mo.)

chairman of the Merchant Marine Committee, conferred with Shipping
Board officials on ship construction for war purposes.

In May, Presi

dent Wilson announced a proposal for a vast ship construction bill with
an appropriation of $500 million, which was later raised to $750
million.

He conferred with a number of Senators and Representatives

and little criticism surfaced.

Once it reached the House, action on

the bill moved quickly, the only objections coming in the form of dis
belief at the sums of money involved.

Some members also expressed

doubts as to the Shipping Board's ability to implement the program.
The bill passed as part of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation in
late May.11®
The second measure, which became known as the Webb-Pomerene
Export Bill, legalized cooperative selling associations among American
exporters.

Originally introduced in the 64th Congress and passed by

the House, but not the Senate, it was not a war measure in the strict
sense. 1 1 7
115

Chairman Webb of the Judiciary Committee, nonetheless,

Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 192.

116New York Times, April 9, 1917, 1; May 10, 1917, 10; May 26,
1917; May 29, 1917, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess.,
Pt. 3, 2931.
117New York Times, January

6

, 1917, 11.
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maintained that the bill was required more than ever.

His argument

stated that trade conditions would be vigorously competitive after
the war.

American firms must be in a position to handle the competition

and this bill would help toward that objective.

Promoters of the bill

added that it would aid smaller companies, who were the intended bene
ficiaries, develop foreign trade.

Singularly, small coorporations

could not compete against larger American companies and foreign
cartels except by banding together into associations.

118

During the 64th Congress the bill provoked criticism from antimonopoly elements.

They objected that it did not bar companies from

acting together inside the United States.

Responding to the objections,

the Judiciary Committee wrote a prohibition into the bill for the 65th
House.

Several critics were mollified but others remained in oppo

sition to the bill . ^ - 8

Andrew Volstead (R-Minn.), concerned about

possible grain monopolies by export millers, warned that the bill
"practically nullifies the Sherman Act."

Dick Morgan (D-Okla.), in

agreement with Volstead, proposed an amendment which would have
vested the Federal Trade Commission with supervisory powers over the
trade associations.

It failed on a non-roll call vote, and the bill

itself passed easily, 241 to twenty-nine.
Historian James Weinstein has argued that the Webb-Pomerene Bill
benefitted large corporate interests by enabling them to organize trade
associations.

Moreover, the bill symbolized the growing acceptance

■^8 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3564-65,
3569-70.
119

Ibid., 3565-67.

120Ibid., 3681-85.
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by Congress of large corporate entities.

Antimonopoly sentiments were

declining, while advocacy of a liberal corporate state grew.

In

particular, the shift in orientation occurred within the Progressive
Movement.

Weinstein contended that the movement sought not to destroy

corporations but, on the contrary, to rationalize American society
along corporate lines.

The export bill consequently meshed with the

corporate ideals of the Progressive Movement.12^
Roll call analysis of the Export Bill can shed light on the
Weinstein thesis.

The nearly unanimous vote on the bill supports his

argument that there was a developing consensus which supported the
formation of a corporate state.

The opposition which existed indi

cates a slight partisan coloring (Table 3-15).

Only four Democrats

opposed the bill while the rest of the opposition (twenty-four) came
from the Republican ranks.

Of course the vast majority of Republicans

voted for the bill (eighty percent). All that can be stated is that a
faction of the Republican party opposed the bill.

Geographically,

twenty of the twenty-four Republican opponents came from the Midwest
(ENC and WNC regions).

Correlation of the roll call with other votes

explains why they came from the Midwest:
several farm measures.

the export vote relates to

Volstead and other Midwestern agriculturalists

rejected the bill because they foresaw the organization of pricefixing grain export monopolies.

In sum, the opponents were mostly

rural-oriented Republicans concerned with monopoly.
But to argue the corollary, as does Weinstein, that supporters
were advocates of a corporate state appears unjustified by the debates.

121weinstein, The Corporate Ideal, 214, 218-19.

TABLE 3-15
THE WEBB-POMERENE EXPORT BILL

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

Yea

MA
R

3

D

7

11

R

ENC
D
R

34

18

WNC
D

D

R

29

4

9

79

7

1

13

1

Nay

BS

SS
R

D

2

MS
R

D

PS
R

18

5

5

4

1

2

1

1

—

D

R

D

3
—

7
1

TOTAL
R

137

101

4

24

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

Yea
Nay

NE

MA

D

R

D

R

100

100

100

100

ENC
D
R

100

WNC
D
R

D

81

80

41

99

19

20

59

1

BS

SS
R

100

MS

PS
D

R

TOTAL
D
R

80

100

88

97

81

20

—

12

3

19

D

R

D

R

95

71

83

5

29

17

178

179

Supporters expressed two main interests:

to promote American trade

and to promote the activities of moderate size companies in foreign
trade.

No member promoted the bill as furthering the trade of large

corporations.

Particularly, id congressman either directly or in

directly viewed the bill as part of plans for a corporate state.

The

main goal of the bill, as its proponents saw it, was to place American
trade in the forefront of the world, not to establish a liberal
corporate state based on capitalism.^-2 2
Another transportation bill, the Rivers and Harbors Appropria
tion, affected the external and internal water transportation of the
country.

During the last minute rush of the 64th Congress, the Appro

priation Bill for fiscal 1918 died in committee.

Since the bill had

the unsavory reputation as the granddaddy of all "pork" legislation,
the Democratic caucus voted that Congress should not consider it
during a national emergency.

123

Chairman John Small (D-N.C.) of the

Rivers and Harbors Committee rejected the caucus decision and behind
the scenes promoted the bill as necessary to maintain projects already
in existence.

Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels boosted Small's

efforts when he recommended for naval reasons, an appropriation to
deepen the Hell Gate entrance to New York harbor.

Through the Secre-

tary's assistance, Small won time on the floor for the bill.

124

A spirited debate ensued, as determined opposition surfaced
among elements of the Republicans.

1 2 2 Cong.

James Frear (R-Wis.), who was

Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3570.

^23New York Times, April 20, 1917,

6

.

124lbid., May 19, 1917, 10; and May 20, 1917, 2.
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joined by Mann and a majority of the Republicans rank-in-file, directed
o p p o s i t i o n .

5

Their motivations included both real concern over the

economy and desires for political gain.

Several Republican stalwarts

such as J. Hampton Moore, however, deserted the party because they
represented export interests.

The divisions in the Republican ranks

deepened the controversy present in the debates.

Charges of "pork,"

"provincialism," "self-interest," "waste," and "partisanship" flew
back and forth.

Personal abuse and the depreciation of the opposi

tion's motivation, rather than a reasonable discussion of the issues,
often became the focus of the arguments.12^
Reflecting the hostility of the debates, the House squared off
in the most protracted voting duel of the session.

Six roll calls were

ordered, which thereby allows for a close definition of the partisan
and regional elements behind the balloting.

A number of members

(thirty-four percent) either could not support the bill in any manner
or could do so only once (Table 3-16).

The greatest number of these

were Republicans, ninety-one Republicans as compared to only twentyfour Democrats.

Regions giving above average support to the majority

^•2 ^Ibid., June 9, 1917, 13; June 27, 1917, 3; and Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3717, 3732.
•L2®Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic, XI (June 23,
1917), 218.
-*~2^New York Times, August 1, 1917, 7; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.
Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3454, 3733. In one particular, the debates
involved more than immediate questions, and that issue was a proposal
to establish a waterway commission. Advocated for years by Senator
Newlands, the commission was to advance multiple-purpose river develop
ment. Newlands won inclusion of the commission in the Senate bill
and the House agreed to it one on on one of the six roll calls. Presi
dent Wilson, however, never appointed commissioners and the 1920
Witer Power Act repealed the Commission. See Hays, The Gospel
of Efficiency; The Conservation Movement, 238-40.

TABLE 3-16:A
RIVERS AND HARBORS APPROPRIATION BILL

Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE
POSITION

MA

NE
R

D

Low
Medium
High

TOTAL

ENC
R

D

2

13

1

2

2

8

1

4

10

19

12

4

13

SS

WNC
R

D

R

D

5
9

34

19

6

11

40

20

46

4

20 ,

5

1

8

2

6

78

6

27

91

1

MS

BS
R

D

R

D

PS
R

D

3

5

6

1

4
3

2

1

23

5

1

1

2

2

32

11

8

6

3

1

—

3

TOTAL
R

D

2

1

R

D

—

1

7

10

24
29
123

91
16
54

176

161

Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE
POSITION

Low
Medium
High

NE

MA

D

R

50
25
25

68
11
21

ENC
D

R

__

33
20

25
45
30

74

17
83

48

D

R

67

74
4
22

2

24

33

MS

BS

SS

WNC

R

D

PS

R

D

R

D

R

6

50

9

—

9
19
72

46
9
46

57
43

60
40
“““

D

86

50

TOTAL
R

D

R

D

33

20

14
16
70

—

67

10

70

56
10

34

The order of the roll calls is 55, 56, 44, 52, 57, 51
Percent at each point on the scale 27, 7, 4, 2, 5, 12, 43
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .946
181

182

TABLE 3-16:B
RIVERS AND HARBORS APPROPRIATION BILL

Scale
Position

6

Motion

VAR 55

To move the previous question on H. R. 126, pro
viding that H. R. 4285, making appropriations for
the construction, repair and preservation of certain
public works on rivers and harbors, be taken from
the speakers table, that the Senate amendments be
disagreed, and that a conference committee on the
same be appointed. 198-93; + = yea. Cong. Rec.,
Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 6 , 5628.

VAR 56

To adopt H. Res. 126, authorizing the House to take
up H. R. 4285 from the speaker's table, and that
Senate amendments be disagreed to and a conference
committee on same be appointed. 188-103; + = yea.
Ibid., Pt. 6 , 5633.

VAR 44

To consider H. R. 4285, making appropriations for
the construction, repair and preservation of certain
public works on rivers and harbors. 189-119; + = yea.
Ibid., Pt. 4, 3359.

VAR 52

To pass H. R. 4285, the Rivers and Harbors Appro
priation Bill. 203-133; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 5,
4357.

VAR 57

To recommit H. R. 4285 to the Committee on Confer
ence with instructions that House conferees disagree
to Amendment 41, which creates a 7 member Waterways
Commission to prepare a plan for the improvement of
waterways, and appropriates $1 0 0 , 0 0 0 to defray
expenses. 142-207; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 6 , 5732.

VAR 51

To recommit H. R. 4285, the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Bill, to the Committee on Rivers and
Harbors with instructions to report back the bill
with amendment, providing no money be expended for
maintenance until the President has certified it is
necessary for the commercial needs of the country
or any new project unless for the successful
prosecution of the war, expenditure to be approved
by the President. 141-189; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 5,
4356.
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Republican position were New England, the Midwest (ENC and WNC), and
the Mountain states.

Democrats going against the dominant Democratic

position were from the New England, the West North Central, and the
Mountain states.

The medium place on the scale includes two motions

to hear the bill, plus the roll call on passage of the appropriation.
Only eleven percent of the members clustered in the swing position,
and they divided about equally between the parties.

The high category

included two votes to recommit; or in other words, to vote against
these motions required the greatest level of support for the bill.
At this level seventy percent of the Democrats supported the bill.
Thirty-four percent of the Republicans were also able to support
moneys for rivers and harbors.

Regionally, the greatest advocates

from both parties came from the Middle Atlantic, Southern, Border
and Pacific states.

Unsurprisingly, these are the regions of the

country with the great seaports and rivers.

The six votes had de

finite partisan qualities since party majorities located on either
end of the scale.
tendencies.

However, the pattern demonstrates strong regional

In fact, they were so decided that the balloting might

be evaluated as more regional than partisan.

Both parties in the New

England, Midwest, and Mountain regions either strongly opposed the
bill or gave it only conditional support.

The reverse is the case

for the Middle Atlantic, Southern, Border, and Pacific states.

Un

doubtedly, some Republicans hoped to embarass the Democrats by oppo
sing the bill, but in most cases regional interests overrode party
advantages.
The railroads, as the main connecting link between the factories
and the seaports, received the attention of the Administration and the
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House.

The thinking of the Administration in the Spring was to regu

late and control the railroads, while still allowing them to remain
under private ownership.

However, desiring to be prepared for all

eventualities, administration supporters introduced a bill that
permitted the takeover of the railroads by the Executive.

It also

included provisions for the regulation of railroad,car usage.

At

the same time, House members introduced an administration-backed
bill for increasing the membership of the Interstate Commerce Com
mission. I2®

The first proposal provoked adverse remarks by some

members because they saw it as another grant of broad and arbitrary
power to the President.

Critics, who feared possible government

ownership of railroads, also claimed that the power was unnecessary
since the railroads functioned adequately under their private managers.
Meanwhile, the Senate modified the bill into a railroad car priorities
measure.

After the revision House opposition melted away and the bill

passed without a roll call.
The second railroad bill engendered more formal controversy,
particularly after the Senate added a new provision.
form,

In its first

the bill divided the ICC into three subdivisions and increased

the membership from seven to nine.

By these administrative changes,

the proponents of the bill hoped to improve the efficiency of the ICC.
No objection was made against these provisions, but this was not the

128washington Post, April 14, 1917, 2; New York Times, April 13,
1917, 1; May 22, 1917, 6; and Cong. Rec.,65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess.,
Pt. 4, 3585.
• ^ Washington Post, May 16, 1917, 2; June 8 , 1917, 2. New York
Times, June 17, 1917, 6 ; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt.
5, 4502; and Pt. 6 , 5847.
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case with the new provision.

It required that whenever a protest

was filed against railroad rate increases, the commission had to sus
pend the rates until a full investigation.

Thetus Sims (D-Tenn.),

chief advocate of the provision, explained that it aimed to block
a pending fifteen percent hike in rates desired by the railroads.

•<**■
The

provision itself raised the question of whether or not the ICC would
retain its discretionary power on suspending rates.-*-3 0
Critics of the provision maintained that it would tie up the ICC
with cases, slow the decision process indefinitely, and severely limit
the ICC's discretion.
the railroads.

A second opposition view expressed distress for

According to George Graham (R-Pa.), the railroads were

not prospering and the amendment would further injure their profitmaking capacities.

As part of the debate that had raged in the House

for many years over the control of the railroads, arguments were shaped
on the one hand by a hostility to higher railroad rates and on the other
by a concern for railroad profits.

The bill became less a matter of

railroad regulation when the members expressed a concern over the
discretionary rights of the ICC . 1 3 1
Consequently, the combination of ICC and railroad advocates
controlled the vote, defeating the Sims provision, 156 to seventysix. * 3 2

Partisan divisions did not operate, as fifty-nine percent of

the Democrats and seventy-six percent of the Republicans voted against
the amendment (Table 3-17).

Twice as many Democrats (fifty) cast an

J-3 0 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3585; Pt. 5,
4369-4371.
1 3 1 Ibld.,

4385.

1 3 2 Ibid.,

4491.

TABLE 3-17
INTERSTATE COMMERCE BILL

Region and Party (Nunibers)

VOTE

MA

NE
D

R

Yea
Nay

3

15

ENC
D
R

R

D

13

WNC
D
R

2

4

7

24

8

23

4

SS

BS

D

8

30

9

32

R

D

9
1

MS
R

12

D

PS
R

2

3

3

5

2

3

D

R

—
3

TOTAL
D
R

2

50

24

4

73

84

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

D

Yea
Nay

100

100

100

R

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

SS
D

8

33

23

100

47

48

92

67

77

--

53

52

BS
R

100

MS

PS

D

R

D

R

43

29

60

50

57

71

40

50

R

TOTAL
D
R

—

33

41

22

100

67

59

78

D

187

affirmative vote as compared to the Republicans (twenty-four), which
may indicate somewhat greater favor among Democrats for restrictions
on railroads.

A more noticeable trend reveals itself geographically.

Here the Northeastern regions, particularly New England and the Middle
Atlantic, opposed the rate amendment at an above average percentage in
comparison to the other regions.

In contrast, the West North Central,

the South, and Mountain states provided high support for the amend
ment.

In stim, both parties opposed restricting the discretion of the

ICC, though more Republicans did than Democrats.

Regionally, the

industrial Northeast evidenced greater opposition to the restriction.
The more agrarian states of the Midwest, South, and Mountain regions
tended to favor it.

Implementing and Critizing the
War Program
With completion of the ICC bill in late June, the House had
virtually nailed down the major points of the war program.

During

the ensuing legislative lull, attention shifted from the creation of a
war program to the evaluation of its implications and operations.
When congressmen voted for war, few fathomed all that was involved in
terms of men, money, mobilization, and transfer of power.

In fact, the

war vote would have been closer if they had known that they would be
conscripting a vast army and sending it to Europe.

Instead, congress

men believed that the American role would consist of providing the
Allies with funds, ammunition, and other supplies, with fighting
restricted to naval warfare.
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They progressively discovered the

Ibid., pt. 2, 1646; LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent,
140; and Ramseyer to Harry M. Neas, July 25, 1917, Ramseyer Papers.

Some
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true situation, first with the draft controversy and then when allied
deficiencies became apparent.
When they had fully adjusted to full-scale war, they were better
able to clarify their thought on the aims of the war.

First of all,

representatives came to a general agreement that German attacks on
American shipping provoked America's

entry into the war.

Nonetheless,

a noticeable split developed over their interpretation of the meaning
and implications of American involvement.

For a number of House

members, the talk of world democracy, humanity, and brotherhood made
little sense.

They believed that nations fought only to gain something

for themselves or to defend t h e m s e l v e s . F o r others, such a defi
nition overlooked the nature of the adversary, which to them embodied
a thorough-going autocracy bent on destroying democracy.

As one

representative wrote, "Germany knows no limits to her ambitions of
world empire.

It is a fight to defend our ideals."

The destruction

of autocratic power and the substitution of democracy in its place
became a logical goal of the war for such representatives.13^

The

division over this most fundamental of all war questions did not find
formal outlet in roll calls, but it did foster an atmosphere of ten
sion and confusion in the House.

members also learned to their dismay that the draft did not work out
as they had expected. See Stephens (D-Neb.) who wrote Woodrow Wilson,
September 25, 1917, Box 30, Folder 236, Stephens Papers, that the
draft as means to exempt farm laborers was not working properly.
1 3 4 Ibid., to Don McGiffin, May 31, 1917, Ramseyer Papers, and
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 6 , 5898.

13^Stephens to Theodore Bests, June 16, 1917, Box 24, Folder
183, Stephens Papers; to Fred A. Marsh, August 13, 1917, Box 28,
Folder 215, Stephens Papers; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess.,
Pt. 5, 4539; Pt. 6 , 5568; and Pt. 7, 7165, 7286, 7293-94, 7316.
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That the war and the creation of the war program engendered
deep apprehensions can be best seen in the controversy over estab
lishing the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

The increasing demands

that the Executive placed on Congress for new grants of power served as
background to this controversy.

As authority flowed to the President,

doubts mounted as to the place of the Congress in the war effort.
Perhaps most members recognized that m o d e m war was a matter of
administration, which consequently left Congress largely out of the
process.13®

Still, they believed that they could advance the war

program, particularly since they knew that the Administration was
running into snags in the implementation of programs.

The Shipping

Board's affairs had become so disorganized that a public scandal
erupted in the middle of July.

Before all was lost, many congressmen

believed that it was time for Congress to assert its prerogatives and
take over the management of the war effort.
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The Senate in July started the row as Republicans and dissendent
Democrats added the Weeks Amendment as a rider to the food bill.

When

the bill passed the Senate and went to the conference, the House
conferees adamantly refused agreement on the rider.

Bolstering them

in their opposition, Wilson wrote Lever that he would veto the bill
with the rider since it would completely undermine his running of the
war.

He compared the present scheme to the joint committee established

13®Stephens to Frank E. Plummer, February 7, 1917, Box 28, Folder
219, Stephens Papers; New York Times, June 16, 1917, 6 ; Washington
Post, May 27, 1917, 2; and July 11, 1917, 1.
13^Washington Post, July 22, 1917, 2; Charles Merz, "At the
Capital," New Republic, XI (June 16, 1917); 186-87; Washington
Post, July 11, 1917, 1; and New York Times, July 18, 1917, 1.
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during the Civil War, which he maintained had seriously impaired
Lincoln's management of the war .-1-3 8

Lever, a vigorous Administration

supporter, fully appreciated Wilson's sentiments.

With the aid of

his fellow House conferees and of Senator Francis Warren (R-Wy.),
he defeated the proposal in the conference.-1-3 9
Lever and the conferees had earlier won instruction from the
House against the amendment.
divided.

At that time, House Republicans were

Kahn, the leading Republican of the Military Affairs Commit

tee, opposed the war committee but Mann and Longworth strongly
advocated it.

Cannon and Gillett also favored it, though they were

unwilling to wage a protracted campaign for it .-1-4 0

Their arguments

rested on the contention that the committee had no evil design.

Its

purpose was simply to establish a means by which the House could moni
tor war expenditures so as to prevent graft, not to hamstring the
Administration.

Not all House Democrats were happy with the Adminis

tration but they lined up against the amendment, defeating it 169 to
101.

On this non-roll call vote, thirty-one Republicans broke ranks

and voted wzth the Democrats.
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The Weeks Amendment was defeated on July 26, but the debate over
it signaled

the start of a running battle over the conduct of the war.

138New York Times, July 22, 1917, 1; July 23, 1917, 1; July 24,
1917, 1; and Washington Post, July 24, 1917, 1. Representative Martin
Madden (R-Ill.) had earlier— only days after the Declaration of War—
introduced a similar proposal. No action was taken on his plan. See
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, Sess., 1, Pt. 1, 497, 626, 630, 683.
139Washington Post, July 28, 1917, 2; and August 1917, 2.
York Times, August 3, 1917, 2.

New

1 4 0 Ibid., July 26, 1917, 1; August 4, 1917, 3; and Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 6 , 5527, 5739.

l ^ I b id . , 5527; and New York Times, July 26, 1917, 1.
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One phase of the conflict came over Republican efforts to attach
amendments similar to the Week's proposal.

Gillett and Joseph Fordney

scored Wilson for insulting the Republicans of the Civil War era who
served on the joint War Committee of that period.

They tried to add

the Committee as an amendment to the second bond bill, but Speaker
Clark ruled the hostile amendment ungerxnane to the bill and therefore
out of order. 1 4 2

More commonly, the Republicans and some Democrats

criticized individual aspects of war management.

A long-standing

complaint was the method of letting war contracts on a cost-plus
basis rather than by competitive bidding. Chairman John Fitzgerald of
the Appropriation Committee at various times objected to the method,
but the Army replied that it offered the fastest means for the pro
duction of war supplies.^-4 3

Other criticisms, mostly of a partisan

nature, rained down on the Administration over the employment of dollara-year businessmen in war agencies, the production of small arms
ammunition, and the inflation of food and non-perishable goods.

While

the opprobrium directed against the Administration remained within
bounds, such criticism after July, 1917, always underlined House
discussions.•L 4 4
The resulting tense atmosphere served to ignite the most dramatic
confrontation of the first session.

Some members, particularly

142cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 6635-36; and
New York Times, September 1, 1917, 1.
^•4 3 Cong.
Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3185; Pt.
7218; and New York Times, September 12, 1917, 7.

7,

•*~4 4 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 8 , 7783; Pt. 7,
6808; New York Times, September 26, 1917, 9; September 5, 1917, 14;
Washington Post, August 7, 1917, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol.
55, 1 Sess., Pt. 5, 5071.
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Democrats, thought that the motivation for the criticism sprang from
partisan bias . 1 4 5

Thomas Heflin (D-Ala.), went farther by claiming

that an element in Congress censured the President's program for
treasonable interests.

Throughout the first session, Heflin had in

dulged in verbal blasts at unpatriotic elements, but during the debate
over the Weeks amendment he unleased bitter remarks against two mem
bers of the House.

He charged that Fred A. Britten (R-Ill.) and William

E. Mason (R-Ill.) purposely stirred up opposition to the war and the
selective service.

Both members came from districts with large German

populations, and each had in fact introduced a bill on the draft,
Mason's to exempt draftees from going to Europe and Britten's to
allow German aliens exemption from the draft.

Heflin alluded to these

particulars, connected Britten and Mason with anarchists and traitors,
and further referred to these representatives by name, which went
contrary to House rules.

His remarks were stricken from the Record

by a roll call, 190 to 122.

Most members simply wrote the incident off

as a typical Heflin performance. 1 4 5
A much less easily ignored speech by Heflin came after State
Department disclosures in September that the former German Ambassador
to the United States, Count Von Bemstorff, had employed a $50,000
fund for influencing Congress.

Most observers interpretsted the fund's

use as for propaganda, but Heflin concluded that the Germans employed
the money as a slush fund for bribing congressmen.

On the basis of

145Stephens to F. B. Knaps, July 16, 1917, Box 27, Folder 206,
Stephens Papers.

6

1 4 5 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2937-38; Pt.
, 5756-57; New York Times, June 26, 1917, 7; and August 4, 1917, 1.
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this erroneous premise/ Heflin delivered a House speech, claiming in
it that he could identify "thirteen or fourteen" congressmen who had
received money from the fund.
Britten to the funds.

At this point he only linked Mason and

William Howard (D-Ga.) supported Heflin, when

he claimed that he could also name members who had taken the money . 1 4 7
Unleasing an uproar in the House, Heflin met with few supporters and
much denunciation even from fellow Democrats.

The House Rules Commit

tee launched an investigation into the charges, while other members
demanded the expulsion of Heflin.
out.

In the end, the incident fizzled-

No members pushed matters to a climax, and the Rules Committee
14o

dismissed Heflin's charges as without substance.

Retrospect
Although the Heflin incident indicated a growing alarm over cri
ticisms of the war program, the first session generally maintained
a sense of proportion in dealing with possible discontented elements
and with dissenters.

They had twice rejected the restrictive censor

ship provision of the Espionage law but accepted another one and over
looked totally the other restrictive features of the bill.

A number

advocated the easy exchange of newspapers and magazines, and a
majority voted to strike Heflin's attack from the House proceedings.
In total, the House went on record six times on civil liberties and
dissent issues.

These provide a basis for analyzing the groups

147New York Times, September 27, 1917, 1; September 23, 1917, 1;
and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 7305-06, 7360-61.
1 4 8 Ibid., 7361, 7461, 7369, 7463; Pt. 8 , 7711-15, 7786; New York
Times, September 24, 1917, 1; September 25, 1917, 8 ; September 27,
1917, 4; September 28, 1917, 1; September 29, 1917, 1; October 7, 1917,
3; and U. S. Congress, House, Alleged German Corruption Fund, Hearings
on H. Res. 148, 149, 151, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 14-18.
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supporting or opposing repressive tendencies.

Since all six of these

votes scaled together, a scalogram pinpoints the members having the
easiest time supporting repressive measures and those having the hardest
time supporting them.

(Table 3-18:A) .

Thirty-eight percent of the

congressmen either could not vote for any repressive measures or found
that they could vote for the passage of Espionage Bill but no restric
tive positions.

Of this first group, a mere ten out of the 147

congressmen were Democrats while the rest carried the Republican
label.

Clearly some partisan factors were at work in the votes.

In

terms of geography, no pattern is noticeable except that New England
Democrats lined up with the Republicans more than normally, and New
England and East North Central Republicans gave slightly below average
support to their party position.

In the moderate category eighteen per

cent of the membership swung from support of repressive measures to
opposition.

The partisan breakdown levels out as a number of Repub

licans (thirty-five), who had found it possible to vote for a measure
or two, moved into opposition against other restrictive measures.

At

the same time, an equal contingent of Democrats (thirty-nine) found
that they also could not agree to such confining policy positions.
These Democrats resided in all sections, but greater numbers came from
the East North Central and the Pacific states.

The third category

includes the supporters of the most repressive measures; they favored
the original censorship provisions of the Espionage Bill and they
opposed removing Heflin's inflamatory remarks.

Partisan divisions

returned as 145 Democrats supported the President's and Heflin's
positions.

Only seventeen Republicans so voted.

These 162 members

came from all sections though the South supported the measures more

TABLE 3-18:A
CIVIL LIBERTIES

Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE
POSITION

MA

Low
Medium
High

TOTAL

WNC
D
R

SS

R

D

R

ENC
D
R

3
1
2

12
7
3

1
6
15

40
7
4

1
8
12

35
14
6

1
2
6

23
4
2

12
80

6

22

22

51

21

55

9

29

92

NE
0

D

BS
R

3
—
—

3

MS

D

R

D

1
7
24

10
—
2

—

32

12

PS
R

2

D

R

5
1

1
3
1

9
2

10
39
145

137
35
17

6

5

11

194

187

5

7

TOTAL
D
R

Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE
POSITION

Low
Medium
High

NE

MA

ENC

SS

D

R

D

R

D

R

WNC
D
R

D

50
17
33

55
32
14

6
27
68

78
14
8

5
38
57

64
26
11

11
22
67

—
13
87

79
14
7

MS

BS
R

100

PS

D

R

D

R

D

R

3
22
75

83

29
—
71

83
17

20
60
20

82
18

17

— —

TOTAL
D
R

5
20
75

72
18
10

The order of the roll calls is 29, 35, 27, 41, 26, 58
Fercent at each point on the scale 19, 20, 9, 6, 4, 20, 22
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .937
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TABLE 3-18:B
CIVIL LIBERTIES

Scale
Position

Motion

1

VAR 29 To pass H. R. 291.
260-107; + = yea. Cong. Rec.,
Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1814.

2

VAR 35 To amend in the nature of a substitute for section 1201, H. R. 4280, by reducing the rates for second
class mail and applying to that class the zone
system now in use for parcel post. 256-150; + = yea.
Ibid., Pt. 3, 2817A.

3

VAR 27 To amend H. R. 291, by prohibiting the wilful pub
lishing of any information relating to national
defense that may be useful to the enemy during any
national emergency resulting from a war, and autho
rizing the President to declare a national emergency
excepting that nothing in this section be construed
to limit or policies of .the government or the publi
cation of same. 191-186; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 2, 1819.

4

VAR 41 To recommit H. R. 291, (40 STAT-217, June 15, 1917),
Espionage and Neutrality Bill, to the Committee of
Conference with instructions, to agree to eliminate
from the Bill Section 4, Title One, which describes
specifically the character of information useful to
the enemy. 184-144; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 3, 3144.

5

VAR 26 To amend H. R. 291 (40 STAT, June 15, 1917), punishing
acts of interference in the foreign relations, the
neutrality, and the foreign commerce of the United
States and strengthening the criminal laws of the
United States, by eliminating Section 4, authorizing
the President to declare, by proclamation, the exis
tence of a national emergency and to prohibit the
publishing and communication of information relating
to national defense which might be useful to the
enemy, and also eliminating the provision that
nothing in this section shall be construed to limit
or restrict any discussion, comment or criticism of
the acts or policies of the government or its repre
sentatives or the publication of the same. 221-167;
+ = yea. Ibid., Pt. 2, 1816.
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6

VAR 58

To expunge certain remarks from the record regarding
Bill H. R. 4961, (40 STAT-217, August 10, 1917),
Providing further for the national security and
defense by encouraging the production, conserving
the supply, and controlling the distribution of food
products and fuel, by eliminating certain words
referring to two representatives as being traitors
and in treason with anarchists and charging them
with stirring up enmity to the draft law. 190-122;
+ = Nay. Ibid., Pt. 6, 5757.
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strongly than the other regions.

In summarizing the votes# partisan

ship clearly influenced the balloting as most Democrats favored the
repressive position while most Republicans were in opposition.

The

members who broke party ranks expressed either a liberatarian or
authoritarian ideological, rather than a strictly partisan, position.
Of course, the positions, of the two parties also reflect ideological
orientations, but more notable is the sinple partisanship of their
stances.
The partisan voting on the civil liberties issues was unusual
for the first session because extreme partisan voting nearly dis
appeared as the House recorded only two percent of its roll calls at
the ninety percent level of partisanship (Table 3-19:A). When compared
to the eleven percent of extreme partisan votes for all sessions, the
two percent for the first session indicates that the parties checked
their partisan tendencies.

Part of the reason for this is that par

tisanship on a number of issues either did not influence the vote or
operated only in a minor fashion.

In this category are such vital war

measures as the draft and food bills.

Open partisanship did not com

pletely vanish, however, as the first session recorded thirty-nine
percent of its roll calls at the fifty percent versus fifty percent
level.

In this category are the Espionage Act, the Roosevelt division,

some of the ballots of the Revenue Act, and the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation.

On still other roll calls partisanship was noticeable,

even though it falls below the statistical convention.

On such votes,

what opposition did exist came from a minority of one party.

For

example, all opposition to the final passage of the Revenue Act came
from a minority of Republican party members.

Then partisanship made
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TABLE 3-19:A
PARTISAN VOTING

First Session

Second Session

Third Session

Overall

Ninety Percent
versus
Ninety Percent

2%

3%

22%

11%

Fifty Percent
versus
Fifty Percent

39%

40%

56%

47%
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itself known through floor debates, criticism of the Administration, and
attempts to wrestle control of the war program from Wilson.

Although

thirty-nine percent was a relatively low percentage of partisan voting,
which compared favorably with the overall percentage of forty-seven for
all sessions, the Republicans added a dimension of conflict to roll
calls that otherwise would have been missing.
At the same time that roll calls recorded few partisan votes, they
also indicated a high cohesion within parties (Table 3-19:B).

Normally,

high cohesion within parties is interpreted as a result of high partisan
voting, as both parties internally unite against the other.

The corol

lary to this thesis is that low cohesion within parties reflects low
partisan voting.14®

However, the thesis is largely incorrect for the

first session of the 65th House, because the high cohesion within
parties actually represented a high agreement between parties on
policy.

Interestingly, however, the Rice Cohesion Index records a

relatively small difference between the three sessions of the 65th
House.

Democrats recorded during the first session a cohesion score

of seventy-four on all votes, which represented an increase of one
over the average score for all sessions.

The Republicans actually

dropped one point from sixty-seven to sixty-six.

A possible explanation

is that while the parties united behind the war program, elements of
both parties at times found it impossible to support the party posi
tion.

In this way the war program created internal party disunity,

though the war program usually engendered surprisingly high unity
within parties.

149Allen and Clubb, "Party Loyalty During the Progressive Years,"
570-77.
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TABLE 3-19:B
COHESION ON SELECTED ISSUES BY PARTIES*

DEMOCRAT
First Session All Sessions
Average
Average
Cohesion
Cohesion

REPUBLICAN
First Session All Sessions
Average
Average
Cohesion
Cohesion

1. Overall

74

73

66

67

2. Revenue

88

88

40

40

3. Progressive

65

63

51

56

4. War
Legislation

72

73

61

64

5. Economic

50

54

52

57

*This table was constructed in a manner similar to Table 22 of
Chapter two.
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The high cohesion was reflected in high unity on several issues
of the first session (Table 3-19:B).*50

The Democrats maintained

significantly high unity on revenue, progressive, and war measures.
Whereas the Democrats were able to unite on these issues. Republicans
achieved little unity on revenue legislation and only average unity on
progressive and war legislation.

On roll calls dealing with economy

in government, the Republicans achieved a higher unity, but their score
of fifty-two against the Democrats fifty cannot be construed as sig
nificantly greater.

The degree of unity on all issues except one

was not greater than the average for all sessions.

In the context of

the fewer partisan votes, the lower cohesion.scores indicate that such
issues, when they caused divisions at all, divided parties internally.
Overall, the parties agreed to the war program, which resulted in high
cohesion on issues.
Policy differences between Republicans and Democrats existed,
but to characterize their positions as progressive or conservative
is more difficult.

The draft vote moved in the realm of liberalism.

Since both sides claimed to speak for democracy and the parties did
not divide, the progressive stance becomes impossible to pinpoint.
However, the Revenue Act and the civil liberties votes suggest more
recognizable liberal positions.

On the Revenue Act, Republicans

staunchly stood for conservativism as they opposed higher business
taxes and favored revision of the bill.

They reversed their alignment

on civil liberties and voted for the liberal position.

The Democrats

15°The cohesion scores on the issues will often be lower than the
overall cohesion average. As an explanation, it should be noted that
all unanimous votes were removed from the votes on issues, while the
overall average, as the term implies, included all votes.
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followed a similar inconsistent pattern, since they adopted the oppo
site stance on these two issues.

Therefore, partisanship is probably

more significant than ideology on the revenue and civil liberties
issues, but elements of both parties broke ranks to express ideo
logical orientations.

Those who did so may be described as progres

sives or conservatives.
If partisanship and ideology influenced the final decisions of
the House, the war program gave substance and weight to all that tran
spired.

The House, though often directed by the Executive, formed a

war program for troop recruitment, espionage, finances, food, and
equipment of the army and navy.

More than once the President and

the press criticized the congressional -pace, but if not immediately,
at least eventually, the required programs were forthcoming.
out, the House insisted on its share in the war program.

Through

They in fact

stamped their image on the draft, the Espionage Act, the Revenue Bill,
and the Lever Food Act.

They failed, however, to develop a program

of their own and, rather, accepted an administration plan from which
to work.

Most of all, they failed to share in the implementation of

the war program.

As a result, many in the House, mainly Republicans

but also some Democrats, uneasily accepted this lack of participation.
The session closed in October, 1917, on a note of cordiality, but an
undercurrent of frustration and tension flowed beneath the surface.
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CHAPTER IV

SECOND SESSION OF 65TH HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES

When congressmen assembled for the second session on December 2,
1917, they were in a critical and suspicious frame of mind.

Rumors

of war mismanagement by the Wilson Administration filled the Capital,
creating a tense atmosphere.

Representatives vocally demanded infor

mation from the Administration of military preparations and of the
status of American relations with the Austro-Hungarian Empire.3- But
tension arose not only from concern over the war program but also
from the legislative difficulties that confronted the new session.
Much of the legislation passed during the first session required
revision because it had left out important war needs or had not pro
vided enough money, men, and material to effectively fight the war.
Also, the war spirit was generating pressures for two long time re
forms, women's suffrage and prohibition.

It was again clear that

complex partisan, regional, and ideological forces would be active
during the session as in the first session.
Adding to the tension and flux was the change in party leader
ship and in the balance between the parties.

Minority Leader Mann had

^New York Times, December 2, 1917, section VII, 2; and Livermore,
Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 65.
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been absent since July, 1917, suffering from a nervous breakdown.
Although he would periodically make an appearance during the second
session, the Republicans had to find new leadership.

At first they

selected a two-man team, Frederick H. Gillett and Irvine L. Lenroot;
Republicans also directed that several other party stalwarts, among
them Joseph Cannon, assist Lenroot and Gillett.

Shortly after his

selection, Gillett took over sole direction of the party when Lenroot
won a seat in the Upper House in April, 1918.

In contrast to Mann,

Gillett chose to work in concert with several other party leaders.
On the Democratic side, old leaders also had to be replaced.

Two

important committee chairmen resigned in December, John J. Fitz
gerald, head of Appropriations, and William C. Adamson, head of
Interstate Commerce.

J. Swagar Sherley replaced Fitzgerald, and

Thetus Sims took over the Interstate Commerce post.

Though both men

had long experience in the House, they lacked the floor training which
Fitzgerald and Adamson had acquired.

3

Meanwhile the control of House machinery could have passed to the
Republicans if they had so chosen after the death of Ellsworth Bathrich
(D-Ohio) and the resignation of four Tammany Hall Democrats, who pre
ferred to reap the spoils of the Tigers' recent mayoralty victory
rather than stay in the House.

With the Democrats' ranks thus depleted,

Republicans technically became the majority party.

Although they

decided that the Democrats ought to bear alone the responsibility for

2Ibid., November 25, 1917, 11.
1917, 8; and December 4, 1917, 3.

New York Times, November 26,

3Ibid., December 13, 1917, 2; and December 15, 1917, 6.
Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 304, 316.

Cong.

206

the conduct of the war, roll calls would now be more bitterly contested
than during the first session.4

Resolution For War
The actual legislative session started calmly enough when the
House heard President Wilson deliver the State of the Union Address
on Deceiriber 3, 1917.

He declared that the goals of the war were just

because America waged war for the vindication of principle and of
right.

Only a complete defeat of German autocracy and complete freedom

for European people would achieve this purpose.

In pursuit of this

goal, Wilson explained, America’s war had to be expanded to include
combat against the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

He suggested that the

Hapsburgs were vassals of Germany and hinted that war against them
would help to liberate the Empire's nationalities.

On domestic matters,

he very cursorily sketched legislation that the Executive would re
quire from Congress during the session.

As Wilson concluded his address,

he had resolved the tensions over the ambivalent status of American
relations with Austria-Hungary, but he had failed to resolve all
doubts over American war aims.5
Immediately taking up the declaration after Wilson’s speech,
the House membership quickly demonstrated that few followed Wilson's

4New York Times, December 25, 1917, 3. Eventually, the Demo
crats were replaced. Since the replacements were other Democrats,
control reverted to them. See ibid., March 7, 1917, 5; and Washington
Post, March 15, 1917, 2.
5Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 21-23; New
York Times, December 3, 1917, 1; and Washington Post, December
4, 1917, 2. Many members wished that Wilson had included Bulgaria
and Turkey in his call for war against Germany's allies. See
Washington Post, December 5, 1917, 5.
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reasoning or sympathized with his aims except for three members, J.
Charles Linthicum (D-Md.), Adolph Sabath (D-Ill.), and Frederick
Gillett.

Phrasing the imperative for war in the terms of Wilsonian

idealism, they also spoke of the war as one to lift humanity, establish
international law, liberate subjugated nationalities, and achieve
permanent peace.®

The majority who finally opted for war on Austria

supported the resolution because they believed that it would be an
effective means of destroying German power.

American might, they

thought, should be directed against Germany's allies because they
furthered her war-making potential.

Such a narrow definition of the

war's purpose could not encompass the idealism of Wilson.
A third group of congressmen diverged even more significantly
from Wilson's view.

According to Pat Harrison (D-Miss.), war

against Austria grew out of the need to maintain American economic
rights.

In effect advancing an economic motivation for the war,

Harrison and like-minded colleagues connected the wartime prosperity
of the country to American's resistance toward the Central Powers.8
Finally, members who had voted against the declaration of war on
Germany often inplied that they still disagreed with the war's pur
poses.

Caleb Powers (R-Ky.), though he supported the Austrian War

resolution, strongly objected to Wilson's claim that his view of war
aims represented the only possible stance.

Similarly, Jeannettee

Rankin (R-Mont.) backhandedly alleged that commercial interests

®Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,'Vol. 56, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 88-89, 92.
^Ibid., 51, 86, 91, 94, 96; and Charles Merz, "At the Capital,"
New Republic, XIII (December 22, 1917), 218.
8Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 88, 85.
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controlled the direction of the war machine.

She, nonetheless, voted

for the Austrian weir resolution because she supported all measures that
carried out the original war declaration.

The only member to vote

against the declaration agreed with Miss Rankin’s economic thesis:
Meyer London, claiming that he stated the Socialist position, sympa
thized with Wilson's internationalism; he declared, however, that sel
fish economic interests only turned Wilson's idealism to their own
advantage in war.9

Debates demonstrated the cleavages within the

House over the war issue, either because members did not agree with
Wilsonian doctrine or because they did not understand its goals.

Prohibition and Women's Suffrage
After the settlement of the Austrian war issue, the legislative
business of December and January consisted mostly of appropriating and
raising money for the war.

Several highly charged issues, however,

disrupted the normal proceedings, the first of which was the national
prohibition amendment.

Since 1913 prohibition forces, directed by

the Anti-Saloon League, had been demanding that Congress bar the
manufacture and sale of liquor by the adoption of a constitutional
amendment.

In 1914, the drys made their first attenpt to pass the

amendment in the House, losing 196 to 190.

Still short of the consti

tutional two-thirds requirement, prohibitionists redoubled their
activity and waged a vigorous election campaign in 1916 that defeated
several anti-prohibition congressmen in Indiana and elsewhere.
1917 they had augmented their already formidable ranks, and the

9Ibid., 94, 98-99, 90.

By
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onset of the war only mobilized the drys all the more for an offen
sive. 10
Prohibitionists believed that the war presented their cause with
a solid argument in their favor.

They cited the insistence of the

Secretary of the Navy on laws prohibiting the sale of liquor to soldiers
and sailors.

Though they failed to add a bone-dry provision to the

Lever Food bill, prohibitionists could claim that the bill's provision
barring the manufacture of most liquor products would conserve grain
for food.11

In a similar vein, John G. Cooper (R-Ohio) maintained in

a speech full of bathos that the American government had no right to
remove a boy from the purity of his mother's home and return him
spoiled by alcohol.

Edwin Webb, floor leader for the Democratic pro

hibitionists, connected liquor with the decline of the Roman Empire.
When the country was to face the challenge of the new "Vandals,"
America could not afford any weaknesses that alcohol would generate.12
Wets tried to counter with a war thesis of their own, namely that
prohibition would foster discontent at home.

In particular, wets

claimed that it would make the laboring people of the country unhappy,
since they would feel they were denied relaxation and liberty.13
However, the wets' rebuttal of the prohibitionists' war argument failed
mainly because the drys more effectively dramatized of the issue.

10Odegard, Pressure Politics, the Story of the Anti-Saloon
League, 98, 151, 166-174; and Kobler, Ardent Spirits; The Rise and
Fall of Prohibition, 180-199.
11New York Times, May 23, 1917, 3; May 25, 1917, 2. Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1286-88; and Pt. 1, 429, 437.
12Ibid., 430, 468.
13Ibid., 428, 430, 446.

During the debates, one side would advance an argument which
the other would then seize and reject.

A favorite wet argument

ridiculed the whole proposition because laws could never force the
people to stop drinking.14

Discounting the likelihood of extreme

violation of prohibition laws, Edward Keating sarcastically suggested
that wets organize a movement to repeal all laws on theft.

Laws, he

maintained, were frequently violated, but that was not the question;
rather, the issue was whether or not the law would help prevent some
damage to the community. 16

Taking another approach, the wets advanced

constitutional objections;

a national amendment would violate states

rights, would place a sumptuary law in a fundamental document, and
would restrict the workings qf democracy.16

Prohibitionists countered

by arguing that the states rights thesis had never been consistently
upheld by its proponents:
tactic.

wets now employed it only as a scare

Further, prohibitionists argued that sumptuary law or not,

the problem came from the existence of wet states next to dry states,
which made dry state enforcement of prohibition laws impossible.
Only national action could ensure the integrity of dry states.
Finally, Webb discounted the issue of limitation of individual rights
because the amendment followed the constitutional procedures.

Be

sides, as Frank Mondell (R-Wyo.) maintained, the people wanted pro
hibition and they had the right to determine such laws as they desired.

14Ibid., 453, 463, 436.
15Ibid., 453.
16Ibid., 428, 457, 439, 432-33, 462.
17Ibid., 431, 435, 426, 453.
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Better organized and more determined, the prohibitionist, consistently
dominated the debates.

1R

Many congressmen during the debates implied that arguments would
not influence their votes but rather that political considerations would
determine them.

Many political units across the country had held

prohibition elections within recent years.

Thus, the political power

of prohibition was graphically evident to many congressmen.

Joseph

Cannon, not noted for his abstentious from strong drink, declared
that he would vote to submit the amendment to the states.

By so

doing, he said that he fulfilled the expressed sentiments of his
c o n s t i t u e n t s . O n the other side, Thomas Heflin, after arguing
that prohibition would weaken the states' police powers, concluded
that, since his district rejected a state constitutional amendment
in 1909, he could not vote against his constituents' desires.2®

Never

unmindful of constituent desires, many congressmen, on this issue
with its deep public passions, voted frequently not as conviction
dictated but as political expediency required.
Despite the influence of politics on many representatives'
stances, there were a number of strong prohibition advocates.

Among

them several attitudes, often overlapping, manifested themselves.
Historians have attempted to classify prohibitionists into assimilative

^•8New York Times, December 18, 1917, 1.
^•®Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3204. In
private correspondence several members candidly expressed the necessity
to vote dry because of constituent pressure. See Stephens to P. M.
Barrett, February 28, 1917, Stephens Papers; Ramseyer to Harry M.
Neas, July 25, 1917, Ramseyer Papers; and Stringer, "Aswell, Educator
and Politician," 66, 68.
20Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 458.
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or coercive reformers, true social reformers, efficiency proponents,
and so forth.23- Such efforts are essentially futile because a congress
man often combined several attitudes.

Yet, in one sense a common

denominator can be found that encompasses many of their attitudes.
Running through their discussions was a characterization of liquor as
"evil."

The word "evil" itself was repetitiously mouthed by drys,

while at the same time they drew sinister images of the "liquor
traffic" and the "saloon."

In their psychology this evil existed,

not simply as an abstraction, but as a real and potent force that
threatened to destroy much that they valued.

A clearcut morality of

right and wrong underlined many drys* beliefs, which fastened on
"liquor" and the "saloon" as the source for many of the problems in
the covintry.22
Since liquor was the source of untold graft, moral degradation,
and social destruction, its abolition became a reform of the highest
order.

According to Congressman Keating, efforts to regulate the

"liquor traffic" repeatedly failed because of the selfish interests of
the liquor manufacturers.
prohibition.23

Reform in this case, he continued, required

Developing the reform concept, Patrick Norton (R-N.Dak.)

2•'■Four basic articles on the prohibitionist mentality are:
Robert Hohner, "The Prohibitionists: Who Were They," South Atlantic
Quarterly, LXVIII (Autumn, 1969), 491-505; Paul Carter, "Prohibition
and Democracy, the 'Noble Experiment' Reassessed," Wisconsin Magazine
of History, LVI (Spring, 1973), 189-201; J. C. Burnham, "New Perspec
tives on the Prohibition 'Experiment' of the 1920," Journal of Social
History, LI (Fall, 1968); and S. J. Mennell, "Prohibition: A
Sociological View," Journal of American Studies, III (December, 1969),
159-175.
33Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 438, 442, 448,
453.
23Ibid., 453; and Keating, The Gentleman From Colorado, 391.
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spoke of prohibition as preventing the blight of "woeful wrecks of
humanity" now found where the "evil" saloon existed.

In broad terms,

prohibitionists spoke of a rebirth of the best moral senses of mankind.
Since liquor dulled moral sensitivity, weakened physical strength,
and spawned criminality, its abolition would further the regeneration
of man.24

The prohibitionist as reformer confidently looked toward a

better day.
Besides retarding the reform of mankind, liquor also damaged
the health and diminished the efficiency of workers.

According to

Webb, alcohol weakened infants of alcoholic mothers, undermined the
intelligence of people, and deprived a person of his physical strength.
Alben Barkley added that liquor robbed the nation of billions of
dollars of industrial production by lowering workers' efficiency.
The growth of "scientific management" advanced the prohibition cause
by demonstrating that industrial efficiency required sober workers.
Not unmindful of the value that most Americans accorded science,
prohibitionists gladly claimed that science had given prohibition its
imprimatur of approval.2*5
Prohibitionists also believed that alcohol threatened the
existence of traditional values and the social fabric of the community.
The prohibition movement, according to Webb and other spokesmen,
sprang from the beliefs of Christian, God-fearing people who were

trying to defend Americanism, motherhood, womanhood, homelife, moral
purity, and "old time religion."

In opposition to these fundamental

24Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 454, 435, 442,
448.
25Ibid., 426, 459-60, 442.
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values and institutions of the American people were alien and sinister
forces which sought to undermine them.26

Usually, prohibitionists did

not define the forces that attacked the community except in the general
condemnation of liquor.

John Tillman (D-Ark.), however, identified

social groups that, if given liquor, became particularly insidious
forces in American society.

Although not denying the danger of whites

"crazed" by alcohol, he singled out the Negro who, he insisted, could
not resist the lures of drink.

His intemperance, Tillman elaborated,

"decreased the Negro's economic efficiency and increased the menace
of his presence."

Attributing the growth of prohibition sentiment in

the South in large measure to the danger of the Negro, Tillman
stressed that the South would do all it could to prevent the crime
which it "regards as the blackest of all crimes."

He completed the

picture of sinister forces by linking "foreign names" to the control
of the liquor industry.27

To some convinced prohibitionists, the

suppression of liquor meant the protection of traditional values
through the disciplining of alien and evil elements.
The strong moral fervor of the prohibitionists encompassed a
variety of reform, traditional, and authoritarian attitudes.

The

congressmen who expressed the attitudes of the dry as well as the wets
can be partially identified through quantitative analysis.

First, this

can be accomplished by correlating the prohibition roll calls, five
altogether, in order to find if they cluster with each other.

Since

they do, the second step is to correlate the prohibition votes with

26Ibid., 468, 438, 430, 442.
27Ibid., 449.

issues that historians have named as overlapping with prohibition.
These issues include women's suffrage, progressivism, and labor
reform, all of which have received computer analysis in relation to
prohibition.

All tests proved ineffective in uncovering significant

links between prohibition and supporters and opponents of other issues.
On the women's suffrage movement, three of the six suffrage votes relate
to one of the five prohibition roll calls.

Since the other votes do

not cluster, only a slight connection is indicated between the advo
cates and opponents of the two movements.

As for progressive issues,

James H. Timberlake makes a strong case for ties between the Pro
gressive and the Prohibition Movements.2®

His study reevaluates and

defines the ideas of the Prohibition Movement in relation to Progres
sivism; he did not, however, analyze congressional voting blocs.
Though Timberlake could be correct about the association of ideas,
the inference that this would necessarily mean there were connections
between supporters of prohibition and progressivism might be wrong.
In fact, this is the case, since tests between progressive and pro
hibition issues revealed no correlations.

Prohibitionists as a group

did not function as a unit on progressive roll calls.

In short, pro

hibition transcended the interests and ideals of progressivism and
women's suffrage and became a force of its own.
Nuala Drescher describes proponents of unionism as usually
nq

opposing prohibition.

However, correlation tests with issues in

28James Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement,
1900-1920 (New Yorks Atheneum Press, 1970), 1-3.
2®Nuala Drescher, "Organized Labor and the Eighteenth Amendment."
Labor History, VIII (Fall, 1967), 280-283. Her study does not include
an analysis of the 65th House.
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which organized labor had taken a position reveal no connection be
tween labor and prohibition.

During their debate both drys and wets

claimed that they spoke for the laboring people of the country.

One

opponent of prohibition in fact waved before the House a letter from
Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, in
opposition to the amendment.

As a rejoinder, John Cooper (R-Ohio), a

member of the Brotherhood ofLocomotive Engineers,
of his union, among others, for prohibition.

cited the support

It would seem that

despite the Engineers support, labor would tend to oppose the abolition
of the saloon because of economic, social, and class reasons, but no
quantitative information sustains Drescher's position.

No organized

voting groups formed which consistently expressed antiprohibition
and pro-labor positions.
Although no correlations exist with these other groups there
appears to be some relationship between prohibition and farm issues.
A number of roll calls involved questions of farm policy and conse
quently divided members supporting or opposing farm proposals.

Since

most farm votes do not cluster with each other, it could not be ex
pected that prohibition roll
votes.

calls would correlate with many farm

Yet, three farm votes, two on a measure to stimulate farm

production and one to raise the guaranteed price of wheat, did corre
late with the prohibition votes.

This inconclusive relationship

at least indicates that agrarian advocates tended toward prohibi
tionist sentiments while farm opponents showed an orientation in
favor of liquor.

The farm and rural connection with prohibition

has been the most constant theme in historiographical literature.
30Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 429, 432.
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These correlations partially verify that thesis.
Partisan and geographical groupings also operated during
the prohibition roll calls/ though their significance varied widely.
The prohibition scalogram ranks menibers into opponents, moderates, and
supporters of the amendment.

The low position on the scale pinpoints

those members who refused to support any prohibition measures (Table
4-1sA).

Since these representatives even continued to oppose pro

hibition bills after the passage of constitutional amendment, the low
category pinpoints those who refused to concede victory to the
prohibitionists and consequently were the most inflexible opponents
of prohibition.

Predominantly from the Northeastern states, twenty-

nine opponents were Democrats and sixteen were Republicans.
In the middle scale bracket, the party breakdown again shows
that Democrats predominated over Republicans.- In the regional break
down, members at this scale level, who switched from opposition to
support after the ballot on the constitutional amendment, came from
the Pacific wine-growing states, and the Border, New England, and East
North Central States.

At the highest level of support, prohibitionists

carried the label of both parties, which indicates the non-partisan
nature of the prohibition coalition.

By regions, the West North

Central, the South, the Border, and Mountain states supported the
amendment more strongly than the rest of the country.
Overall, the most noticeable voting pattern revealed within the
Democratic party was a geographical split.

Although the Republicans

had no significant geographical divisions, Democratic opposition to

Chapter I for historiography on prohibition and the farm.

TABLE 4-1: A
SCALQGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON PROHIBITION

Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE
POSITION

NE
D

Low
Medium
High

TOTAL

MA
R

D

3
2
1

1
3
15

—

6

19

ENC

WNC
D
R

R

D

R

2

7
2
20

7
4
10

6
4
41

1
1
8

8

29

21

51

10

6

SS

BS

MS

D

R

D

R

D

1
—
25

10
15
65

—
3

2
6
24

1
8

26

90

3

32

9

PS
R

R

D

D

TOTAL
R

8

1
5

2
3

1
1
6

29
30
121

16
12
123

8

6

5

8

180

151

—

Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE
POSITION

Low
Medium
High

MA

D

R

D

R

D

R

WNC
D
R

50
33
17

5
16
79

75
—
25

24
7
69

33
19
47

12
8
80

10
10
80

NE

ENC

D

4
—
96

11
17
72

MS

BS

SS
R

—
—
100

D

6
19
75

R

D

PS
R

D

R

TOTAL
D
R

40
60

12
12
76

16
17
67

„
11
89

—

100

17
83

11
8
81

The order of the roll calls is 161, 160, 174, 71, 177
Percent at each point on the scale 9, 5, 3, 9, 21, 53
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .970
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TABLE 4-1:B
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON PROHIBITION

Scale
Position

Motion

VAR 161

To pass Bill S. 3935 prohibiting the sale, manufac
ture, and importation of intoxicating liquors in
the Territory of Hawaii during the period of the
war, except as herein after provided. 237-30;
+ = yea. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess.,
Pt. 7, 6741.

VAR 160

To refer Bill S. 3935, (40 STAT-560, May 23, 1918),
prohibiting the sale, manufacture, and importation
of intoxicating liquors in the Territory of Hawaii
during the period of war, except as hereinafter
provided, to the committee on Territories with
instructions to report back with amendment removing
the two year limitation regarding appeal. 40-239;
+ = nay. Ibid., 6739.

VAR 174

To discharge the Committee on Agriculture from
further consideration of H. RES. 394, a resolution
requesting the President to report to the H. of
Rep. whether any order has been issued by the U. S.
Fuel Administration restricting the supply of coal
to persons engaged in manufacture of intoxicating
liquors. 205 - 47; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 8, 8137.

VAR 71

To agree to S. J. RES. 17, proposing an amendment
to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting
manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating
liquors. 282-128; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 1, 469.

VAR 177

To table H. RES. 399, requesting the President to
report to the H. of Rep. whether any order has been
issued restricting the supply and transportation of
materials and machinery for use in manufacture of
intoxicating liquors or the transportation of such
liquors. 142-159; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 8, 8358.
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prohibition clustered more nearly in the three Northeastern regions.
These Democrats, representing city and Catholic ethnic constituencies,
registered their protest against the party's dominant position.

In

1918, signs of the growing regional strife, which would divide the
Democracy in the 1920's, were already appearing.
In January, 1918, the House took-up another constitutional
amendment, this time on women's suffrage.

The movement for the

amendment had been gathering momentum for several years, but during
1917, its forward progress accelerated.

In January, 1917, suffragettes

started continuous picketing of the White House.

Hoping to dramatize

their cause, they also desired to push Wilson toward more aggressive
support of the amendment.

Some congressmen, particularly anti

suffragists, fumed against the tactic as an insult to the President.31
The pickets continued, nonetheless, since they spotlighted demands of
the movement.

Meanwhile in Congress, suffrage leaders such as John

Raker (D-Cal.) and Jeannette Rankin organized their cohorts.

In

September, 1917, they proposed creation of a special House committee
on suffrage.

The Judiciary Committee, which usually heard constitu

tional amendments, was chaired by Edwin Webb, the leading opponent of
the amendment.

Since he had long refused to permit a favorable report

of the amendment, suffragists hoped to bypass his committee with a new
Women Suffrage Committee.

They succeeded when the House agreed on a

roll call, 181 to 107, to establish the new committee.32

^Washington Post, January 10, 1917, 1; and New York Times,
January 19, 1917, 6.
32Josephson, Jeannette Rankin, 94; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 7384.
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With this lopsided vote indicating the suffragists' strength,
President Wilson increasingly moved toward open avowal of the movement.
His previous stance had been that the Presidency had no constitutional
role in the amendment process, since Congress exclusively initiated
the amendment process.

Moreover, Wilson, as he tried to side-step the

issue, maintained that his party had not taken a position in favor of
a national amendment.
more positive.

His statements, however, became progressively

In October he told a group of suffragists that he

favored the amendment, because the war brought to the fore fundamental
issues and women's suffrage was one of the most essential.

He still

believed, nonetheless, that the states should settle the matter.

In

January, 1918, the President finally reversed course, and though he
did not start to actively pressure Congress for passage until later,
he now squarely supported the amendment.

Many of his Democratic party

members, particularly Southern ones, were not

pleased,

33 but they

could not stop the well-organized movement, now aided by war ideals
and by the advocacy of the President.
The new Committee on Women's Suffrage held hearings on the
Susan B. Anthony Amendment, starting January 3, 1918.
witnesses were led by Mrs. James Wadsworth.

The opposition

They argued that women

found their dignity only in the home, and that in New York, where
a suffrage amendment had recently won, Socialists, pacifists and
German sympathizers had given it the margin necessary to pass.

Pro

suffragist witnesses rejected out of hand anti-suffragist claims,
arguing instead that the German-Socialist vote in New York affected

•^Washington Post, January 10, 1917, 1; New York Times, October
24, 1917, 1; November 10, 1917, 1; and January 10, 1918, 1.
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the outcome hardly at all.

Turning to the attack, suffragists main

tained that anti-feminist simply did not realize the great changes
occurring in the world.

As Carrie C. Catte, President of the National

Women's Suffrage Association stated, female security no longer de
pended on the reverence of the male, but on her rights before the law.
Women, suffragists elaborated, had broken out of the home, and now
demanded their inherent rights as protection against abuse by employers.
The suffragist witnesses also maintained that their aim harmonized
with the democratic ideals of the war and would help contribute to
the war effort by boosting the morale of women.34
Backed by a favorable report from the Women's Suffrage Committee,
general debate on the House floor commenced January 10, 1918.

On one

plane, the debate focused on the immediate implications of a favorable
vote.

On another plane, the debate probed into the fundamental

attitudes for support or opposition.

Supporters of the amendment

argued that the war was being fought for the uplift of humanity and
the advancement of democracy.

Miss Rankin closed her speech with the

rhetorical question, "How shall we explain to them (the peoples of the
world) the meaning of democracy if the same Congress that voted for
r

war to make the world safe for democracy refuses to give this small
measure of democracy to the women of our country?"35

The suffragist

opposition also appealed to the war for vindication of their position.
Willfred Lufkin (R-Mass.) claimed that conditions were too unsettled

34Josephson, Jeannette Rankin, 96; and U. S. Congress, House
Extending the Right to Suffrage to Women, Hearings, on H. J. Res.
200, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 120, 57, 320, 245, 29.
33Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 772, 774.
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for deciding grave constitutional questions.

Developing this theme,

James Parker (R-N.J.) added that the House must avoid divisive issues
in favor of proposals that unified the people and cemented the war
machine together.3®

Overall, the suffragists gained the advantage

because the war ideals, as phrased by Wilson, placed the opponents of
the amendment on the defensive.
On the second plane, both political calculation and social and
moral ideals shaped a representative's vote.

John Moon (D-Tenn.)

explained that he opposed the amendment because the overwhelming
majority of his constituents opposed it.

J. Hampton Moore (R-Pa.),

too, reduced the issue to a simple determination of his constituents'
wishes.

Questions of right or wrong aside, he declared that his

voters' opinions determined his vote against the amendment.37

On the

suffragist side, James Cantrill (D-KY), who had just conferred with
Wilson on the amendment, counseled his Democratic brethren to vote for
the amendment to ensure future party success at the polls.

He ex

plained his contention by pointing out that, in the 1916 election,
Wilson carried the West because of the female vote.
alarmed by the possible negative vote of Southerners,

Particularly
he reminded them

of their grave responsibility as the dominant element in the party
during a time when democracy demanded positive support.38

36Ibid., 790, 763-64.
37Ibid., 765, 778.
38Ibid., 764; and Stringer, "Aswell, Educator and Politician,"
86-87. At least one congressman voted against his constituents'
expressed positions. John Esch in January, 1917, stated that he could
not support women suffrage because his district had registered its
disapproval in several recent ballots. Nonetheless, in January, 1918,
he voted yea. See John Esch to Alfred L. Deves, January 13, 1917,
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Significantly/ Cantrill's advice and his reference to his con
ference with Wilson brought prolonged laughter and jeers from fellow
Democrats and Republicans alike.

The House's response indicated that

a congressman's attitudes and ideals were more fundamental than
political considerations.

Placing the whole movement in the context

of democratic evolution, Miss Rankin linked the amendment to the basic
democratic desires of the American people.

She went on to say that

the suffrage movement sought the realization of justice which would
allow equal opportunity and equal freedom for both male and female.
Similarly, Clyde Kelly (R-PA) pictured women's suffrage as fitting
the new "epoch" that the war commenced because both asserted the
ideals of equality and liberty.

But he also talked, as did other

suffragists, of the uplifting influence that women's suffrage would
have on public morality.

Women had already demonstrated their redemp

tive quality in social work; their beneficial influence should spread
to politics, also.39
At this point anti-suffragists showed a traditional and mascu
line bias in their rebuttals to the suffragists' viewpoint.

To critics

women belonged not in public life but in the home; otherwise, the
family unit would be destroyed.

The female in their view lacked the

strength, intelligence, and above all the firmness and hardness of
the male.

The world in their mind was divided between security and

purity of the home and the battlefield of the business, political, and
military worlds.

Frank Clark of Florida cited Herbert Spencer as an

Esch Papers, Wisconsin State Historical Society; and Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 810.
39Ibid., 771, 769.
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authority on women's abilities.

To Spencer women were emotionally and

mentally incapable of carrying the burdens of government.

If women

left the home, the result would not only be the destruction of a
safcred haven but also the weakening of the competitive and hardfisted
world of men.40
It seemed to the suffragists that their opponents completely
ignored the numerous new roles that women played in American society.
Ira Hersey (R-Maine) noted that in the war women were serving in all
branches of industry and on the battlefield as nurses.

Having

become more than either, the slave or the little angel of men, women,
i

Edward Little (R-Kans.) declared, were capable people who were helping
to win the war.

Although most proponents limited the woman's new role

to war activities, several, who were often ardent prohibitionists,
stressed the woman's moral role in the general advancement of mankind.
They rejected the opponents' view of the world as necessarily evil.
Besides, even if this were true, women should not retreat to the
hearth but should, these suffragists argued, exercise their spiritual
vitality and sympathy to help transform the world.41

While this

argument was designed to attract the advocates of other reforms,
suffragists at the same time believed that women had in truth de
veloped a finer moral sense than males.42

40Ibid., 777, 763-64, 783-84.
I
41Ibid., 778, 791, 793, 796, 780-81, 771, 774, 798; and Nethers,
"Simeon Fess," 320-21.
42See Alien S. Kraditor's, The Ideas of the Women Suffrage
Movement, 1890-1920 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965),
Ch. 1, discussion of the suffrage movement's ideas.
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The suffragist debates were complicated by the concealment of
anti-suffragists' real opinion behind a states-rights argument.
Briefly, the states-rights thesis ran that the Constitution placed
electoral matters in the hands of the states.

The women's suffrage

amendment was a "lawless invasion" of state privilege, which would
jeopardize the integrity of the states.

Proponents covintered by

pointing out that the anti-suffragists had often voted for restric
tions on states rights, for example*in the case of prohibition.

Since

most Southern representatives had voted for prohibition, they were
forced to explain the apparent inconsistency.

They did so by insis

ting that a difference existed between the two amendments, namely,
that the prohibition amendment dealt with police powers while the
suffrage amendment involved voting powers.43
Though the South's states-rights argument accounted for the
inconsistency, it nonetheless concealed a basic reason for their
opposition to the amendment, which was their fear over the effect of
women voting on race relations.

To Southerners, prohibition would

have beneficial effects on the Negro race since it would increase
the black's economic potential while it also would help subdue and
discipline his passions.

In effect, prohibition would only increase

the South's police power by strengthing its control over the Negro.44
The situation reversed itself in the case of women's suffrage.

Carter

Glass wrote a constituent that there is "danger of permitting the
federal authority to have anything whatever to do with the franchise

43Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 775-76, 764,
765, 781.
44Ibid., 772, 789, 797-98, 805-06.
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....The only time there was ever federal intervention it took the
extreme form of perpetrating the crime of Negro enfranchisement."45
It is true that Southern opposition revealed a deep strain of anti
feminist and traditionist sentiment which would oppose women's suf
frage even by state amendment.

Still, Southerner's fears were

heightened by the specter of federal marshals at the polling places
and Negro women in the voting booths.
After the conclusion of House debates, three roll calls occurred
over the suffrage amendment.

Since three other votes were taken

during the session over other suffrage questions, the House recorded
altogether six ballots.

One roll call established the Women's Suffrage

Committee and two others referred bills to the new Committee.

Of

the constitutional amendment roll calls, two represented attempts by
opponents to undermine the amendment by inserting limiting clauses
into it.

The first required state conventions rather than state

legislatures to approve the amendment, and the second limited the
ratification period to seven years.

Anti-suffragists supported these

motions as a means to defeat the amendment on the state level.

Suffra

gists, who saw through the intentions of the anti-suffragists, opposed
AC

and defeated the two motions.

The final ballot involved passage

of the constitutional amendment itself, which won, just barely, the
necessary two-thirds support of the House (Table 4-2:B).
These six votes were subjected to the usual quantitative tests.
As in the case of the prohibition amendment, the women's amendment

4^Glass to Mrs. S. J. Hartsook, January 16, 1918, Box 107,
Folder 1918, Glass Papers.
45Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 807-10.
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TABLE 4-2:B
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE

Scale
Position'

Motion

VAR 109

To table motion discharging the committee on
territories from further consideration of H. R.
4665, granting to the Legislature of the Territory
of Hawaii additional powers relative to elections
and qualifications of electors and refering the
same to the Committee on Woman Suffrage. 64-268;
+ = nay. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess.,
Pt. 4, 3491.

VAR 72

To refer the two Bills, H. R. 242 and H. R. 3371,
protecting the rights of women citizens of the
United States to register and vote for Senators of
the U. S. and members of the House of Representatives
by transferring same from the committee on election
of President, Vice President, and Representatives
in Congress, to the Committee on Woman's Suffrage.
234-107; + = yea. Ibid., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 515.

VAR 77

To amend H. J. RES. 200, proposing an amendment to
the Constitution extending the Right of Suffrage
to Women, by providing that the H. R. RES. be sub
mitted to conventions in all states rather than 3/4
of the Legislatures. 131-274; + = nay. Ibid., 807.

VAR 79

To adopt H. J. RES. 200.
810.

VAR 63

To adopt H. RES. 12, amending the rules of the House
of Rep. as follows: Amending rule X by adding a
subdivision to be numbered 51A as follows: 51A
on Woman Suffrage, to consist of 13 members," To
amend rule XI by adding a subdivision as follows,
"51A all proposed action touching the subject of
Woman Suffrage, to the Committee on Woman Suffrage."
181-107; + = yea. Ibid., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7,
7384.

VAR 78

To amend H. J. RES. 200, by making inoperative this
article unless ratified as an amendment to the Con
stitution by the Legislatures within 7 years from
the date of submission to the states. 158-247;
+ = nay. Ibid., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 809.

274-136; + = yea.

Ibid.,
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called into existence a discrete and single-issue voting coalition
since its votes related with few other ballots.

Women's suffrage

has long been accorded status as a progressive measure by historians
who generally describe progressivism as having at least a phase
devoted to the spread of democratic forms.

In terms of constitutional

changes, this meant that progressivism sought the direct election of
senators and the recall and the referendum, along with women's suf
frage.

Since the 65th Congress considered only the women's suffrage

amendment, it would be logical to assume that no similar voting blocs
would exist.

Such was the case particularly since other progressive

issues, such as taxation, generated a totally different set of
ideas and sentiments and consequently a separate set of voting blocs.
Further, other roll calls that included farm and war issues indicated
no consistent relationships e i t h e r . W o m e n ' s suffrage mobilized
a new, but not insignificant, voting alignment.
Because the votes correlated, a scalogram was computed, thereby
indicating the degree of support for the amendment (Table 4-2:A ) . A
quarter of the House membership rejected all votes that advanced the
women's cause or agreed to only one ballot— this vote on a referral
motion after the victory of the amendment.

The anti-suffragists

disproportionally represented the Democratic party:
compared to sixteen Republicans.

eighty-seven,

The overwhelming majority of these

Democrats, sixty-nine, hailed from the Southern states, while seven
more came from the Border states.

The rest represented the

4^The Women's votes did correlate with two farm roll calls.
Perhaps a small regional influence is thereby detected by this
fact, since the particular farm votes won strong support from the
West as did the women's amendment.

TABLE 4-2:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON
WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE

Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE
POSITION

MA

NE
R

D

R

1
2
2

4
6
14

4
1
15

7
11
37

6
5
12

4
5
47

..

1
9

1
27

69
12
17

5

24

20

55

23

56

10

28

98

D

Low
Medium
High

TOTAL

WNC
D
R

SS

ENC
D
R

_

BS

MS

D

R

D

D

—
3

7
1
26

1
1
7

3

34

9

R

PS
R

D

R

—

—

TOTAL
D
R

8

6

5

10

87
22
94

8

6

5

10

203

—

16
24
151

191

Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE
POSITION

Low
Medium
High

MA

NE

ENC

D

R

D

R

D

R

20
40
40

17
25
58

20
5
75

13
20
67

26
21
53

7
9
84

WNC
D
R

-

-

10
90

4
96

SS

BS

D

R

70
12
18

—
100

D

R

21
3
76

11
11
78

' MS
D
R

PS
D

R

—

—

—

—

100

100

100

100

TOTAL
D
R

43
11
46

8
13
79

The order of the roll calls is 109, 72, 11, 19, 63, 78
Percent at each point on the scale 16, 10, 5, 3, 4, 12, 50
Coefficient of Reproducibility = . 9 4 8
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Northeast, the region from which fifteen of the sixteen Republican
opponents were also elected.

At the medium level of support, a small

swing group of twelve percent is to be found.

A close evaluation of

the roll call scale order reveals an interesting point on the swing
group:

the roll calls at this medium level include the constitutional

amendment votes, while those at the high level consist of two suffrage
motions that came before that roll call.

Given this order, the swing

group first tried to oppose the amendment but once finding that they
could not defeat it, they voted for it.

Otherwise, the swing group

reveals no important party or geographical characteristics.

Supporting

the women's suffrage movement most consistently were the Republicans,
who rallied seventy-nine percent of their members in support.

Since

forty-six percent of the Democrats similarly voted as did these
Republicans, women's suffrage, in a strict sense, created a non
partisan coalition.

Yet, the Democratic divisions and the greater

Republican solidarity clearly demonstrate which party more avidly
backed women's suffrage.

Regionally, the Western states (MS and PS)

gave enphatic and total approval while the West North Central states
also firmly sustained the women's cause.
In some respects the suffrage coalition showed a connection with
the advocates of prohibition.

Both prohibitionists and suffragists

came from the Mountain and West North Central regions in disproportional numbers, while the East North Central, Pacific, and Border
states gave roughly average support.

The greatest difference between

the coalitions existed in the South, which voted for prohibition and
against women's suffrage.

In sum, women's suffrage mobilized a coali

tion with a larger number of Republicans than Democrats who represented
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in greater percentages the Western and West North Central regions.

The

opposition consisted mainly of Southern Democrats, who were concerned
over the effect of women's suffrage on traditional values, states
rights, and race relations.

Opponents also included some Northeastern

Democratic and Republican congressmen who represented conservativeminded old stock Yankees and recent immigrants.

Conduct of the War
The House, at the same time that it considered the democratic
implications of the war, increasingly became embroiled in controversy
over the conduct of the war.

The vast appropriations for military

mobilization, the decline of Allied fortunes in Europe during the fall
of 1917, and the leisurely pace of the War Department fostered growing
alarm among congressmen.

In response to these apprehensions, the

Senate Military Affairs Committee, on December 12, started a probe
of the Ordnance office to determine if shortages of guns and artillery
existed.

General William Croizer, head of Ordnance, and other officers

evaded the Senators' questions, denied failures, or shifted responsi
bility— either toward Congress or in the direction of Secretary of
War Baker.

The testimony of Surgeon General William Gorges, however,
AQ

revealed alarming medical conditions in several army camps.

On the

House side, criticism also surfaced, though on a more muted note.

The

Naval Affairs Committee started hearings on conditions in the Navy
Department, not because of any specific charges but as a parallel to
48
Washington Post, September 4, 1917; New York Times, December 2,
1917, Section VII, 2; December 12, 1917, 1; December 19, 1917, 1; and
Lindsay Rogers, "Cooperation Between Congress and the Executive,"
Nation, CV (December 27, 1917), 714-16.
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the Senate's investigation of the Army.

An interim report in early

January, instead of criticizing the Navy Department, praised it.4*9
Meanwhile several House Republicans, who had recently returned from
France, issued a gloomy report on conditions overseas.

According to

Medill McCormick (R-Xll.) and George H. Tinkham (R-Mass.), American
forces suffered from shortages of guns and ammunition.

Fed by such

charges, plus the finding of the Senate investigation, Administration
antagonists prepared for a fullscale attack on the war program."
Congressional critics launched their assault by charging Secre
tary Baker with incompetence and by demanding the reorganization of
the war machine.

Senator George E. Chamberlain (D-Org.), chairman of

the Senate Military Affairs Committee, drafted a proposal for a
minister of supply with cabinet status and requested that Baker appear
before his Committee.

Simultaneously, Horace M. Towner (R-Iowa) and

William P. Borland (D-Mo.) introduced into the House bills similar to
Chamberlain's, both of which would establish cabinet-level military
ordnance departments.51

Coming before the Senate Committee on January

10, 1918, Baker rejected the ministry proposal as overlapping with a
new war council recently set up by the army.

When the Committee

questioned Baker on the alleged ammunition shortages and camp deficien
cies, he categorically denied any problems out of the ordinary.

From

49New York Times, December 20, 1917, 1; January 14, 1; and U. S.
Congress, House, Conduct and Administration of Naval Affairs, Investi
gation, Hearings before the Naval Affairs Committee, 65 Cong., 2 Sess.
" Washington Post, December 28, 1917, 2; New York Times, December
19, 1917, 1; January 1, 1918, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56,
2 Sess., Pt. 1, 976.
51New York Times, January 4, 1918, 1; January 12, 1917, 3; and
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 980-81.
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the Senators' perspective, Baker's manner, which had been rather casual
and offhanded, was irritating.

They also thought that he withheld
CO

full information on military conditions.

Criticism only intensified.

On January 17, Fuel Administrator Harry Garfield gave Administra
tion critics more ammunition when he issued an order closing North
eastern coal-burning factories (except munition plants) for five days
and on Mondays for the next several weeks.

Ostensibly, the order

was designed to clear railroad coal car congestion and move coal to
the points experiencing the most critical shortages, the cities and
seaports.

53

In the House, Republicans reaction was hostile:

co

leader Gillett introduced a resolution which would suspend the Garfield
edict.

In what developed as the first full-scale House debate on the

war's conduct, Madden and Lenroot charged "absolute incompetency,"
and Gillett bewailed the repercussions of Garfield's order on war pro
duction and on workers' wages.

Democratic spokesmen, who largely

stayed out of the debate, confessed that they did not know the exact
reasons for the order, although Henry Rainey (D-Ill.) lamely added
that "it must be needed."

Criticism of the order continued for the

next several days.154
With the political atmosphere highly charged, the opposition to
the Administration started to coalesce around Chamberlain's proposal

^Beaver, Newton D. Baker, 80-89; New York Times, January 11,
1918, 1; January 13, 1917, 1; and January 16, 1918, 1.

33Ibid., January 17, 1918, 1.
^4Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 974, 973, 984,
990, 983, 993, 1038-44; Washington Post, January 18, 1918, 1; January
19, 1918, 2; New York Times, January 18, 1918, 1; and January 19,
1918, 1.
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to reorganize the cabinet.

Representative Julius Kahn (R-Cal.),

leading Republican member of the Military Affairs Committee, told
the National Security League that the War Department had collapsed.
Kahn also gave his endorsement to the Chamberlain proposal.

While

a few Democrats joined in the criticisms, Republicans met in caucus
over whether or not to support the Chamberlain plan.

Since they

failed to reach an agreement,ex-president Teddy Roosevelt, who had
long been predicting disaster, rushed to Washington.

Conferring with

leading Republicans at the home of his son-in-law, Nicholas Longworth
(R-Ohio), Roosevelt argued for more "constructive criticism" of the
Administration.

House Republicans again caucused and this time agreed

to support the establishment of a "director" of munitions, a suggestion
that the President strongly opposed.

However, they hesitated to take

immediate action on their proposal and decided instead to allow the
Senate to act first.
Up to January 20, President Wilson and House Democrats had not
mobilized a counter-attack.

Under the increasing pressure, they

organized a series of blows that threw critics into disarray.

Wilson

initiated the offensive when, in a blunt letter to Chamberlain, he
claimed that the Senator was guilty of "astonishing and absolutely
unjustified distortions of the truth."
cabinet p l a n . ^

Wilson also rejected the

While the President next conferred with Democratic

55Ibid., January 20, 1918, 1; January 16, 1918, 3; and Beaver,
Newton p. Baker, 97.
56Washington Post, January 24, 1918, 1; and New York Times,
January 24, 1918, 1.
^ L i v e r m o r e , Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 93.
See
chapter five and six for a general discussion of the War Department

236

leaders, Baker requested another session before the Senate Military
Affairs Committee.

Shedding his former evasive manner, Baker master

fully cited a ream of statistics which demonstrated that the War
Department had not in fact collapsed.

Shortly before his defense he

had appointed Edward Stettinus, a widely respected financial leader,
as Surveyor General of Army Purchase and had also reorganized some
of army bureaus.®®

Congressional response to Baker improved as

a result of his new candor and more decisive action, and as the opposi
tion started to break-up Wilson initiated the final counterstroke.
On February 6, Wilson called in Democratic Senators and gave them a
bill that entrusted the President with power to organize the government
in order to improve war coordination.

Robbing the critics of their

own plan while maintaining Presidential authority, Wilson's plan com
pleted the regrouping of the Democrats behind the President and the
rout of his opponents.®9
From then on criticism subsided:

the Chamberlain plan passed

into oblivion, while the President's bill sped toward enactment.
Carter Glass defended the Administration in an extended House speech
on February 7.

Noted for not mincing his words, Glass accused Chamber-

lain of "theatricism," called the criticism "foolish,” and declared
the war program a success.®0

Crisis.

No appropriate rejoinder by the critics

New York Times, January 22, 1918, 1.

58
Beaver, Newton D. Baker, 97-100; New York Times, January 26,
1918, 1; January 27, 1918, 1; January 30, 1918, 1; and Washington
Post, January 26, 1918, 4.
59New York Times, February 7, 1918, 1; February 11, 1918, 1;
February 14, 1918, 1; and Washington Post, February 7, 1918, 1.
®°New York Times, February 8, 1918, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
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followed, though a few more anti-administration speeches were heard
in the House.

Representative Fess, on the same day as Glass' speech,

meekly suggested that the Administration required an infusion of new
ideas.

A.few days later Gillett, offering a disquisition on congres

sional grants of power to the Executive, deplored Administration
failures but was unable to suggest any alternative.

On February 18,

the final shot of the winter crisis was fired by Horace Towner, who
insisted that his plan for a munitions department offered the best
solution.

No one listened, and soon the House, in a fit of near

absent-mindedness, passed the President's proposal instead.
No direct roll call was demanded on the President's reorgani
zation plan, but one did come over an effort to curtail the bill's
power.

In particular, opponents attempted to grant immunity to the

Interstate Commerce Commission from the effects of the President's
reorganizing power.

Although the Commission enjoyed high prestige

among members of both parties, the amendment vote, which enlisted the
support of eighty-three Republicans but only eleven Democrats, clearly
demonstrated that partisan considerations outweighed solicitude for
the ICC (Table 4-3).

Republicans in Southern, Border, and Western

(MS and PS) states voted below that party's average support; however,
the variation fails to signify significant discordant voting.

More

importantly, the Republican majority did not mobilize fully forty-two

Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1819-28.
61Ibid., 1831-32, 2170-71; Pt. 3, 2290; New York Times, May 8,
1918, 9; May 14, 1918, 12; and May 15, 1918, 1. Towner's speech con
sisted of only a few remarks on the House floor, which he then extended
in the Record. A few more speeches were made but they were proforma
performances. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt.
2546, 2548.

TABLE 4-3
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S.3771: PRESIDENTIAL
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH*

Region and Pacty (Numbers)

VOTE

Yea

NE

MA

ENC
D
R

D

R

D

R

—

14

—

16

1

28

12

15

18

15

Nay

4

7

WNC
D
R

SS
D

BS
R

D

16

4

1

7

70

2

7

MS
R

D

PS
R

D

4
27

5

8

4

TOTAL

R

D

R

4

5

83

4

149

59

3

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE

ENC

MA

D

D

R

D

R

Yea

—

67

—

52

5

65

Nay

100

33

100

48

95

35

R

WNC
D
R

100

SS
D

BS
R

70

5

33

30

95

67

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., pt. 7, 6521.

D

MS
R

D

PS
R

D

44
100

56

100

100

100

TOTAL

R

D

R

50

3

58

50

97

42
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percent of their membership.

Throughout the winter attack on the

Administration some Republicans adopted a moderate or neutral stance;
consequently, the two Republican caucuses that assembled during this
period failed to attract large numbers of the Republicans.

Only ninety-

five out of a possible 210 attended the first meeting, and it adjourned
without reaching any decision on policy.

The second caucus, which

attracted a slightly larger attendance of 125, could agree only to a
watered-down compromise bill instead of the Chamberlain bill.

Appa

rently, a sizable number of moderate Republicans feared charges by the
press of partisan p o l i t i c s . in any event, the Democratic rout of the
Administration's adversaries, as reflected in the roll call, was
aided by disunity in Republican ranks.
Also enabling the Administration to finally triumph was the fact
that House Democrats never broke into splinter groups, although such
dissatisfaction existed over administration muzzling of military in
formation and over autocratic direction of the war program that
Representative Borland even introduced a war cabinet proposal.

go

House
N »
Democrats also showed their displeasure by not defending the Administration during Republican attacks.

Yet, the Democrats knew that the

Wilson Administration was their administration, and their success
rested in Wilson's victory.

In the end the Democrats rallied behind

New York Times, January 16, 1918, 3; and January 24, 1918, 1.

^Washington Post, January 26, 1918, 4; and New York Times,
January 12, 1918, 3.
®^A few Democrats spoke up for the Administration during the
Garfield order uproar. However, they usually allowed the Republicans
to blow off steam without interruption. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 973-93, 1038-44, for Democratic defenses of
the Garfield order.
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Wilson, though their doing so came at the high price of granting the
President additional powers.
While the major crisis of the war receded into the background,
a mini-explosion flamed up in April.

George Creel and his Committee

on Public Information had long drawn the fire of congressmen because
he acted as a propagandist not only for the war but also for the
Administration.

He also inflamed passions by his obvious doctoring

of news stories, by his egotism, and by his inpulsiveness. Criticisms
had, however, been sporadic before April, but he solidified opponents
when he stated, "I will be proud to my dying day that my country was
inadequately prepared when it entered the conflict."
pounced on this pacifist-like remark.

Congressmen

Creel then increased his diffi

culties when he denied charges by Representative Allen Treadway (R-Mass.)
that the Committee on Public Information sent propaganda materials to
soldiers in France.

He declared the accusation to be "totally baseless"

and added that Treadway should have checked his sources before flinging
charges.
The House, particularly the Republican side, hotly criticized
Creel for his remarks.

Longworth demanded Creel's resignation and

other Republicans moved to censor him.

Democrats rebutted a claim by

Republicans that they always supported the Administration and pointed
out that they actually attacked the Administration at every opportunity.
The vote on motions to reject the report in which Creel made his reply
to Treadway reflected the high partisanship behind the debate.

Only

65New York Times, July 11, 1917, 8; July 15, 1917, 1; December
15, 1917, 2; Washington Post, April 10, 1918, 3; April 12, 1918, 3;
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4973-77; and Gruber,
Mars and Minerva, 139.
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one or two members from either party broke ranks as ninety-nine percent
of each party opposed the other.

Since the Republicans had more mem

bers on the floor, they won the rejection of the report.6®

Further

confrontations ensued after Creel attempted to have the last word; he
told reporters that he would not "inquire into the heart of Congress"
because he "did not like to go slumming."

After this insulting remark,

the House Rules Committee demanded an apology; Creel retracted the
remark, but the House membership was not through with him.

They de

livered the final blow when they cut his Committee's appropriation
from $2 million to $1.25 million.6^

Aliens and Dissenters
During the winter of 1918, a less than amicable atmosphere also
prevailed in the House over a number of other issues, one of which was
the status of alien "slackers."

The issue arose because American

treaty arrangements with Allied and neutral countries prohibited the
conscription into the U. S. military of their nationals who resided
in America.

When many aliens refused induction based on their treaty

rights, many American citizens demanded that these aliens, who re
ceived the nation's benefits, should also shoulder its duties.

Adding

to the public's discontent was the fact that the draft based its
quotas on the total population of a district without regard to its
alien population.

Thus, areas of immigrant concentration were forced

66Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4975, 4977-78,
4980; and Washington Post, April 21, 1918, 10.
67Ibid., May 17, 1918, 17, 2; May 18, 1918, 2; June 18, 1918, 2;
New York Times, June 14, 1918, 8; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56,
2 Sess., Pt. 8, 7915.
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to draft a higher percentage of citizens than in regions of low
alien population.

Given these conditions, considerable demand

arose outside of Congress and in Congress for harsher treatment of
the alien "slacker.”68
In September, 1917, Reptesentatives John Burnett (D-Ala.) and
John Rogers (R-Mass.) introduced a slacker bill that required
the alien either to enter the military or face deportation. 7
The bill was assigned to the Military Affairs Committee which first
heard Secretary of State Robert Lansing and later the bill's sponsors.
The Secretary acknowledged the inequalities in current conditions,
but in extenuation he pointed to treaty obligations of the government.
These, Lansing continued, would not permit a law requiring military
service from aliens.

To change current draft laws, he added, would

adversely affect relations with neutral nations, drive out of the
country skilled labor, and disrupt commercial activities.

He con

cluded by saying, however, that the Department was initiating discus
sions with the treaty countries in order to revise the draft status of
aliens.

During Lansing's statement Military Affairs committeemen had

interjected that the public was demanding action on alien slackers.
Moreover, Frank L. Greene (R-Vt.) insisted to Lansing that the drafted
native soldier risked his life while the alien remained at home in
safety.

John Q. Tilson (R-Conn.) added that the current draft law

unjustly discriminated against districts with many aliens.

The

Committee implied to Lansing that the State Department must speed
I

68Washington Post, September 20, 1917, 6; and Cong. Rec., 65
Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 8, 7384-85.
^Washington Post, September 20, 1917, 6.
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action on the treaties, or else the House would take matters into its
70

own hands.

After Lansing left the committee room, sponsor Rogers presented
several proposals to the committee which he had designed to meet some of
the Secretary's objections.

He agreed with Lansing that the sections

on neutral and enemy aliens ought to be removed, but he insisted
that those on co-belligorent aliens should remain.

With the bill's

application thus narrowed, he next advocated that aliens ought not
be drafted; however, the bill should continue to provide for the
deportation of all aliens who refused to be drafted.
had asked Lansing about such a proposal.

Earlier Greene

Diplomatically phrasing his

reply, the Secretary had answered that it would be most "unfortunate"
to deport aliens.

Rogers acknowledged Lansing's position but rejected

it because he disliked the granting of special privileges to aliens.
Though some committee members agreed with Roger's nationalism, the
Committee decided that they would wait and see if Lansing actually
revised the alien status treaties.

71

When the State Dejartment proved too dilatory, Burnett, Rogers,
and others in January, 1918, revived the alien slacker bill.

This

time the legislation came under the auspices of the Naturalization and
Immigration Committee, which Burnett headed.

The Committee quickly

agreed to the bill and won time on the floor for it in February, 1918.
Henry Flood. (D-Va.), Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, opposed

70U. S. Congress, House, Drafting Aliens into the Military
Service, Hearings on H. R. 5289 and J. J. Res. 84, 65 Cong., 1 Sess.,
3-8.
7^Ibid., 16, 20-22, 30, 34, 8; Washington Post, September 27,
1917, 7; and September 28, 1917, 6.
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it as unnecessary.

The State Department, he explained, was conducting

its negotiations as rapidly as possible.

He added that the bill’s

principle was defective even if the Department was not conducting
negotiations because it established a precedent that could be used
against Americans residing in foreign countries.

Disregarding these

international ramifications, Burnett characterized the alien "slacker"
as a "sinister parasite" feeding on the American nation.

The concern

for "justice" that had earlier been voiced in the Military Affairs
Committee largely disappeared.

In its place appeared a stark nationa

lism that demanded the deportation of aliens regardless of the viola
tion of treaty rights.

Burnett even read into the Record a letter

from the alien-baiting Patriotic Order of Sons praising the bill.
Not all opponents of aliens, however, lined up in support of the bill.
For example, Albert Johnson (R-Wash.), a strong restrictionist,
opposed the bill as rendering American treaties "mere scraps of paper."
The majority, however, agreed with Burnett's aggressive nationalism,
which permitted them to vent their rage not only against aliens but
also upon the State Department.

The bill won 234 to 130 on the key

roll call.72
In the end the majority's singer turned to frustration as the
State Department successfully sabotaged the bill in the Senate.

Be

fore the upper House could act on the alien bill, Lansing introduced
the treaties.
alien bill.

The Senate then stoped proceedings on the Burnett
After this happened, Lansing withdrew the treaties.

Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1764-66,
1769, 1772, 1779; and Pt. 3, 2748, 2766.
7 ^Cong.

With
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the alien law thus sidetracked, Rogers vehemently protested Lansing's
duplicity and the House attempted no further action.73
Similarly, two proposals on alien voting came to naught.

In

one case, Representative Flood introduced a bill which barred from
voting aliens who had not taken out their first naturalization papers.
Representative Montague introduced a constitutional amendment that
removed all voting rights of aliens irrespective of the commencement
of naturalization procedures.

In both cases the proposals struck at

the practices of ten states, including New York, which did not prohibit
alien voting.

Only the Montague scheme came to a hearing before the

Judiciary Committee.

Presenting the amendment as a protection device,

Montague argued before the Committee that foreign elements could
control or influence elections in eight or nine of the ten states.
This threatening condition, he postulated, must not be "acquiesced in”
because the "preservation of our nation" hung in the balance.
Foreign countries, Montague continued, would purposely colonize
America in order to control elections and to undermine American
independence.

Returning to more solid ground, he concluded that

America had moved too rapidly in allowing immigrants into the country.
Appaxently the Judiciary subcommittee did not agree with Montague's
combination of apocalyptic fantasies and restrietionist sentiments.
At least, they failed to report the amendment out of the Committee.74
Behind Montague's apprehensions lurked the fear that aliens
and "sinister" forces were nearly one and the same.

In particular

i

73Ibld., Pt. 8, 7389-85.
74New York Times, March 12, 1918; and U. S. Congress, House,
Limiting the Right to Vote to Citizens of the United States, Hearings
on H. J. Res. 270, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 4-8.
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the alien and the "dangerous" anarchist had long been firmly linked
together in popular thought.

Laws as of 1918 provided that alien

anarchists who had been in the United States less than five years
could be deported.

The Department of Labor and the Justice Department

found the five-year law too restrictive.

In its place, the Departments

wanted a bill that provided an unlimited period of time for deporta
tion.

They also suggested that the bill contain a new and broader

definition of anarchist, to include all those who believed in the
violent overthrow of the American government.

The Naturalization and

Immigration Committee, which had jurisdiction on this proposal, agreed
readily and reported the bill under the floor direction of Albert
Johnson.

In his analysis the bill supported one more "step on the

part of the United States toward cleaning up its citizenship."

Not

unexpectantly, he pictured anarchists as "rats gnawing at the very
foundations of our government."

From his vantage point and also that

of Jacob Meeker (R-Mo.), the war both roused Americans to the danger
and offered the opportunity to rid the country of such freeloading
and dangerous riffraff.

John M. C. Smith (R-Mich.) rounded off the

Americanism theme by asserting that the proposed law would further
the development of a good, loyal, and "flag-waving" citizenry.

If any

representatives disagreed with his colleagues’ prejudice^ he elected
not to express his opinions.

The bill passed without a division.

75

^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 7, 8109-8127.
Congressman Smith was also advocating the adoption of a bill to
punish "insults" to the flag. See Ibid., Pt. 6, 6176. The Alien
Law of 1918 served as the basis for deportation of radical aliens
after the war. See Robert K. Murray, Red Scare, A Study in National
Hysteria, 1919-1920 (University of Minnesota Press, 1955), 14, 196,
247, 213-17, and Preston, Aliens and Dissenters, 182-83, 193, 207,
218, for a discussion on the law's application.
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Notwithstanding such attitudes as those voiced on the Alien
Deportation bill, the House did not always follow a repressive course
on aliens.

As the war progressed, particularly when Congress declared

war against Austria-Hungary, problems arose over the status of "enemy
aliens."

First, the naturalization of all enemy aliens had ceased

after April 6, 1917.

Since this inadvertently blocked the completion

of naturalization by enemy aliens who had taken first papers, the
House received protests from aliens so affected.

John Raker (D-Cal.)

responsed to their demands and steered a bill through the House that
rectified the situation. 7*> A second bill passed the House, without
debate, concerning certain aliens from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Many in Congress did not believe that non-German nationalities of that
Empire should be defined as enemy aliens.

The bill, consequently,

excluded them from classification as enemy aliens if they were serving
in the American military.77
However, when Adolph Sabath (D-Ill.) introduced another bill
favorable to aliens, it stirred up many congressmen's prejudice
about the racial "purity" of the American stock.

His measure provided

that certain Czecho-Slovak and Polish troops could receive American
citizenship.

Now fighting in the Allied armies, these soldiers had

in the past resided in the United States.

Sabath's bill allowed these

former residents, if they wished, to become naturalized citizens while
still in Europe.

Assigned to the Naturalization Committee, this

seemingly simple proposal unleased a torrent of nationalistic bigotry.

7^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 3660-68.
77Ibid., Pt. 3, 3010.
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Everis Hayes (R-Col.) conjured-up horrid images of the Czechs and Poles
marrying "undesirables" and returning to the United States with them.
To both Hayes and Albert Johnson, if such happened, the purging and
cleansing of the American citizenry, which they named as the war's
chief goal, would be undermined since these unions would propagate
an ignorant and degenerated race of children that would subvert
American institutions.

Apparently, the whole Committee suffered from

similar phobias about the contamination of American blood.

At least,

the Sabath bill did not win their endorsement.^®
Intolerance toward aliens fed upon itself and spread to attack
other parts of the population.

It grew not so much because of the

breast-beating of the superpatriots, though they had their role, but
because of long-term attitudes

79

and wartime pressures for conformity.

When the war started, members could still counsel caution in the speed
with which the House enacted restrictive measures.

The House even

dared in face of demands for full-scale war to turn aside newspaper
censorship provisions, foreign wire censorship, and a broadly worded
sabotage bill.

Increasingly, the war climate swept away all restraints

as the country realized that all its resources and, above all, its
men, would be required to crush the enemy.

The "badgering of Baker"

in part flowed from a real patriotic emotion that demanded the utmost
78

U. S. Congress, House, Amendments to the Naturalization Laws,
Hearings on H. R. 10694, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 22, 24-30.
^9See John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American
Nativism, 1860-1925 (New York: Atheneum, 1963), 186, 199-203; and Pres
ton, Aliens and Dissenters, 85-87, for a discussion of prewar nativist
and repressive tendencies. Both authors stress that immediately before
the war deep and broad-based phobias had developed against aliens
and radicals.
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dispatch and mobilization for war.

Groups or individuals who appeared

to block the weir or who refused to pledge one hundred percent support
became un-American.

In the early days of the war the patriots sought

to entrap spies, but by the second session they wished to ferret out
"traitorous" speech and groups.

As a result, when Socialist Meyer

London (N.Y.) called for greater freedom in expressing opinions, he
became an object of attack by several members, as the Socialist party
became suspect.

Similarly, Clarence Miller (R-Minn.) singled out the

Non-Partisan League of the Northern Plains states as anti-war group
which ought to be suppressed.

Others talked of "coward objections,"

"anarchists," "saboteurs" and related sinister forces supposedly at
work in America which must be either suppressed, deported, or pun
ished.8®

If any members were predisposed to oppose the trend, the

fear of attack from fellow members and blasts from the press restrained
their libertarian sympathies.

81

The Sedition Act was the congressional answer to the problem of
disloyalty.

Written by Attorney General Thomas Gregory and advisers in

the Justice Department, the bill defined sedition as any means to
excite discontent against the government or to disturb the public
tranquility through inflammatory language.

States had already passed

similar laws, with the result that Congress had grown used to the idea

80Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 855, 862; Pt. 2, 1572,
1872; Pt. 3, 2576; Pt. 4, 4214, 4242, 4281; Pt. 5, 4990, 5095; and
Pt. 8, 7542, 8108, 8112, 8162. See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 112-13,
116-18, and Preston, Aliens and Dissenters, 181-199 for a general
discussion of wartime and postwar attitudes.
8^That congressmen feared attacks from press and fellow members
can be seen in the following citations; Cong. Rec., 65th Cong., Vol.
5, 2 Sess., Pt. 7, 7320; Pt. 8, 8701; and Pt. 10, 10217, 10532.

of extreme measures.82

Thus when Representative Webb in January, 1918,

introduced the bill, the House passed it after a short and uncontested
debate.

What discussion occurred made it abundantly clear that the

House wanted legislation to silence hostile opinion and to curb
pO
radical groups such as the I.W.W.

Sent to the Senate, the bill was

expanded and then returned to the House.

This time the House gave

it slightly more attention, but the emphasis remained the same, the
suppression of "loose" and "dangerous" speech.

Meyer London attempted

to describe the deleterious consequences of the bill, arguing that it
would turn "people into cowards, hypocrites, and spies."

But the

House's nationalists rejected his libertarian argument and, instead,
preferred to rout out, as Green of Iowa called them, the "pernicious
vermin" who dared to attack the government.

Behind the repressive

attitude of the House was the war frenzy, which insisted, as Thaddeus
Caraway (D-Ark.) said, that the country could not allow its young men
to die in France while soap-box orators vilified the government.

When

the House voted on the conference report, London alone opposed the
growing war intolerance, as the bill passed 293 to one.84
In general the House's majority had developed a harsh attitude
toward aliens and dissenters by the late spring of 1918.85

From roll

82Peterson and Fite, Opponents of War, 212-13. See, also, Harry
N. Scheiber, The Wilson Administration and Civil Liberties, 1917-1921
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), 22-24, for a discussion on
the bill's background.
QO

Ibid., 214; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt.
2, 3002-04.
84Ibid., Pt. 6, 6179-87; Washington Post, April 6, 1918, 2;
May 7, 1918, 6; New York Times, April 25, 1918, 12; and May 5, 1918, 7.
85The House adopted other narrow-minded measures, and individual

call analysis of two ballots on the "alien slacker" law, some descrip
tion of this majority can be given. The first vote on the bill, which
i
sought to postpone debated on it, united a non-partisan coalition of
sixty-sevien percent of the Democrats and seventy-two percent of the
Republicans in opposition to the motion (Table 4-4).

The second

ballot, which attempted to lessen the bills' severity by amendment,
united a slightly lower percentage of both parties.86

Sixty-three

percent of the Democrats and sixty-five percent of the Republicans
refused to water down the bill (Table 4-5).

This bi-partisan agree

ment is notable because House Democrats went against the Administration
position on the bill.

However, since at least the 64th Congress when

many had voted to override Wilson's veto of the immigrant literacy
bill, House Democrats had followed their own course on such matters.
The voting pattern revealed that the Far West (MS and PS regions)
which likely transferred its phobia against the Japanese to all aliens,
07

most strongly supported the anti-alien measure.

Along with the South

which was the next strongest advocate of the measure, the Far West had
the fewest number of immigrants.

Regions with the larger numbers of

aliens, the Northeast and Midwest, usually either provided average
support or below average support for the bill.

It is most likely

that representatives from districts with large alien populations

congressmen introduced confining legislation. See New York Times,
June 2, 1918, section IV, 12; and Washington Post, July 14, 1918, 4.
86Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1766; and Pt.
3, 2766.
P7

See Rogers Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japa
nese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 65-68, 79, 85, for a
discussion on links between anti-Janapese prejudice and the support of

TABLE 4-4
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H.R. 5667:
"SLACKER" DEPORTATION BILL*

ALIEN

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

D

R

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

SS

MS

BS

D

R

D

—

14

1

1

3

18

11

7

3

Yea

2

4

4

15

14

14

4

12

20

Nay

2

18

8

31

7

37

6

17

69

3

R

D

PS
R

D

R

—
4

TOTAL
D
R

2

59

51

9

121

129

Region and Party (Percent)

NE

MA

ENC

D

R

D

R

D

R

WNC
D
R

D

R

D

Yea

50

18

33

33

67

27

40

41

23

—

44

Nay

50

82

67

67

33

73

60

59

77

100

56

VOTE

SS

MS

BS
R

PS

TOTAL
R

D

R

D

R

D

8

12

50

—

18

33

28

92

88

50

100

82

67

72

*Cong. Rec./ 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., pt. 2, 1766.
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TABLE 4-5
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 5667:
ALIEN DEPORTATION BILL*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

MA

NE
D

R

D

R

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

SS
D

Yea

2

9

2

24

16

20

4

6

29

Nay

4

17

15

28

7

32

5

17

58

BS
R

D

3

MS
R

D

PS
R

13

1

1

1

17

10

6

4

NE

MA

D

R

D

R

D

ENC
R

WNC
D
R

D

R

D

Yea

33

35

12

46

69

38

44

26

33

—

43

Nay

67

65

88

54

31

62

56

74

67

100

57

SS

R

—
4

TOTAL
D
R

3

67

64

7

116

118

<

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

D

BS

MS
R

PS

TOTAL
R

D

R

D

R

D

9

14

20

—

30

37

35

91

86

80

100

70

63

65

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., pt. 3, 2766.
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adopted a cautious position on the bill.

On the one hand, they wanted

to appease the voters who were citizens; and on the other, they did
not wish to alienate foreign residents who either could vote or might
shortly be able to vote.

Such district tensions operated most strongly

on Democrats of the Northeast, particularly the East North Central
states.

In sum, Republicans evidenced little tension on the bill since

there were only small regional variations in their voting.

Basically,

the same is true for the Democrats, though a greater tendency toward
division existed.

This variation, as was true of prohibition also,

foreshadowed the cultural splits of the 1920's within the Democratic
party since Northeastemers opposed the other regions.
of 1918 a broadly based coalition

By the spring

upported restrictive measures.

Labor Policy
The wartime suspicion of divisive groups almost spread to include
organized labor.

A number of congressmen thought that the government's

policy toward labor was too generous.

Qp

Forthcoming during the

session as a result were a number of proposals to change the
government's labor policy.

These proposals encompased such areas as

conscription of labor, farm labor, convict labor, and speed of work.
Not all suggestions rested on anti-labor attitudes, nor did opponents
of labor win all the battles.

In fact, the anti-labor attitudes of

some House members was offset by the progressive orientation of other
members.

As a consequence, no coherent theme or labor policy emerged

from House actions.

the return of all aliens.
88Washington Post, April 14, 1918, 4; and April 16, 1918, 6.
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In July, 1917, a threatened strike had come precariously close
to occurring in the critical shipbuilding industry, and rumors of
other strikes periodically recurred thereafter.

When the Executive,

however, did not suggest anti-strike legislation, several congressmen
sought an opportunity to act on their own.

In March, 1918, a bill

came before the House which was designed to control and regulate the
sale and use of explosives.

Since the bill's purpose was to prevent

the destruction of war industries. 8 9

Joseph Cannon thought that

"conspiracies" to prevent work were similiar to schemes to "destroy"
factories.

Winning recognition on the floor, he offered an amendment

to bar conspiracies, claiming that labor conditions were upset by
"conspiratorial" organizations such as the Industrial Workers of the
World.

He conjectured that his amendment would not affect loyal groups

such as the American Federation of Labor.

Nonetheless, he conceded

that his amendment really stopped strikes by any group.
members protested.

Several

In their minds, Cannon's proposal not only was

too drastic, but it also questioned the patriotism of labor.

90

The Cannon amendment came to a roll call call and won over
whelmingly, 257 to fifty-nine.

Immediately, George Y. Lunn (D-N.Y.),

an ex-Socialist, offered a "clarifying" amendment which permitted
"bona-fide" strikes for increased wages or improved conditions.

Though

this amendment, in effect, gutted the Cannon amendment, the House
reversed its position and voted illogically for the Lunn Amendment,
273 to thirty-eight.

Both were now included in one bill, which passed

89

U. S. Congress, House, Regulation of the Use of Explosives,
Hearings, on H. R. 3633, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3-7.
^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 3, 3113-3124.
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and went to the Senate .9 1

There the provision on explosives won

acceptance, although those on strikes did not.

A conference committee

attempted to adjust the differences between the Senate and House
bills but concluded that no harmony existed between the bills or be
tween the Cannon and Limn Amendments.

The conferees pared the amend

ments and sent the bill back to the House.

Returned to its original

pristine status as a bill on explosives, it won acceptance from the
House.

Cannon closed the debates on the strike amendments by simply

noting his confusion as to the House's conduct.9 2
Analysis of the strike amendment roll calls yields only a few
conclusions, one of which suggests a pro-labor position by some
members (Tables 4-6 and 7).

When Cannon and Lunn votes are correlated

with roll calls that affected labor, it is found that opponents of the
Cannon amendment voted in favor of a commission to study unemployment,
which indicates their solicitude for labor.

Secondly, since the House

reversed itself from the initial vote,it is clear that many members did
not really understand the Cannon proposal.
grasp the issue at stake.

However, an element did

These members responded in a consistent

manner either by voting for the Cannon proposal and against the Lunn
amendment or by adopting the pro-labor positions on those amendments.
The numbers in the two groups were small, fifty-six pro-labor members
and thirty-eight Cannon supporters.

Thirdly, no party or regional

pattern emerges except among Northeastern Democrats who voted more

91

Ibid., 3124-26; and New York Times, March 5, 1918, 15.

9 2 Ibid., April 6 , 1918, 8 ; April 14, 1918, 12; Washington Post,
April 14, 1918, 4; April 16, 1918, 6 ; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol.
56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 5093.

TABLE 4-6
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. 383:
CANNON CONSPIRACY AMENDMENT*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

D

R

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

BS

SS
D

R

Yea

3

19

5

32

16

34

7

20

69

Nay

2

—

4

7

4

13

1

4

4

D

1

MS
R

D

PS
R

D

27

3

2

3

3

5

5

3

TOTAL
D
R

R

4
—

8

133

120

1

23

33

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

D

R

D

ENC
R

WNC
D
R

D

BS

SS
R

Yea

60

100

56

82

80

72

87

83

95

Nay

40

—

44

18

20

28

13

17

5

100

MS

PS

D

R

D

R

90

38

29

50

10

62

71

50

R

TOTAL
D
R

100

89

85

78

—

11

15

22

D

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., pt. 3, 3124.
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TABLE 4-7
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. 383:
LUNN AMENDMENT*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

5

Yea
Nay

MA

ENC

R

D

R

D

R

14

10

25

20

38

9

1

7

—

5

SS

WNC
D
R

8

D

20

R

68

3

BS

1

7

MS

D

R

26

10

5

D

PS
R

7

D

R

147

123

—

14

24

D

3

6

—

1

TOTAL
R

D

9

Region and Party (Percent)
l
VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

Yea

100

74

Nay

—

26

D

100

R

ENC
D
R

74

95

84

100

87

91

26

5

16

—

13

9

WNC
D
R

SS
D

BS

PS

MS

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

100

84

100

100

100

.75

100

16

25

TOTAL
R

91

84

9

16

*Cong. Rec. , 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 3, 3126.
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frequently than other Democrats with Lunn.

In short, the strike

question cut across parties and all regions except the Northeast,
revealing a trepidation to either support conspiracies or oppose
"bona-fide" strikes.
On a second front, labor adherents battled to retain the sevenhour day.

Since the 64th Congress, William P. Borland (D-Mo.) had

been carrying on a one-man crusade to increase the legal workday for
Washington, D. C., government clerks from seven hours to eight hours.
During the first session he had offered amendments to several appro
priation bills, but opponents easily turned these aside.

By the second

session, he had gained adherents to his position because of increasing
pressure for greater war production.
the "war demands...more work . " 9 3

In the words of a new supporter,

Bred also by the war was a certain

antagonism toward anyone who supposedly worked less than the norm.
Borland characterized his proposal as requiring an "honest day's"
work and as giving a "square deal" to the American taxpayer.

Similarly,

during floor debates on the Borland amendment, Clarence B. Miller (RMinn.) claimed that the government "coddled" its workers, while John
A. Sterling (R-Ill.) added that all should do the same amount of toil.

94

The defenders of government employees rejected the emotionalism
of the Borland advocates and turned the House's attention toward
actual working conditions.

Henry Rainey (D-Ill.) pointed out that clerks

already could be required to labor more than seven hours a day with
out overtime compensation.

9 3 Ibid.,

94

In fact, throughout the entire war period

Pt. 1, 308, 310.

Ibid., 308; and Pt. 4, 3563-64, 3558-59.
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they had continuously worked over the limit.

Another labor advocate,

Edward Keating (D-Col.), added that government clerks would demand
overtime pay if the amendment passed, whereas before they did without
it.

95

In any event, the opponent's factual case proved ineffective,

even with the all-out backing of the American Federation of Labor.
Borland succeeded in having his amendment attached to the Legislative,
Executive, and Judiciary Appropriation bill, and then defeated efforts
to have it removed.

The Senate concurred with the Borland amendment;

President Wilson, however, refused to sign the bill and returned it to
the House.

In an atempt to override the Wilson veto, Borland forced

a final roll call on his proposal.

His motion lost, 246 to fifty, as

not many members chose to directly confront the Chief Executive.9®
In the end winning the seven-hour day fight, labor proponents
proved equally successful in securing a wage increase for government
employees.

Since the tremendous inflation during the war period had

eaten into the fixed incomes of government workers, Edward Keating
introduced a bill that responded to their plight.

Gathering the sup

port of the American Federation of Labor, the bill also received the
endorsement of the Appropriations Committee.9 7

Committeemen apparently

concurred with William Wood (R-Ind.) that justice required the wage
increase because of skyrocketing prices.

®Ibid., 3577; Pt.
1918, 5.
9

8

In any event, once on the

, 8313-14; and Washington Post, February 7,

9 ®Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3563-64; Pt. 7,
6439; Pt. 8314; and Pt. 9, 8577, 8515.
9 7 U. S. Congress, House, Increased Compensation, 1919, Hearings,
on H. R. 10358, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-11.
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floor, the proposal won the support of the House without extensive
debate and without recourse to a formal roll call .9 8
Since postal workers came tinder a separate government employee
classification and did not benefit from the wage hike, certain House
members pushed a special pay raise for them.

Seventy or more repre

sentatives, along with the legislative representative of the American
Federation of Labor, appeared before the Postal Committee to endorse
QQ

the pay boost.

With this backing, the bill secured time on the

House floor in March, 1918.
increase:

Debates clarified the need for the pay

the decrease in value of postal workers' salaries from

inflation, the drain of employees to wartime industries with their
better salaries, and the importance of postal workers as representa
tives of the government.

However, a conflict in the proponent's ranks

appeared over whether or not the pay raises ought to be permanent or
temporary.

Martin Madden offered an amendment to retain the higher

wages even in peacetime.

Opposing this motion was John Moon, (D-Tenn.),

chairman of the Postal Committee, who described times as abnormal and
argued that with the return of peace, their old salary of $1 , 2 0 0 a
year would be sufficient.

Henry Rainey agreed and added that Madden

had organized the Republicans, with sufficient numbers of Democrats,
for a "great salary grab."

Cries of economy, however, did not deter

the coalition, and they carried Madden's amendment on a roll call.
Opponents quickly offered a motion to pare the Madden Amendment's

"Washington Post, January 3, 1918, 5; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3501.

"u. S. Congress, House, Salaries of Postal Employees, Hearings,
on H. Res. 270, and H. R. 9414, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-35.
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increases, but the postal bloc remained intact and defeated it, 311
to fifty-one. 1 0 0
Later in the session another bill aided the lowest paid govern
ment workers by establishing a minimum wage of three dollars a day . 1 0 1
Overall, on the wage front, the House responsed to the mounting in
flation, though with increases less than the surge in prices.

In the

area of labor conditions, the House agreed with one position taken by
labor backers and rejected another.

The Senate had attached an amend

ment to the Naval Appropriation bill which granted bonuses to govern
ment shipyard workers for faster work.

Seemingly, a benign measure to

boost production in an all important war industry, it actually raised
fundamental questions about labor conditions.

Before the war, ship

yard workers had won the establishment of maximum production levels
beyond which they could not work.

Advocates of the Senate provision

portrayed the rules as restricting the productive capabilities of
a laborer.

With the bonus as an incentive, the shipyard worker,

advocates maintained, would be motivated to greater efficiency and
in the process earn extra money for his effort.

An opponent, John

Nolan (R-Cal.), connected the bonus to the Frederick W. Taylor "stop
watch" method of production.

Though Taylor’s method might speed work,

it was, Nolan asserted, completely unsympathetic to workers; moreover,
its introduction would exacerbate the already tense worker-employer
relations of the shipbuilding industry.

The majority agreed with

Nolan that war time was not the proper occasion for the introduction

100Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3847, 3868,
3907-08, 3927, 4026, 4105, 4107.
101Ibid., Pt. 11, 10731.
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of innovations and turned down, on two separate roll calls, the speedup proposal.

102

.

The second measure on the status of labor entailed the established
of a cotton factory at the Atlanta Federal penitentiary.

In hearings

before the Justice Committee, a government witness presented the pro
posal as a means to rehabilitate prisoners by employing them in produc
tive work.

Since the AFL opposed the bill, committee member Thaddeus

Caraway (D-Ark.) suggested that prisoners should be employed in farm
work rather than textile production in order to prevent their competing
with textile workers.

A government witness agreed, but he also pointed

out that no farm land was located close by the prison.

Andrew Volstead,

in support of the government witness, interjected that labor unions
should not be distressed because the bill protected free labor
by requiring the sale of prisoner-made goods at market prices.
Volstead added that, the prison-produced cotton goods would go
only to the government.

103

After a favorable report by the Justice

Committee, the bill went to the House floor.

Labor supporter Leonidas

Dyer (D-Was.) attempted to organize opposition against the measure
on the grounds that convict labor would ultimately compete with free
labor.

The majority, however, agreed with the Justice Committee and

passed the cotton factory bill on a roll call, 181 to seventy-four.
Analysis of the roll calls on labor questions was simplified
because several of the measures scaled together.

102

Ibid., Pt.

8

Usually scalograms

, 8016-8023, 8382.

1 0 3 U. S. Government, House, To Equip the Atlanta Federal Penetentiary for the Manufacturing of Certain Government Supplies, Hearings
on H. R. 8938, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 4-9, 25-26.
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are constructed on roll calls that encompass only one bill; in the case
of the labor issues, two votes on wages, ballots on the Borland eight
hour amendment, and three ballots on the Atlanta prison bill met the
criteria for construction of a scale.

By so doing, it indicates that

not only a pro-labor bloc and an anti-labor group existed in the House
but that they also operated together on several discrete measures.
Seventy-four House merribers indicated an anti-labor position by their
low scale position on the several roll calls (Table 4-8:A).

They either

rejected all pro-labor positions or they adopted only one such vote,
the roll call recommitting the postal workers' pay raise.

Politically,

the Democrats showed a distinct anti-labor bias, since seventy-two
Democrats and only two Republicans were found at this scale level.
These Democrats came predominantly from the South and Border states.
In the medium category, party support equalizes.

Still, the Democrats

were more likely to provide only lukewarm support, since seventy-two
of them in comparison to thirty-nine Republicans were found in this
category.

In the high category, thirty-two percent of the House

membership voted for all or in some instances six of the seven labor
positions.

These strong labor advocates were usually aligned with the

Republican party, particularly the Northeastern contingent.
The high Republican support for labor positions does not fit
their historic

image.

An explanation might come from the fact

that all the roll calls involved labor policy of the government.

Their

old nationalistic outlook might have disposed them to favor a govern
ment employee's policy of higher pay, shorter hours, and no prison
labor competition against free labor, while they would have opposed
such a policy in private industry.

Another possible explanation is

TABLE 4-8:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION
ON LABOR ROLL CALLS

Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE
POSITION

NE
D

Low
Medium
High

MA
R

D

1

TOTAL

2

2

3

16

5

19

R

mm

M
M

5
17

6

6

22

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

M
M

6

1

11

13
25

7

39

7

M
M

17

SS
D

BS
R

D

M
M

16

MS
D

R

10

49
29

11

1

2

1

3
4

79

2

25

7

M
M

21

—

~

8

1

PS
R

D

M
M

M
M

3

6
M
M

3

3
5

3

8

1

7

4

TOTAL
D
R

R

72
72
5

149

2

39
81

122

Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE
POSITION

Low
Medium
High

NE
D

M
M

40
60

MA
R

D

5
11

84

mm

100

R

M
M

23
77

ENC
D
R

35
65
M
M

3
33
64

WNC
D
R

M
M

100
--

M
M

47
53

BS

SS

MS

D

R

D

R

D

62
37

M
M

64
32
4

—
43
57

14

—

1

100

86
M
M

PS
R

75
25

D

R

M
M

M
M

100
M
M

38
62

TOTAL
D
R

48
48
4

2

32
66

The order of the roll calls is 116, 115, 233, 153, 155, 150, 154
Percent at each point on the scale 16, 11, 11, 9, 7, 14, 9, 23
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .950
265

266

TABLE 4-8:B
LABOR VOTES

Scale
Position

Motion

1

VAR 116

To recommit to the Committee on Post Offices H. R.
9414, with instructions and report back with
amendment that during the balance of fiscal year
1918, and during fiscal year 1919, the increased
allowance for Postal Employees in addition to the
compensation now received by them shall be changed
in several ways. 51-311; + = nay. Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 4107A.

2

VAR 115

To amend H. R. 9414, by setting compensation for
various grades in the Postal Service. 262-97;
+ = yea. Ibid., 4105.

3

VAR 233

To amend H. R. 14078, (40 STAT-1213, Mar. 1, 1919),
by increasing the annual compensation of all civilian
employees of the government of the United States who
now receive a total annual compensation of $2,500
or less. 202-79; + = yea. Ibid., Vol. 57, 3 Sess.,
Pt. 2, 1698.

4

VAR 153

To recommit Bill H. R. 8938, to the Committee on
the Judiciary with instructions to report the Bill
back with an amendment that the rules and regulations
governing the prisoners engaged in such work shall
not give them any advantage over free labor, either
for the government or independent manufacturers.
117-142; + = yea. Ibid., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 7,
6395.

5

VAR 155

To recede from the amendment to Bill H. R. 10358,
making appropriations for the legislative, execu
tive and judicial expenses of the government for
fiscal year 1919, by fixing a minimum number of hours
of work per day for government employees. 131-159;
+ = yea. Ibid., 6439.

VAR 150

To adopt Bill H. RES. 335, providing for 1 hour de
bate on Bill H. RES. 8938, (40 STAT-896, July 10,
1918), relating to the manufacture of government
supplies at Atlanta Ga. Penitentiary, and for the
compensation to prisoners for their labor. 191-132;
+ = yea; + = nay.

6

267
9

TABLE 4-8:B

Scale
Position

7

(Cont'd)

Motion

VAR 154

To pass bill H. R. 8938.
6396.

181-74; + = nay.

Ibid.,
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that the Republicans saw some partisan advantage in the positions
they adopted.

Though no partisan benefit would arise from opposing

to the Atlanta cotton factory bill, the other measures with their
pay hikes and seven-hour day would win the approval of government
workers.

On the other hand, the Democrats voted against positions

espoused by the AFL and, on the Borland amendment, by the Administration.
An explanation for the Democratic pattern is not readily determinable
though it is true that at least on the Atlanta prison bill they were
adhering to an Administration position.

The other two positions that

they adopted on the wage and hour proposals may have reflected a rural
economic fundamentalism, particularly since the South and Border states
gave the greatest support to these positions.

In any event, House

members followed no consistent labor policy, since they reversed them
selves on the Cannon conspiracy amendment and voted against labor
on the Atlanta prison measure and the seven-hour limit.

Yet, the House

voted for labor by adopting pay hikes for government employees and
by rejecting bonuses for shipyard workers.

Overall, the House's

attitude toward labor, as reflected in roll calls and debates, ex
pressed an anbiguity that called for the conscription of labor but
also recognized that positive labor relations were essential to the
American war effort.

Meanwhile, the Administration created the truly

significant features of wartime labor policy . * 0 4

*04See William E. Leuchtenburg, "The Impact of the War on the
American Economy," The Impact of World War I, ed., Arthur S. Link (New
York: Harper and Row, 1969), 58-59, for a discussion of labor policy
during the war. See also John S. Smith, "Organized Labor and
Government in the Wilson Era," Labor History, III (Fall, 1962),
265-86.
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Farm Policy
During the first session, the House had enacted the fundamental
features on a farm program:

legislation to authorize a survey of

existing food-stuffs, a food administration to conserve and regulate
food products, and a guaranteed price of wheat.

In the second session

the House would add several particulars to the farm program.

Namely,

they would agree to increase credit sources for farmers, augment the
normal agricultural appropriation bill, regulate conservation of food
in greater detail, distribute seed grain to farmers, and raise the
price guarantee for wheat.

No consistent voting alignments formed on

these proposals, but the basic issue remained constant:

how much the

government would help the fanner as compared to the urban resident.
The drain of banking resources into liberty bonds put the
fledgling Farm Loan Board out of business.

Several congressmen also

charged that Eastern speculators had attempted to c o m e r the agency's
bonds, thus driving the bonds below par.

In either case, the Farm

Loan Board, which had been created in 1916 to extend loans at reason
able rates to farmers, found itself without funds to loan.

To rectify

the situation, the Board proposed a bill which would authorize the
Treasury to buy $100 million worth of bonds from the Board.

105

Sponsored by Carter Glass, the bill drew opposition from a
portion of the Republican membership, who forced two roll calls over
it.

On the first roll call, which was a motion to postpone hearing the

bill, sixty-seven percent of the Republicans, joined by just six percent

• ^ Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 589; Willian
Stevenson to J. W. Miller, February 1, 1918, Southern Historical
Collection, William Stevenson Papers, University of North Carolina;
and Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement, 56-59, 225-26.
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of the Democrats, subscribed to the motion (Table 4-9).

The Eastern

wing of the party, led by Gillett who claimed that the Banking Com
mittee should study the bill in greater detail, more strongly backed
the motion than did the rest of the party . 1 0 6

When Glass offered an

amendment strengthening the bill, Republicans again attempted to
defeat it.

In their view the Board had already mismanaged its

affairs by over loaning.

Also, the whole proposition, some Repub

licans claimed, was political because only Democrats served as direc
tors of the Board.

In rebuttal Glass argued that the bill was neces

sary to meet abnormal war conditions.

Otherwise, he stated that he

would oppose the bill as "vicious" class legislation.

107

In this final

roll call, the same configuration of Eastern Republicans opposed the
bill (Table 4-10).

Most other Republicans and ninety-seven percent

of the Democrats secured the amendment's10® victory, 217 to 69.

The

bill then passed without a roll call in early January, 1918.
In February the House considered the annual agriculture appro
priation bill.

Generally uncontroversial, the bill for fiscal 1919,

however, generated divisions over two particulars.

The first involved

an expenditure close to the heart of many representatives, namely con
gressional distribution of "valuable seeds" to constituents.

Ezekiel

Candler (D-Miss.) set the waters churning when he proposed an amendment
which would add to the seed appropriation by fifty percent.

The

necessity, he stated, grew out of greater constituent demand for seeds.

1 0 6 Cong.

Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 537, 615.

1 0 7 Ibid.,

108

592, 595, 597, 589.

Ibid., 615.

TABLE 4-9
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 7731: TO POSTPONE
HEARING THE FARM LOAN BROAD BILL*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

MA

NE
D

R

Yea

1

Nay

3

D

17

ENC
D
R

R

2

27

2

8

2

17

WNC
D
R

28
12

SS

14

R

D

MS
R

4

3

10

9

BS

D

65

2

27

D

PS
R

D

—

1

7

5

TOTAL
D
R

R

1

1

9

87

1

6

137

42

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE
D

Yea

25

Nay

75

MA
R

100

D

R

ENC
D
R

20

93

10

70

90

30

80

7

WNC
D
R

100

SS

BS

D

R

42

4

58

96

100

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 537.

D

100

MS
R

D

80

—

20

100

PS
R

100

TOTAL
R

D

R

50

14

6

67

50

86

94

33

D

TABLE 4-10
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. 3235:
FARM LOAN BROAD BILL*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

MA

NE
D

R

Yea .

3

Nay

2

m

1
21

D

WNC
D
R

D

5

13

21

10

77

26

1

15

n
—

SS

ENC
D
R

R

23
3

BS
R

D

2

MS
R

27

4

1

1

—

PS

D

R

7

D

3

6

TOTAL
D
R

R

5

151

67

4

4

70

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

ENC
D
R

100

16

93

58

—

84

7

42

D

R

Yea

60

4

Nay

40

96

WNC
D
R

100

SS

BS

D

R

89

100

100

11

—

PS

MS

D

R

96

80

4

20

D

100

R

100

D

100

R

TOTAL
D
R

56

97

49

44

3

51

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 615.
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In rebuttal/ Meyer London (Socialist-N.Y.) asked if congressional
distribution of seeds was the proper activity for legislators.
Agreeing with London, Joseph Walsh rejected the whole seed appropriation as a drain on the Treasury in a time of high costs from the war.

1.09

Though not agreeing with the extreme view of London and Walsh, a
majority of the House voted "nay" to Candler's proposed increase
(Table 4-11).

Seventy-two percent of the Democrats voted "yea" and

eighty-four percent of the Republicans responded "nay. " 1 1 0

Southern

Democrats and Western Republicans, both largely from rural areas,
supported the seed proposition by a higher percentage than did the
rest of their parties.

On the other hand, Eastern and Midwest Demo

crats, often from the cities, split with their party.

Clearly, rural

and partisan factors shaped this ballot.
The eradication of tuberculosis in stock cattle, particularly
milk cows, attracted the active support of most Republican members.
As reported to the House floor by the Agriculture Committee, the bill
appropriated a $250,000 sum to combat this disease, but William J.
Graham (R-Ill.) maintained that too many cows and hogs had the
affliction for this small amount to be effective.

When he offered an

amendment to double the appropriation, Agriculture Committee spokes
man James Young (D-Tex.) asserted that the Agriculture Department could
not properly spend more than $250,000.

One of the few Republicans

to vote against the proposition was Gilbert Haugen, who agreed with
committee colleague Young on the Department's inability to use the

109Ibid., Pt. 2, 1255, 1368-70.
110Ibid., 1600.

TABLE 4-11
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 9054:
DISTRIBUTION OF VALUABLE SEEDS*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

Yea

NE
D

MA
R

—

Nay

2

D

ENC
D
R

R

SS

WNC
D
R

D

BS
R

D

MS
R

D

PS
R

D

R

D

1

5

5

9

2

3

1

58

2

21

4

3

2

1

4

13

2

26

7

41

3

21

11

--

9

4

3

2

1

6

TOTAL
R

100

38

21

113

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE
D

Yea

—

Nay

100

MA
D

R

ENC
D
R

7

71

16

56

5

50

5

84

93

29

84

44

95

50

95

16

R

WNC
D
R

SS
D

*Cong. Rec./ 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess.,Pt.

BS
R

MS

PS

TOTAL
R

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

100

70

50

50

50

50

40

72

16

—

30

50

50

50

50

60

28

84

3, 1600.
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extra funds.

In the roll call that resulted from the division of

opinion, the House parted along strict party lines, as ninety-six
percent of the Republicans opposed ninety-four percent of the Democrats
(Table 4-12).

Why Republicans lined up behind this proposal is unclear

from the sources, but it may reflect the greater concentration of
Republicans in milk-producing regions in comparison to the Democrats.
The amendment lost by the close margin of 142 to 139.111
A severe drought in the Great Plains states and the resulting
plight of poor fanners brought the next farm bill before the House . 1 1 2
Sponsored by John Baer (D-N.Dak.), the bill proposed to aid farmers
by extending fifty million dollars in credit to them to purchase
seed for crops and feed for stock.

A second provision alioted $2.5

million for the recruitment of farm labor.

With many of the nation's

farmers drafted into the military, a major farm problem developed
from the resulting acute shortage of farm labor.

Congressmen had

proposed solutions to the problem, including the conscription of "city
idlers" and the transfer of soldiers to the farms during harvest time.
Prior to the Baer bill, no proposal had reached the House floor. 1 1 2
Defenders of the bill acknowledged that during peacetime they
would never consider it.

They added, however, that the times prompted

radical action, and though the bill's intention was paternalistic,
even "socialistic," the Congress had been similarly paternalistic to
industry.

1U

The situation, as Gilbert Haugen argued, simply overrode

Ibld., 1259, 1262, 1269, 1342, 1601.

1 1 2 U. S. Congress, House, Seed Grain and Feed for Farmers and
Stockmen, Hearings, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 78-82.
1 1 2 Cong.

Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 4152-53.

TABLE 4-12
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 9054: ERADICATION
OF TUBERCULOSIS IN LIVE STOCK*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

Yea
Nay

MA

ENC

WNC
D
R

SS

BS

R

D

R

14

—

29

1

41

3

20

1

2

3

1

15

2

4

2

71

1

25

7

3

D

R

D

R

MS

D

R

R

NE

MA

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

SS

D

R

D

R

Yea

—

100

—

97

6

95

43

91

Nay

100

3

94

5

57

9

100

D

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess.,Pt.

D

1

67

99

33

R

10

7

2

TOTAL
D
R

8

130

134

6

-

MS

BS
R

D

4

10

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

PS

D

PS

TOTAL
D
R

R

D

R

D

R

11

100

—

100

—

100

6

96

89

—

100

~

100

—

94

4

2, 1601.
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277

prewar considerations, since the winter wheat regions were starved
for seed and money.
tic sentiments.

Objections to the bill reflected anti-patemalis-

According to Joseph Cannon, the original American

pioneer farmer never would have asked for government handouts.

Young

of Texas in addition appealed to regional interests when he claimed
that the measure would mainly benefit the farmers of the Northern
spring wheat belt but no others.

114

Moved by Cannon's and Young's argument, opponents forced six roll
calls over the bill.

Since four of these votes scaled together, a

scalogram was devised that defined the shifting pattern from support
to opposition (Table 4-13:A).

Exactly fifty percent of the House

defended the bill against the critics' assaults on all roll calls.
Seventy-four percent of all Republicans and twenty-nine percent of
the Democrats lined up solidly for the bill.

Regionally, two extremes

existed, as only one Republican from the New England states voted for
the bill, while one-hundred percent of both parties from the Mountain
states united behind the bill.

Given the bill's contents, these two

regions stood to gain either the least or the most from the bill.
Thus, the supporters, though showing partisan differences, indicated
regional orientations as well.

In the medium category, twenty-seven

percent of House members moved to eliminate the enabling clause,
and then switched sides and voted for final passage.

This swing group,

who were almost instrumental in defeating the bill, was composed of
fifty-five Democrats and thirteen Republicans.

While these Democrats

resided in all regions, they represented the Northeast (NE and MA

114Ibid., 4147, 4153-55, 4173-74.

TABLE 4-13:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R.
7795: FARM RELIEF BILL

Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE
POSITION

NE
D

Low
Medium
High

MA
R

D

TOTAL

1

2

9

4

11

R

4
7
3

19
7
2

9
5
3

14

28

17

1
2

R

SS

WNC
D
R

ENC
D

27

5

—

1

3

30

16

R

—
—

—

1

—

5
30
30

7

17

65

1

MS

BS

D

D

R

7

5

8

1

3

1

-

18

PS

D

R

7

4

—

7
3

2
2

4

TOTAL
D
R

R

—

7

7

D

4

10

39
55
42

79
13
15

136

107

Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE
POSITION

Low
Medium
High

NE
D

„
50
50

MA
R

D

R

9
9
82

28
50

68

22

25
7

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

53
29
18

71
14
15

90
—
10

The order of the roll calls is 120, 121, 123, 119
Percent at each point on the scale 50, 8 , 19, 15,
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .983

D

94

8

6

46
46

—

MS

BS

SS
R

D

R

—
—

39
44
17

71
14
15

PS

D

R

100

100

—

—
— ••

D

R

50
50
—*

12

88

TOTAL
D
R

29
40
31

74
12

14

8

278

279

TABLE 4-13:B
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 7795: .FARM RELIEF

Scale
Position

Motion

VAR 120

To order the previous question on the amendment
requiring the chairman of the Committee on Agricul
ture to report H. R. 7795 back eliminating the
enacting clause. 120-123; + = yea. Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 4178.

VAR 121

To amend H. R. 7795, by eliminating the enacting
clause. 106-144; + = yea. Ibid., 4179.

VAR 123

To pass H. R. 7795.
Pt. 5, 4297.

VAR 119

To adopt H. RES. 281 for the immediate consideration
of a Bill reported from the Committee on Agriculture
as a substitute for H. R. 7795, providing for
National Security and Defense and an adequate supply
of food, by authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture
to contract with farmers in certain areas for the
production of grain through advances and loans and
otherwise, and by providing for the voluntary
mobilization of farm labor, which substitute Bill
appropriates $50,000,000 for the purchase of seed
grain for live stock, the same to be supplied to
farmers and stock men and also created boards in
the several states to carry out the provisions of
the act. 278-40; + *= nay. Ibid., 4151.

250-67; + * nay.

Ibid.,

280

regions), Southern (SS and BS), and Pacific sections in greater
nuiribers.

In the high category, the strongest opponents of the bill

mostly represented the Democratic party.

The only noticeable regional

pattern was the greater concentration of opponents in the New England
and Southern states.

In sum, the Republicans generally supported

the bill, while two-thirds of the Democrats opposed the bill.

The

Republicans and Democrats of the New England states provided the grea
test opposition to the bill, as did the Democrats of the Middle Atlan
tic and Southern states.

Over ninety percent of Midwestern Republicans

upheld the bill, while Midwestern Democrats tended to break party ranks
and to vote with the Republicans.

Finally, both parties of the drought-

stricken Mountain states voted unanimously for relief.
Although the wheat farmers benefitted from the seed bill, the
price of wheat was more important to them.

The Lever Food Bill of

1917 authorized the President to set a price for wheat, which Wilson
eventually pegged at $2.20 a bushel.

Since the propserity of three

million fanners was affected by the price, the President's action un
leashed a growing problem for the Democrats.

Wheat fanners complained

that the rising costs of farm production cut deeply into their pro
fits.

When they compared their situation to Southern cotton farmers,

whose prices remained unregulated, they became convinced that they
were treated unfairly by the Administration.

Thus, wheat producers

rained down demands on the President and Congress either for higher
wheat prices or for fixed prices on all products.

HSLivermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 170; and
U. S. Congress, House, The Spring Wheat Situation, Hearings, 65 Cong.,
2 Sess., 12-15.
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Response by the Administration and the House took separate
courses.

In his December message and later in a bill, Wilson re

quested a proposal to control profiteering and to fix prices on the
necessities of life.

Coming during the winter military crisis and

the Garfield order, such a proposal stood no chance of acceptance as
Congress was in no mood to grant additional power to the President.
Representative Lever, Chairman of the Agriculture Committee, imme
diately buried the bill in his committee, knowing that its broad
grant of power would cause its certain defeat.

Since no action

came on the industrial price front, Congress started to move in the
direction of higher wheat prices.

The Administration, however,

strongly opposed higher prices because they would bestow windfall pro
fits on grain dealers who were storing wheat.

Moreover, the Adminis

tration maintained that higher prices would adversely affect both the
American consumer and the country's allies.

Given these economic and

political ideas, President Wilson on February 23 reset the mini
mum price for wheat at $2.20 a bushel.

In no mood to listen, the

Senate attached a rider to the Agriculture Appropriation bill that
added thirty cents to the President's price support.
When the House received the bill from the Senate, urbanites
charged that the proposal imposed "outrageous" burdens upon industrial
workers.

Homer Synder (R-N.Y.) claimed that only U. S. Steel had

ll% e w York Times, January 22, 1918, 11; January 23, 1918, 9;
Washington Post, January 22, 1918; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56,
2 Sess., Pt. 1, 21-22.
Washington Post, February 21, 1915, 2; New York Times,
February 24, 1918, 1; and April 19, 1918, 6.
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reaped such huge profits as had the farmers. 1 1 8

In the fanners defense,

William A. Ayres (D-Kans.) pointed out that only wheat growers had been
subjected to price controls.

Additionally, William E. Cox (D-Ind.)

told the House, the increase represented a mere "bagatelle" which would
hardly hurt anyone but, on the other hand, would greatly spur wheat
production.

After further heated debate, a vote on the Senate

provision was called.

At this point, enough Democrats stayed with

the Administration for the House to vote down $2.50 a bushel wheat, 180
to 127.119
When the Senate conferees insisted upon $2.50 wheat, a long
term deadlock ensued, lasting from May to July.

During this prolonged

stalemate, political pressures from wheat-producing areas intensified
as Democratic congressmen increasingly believed that their political
survival in the upcoming 1918 congressional elections depended on a
high wheat price.

As a result, the House conferees eventually acceded

to a compromise price of $2.40 a bushel.

The House readily passed what

they thought a suitable solution to the impose by a roll call vote,
150 to 106.128
Wilson veto

Placed on the President's desk, the bill provoked a

because he was concerned about consumer and Allied dis

tress from the

hike. A number of wheat congressmen, greatly agitated

over their politicalself-preservation,
ride the veto.
1 1 8 Cong.

119

demanded a roll call to over-

Theyfailed by the wide margin of 172 to seventy-two.
Rec.,65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 5269-72.

Ibid., 5272, 5274, 5319; and New York Times, April 19, 1918,

1 2 0 Ibid., May 4, 1918, 6 ; July 2, 1918, 9; July 6 , 1918, 8 ;
Washington Post, July 13, 1918, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56,
2 Sess., Pt. 9, 8796.

121

121

Ibid., 9105.

6

.
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Since the three wheat votes scale, it is possible to indicate
shifting patterns of support (Table 4-14:A) .

Thirty-nine percent of

the House voted against all efforts to increase the price of wheat.
Eighty of these representatives came from the Democratic party, while
twenty-eight Republicans voted with them.

Members in the low category

more likely hailed from the Northeast (NE and MA) in both parties, and
from the South among the Democrats.

In the medium category, again

more Democrats (forty-four) are found than Republicans (twenty-one).
This swing group, who voted for $2.50 wheat and $2.40 wheat, but who
could not go along with overriding the President's veto, showed no
significant regional concentration.

The strongest advocates of

higher wheat prices mostly represented the Republican party, eighty
members as opposed to thirty-two Democrats.

Since fifty-one percent

of the Democrats voted three times against benefits to beleagured
wheat farmers while sixty-two percent of the Republicans voted for all
three, the balloting indicated a partisan difference of opinion on
wheat prices.

To a degree, Wilson's firm stand against higher wheat

prices had made the voting partisan.

However, regional patterns were

still very significant, because members of both parties from the North
east had no fondness for higher bread prices for their urban constituents.
On the opposite side, both parties of the West North Central states,
which included some of the leading wheat growing states, gladly sup
ported higher prices.

The Mountain states followed a similar pattern,

while the other regions divided along a voting pattern that reflected
partisan differences.

Politically, the most potent issue to emerge

from the voting came from the low support that Southern Democrats
gave to the wheat increases.

To Northern wheat growers, fair play

TABLE 4-14:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON
H. R. 9054: WHEAT PRICE

Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE
POSITION

MA

NE
R

D

Low
Medium
High

3

4

ENC
D
R

R

9

WNC
D
R

SS

5
6

1

2

R

—

1

1

8

4

1

11

6

30

7

18

47
25
4

15

11

29

19

41

8

22

76

10

2

MS

BS

D

9
4

10

1

TOTAL

D

D

D

R

9

PS
R

D

R

D

TOTAL
R

1

__

2

1

1

5

4

1

8

80
44
32

8

6

3

9

156

1

2

10

1

1

1

8

4

1

27

6

28
21

80

129

Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE
POSITION

Low
Medium
High

MA

NE
D

R

D

R

75
25

67
7
26

82
9
9

34
28
38

ENC
D
R

47

12

21

15
73

32

WNC
D
R

12
88

9
9
82

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

TOTAL
D
R

62
33
5

_ _

33
37
30

17
17

25

„

12

11

51
28

66

63

33
33
34

89

21

SS

MS

BS

—

100

PS

33
67

22

16
62

The order of the roll calls is 189, 138, 192
Percent at each point on the scale 3 9 , 22, 17, 22
Coefficient of Reproducibility = . 9 7 1
284

285

TABLE 4-14:B
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AMD REGION ON H. R. 9054:

Scale
Position

WHEAT PRICE

Motion

0

1

VAR 189

To have the House recede from its disagreeing vote
on the amendment to H. R. 9054, making appropria
tions for the Department of Agriculture for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1919. 150-106; + =
yea. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt.
9, 8796.

2

VAR 138

To concur in the Senate amendment to H. R. 9054,
making appropriations for the Department of Agri
culture for fiscal year 1919, which amendment pro
vides that the President in an emergency fix the
price of wheat products in the U. S. guaranteeing
a certain profit to the producers thereof; that
guaranteed price of 1918 wheat shall not be less than
its equivalent of #2 northern spring wheat at $2.50
per bushel, the same to be binding until Dec. 1,
1919. 127-180; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 5, 5319.

3

VAR 192

To pass, over the Presidents veto, H. R. 9054,
making appropriations for the Department of Agri
culture for fiscal year 1919, the President's
objections to the Bill being that Legislative price
provisions should not be administered in a way
advantagious to producers or consumers. 72-172;
+ = yea. Ibid., Pt. 9, 9105.
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demanded that Southerners vote for the increase because their cotton
farmers enjoyed unregulated cotton prices.

Their failure to do so,

gave the Republicans an excellent campaign issue.

Democratic farm

policy failed to satisfy wheat farmers.■L2^

Wartime Social Policy
At times during the session the House directed its attention
toward the social welfare needs of war workers and others.

Industrial

centers, particularly Eastern cities, became jammed with laborers
from all parts of the country.
shot skyward.

Houses became overcrowded and rents

The shortage of housing caused family separations, low

morale, and high job' turnover among war workers.

Conditions were most

acute in the shipbuilding industry and certain other war industries,
which led concerned government officials and congressmen to propose
solutions.

For shipyard workers, the Shipping Board advocated a

fifty million dollar appropriation to build either dormitories for
single men or small homes for families.

The government also suggested

a similar appropriation for munition workers.

Witnesses before House

committees supported both proposals because of the industries inability
to retain workers who were unable to find proper housing.

They also

elaborated on the failure of private enterprise to fill the gap.

In

short, the witnesses' theme stressed the necessity for government
action because of wartime conditions.
122

123

Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 174-76.

123Washington Post, February 8 , 1918, 1; April 13, 1918, 7; U. S.
Congress, House, Housing for Employees of Shipyards Building Ships for
the U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, Hearings on S
3389, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-8, 24, 47-49; and U. S. Congress, House,
Public Buildings and Grounds, Hearings on H. R. 9642, H. R. 10265,
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On the House floor, defenders presented the proposal as a
straight forward war measure.

In an effort to defuse any possible

criticism, they denied any "socialistic" intentions, though they ack
nowledged that the structures ought to be well built and useful after
the war.

Critics voiced more concern over possible graft and waste

of money than over government giveaways to workers.

Representative

J. Hampton Moore, playing his normal role as Republican partisan,
implied that the money would go to contractors who were friends of the
Administration.

From another single John W. Langley (R-Ky.) found

distressing the ease with which Congress dispensed the fifty million
dollars.

Probably reflecting the astonishment of some other colleagues,

Langley noted how Congress spent billions as casually as it had formerly
appropriated millions.

Ultimately, however, these critics realized

that the measure was vital for war production, and they dropped their
opposition.

Passing without recourse to a roll call, both measures met

war conditions and only indirectly represented efforts at solving
long-term social distress.^2^
Meanwhile, the rental situation aroused Ben Johnson (D-Ky.), who
became inflamed over exhorbitant increases in house rentals.

Washing

ton, which became a boom town because of the war, reported a series of
evictions and rent gouging cases.

Examining the situation, Johnson's

65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-10, 18.
•**2 ^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4463, 4395; and
Pt. 2, 1953. See Allen F. Davis, "Welfare, Reform and World War I,"
American Quarterly, XIX (Fall, 1967), 517-20, for a general discussion
of the aims of wartime housing. Davis notes the influence of housing
experts, such as Lawrence Veiller, on the construction of the houses.
Davis does not comment on congressional attitudes. The House realized
that the homes ought to be well-built, but they definitely rejected
long-term goals in so building them.
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House Committee on the District of Columbia called a number of witnesses.
Captain Julius Peyser of the Army housing division cited cases of the
proverbial sick and old widow evicted by the heartless landlord, while
others testified to similar distressing cases.

In order to correct

the situation, Chairman Johnson authored a bill that taxed excess war
time profits from rental property in the District of Columbia.12^
By the time the Johnson bill came to the House floor in February,
1918, most members readily agreed that legislative action was demanded.
Several congressmen, nonetheless, withstood the prevailing sentiments
and voiced doubts about the effectiveness of the bill's technical
features.

Allen Treadway (R-Mass.) also claimed that the rental

problem came from customers bidding up prices, not just landlords
arbitrarily raising prices.

Angry blasts from Johnson against rent

profiteers, however, checked any tendency among members to vote for
the landlords.

The bill passed on a roll call, 221 to 101 . 1 2 6

Less directly tied to war conditions, another social welfare
measure proposed a minimum wage board for Washington's working women.
Before a House committee, Edward Keating, who sponsored the bill,
i nc

U. S. Congress, House, Housing in the District of Columbia
Hearings, on S. J. Res. 152 and H. R. 9248, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-11,
16; and New York Times, March 17, 1918, Section V, 1.
1 2 6 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 2110, 2118;
Pt. 4, 3333, 3390. The rent bill never became law. Since the Senate
passed a much different bill, the conferees had a difficult time working
out differences. Representative Johnson charged that the Senators were
really in league with the landlords and did not want to help the "humble"
citizen. His denunciation of the Senators became so strong that the
Senate passed a motion refusing to confer further with the House if
Johnson remained on the Conference Committee. Eventually, Johnson
resigned but still no action was taken. See ibid., Pt. 8 , 7808, 835960; Washington Post, June 23, 1918, 2; June 25, 1918, 3; and November
19, 1918, 1.
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described the proposal as a social protection measure.

Since women

usually were unable to organize unions, the board, Keating elaborated,
would ensure an irreducible minimum living wage which their present
disheartening living conditions indicated they did not receive.

Taking

the highest plane possible, Keating added that American democracy
must fulfill its promises for'all of its citizens.

Keating and legal

expert Felix Frankfurter told the committee that the bill followed the
lines of an Oregon law which the Supreme Court had declared constitu
tional in 1908.

Safe from attack on that ground, the bill also gained

security by the surprising support of Washington's commercial interests.
A spokesman for the Merchant's Association, who justified the bill on
grounds other than Keating's social democratic ideals, told the com
mittee that his group endorsed Keating's plan as a means to improve
127
employer-employee relations.
With this backing, the bill gained a hearing on the House floor.
Socialist Meyer London spoke in favor of the bill, something that did
not recommend it in the minds of some members.

Ex-Speaker Cannon

opposed the bill because wage levels should increase only from bar
gaining between employee and employer.

He further argued that the

bill would be difficult to implement and would also violate the funda
mental principle that all individuals must care for themselves.

Most

members apparently did not concur since the House passed the bill with
out a formal roll call.

At least for the District of Columbia, congress-

men were inclined to violate the workings of the free market system.

128

127u. s. Congress, House, Minimum Wage for Women and Children,
Hearings, on H. R. 10367 and H. R. 12098, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-4, 6 ,

8

.

^ ^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 8871, 8886, Pt.
10, 9537; Washington Post, July 9, 1918, 6; and August 27, 1918, 6.

290

Because the country experienced a tremendous wartime boom, some
congressmen were frightened over a possible postwar economic recession.
In order to prevent this possibility several suggestions were presented,
only one of which reached the stage of a final House roll call.

Intro

duced by Meyer London, this proposal created a commission made up of con
gressmen and experts who would study the feasibility of unemployment in
surance.

In committee Samuel Gompers strongly objected to the bill

as inimical to labor unions.

Most of the committee disagreed with

Gompers and sent it to the House floor.

During the ensuing House de

bate, Medill McCormick (R-Ill.) argued that conditions might shortly
require Congress to have information on unemployment.

Showing little

ability to look beyond immediate conditions, many House members agreed
with Henry Rainey's question that "in abnormal times why make investi
gations for normal times?"

Similarly, J. Hampton Moore claimed that

sufficient information already existed on the subject.

Moore also

brought to light another inhibition working against the bill, namely a
belief that a commission would foster tensions between capital and
labor.

The House was not already to listen to advanced social ideas,

and consequently representatives voted down the bill, 199 to 133.-1-29
Partisanship did not operate on the balloting (Table 4-15).
Sixty-two percent of the Republicans joined by fifty-nine.percent of
the Democrats opposed a study of unemployment insurance. At least in
this instance neither party demonstrated any greater tendency than

■^^Keating, The Gentleman From Colorado, 365-66; Charles Merz,
"At the Capital," The New Republic, XIII (January 26, 1918), 381; and
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 903-907. Moore may have
been thinking about the Commission on Industrial Relations. See Wein
stein, The Corporate Ideal, 190-91, for its impact on public opinion.
Conservatives may have bulked at the idea of any other similar commis
sions .

TABLE 4-15
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. RES. 189:
UNEMPLOYMENT COMMISSION*

Region and Party (Numbers)

V v lc i

MA

NE
R

D

Yea

1

15

Nay

4

2

ENC
R

D

D

D

BS

SS

WNC
R

R

D

D

R

MS
R

D

PS
R

3

25

7

31

3

13

69

2

14

7

1

1

8

13

9

22

7

14

14

1

16

1

5

4

D

TOTAL
R

—
4

D

R

5

98

99

4

67

61

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

MA

NE

WNC

ENC

PS

MS

BS

SS

TOTAL

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

Yea

20

88

27

66

44

58

30

48

83

67

47

87

17

20

—

56

59

62

Nay

80

12

73

34

56

42

70

52

17

33

53

13

83

80

100

44

41

38

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 906.
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the other toward support of social welfare schemes.
definite pattern emerged.

Regionally, a

Republican support of the commission was

abnormally high in the Midwest (ENC and WNC) and the Far West (MS and
PS).

Greater than average opposition among Republicans surfaced in

New England and the Border states, both light industrial areas that
seemingly would want protection for their workers.

On the Democratic

side, all regions voted for the proposal except the Southern states,
whose predominance in the party swung them into opposition against the
measure.

Democrats from other regions often strongly favored the

measure, such as the over eighty percent advocacy by New England,
Middle Atlantic, and Pacific state delegations.

In any event, the

Southern Democrats, probably because of their strong rural and anti
labor bias, contributed significantly to the proposals defeat.

In

genera], social welfare proposals received a measure of support from
the House.

War conditions provoked a potentially far-reaching housing

program and experimental rental plan.

Further, local District of

Columbia wage rates warranted action, and national unemployment condi
tions, in the minds of many, were at least worthy of study.

Some hint

of future social measures could be detected, but in the main House
action was shaped more by war conditions than by an ideology favorable
to a social welfare state.

130

130

Clarke A. Chambers, Seedtime of Reform; American Social
Service and Social Action, 1918-1933 (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1961), 20-22, records evidences for a confidence
among social workers that social welfare goals would be advanced by
the war. At least during the second session, little evidence of
a positive attitude toward social welfare can be found among Con
gressmen .
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Industrial Policy
The Wilson Administration progressively evolved a wartime pro
gram for the organization of industry.

During the first session of

Congress the Administration usually acted on its own initiative, though
it did seek authorization from Congress in a few limited areas.

In

the second session, a war-induced industrial crisis would force the
Administration to seek legislation from Congress in several important
spheres of economic activity.

From the summer of 1917 to the winter

of 1918, war demands increasingly pressured vital components of the
economy as railroad transportation slowed, mineral prices continued
skyward, and credit sources for corporations dried up.

Adding to the

war-related dislocations was the severest winter in years, which hit
the manufacturing Northeast the hardest.

The railroad industry became

the first to collapse from the combined war and weather pressures.
President Wilson responded when he ordered a government takeover of
the railroads late in December, 1917.

Placing them under the control

of a railroad administration, he conferred dictatorial power to run
the roads upon his son-in-law, Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo.
At the same time, the President announced his intention to address
Congress on the railroad crisis after it reconvened from the holiday
recess. 131
A
When Wilson addressed Congress on January 4, 1918, he listed
several specific results that would accrue from government administration

131New York Times, December 6 , 1917, 1; December 7, 1917, 1;
December 8 , 1917, 1; December 11, 1918, 1; and January 1, 1918, 1.
See McAdoo, Crowded Years; The Reminiscences of William G. McAdoo,
447-61; John F. Stover, American Railroads (University of Chicago
Press, 1961), 185-88; and Walter D. Hines, War History of American
Railroads, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928), 20-23, for a
discussion of railroad conditions before the government's take over.
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First, all properties could be used without injuriously discriminating
against any particular railroad companies.

Second, the government

would have, unrestricted use of all railroad properties.

Third, the

government would be better able to finance railroad improvements.
Half-way measures, such as private control with a head traffic director,
would fail to infuse the necessary coordination and efficiency into the
railroad system.

Government interference, then, was due not only to

wartime confusion but also to railroad decentralization.

Wilson con

cluded his message with an outline of a bill that Congress eventually
passed.

The Railroad Act of 1918 provided that the government estab

lish a fund for improvements and that it also compensate railroad
owners during the period of the take-over.

132

Setting the pattern for the House, the Interstate Commerce
Committee argued over the necessity and implications of government
control.

ICC Commissioner George W. Anderson pointed out to the

Committee that tremendous increases in operational expenses, partly
as a result of duplication of services under private control, was one
reason for the take over.

He also covered the bill's provisions

which established the principle of "just compensation" and set the
rates for reimbursement on the base years of 1914-1916.

Sam Rayburn

(D-Tex.), showing concern for the railroad corporations, asked Ander
son why railroads should not be allowed boom profits such as other
industries then received.
1 32

Railroad executives who came before the

Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 586-87; and
New York Times, January 5, 1918, 1. See Austin Kerr, "Decision for
Federal Control: Wilson, McAdoo, and the Railroads," Journal of
American History,LIV (December, 1967), 550-560, for a discussion of
the ideas behind the takeover of the railroads.
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Committee also wanted a high return.

In particular, they asserted that

the government's date for deciding compensation worked against their
profits.

As one executive told the Committee, the railroads had made

low profits during 1914-16; if the House allowed the increased profits
of 1917, the railroads would be justly compensated.

133

Throughout the hearings railroad officials displayed greater
distress about the possibilities of government ownership after the
war than over "unjust" compensation.

Since some congressmen had de

cided predilections in favor of government control or outright
nationalization, railroad executives and their congressional allies
pressed for a clause limiting the takeover to one year after the war's
end.

On the other hand Director General William G. McAdoo, who proba

bly favored government ownership, told the Committee that he opposed
any fixed date for the return of the railroads to private control.

To

set a date, he maintained, would make an orderly and rational deter
mination of compensation difficult.

He also intimated that detailed

legislation should be passed after the war that would replace the old
system of railroad 'competition with a rationalized and centralized
railroad a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . C o m m i t t e e members viewed McAdoo's sugges
tions as the symbolic battle point on the disposition of the railroads
after the war.

When they consequently decided fifteen to six to set a

two-year postwar limitation on government control, it represented
a partial victory for the corporations.

135

1 3 3 U. S. Congress, House, Federal Operation of Transportation
Systems, Hearings,on H. R. 8172 and H. R. 9685, 65 Cong., 2 Sess.,
6 , 2 2 , 118-22.

•*-3 4 Ibid., 183, 105, 333, 915, 589-99; New York Times, January
15, 1918, 8 ; and Washington Post, January 5, 1918, 3.
135

Ibid., February 2, 1918, 1; and New York Times,
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As soon as the bill reached the House floor# supporters of greater
government control attempted to reverse the Interstate Commerce Committee's decision.

Thetus Sims# who was chairman of that Committee#

directed this campaign.

He argued that the railroads' transfer from

private to government control was necessary because of the inefficiency
and decentralization of the railroads.

If these deficiensies were to

be corrected# the House# he maintained# had to formulate bold and new
legislation when the war ended.

The two-year limitation on government

management would impede the adoption of such legislation.

However#

these and similar arguments failed to convince the House membership.
As a result# when Sims and like-minded colleagues endeavored to pass
an amendment which removed the limitation# they were easily defeated.
Sims did not force a formal roll call over his amendment.-1-3 6
After the defeat of the Sims

Amendment, the more corporate-

minded representatives attempted to modify the bill.

They rallied be

hind John Esch (R-Wis.), who wanted two changes in the bill.

First,

he opposed allowing the President power to fix railroad rates, pre
ferring instead that the ICC maintain control over rates.

He supported

the ICC's control because of that body's long-term experience in
establishing rates.

Perhaps a more basic reaxon for his position was

that he objected to a further extension of Presidential power.
Second because of his preference for private control, he argued
that the two-year return provision gave the government too much
time and that Congress could enact the needed legislation in one

February 3# 1918, 2.
^ ^ Cong. Rec.# 65 Cong.# Vol. 56# 2 Sess.# Pt. 3, 2236-38, 2346,
2464.
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year.

Although other issues— -such as the fate of the short-line

railroads— also engendered the lively interest of some congressmen ,■*•3 7
the two issues as defined by Esch became the storm centers over which
the House fought its roll call duels.
Barton E. Sweet, an Iowa Republican, forced a roll call over the
Esch proposal to delegate the rate-setting power to the ICC.

His

motion lost 210 to 165 as seventy-three percent of the Republicans
voted for the transfer while eighty-five percent of the Democrats
voted to retain Presidential control over rates (Table 4-16).
Atlantic Republicans split off from the party position.

Middle

Since most

Republicans expected the President to increase railroad rates if granted
the power to do so, the deviation of Middle Atlantic Republicans ap
parently resulted because they believed that such a power would benefit
their region's railroads.^-3 8

On Esch's proposal for the early return

of the railroads to private control, eighty-seven percent of the Repub
licans voted for it (Table 4-17).

But the Democrats, who refused to

decrease the possibilities for congressional legislative action after
the war, demonstrated even higher cohesion and defeated the Esch
Amendment, 205 to 164.

No significant geographical pattern emerged

among either the Democrats or Republicans.

In general, the two roll

calls evidenced a clear partisan division, with only Middle Atlantic
Republicans indicating any significant geographical alignment on the
two votes.

The Republicans stood squarely for the retention for as

1 3 7 Ibid.,

2465-70, 2564-65, 2569, 2358.

138New York Times, February 2, 1918, 1; February 6 , 1918, 9; and
February 9, 1918, 9. House conferees agreed to a Senate provision
granting the ICC review power over government rate increases. See
Ibid., March 8 , 1918, 1; and March 15, 1918, 4.

TABLE 4-16
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 9685: ICC RATE
CONTROL AMENDMENT OF THE RAILROAD BILL*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

Yea

MA

NE

ENC

R

D

R

—

19

—

15

2

49

17

39

19

5

Nay

6

6

D

WNC

D

R

D

SS

BS

R

D

28

24

2

66

1

10

MS

D

R

D

R

1

8

1

32

PS
D

R

6

1

7

TOTAL
R

D

10

29

137

160

51

3

R

Region and Party (Percent)

NE

MA

D

R

D

R

ENC
D
R

Yea

—

76

—

28

10

91

Nay

100

24

100

72

90

9

VOTE

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, Pt.

WNC
D
R

D

R

—

27

67

3

73

33

97

100

100

SS

BS
D

MS
R

100

D

13
87

PS
R

100

D

R

TOTAL
D
R

25

100

15

73

75

—

85

27

3, 2834.
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TABLE 4-17
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 9685: TIME LIMIT
AMENDMENT OF THE RAILROAD BILL*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

MA

NE
D

Yea
Nay

6

R

D

R

ENC
D
R

25

—

48

—

—

17

7

45

22

SS

WNC
D
R

6

D

20

7

6

82

9

BS
R

D

3

MS
R

1

7

33

1

PS
R

D

—

D

4
2

8

TOTAL
R

—
4

D

R

9

8

161

1

181

23

Region and Party (Percent)

NE

MA

D

R

D

R

ENC
D
R

Yea

—

100

—

88

—

88

Nay

100

100

12

100

12

VOTE

WNC
D
R

100

SS
D

BS
R

77

8

23

92

100

D

3
97

PS

MS

TOTAL
R

R

D

R

D

R

88

—

67

—

90

4

87

12

100

33

100

10

96

13

D

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 3, 2835.
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much of the old system as possible, either in rate matters or in the
immediate return of the railroads to private hands after the war.
Striking a more progressive stance, the Democrats advocated greater
centralization and rationalization of the railroad industry.

Both

parties were drawing the battle lines over the postwar disposition of
the railroads.
At the same time that the Administration struggled to reorganize
the overburdened railroads, a shortage of credit started to plague
corporations, particularly railroads.

For nine months the government

had staged liberty loan campaigns in order to finance its war programs.
By the winter of 1918, normal bank funds had been largely diverted to
the government and the bond market had gone to pieces.

While this was

happening, ever larger capital outlays were required because of wartime
plant expansion.

Not able to borrow the money from the banks or

securities market, corporate leaders turned to the government for aid.
In response William McAdoo, the financial wizard of the Administration,
devised a scheme whereby a War Finance Corporation (WFC) would lend
money to war industries.
As McAdoo explained the plan, the Corporation would have a
capital of $500 million.

Based upon this sum, the Corporation could

furnish up to four billion dollars in loans to bankers.

From the

bankers, the money would find its way to the credit starved war industries.

139

Designed strictly to aid wartime industrial expansion,

the WFC proposal stood above partisan cavil.

The specifics of the

•^•^Ibid., January 29, 1918, 1; January 30, 1918, 4; and U. S.
Congress, House, War Finance Corporation, Hearings on H. R. 9499, and
S. 3714, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3—4, 23—24.
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plan, however, particularly its broad concession of powers to Secre
tary of the Treasury McAdoo, threw the Banking and Finance Committee
into a frenzy.

Stepping in to expedite its passage, Majority Leader

Kitchin placed the bill under his Ways and Means Committee rather than
under the disaffected Banking Committee.•L4°
In hearings before Kitchin's Committee, the bill still continued
to draw fire over its particulars.

Paul, Warburg, Vice-Governor of the

Federal Reserve Board, admitted that the bill smacked of an undesirable
paternalism but was a necessary weirtime expedient.

John Garner (D-Tex.)

interpolated that Congress had unfortunately had to pass many undesira
ble bills.

When Secretary MgAdoo appeared, Congressman Hampton Moore

grilled him over the "tremendous grant of power" the bill gave McAdoo.
Other congressmen described McAdoo's positions, that of Treasury head
and Railroad Director, as being already beyond the capacity of one
man.

Wishing to lessen McAdoo's burden's, Martin Madden (R-Ill.)

suggested a board of managers to supervise the WFC.

Since the Senate

in fact had substituted a board appointed by McAdoo for one appointed
by the President and the Senate, the Committee agreed to this cutback
in McAdoo's powers.

They also reduced from four to two billion

dollars the amount that the WFC could lend.141

The bill won the

unanimous approval of the Committee loans.
Pleased by the Ways and Means Committee's courage in revising
an administration bill, Republican Nicholas Longworth pronounced the

140flew York Times, February 5, 1918, 1; February 9, 1918, 14;
and Washington Post, February 5, 1918, 2.
■^■^House, War Finance Corporation, Hearings on H. R. 9499, 3941, 61, 92-95, 104; Washington Post, February 22, 1918, 2; March 10,
1918, 2; New York Times, February 19, 15; and March 9, 1918, 5.
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bill as much improved by the Committee's handiwork.

Still, some

House members were struck by the hitherto undreamed of actions that
they were taking in wartime.

To these and like-minded colleagues the

bill required more revision, such as prohibiting loans to individuals,
allowing the Federal Reserve Board to increase its loan power, and
placing more checks on Secretary McAdoo's power.

Republican leader

Frederick Gillett (Mass.) continued his long standing lament over
congressional grants of power to the Executive.

Paraphrasing Lord

Acton, Gillett said that the possession of power in truth did corrupt
those who possessed it.

Gillet did not, however, propose any revisions,

preferring instead his role as "constructive critic" to actual creator
of legislation.

142

Joseph Fordney, leading Republican member of Ways

and Means, agreed with Gillett that powers had flowed to the Execu
tive; he nonetheless argued that this unfortunately must continue
because American corporate institutions required financial assistance.
Apparently, the House agreed with Fordney's viewpoint.

After a few

futile efforts at amendment, the bill passed the House as written by
the Ways and Means Committee, 370 to two .'*'4 3
Another important economic proposition arose out of the war's
massive demands on the mineral resources of the country.

The United

States suffered from critical shortages of certain minerals.

These

included managanese, pyrite, and chrome, of which the U. S. did not
produce enough for its own needs.

These minerals, because of their

142cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3619-20, 3718,
3716, 3786, 3661, 3793, 3727.
143Ibid., 3613-17, 3609, 3793, 3807, 3843.
March 19, 1918, 10; and March 20, 1918, 12.

New York Times,
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scarcity, had spiraled in price.

In order to deal with this problem,

the Administration introduced in March a bill that encouraged mineral
production and controlled prices.

The goal, as Bernard Baruch told

the House Mining Committee, was the economic self-sufficiency of the
nation in war and in peace .1 4 4
Since the provisions on production favorably appealed to the
sentiments of economic nationalism, they easily secured the approval
of most members when the bill was presented to the House in late
April.

The price-fixing sections, on the other hand, distressed the

already frayed sensitivities of congressmen.

Concerned about the fate

of private enterprise, members turned to the injunctions of the classi
cal economists against price-fixing.

As a result, many House members

argued that the market system, though under severe strain, would yield
not only the right prices but also increase production.

If the govern

ment, however, intervened and set prices, the bill's production
provisions would be contradicted.

The critics also rejected the new

(and what they considered dictatorial) powers that the bill granted to
the President.

145

When the House voted on the bill's price section, a combination
of Republican partisanship, opposition to further delegations of power
to the President, and southern cotton advocacy defeated its inclusion
in the bill, 156 to 150.146

Eighty-three percent of the Republicans

144New York Times, March 27, 1918, 20; and Congress, House,
Minerals and Metals for War Purposes, Hearings on S. 2812 and H. R.
11259, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-7, 23, 33.
145Ibid., 95, 99, 149; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56,
2 Sess., Pt. 6, 5794.
^^Ibid., 5844; and New York Times, May 1, 1918, 24.
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massed in opposition to the price control provisions (Table 4-18).
They were joined by twenty-two percent of the Democrats, while the
rest of the party adhered to the Administration's position.

Although

it was a decided partisan ballot, there were regional variations of
significance. Almost all the Democrats who broke from their party's
stance hailed from the Southern states (thirty of the thirty-four
came from the South). Apparently, a number of Southern Democrats
were apprehensive that the bill's principle would be applied to un
regulated cotton prices, which were then experiencing wartime inflation.
Members of both parties in the Mountain states supported price controls
on minerals, probably because they believed that the Administration
would increase prices for their minerals.

Overall, the Republicans

continued their opposition toward the Administration, while the
Southern Democrats' action signaled to the Administration that they
bitterly opposed any price control which might even remotely be construed as a reason to regulate cotton prices.

147

The spread of governmental regulation seemed checked by the late
spring of 1918.

Upsetting this more congenial trend was a threatened

strike among Western Union employees because that corporation denied
its employees the right to join the Commercial Telegraphers' Union.
In response to this crisis, Representative George R. Lunn (D-N.Y.)
proposed a bill establishing government control of all telegraph and
telephone companies.

He told the press that this was necessary in

wartime and that he believed it wise in peacetime.

As an argument

•^^Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 173-76,
portrays the Southerners as stoutly resisting any measures that
smacked of price controls on cotton.

TABLE 4-18
•VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 11259:
MINERAL PRICE CONTROL AMENDMENT*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

Yea
Nay

MA

ENC
D
R

R

D

R

21

—

32

1

32

2

18

10

3

11

WNC
D
R

SS
D

17

30

7

44

9

BS
R

D

1

3
26

MS
R

D

10

—

—

PS
R

2

D

—

4

8

R

5

D

TOTAL
R

5

34

120

1

124

24

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

MA

NE

ENC

D

R

D

R

Yea

—

100

—

94

5

76

Nay

100

6

95

24

100

D

R

WNC
D
R

100

SS
D

71

41

29

59

BS
R

100

D

MS

PS

TOTAL
R

R

D

R

D

R

D

10

100

—

33

—

83

22

83

90

—

100

67

100

17

78

17

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 6, 5844.
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for this proposal, Lunn pointed out that no European country allowed
private control of wire services.

When the strike danger continued,

Wilson, on July 1, conferred with his cabinet and decided on an extension of government control to the wire services.

Simultaneously,

administration supporters introduced a resolution, which was sent to
the Interstate Commerce Committee for hearings.
First, attempting to determine the reasons for the take over,
committeemen questioned Secretaries Baker and Daniels and Postmaster
General Albert Burleson.

These witnesses cited the strike threat as

the proximate cause for action, but Daniels stressed a second reason.
There was, he argued, a real danger of "spying" on government communi
cations with the wire services under private control.

The legislators

turned the questioning in a second direction when they asked the wit
nesses about government ownership after the war.

Daniels and Burle

son replied that they favored postwar government ownership for two
reasons:

that the wires were a public utility and that sedition could

be more efficiently suppressed by government control.

Committee

members, though voicing no desire to protect free speech and communi
cation, did not want further intrusions by the government into the
private economic sector.

The government witnesses and the Committee

agreed to restrict the resolution exclusively to war-induced condi
tions . 1 4 9
The Committee directed the resolution to the House floor, where
a number of congressmen protested its possible danger to private
148New York Times, June 5, 1918, 17; and July 3, 1918, 1.
14 9 U. S. Congress, House, Federal Control of Systems of Communi
cation, Hearings on H. J. Res. 309, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3, 6 , 13, 19,
29, 33, 36-38; and New York Times, July 3, 1918, 1.
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ownership after the war and to free exchange of communications during
the war.

They won a voice vote which would have sidetracked the bill

except that supporters of the resolution demanded a roll call of the
House and won, 197 to 107.

150

The voting on the motion indicates that

partisan factors had only nominal influence, since sixty-eight per
cent of the Democrats and fifty-eight percent of the Republicans
supported the motion (Table 4-19).

Only the Middle Atlantic and East

North Central regions manifested a tendency to vote above their par
ties' average percentage against the resolution.

These regions con

tained the great wire service companies that might have been adversely
affected by the resolution.

Otherwise, the divisions over it indicate

no distinguishable pattern.

Throughout the House's consideration of

economic measures, the membership nervously viewed the postwar impli
cations of their actions.

If their conduct indicated any clear

preference, it was to return the country to "normal" conditions as
fast as possible after the war without additional government regulation.

Military Policy
During the first wartime session, Congress had passed most of
the vital military measures.

A portion of this work, however, had

been done in such an incomplete fashion that it generated a number of
problems that would require House attention.

A modification of the

draft law was necessary in order to correct oversights and to obtain
enough men to fill the ranks of the A m y .

Then there were other

matters stemming from the aircraft and the machine-gun program.
Normal and extraordinary appropriations for the army and navy would
150cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 8727, 8715,
8648-51; and New York Times, July 5, 1918, 1.

TABLE 4-19
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. J. RES. 309:
WIRE SERVICE BILL*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

Yea
Nay

MA

NE
R

D

14

1

4

—

ENC

WNC

R

D

R

8

21

12

17

7

16

8

19

D

D

6

13

50

2

11

23

MS

BS

SS

R

D

R

D

2

R

PS
R

D

R

D

D

TOTAL
R

20

5

5

4

2

4

104

80

4

3

2

1

3

4

49

58

—

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE
D

MA

ENC

WNC

SS

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

BS
R

MS

PS

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

TOTAL
R

Yea

100

78

53

57

60

47

75

54

69

100

83

63

71

80

40

50

68

58

Nay

—

22

47

43

40

53

25

46

31

—

17

37

29

20

60

50

32

42

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 8651.
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also require the close attention of the House committees involved.

A

lengthy list of appropriation bills poured into the Appropriation,
Naval, and Military Committees.
Even though the frenzy of the first days of the war had declined,
House committees still processed billions of dollars of appropriation
requests in a matter of days, and the full House scrutinized matters
less closely.

Still, the committees did often subject witnesses

and bills to hostile scrutiny.

Thus during the attack on Baker in

the winter of 1917-18, Representative Kahn lashed out at the military's
failure to transport troops to France faster.

He, along with William

Gordon (D-Ohio), also criticized camp conditions and conjectured that
the whole problem came from the Administration's anti-preparedness
stance before the war.

When major political crises were not occurring,

witnesses received more deference and more straight-forward technical
questions.

Even then they did not escape unscratched, since the

committees were adamant that the government secure the best buy
possible for its money.

Specific contracts, on such supplies as

woolens, tents, guns, and clothes, were reviewed in order to ensure
that private contractors were not gathering windfall profits from the
government.

At times congressmen also displayed apprehensions that

some of their local manufacturers were mistreated by the War Depart
ment's purchasing system.

On occasion the committees also criticized

the method of making contracts.

Richard Olney (D-Mass.) thought that

the National Council of Defense hampered contract-making since counci1men were dollar-a-year businessmen who, he claimed, sought to protect
the interests of big business.

Additionally, committee members

310

frequently inveighed against the cost-plus system that the military
used for determining costs and profits on contracts.

151

At times, the detection of government failure led to full-scale
investigations.

In May, the inadequacy of army machine-gun production

came to light which resulted in close investigation by Julius Kahn (RCal.).

152

More far-reaching in its repercussions was the failure of

the aircraft program.

Secretary of War Baker had initiated an air

program shortly after American entry into the war and then placed it
under the Council of National Defense.

The Council originally envisioned

a modest program of 5,000 planes, but this soon multiplied into 20,000
planes and a $600 million cost.

Congress, fascinated by a vision of

American air power, voted to appropriate the money after a short
debate.

153

Planning proved much easier than actual implementation,

and the whole program rapidly ran into numerous problems.

When Gutzon

Borglum, a famous sculptor and also an aircraft enthusiast, revealed
the distressing conditions to the Senate, Republican senators and
Senator Chamberlain (D-Oreg.) pounced on the War Department and
t.

started an investigation.

Meanwhile, the House, as it often did when

such investigations of the Administration arose, sat on the side lines
and commended its sister body for its discovery of fraud and mis
management in the war program.

Senator Chamberlain revived the old

1 5 1 U. S. Congress, House, Army Appropriation Bill, 1919, Hearings,
on H. R. 12281, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 51, 204-05, 425, 609, 685, 1368,
679, 155, 898, 681-85; U. S. Congress, House, Council of National
Defense, Hearings on H. R. 3971, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 9, 16-17, 95; and
U. S. Congress, House, First Deficiency Appropriation Bill, Hearings
before the Appropriations Committee, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 98-102.

152New York Times, May 7, 1918, 1.
^•^Beaver, Newton D. Baker, 57-58.
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Weeks Resolution and called for a general investigation of the War
Department.

Wilson moved deftly to head off the proposed Senate

inquisition of the war program when he appointed a Justice Department
investigation under the former Republican standard-bearer, Charles
Evans Hughes.

The Senate, completely out-maneuvered, still authorized

a lesser investigation, while the House refused to become involved
at all . 1 5 4
In addition to preventing military waste, the House on occasion
became a component of the military policy-making process.15^

The

defects of the original draft law engaged the House's attention at
several points during the session.

First, the Administration requested

that the House enact legislation to remove "inequalities" in the selec
tive service system.

The bill redefined the classification system,

thereby allowing exemptions of persons with dependents or with critical
occupations.

It also corrected the basis for determining draft-age

populations in a district by removing foreign aliens as part of those
counted for the draft.

Overall, the supporters hoped that it would

more efficiently use manpower and that it would prevent the drafting
of married men with dependents.

It also greatly enhanced the mili

tary’s power since it allowed classification of civilians by the
draft boards.^56

154New York Times, April 11, 18, 1; April 12, 1918, 13; May 3
1918, 3; May 5, 1918, 6 ; May 8 ,1918, 1; May 16, 1918, 1; May 23,
1918, 1; May 30, 1918, 9; and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War
Congress, 119, 133-34.
155flew York Times, February 15, 1918, 4; and March 15, 1918,
4.
156ibid., March 14, 1918, 1; March 15, 1918, 5; and Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4981, 5036-38.
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Because some representatives saw the measure as a step toward
universal military training and military control, it stirred up the
still controversial issues from the previous year's draft debates.
Again Representative Hubert Dent (D-Tenn.), head of the Military
Affairs Committee, deserted the President and supported instead a
plan that Ashton C. Shallenberger (D-Neb.) had drawn up.

Consisting of

two amendments, Shallenberger's plan first provided that draft quotas
should be based on the total registered population of military age and
that Congress, rather than draft boards, would classify the draftage population.
volunteers.

The second amendment gave districts credit for

Advocates of the Shallenberger proposals commended such

measures on the grounds that they would prevent non-industrial states
from having to make up quotas for states granted deferments because
of a large labor force in war industries.

This agrarian state argu

ment was coupled with an attack on the military.

The Administration's

plan, asserted Samuel Nicholls (D-S.C.), allowed the army to set quotas
and classes; thereby, it delegated the military immense power over
individual citizens.

Only Congress, he maintained, should make such

decisions regarding the exemption and non-exemption of different
citizens.
Although this draft bill was complicated by several other provisions,

158

the three basic roll calls on it came over the Shallenberger

1 5 7 Ibid., 4984-86, 5028-29, 4989-90; New York Times, April 13,
1918, 11; April 14, 1918, 6 ; and Washington Post, April 11, 1918, 4.
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A draft exemption for divinity students caused divisions.
Eventually, the House insisted on their continued exemption. Also, a
provision on placing twenty-one year olds at the botton of Class one
created difficulties. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt.
6 , 5625; New York Times, May 9, 1918, 9; and May 10, 1918, 10.
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proposals. 1 ^ 9

The first vote can be defined as a partisan vote because

fifty-seven percent of the Democrats opposed ninety-two percent of
the Republicans (Table 4-20).

More significantly, the majority

position of the Democrats represented a revolt against the Adminis
tration's stance while the Republican majority voted for the War
Department's proposal.

Such a division lent credence to Republican

charges that Democratic obstructionists blocked the war program since
the Shallenberger amendment was defeated only by Republican aid.
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Most of the Democratic rebels came from the West North Central, the
South, and the Mountain areas.

As was true during the first session,

the industrial Northeast gave nearly unanimous support to the draft.
In general, the voting pattern reflected the appeal made by the
Shallenberger forces for the quota and classification amendment:
rural-oriented areas tended to support it,' while industrial regions
opposed it.
The second Shallenberger roll call, which was demanded on the
proposal granting to the states credit for volunteers, followed a non
partisan pattern as it carried by a vote of 293 to sixty-six.

Nonethe

less, fifty-five of the opponents came from one party, the Republican,
while only eleven Democrats joined them (Table 4-21).

A geographical

relationship was also evident in this ballot since most of the fifty-five
Republicans, who upheld the strongest pro-draft stance, represented
159

Two of the three votes scale together, the third does not.
It appears that after the first two votes, which came in April,
1918, and the third, which came in May, Wilson's change on the
credit proposals caused a realignment. Wilson always opposed the
quota amendment. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5,
5058-59; and Pt. 6 , 6291.
^•^Hew York Times, April 6, 1918, 6.

TABLE 4-20
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. J. RES. 123:
SHALLENBERGER AMENDMENT TO DRAFT BILL*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

Yea

MA

NE
D

R

D

5

—

Nay

R

5

26

14

49

WNC
D
R

ENC
D
R

SS
D

4

5

7

3

68

17

46

1

18

22

MS

BS
R

D

3

R

D

13
16

11

PS
R

D

TOTAL
D
R

R

5

2

2

1

104

14

2

4

2

9

79

163

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

Yea
Nay

NE
D

MA
R ^

R

26

—

100

D

100

74

100

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

D

19

10

87

14

75

81

90

13

86

25

SS

BS
R

100

D

MS
R

45
55

100

PS

D

R

D

R

TOTAL
D
R

71

33

50

10

57

8

29

67

50

90

43

92

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 5058.
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TABLE 4-21
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. J. RES. 123:
CREDIT FOR VOLUNTEERS*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

MA

NE
D

ENC

R

D

R

D

R

Yea

4

15

16

33

19

35

Nay

1

11

3

16

2

16

WNC
D
R

7

SS
D

BS
R

16

87

3

6

1

MS

D

R

26

10

3

1

D

PS
R

6

D

5

—

TOTAL
D
R

R

3

5

168

122

1

5

11

55

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE

MA

ENC

D

R

D

R

D

R

Yea

80

58

84

67

90

69

Nay

20

42

16

33

10

31

WNC
D
R

100

SS
D

BS
R

73

99

27

1

100

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., pt. 5, 5059.

MS

D

R

90

91

10

9

PS

D

R

100

100

—

D

R

TOTAL
D
R

75

50

94

69

25

50

6

31
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the Northeast.

The third roll call, again on the credit

principle, came a month later and showed the influence of changed
conditions (Table 4-22).

Prior to the first ballot on the volunteer

credit provision, the President had maintained a neutral position;
however, between the first and second ballot pressure from his military
advisors forced Wilson to adopt a definite position against it.

When

a conference report on the draft bill returned to the House, most Demo
crats agreed with the President's new stance and now voted against
the a m e n d m e n t . L e s s mindful of Presidential alterations in policy,
forty-one percent of the Republicans still voted for the Shallenberger
credit proposal. Overall, the three ballots, even though they do not
correlate with each other, indicated a strong preference by the North
east, particularly the Republicans of that region, for the military's
position on the draft.

Southern and Western Democrats usually reacted

negatively to the military's plans.

In any event, significant ele

ments of both parties demonstrated that they stood ready to adopt an
independent course on draft questions.
Later in the second session a second draft controversy arose
when the Administration sought authorization for a larger army.
Various Republicans, including Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, General
Leonard Wood, and Congressman Julius Kahn, started a campaign in the
spring of 1918 for an army of five million.

Their plan would augment

the then current size of the army by two million, an increase which they
believed absolutely necessary for an Allied victory.

T62

The

161Ibid., Pt. 6, 6289-91.
•^2New York Times, June 14, 1918, 4; Washington Post, March 28,
1918, 3 and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson, 177-78.

TABLE 4-22
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. J. RES. 123:
CREDIT FOR VOLUNTEERS*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

D

R

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

SS
D

Yea

2

16

7

23

18

25

3

11

76

Nay

4

6

3

14

3

21

5

9

6

MS

BS
R

D

R

D

PS
R

D

TOTAL
R

D

R

29

7

5

1

3

6

143

89

2

2

3

4

1

5

27

63

2

Region and Party (Percent)

NE

MA

D

R

D

R

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

D

Yea

33

73

70

62

86

54

37

55

93

Nay

67

27

30

38

14

46

63

45

7

VOTE

SS

BS
R

100

*Cong. Rec■, 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 6, 6291.

D

R

D

R

D

PS
R

TOTAL
D
R

93

78

63

20

75

54

84

59

7

22

37

80

25

46

16

41

MS

Administration reacted slowly to the clamor, but after Secretary Baker
returned from a European fact-finding trip, the Administration asked
Congress to remove any legislative limitation on the size of the
a

r

m

y

.

Rumors that the Executive would soon ask for much larger

military appropriations and a change in draft ages mounted during the
summer months.

On August first, the War Department finally announced

plans for a five million man army and at the same time requested an
extension of age limits for the draft to include all males between
eighteen and forty-five.
Response from Capital Hill demonstrated a continued mixed
attitude toward military draft planning.

Representative Kahn, who

saw the age proposal as a step toward universal training, supported it
as a result, but Chairman Dent again opposed the War Department.

He

and like-minded colleagues rallied behind a compromise counter-pro
posal that John C. McKenzie (R-Ill.) had drawn up.

His plan provided

that the eighteen-year old age group would be called only after the
nineteen to forty-five category.

Secretary of War Baker, however,

rejected the McKenzie compromise plan.

164

After Baker's refusal to compromise, a controversy erupted over
deference to the military's position.

Representative Kahn and his

cohorts advocated following the military in technical matters.

To

representatives such as Dent, the whole idea violated their belief
in the civilian creation of military policy for the p u b l i c . I n
^Washington Post, May 2, 1918, 6; and May 3, 1918, 1.
-*-6% e w York Times, June 27, 1918, 1; August 2, 1918, 1; August 4,
1918, 1; August 6, 1918, 1; August 21, 1918, 11; and Washington Post
165New York Times, August 23, 1918, 11; August 24, 1918, 1; and
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 9363-65, 905-06.
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this case the anti-militarist bloc, however, represented a minority,
as they lost the critical motion, one to recommit, 194 to 147.

Again

partisan differences were manifested on a draft vote (Table 4-23).
Fifty-three percent of the Democrats voted with Dent, while sixty-six
percent of the Republicans agreed with an Administration position.
Nonetheless, the low cohesion indicates that neither party achieved a
coherent party line.

Proponents of the military position more likely

resided in the Northeast (NE, MA, and ENC) and the Pacific states.
Opponents hailed from the other regions.

While this vote does not

correlate with other draft roll calls of the second session, on a
regional level it did display a consistency, particularly for the
Northeast with its strong conscription advocacy.

Overall, the balloting

on draft legislation demonstrates that in the only area in which Congress
participated directly in the formulation of military policy, significant
numbers of representatives stood opposed to military and Administration
directives.

When this fact is related to the often aggressive and

critical questioning of the House hearings, the military clearly did
not win the approval of many congressmen.

Although a majority suppor

ted the military's plans, many of these did so with ill-temper, and a
significant proportion refused all support.

The House was permeated

by a strong anti-military bias, which alerted its members to any
possible abuses of power by the military.

Revenue and Water Power
By late May, the House could look forward to an end of their
labors.

With the primary elections in the offing, the solons were

anxious to leave Washington for the hustings.

However, these plans

were in danger of being disrupted by the necessity for additional

TABLE 4-23
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 12731:
AGE CLASSIFICATION ON DRAFT BILL*

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

D

ENC
D
R

R

WNC
D
R

SS
D

BS
R

D

MS
D

R

• PS
D
R

R

TOTAL
D

R

Yea

1

1

4

9

9

19

6

14

51

2

14

9

4

3

2

3

91

60

Nay

5

24

18

41

13

27

3

9

28

1

11

1

1

2

3

9

82

114

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

D

R

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

TOTAL
D
R

SS

BS

MS

PS

Yea

17

4

18

18

41

41

67

61

65

67

56

9.0

80

60

40

25

53

34

Nay

83

96

82

82

59

59

33

39

35

33

44

10

20

40

60

75

47

66

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 9506.
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revenue.

With war costs mounting, the old revenue bill became more

inadequate in maintaining the desired high ratio of taxes to bonds.

As

a result Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo met in early May with Demo
cratic leaders Kitchin and J. Swagar Sherley, telling them that new
taxes were imperative in the light of financial conditions.

They and

other congressional leaders vociferously objected and insisted that
new taxes were not required until 1919, and that bonds could properly
finance the war.

But behind their distress was the apprehension that

all the maneuvering necessary to pass the bill would wreck their
party's chances in the November elections.
Notwithstanding these objections, McAdoo maintained his position,
and in the ensuing deadlock Wilson was forced to step-in to break the
impasse.

Meeting with Republican and Democratic leaders in several

conferences, he devised various compromise plans, such as for a special
session to start November 11.

House Ways and Means leaders Kitchin

and Fordney accepted one proposal, but the Senate Republicans rejected
it.

167

Now completely deadlocked, the House was startled by Wilson's

request to address a joint session of Congress

on May 27.

With a clarion call to duty that thrilled the public and that
compelled the Congress to fall into line with his wishes, Wilson
pressed home the necessity for new taxes.
he had in mind:

He also outlined the taxes

a higher excess profits tax, a new war profits tax,

and a more stringent tax on luxuries.

In the midst of his speech,

166wew York Times, May 11, 1918, 1; May 14, 1918, 12; May 21,
1918, 11; Washington Post, May 11, 1918, 2; and May 22, 1918, 2.
167Ibid., May 24, 1918, 1; May 25, 1918,
New York Times, May 25, 1918, 1; May 26, 1918,
4.

6; May 26, 1918, 1;
1; and May 27, 1918,
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he interjected what became its most memorable phrase, namely that
"politics is a d j o u r n e d . 8

Meant not as a literal statement but as

relating only to the framing of the revenue bill, Wilson's remark
was misinterpreted by the press as a plea for a general truce in
political infighting.

Though incorrectly understood, it served the

immediate purpose of forcing congressmen to give up their desires
for campaigning.

Many did so, however, with much ill-grace and deep

resentment toward McAdoo.
The day after Wilson's speech, Kitchin, unhappy at the prospects
of writing a tax bill, accused Secretary McAdoo of falling under the
influence of the powerful publisher's lobby who wished to keep Congress
in session until the rates on second-class mail had been repealed.
Kitchin also "breathed fire" against the monied interests supposedly
favored by McAdoo and threatened higher taxes on their ill-gotten
war gains.

Slightly better feelings returned when Kitchin and the

White House agreed to brief summer vacations while Congress remained
technically in session.
underway m

Nonetheless, hearings on the tax bill got

an atmosphere of resentment.

169

The Ways and Means Committee's original plan was suggested by
Secretary McAdoo.

Its basic premise rested on the theory that good

public financing required a bond to tax ratio of three to one or a
tax bill of eight billion dollars.

Since this figure represented

about a four-billion dollar increase over the old revenue bill, McAdoo

*88Ibid., May 28, 1918, 1; Washington Post, May 28, 1918, 1;
and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 136-37.
^88Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 7, 7163-64;
New York Times, May 29, 1918, 1; and Washington Post, May 29, 1918,
6.
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proposed to raise the difference by a new eighty percent war profit
tax to be superimposed on the existing excess profit taxes.

He also

suggested that normal income taxes should be increased from six to
twelve percent and that additional heavy taxes should be placed on
luxuries.

The clear intention of the taxes, McAdoo implied, was to

reduce the huge profits that contractors had garnered from war pro
duction.

Although Republicans mostly concurred with the proposals,

Fordney wanted more consumption taxes anda higher tariff.-*-^®

Past

tax measures, along with McAdoo and Fordney1s recommendations, pro
vided the basis for the proposed bill and for remarks by witnesses
before the Ways and Means Committee.
During the hearings Chairman Kitchin and John N. Garner (D-Tex.)
told R. C. Leffingweld, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, that they
disliked McAdoo's new tax plan.

They suggested, instead, a dual plan

by which the excess profit tax would be raised to the same eightypercent level as the war profit tax.

Their scheme proposed that which

ever of the two taxes yielded the most revenue from a company, so long
as it was not more than seventy percent of the net income, would be
the tax used.

Kitchin desired this formula because it would tax as

much as the market would bear, thereby preventing business from
escaping taxation.

Rejecting their suggestion, Leffingwell argued that

the war tax would accomplish the task alone.

This tax also had the

advantage, he maintained, of permitting the government to make con
tracts with manufacturers that would allow room for mistakes.
170

Thus,

Ibid., June 1, 1918, 1; June 7, 1918, 1; New York Times, June
3, 1918, 1; June 4, 1918, 9; June 7, 1918, 1. U. S. Congress, House
Proposed Revenue Act of 1919, Hearings on H. R. 12863, 65 Cong., 2
Sess., 9-11.
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on the one hand,a war contract would not bankrupt a company and, on
the other hand, the tax would not permit huge profits from it.
concluded with a theme repeated throughout the hearings:

He

the war

tax was the most patriotic tax because it prevented war profiteering.1^1
Spokesmen from such diverse businesses as oil exploration and
apple-growing paraded before the Ways and Means Committee.

Although

they all affirmed their patriotic desire to pay taxes, they also claimed
that the proposed taxes would work unfairly against their own conpany
but not their conpetition.

They then proceeded to list a number of

defects in the excess profit tax, some of which included a failure to
differentiate between normal prewar profits and war profits and between
capital expenditures and costs and an improper taxation of the "high
risk" coal and oil industries, both of which their spokesmen asserted,
deserved a depletion allowance.

Other witnesses, some of whom repre

sented farm groups, demanded confiscation of incomes over $100,000.
When Garner asked one farmer spokesman if such high taxes might not
kill the "golden goose/" he replied that Garner's implication was that
the country's men of great wealth were unpatriotic.

A host of other

special interest groups claimed that proposed taxes on cars, firearms,
candy, and movies threatened the welfare of the American people as well
as their industry.

The most insistent special interest group was the

second-class mail lobby, Kitchin's antagonists.

To them, the added

postal taxes restricted information, burdened them with difficult
administrative procedures, and violated the expressed opinions of

*^1Claude Kitchin, "Who Will Pay the New Taxes?", Forum, LX
(August, 1918), 149-154; and U. S. Congress, House, Proposed Revenue
Act,55, 65, 75.
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Presidents

Washington and Lincoln in favor of low cost mail.

172

By

the time the Ways and Means committeemen closed public sessions,
they were fully informed that any tsixes they levied would offend many
while pleasing few.
Writing the bill in secret, the Committee proceeded in an un
usual fashion.

Normally, the majority party wrote the bill by itself,

then let the minority make its futile suggestions for change after
the bill was written.

This time, the parties joined together and

drafted the bill in a non-partisan fashion.

Though a few disliked

this additional step, the committeemen also designated Kitchin as tbe
only authorized spokesmen for the Committee.

173

Working in this manner,

the Committee first rejected a number of the luxury taxes suggested
by the Treasury Department as unsuitable for heavy taxation.

When

the Committee next turned to the corporation provisions, more radical
I
members attempted to regain the losses on luxury taxes with an increase
from sixteen to twenty percent in the corporation tax.

The Committee

members turned this recommendation down, but they did agree to an
eighteen percent tax.

J. Hampton Moore, who insisted that the 1917

Revenue Act treated the rich too liberally, pressed for higher
income tax assessments on larger incomes.
The main proposal under discussion by the Committee was Kitchin's
plan to remove the war profits tax and to insert a higher excess
172Ibid., 203, 208, 231, 437, 542, 544, 611, 629, 730, 775, 154-57,
955, 988, 1037, 1089, 1127, 1711, 1758, 1869, 1956, 2003, 2101-02, 2242.
•L73Washington Post, July 15, 1918, 2; New York Times, July 21,
1918, 15; and July 23, 1918, 19.
174Ibid., July 18, 1918, 8; August 5, 1918, 11; July 24, 1918,
17; July 26, 1918, 1; August 6, 1918, 14; and August 7, 1918, 15.
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profits tax in its place.

At one point the Committee adopted Kitchin's

tax plan, but then the Administration mounted a campaign for the war
tax.

McAdoo told the press that a war profit tax would heavily

assess all profiteers and also would have the added advantage of
raising more money.

Buttressing McAdoo's stance, Wilson issued a

strong statement against profiteers in which he also supported his
son-in-law's proposals.
his position altogether.

Kitchin, however, refused to retreat from
Instead, he and other members insisted on

a compromise system of excess and war profit taxes.

In their plan,

war profit taxes would apply if a company escaped from the first
tax.

Since Kitchin and not McAdoo dominated the Committee, McAdoo

had to give way.

The bill also differed from the Secretary's desires

over the flat eighteen percent corporation tax and its failure to
distinguish between earned and unearned income.

175

Unanimously reported in early September by the Ways and Means
Committee, the bill was explained by Kitchin for two days, the longest
speech in House h i s t o r y . L i t t l e criticism surfaced during his
discussion or in subsequent debates from Republicans.

GOP leader

Fordney told the House that he disliked particulars of the bill,
such as parts of the excess tax provisions, and wished for the in
clusion of a protective tariff.

Yet, he quickly added that he was

pleased by the bill and that any defects could be worked out by the
Senate.

The only partisan controversy during the debates arose over

175Ibid., August 7, 1918, 18; August 13, 1918, 8; August 20,
1918, 6; August 27, 1918, 1; August 31, 1918, 9; September 3, 1918,
1; and Washington Post, August 5, 1918, 3.
176cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Appendix, 661-702.
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a maneuver by Moore.

In his latest foray against the Democrats,

he offered the old Weeks resolution, under yet another of its manifold
guises, as an amendment to establish a congressional commission which
would investigate the expenditure of money raised under the Revenue
Bill.

Though the chair quickly ruled the amendment not to be

germane., Moore scored another partisan point for the Republicans.

177

On the Democratic side, a few members complained that the bill
unfairly taxed the country, but they offered no counterplans.

Party

opposition to the bill disappeared, and though neither party was
pleased with levying huge taxes days before the fall elections, they
had to console themselves with the thought that the government required
the money.

An element of the House members, mainly progressives, liked

those provisions which taxed the wealth of the country in an equalitarian fashion.

These and the less sanguine Democratic and Republican

members, joined together and voted unanimously for the bill 349 to

0.178
The Administration seized the time allowed by the prolonged
session to advocate several other measures, the most important of
which was an emergency power bill.

For several years hydroelectric

interests and public groups had been pushing for legislation to
allow development of electrical power plants on navigable rivers.

179

177Washington Post, September 7, 1918, 2; September 21, 1918, 1;
New York Times, September 7, 1918, 6; September 10, 1918, 5; September
21, 1918, 1; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 10, 10089
10339, 10547.
3-^ I b i d . ; and "The Revenue Bill," New Republic, XVI (September 14,
1918), 183-185. The Senate did not complete the tax bill until the
third session. The bill's story will be taken up in the next chapter.
1 7Q

See Samuel P. Hayes, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency;
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President Wilson brought this question again before the House in his
December, 1917, address when he advocated the development of resources
on the principles of conservation.

In January, he and House leaders

organized a special committee on water power.

At this time he also

voiced his objections to the Senate's Shields water power bill because
it did not protect the public's rights in conservation.

Having already

passed the Senate, the Shields bill provided for private development
of electrical power and state control of rates.

Its specific provisions

established a difficult procedure for government "recapture" of water
sites from companies and required a high rate of reimbursement to the
companies by use of the formula of "just compensation."
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Behind the

specific provisions of the Shields bill was a controversy over the
proper use of America's natural resources.

Congressmen such as Scott

Ferris (D-Okla.) advocated a government managerial policy:

the

government should use public property for undertakings designed to be
of the widest application to the public.

Another group, as represented

by the Shields bill, pushed natural resource development through
private means, though they would accept a few government restrictions.
Coloring the whole issue was the attitude of congressmen toward
government regulation, corporate power, scientific management, and
rational planning.

181

The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1959), 238-40, a discussion on the bill's background.
^Washington Post, January 6, 1918, 7; ibid., January 17,
1918, 6; January 18, 1918, 2; Charles Merz "At the Capital," New
Republic, XIII (January 12, 1918), 316; New York Times, January 19,
1918, 6.
181see Robert Lowitt, "A Neglected Aspect of the Progressive
Movement: George Norris and Public Control of HydroElectric Power,"
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The new Water Power Committee started its hearings with testimony
from O. C. Merrill, an employee of the Forestry Bureau, who had helped
prepare the Shields bill.

He presented the bill as one which fully

protected the public interest and the natural resources of the country.
Nonetheless, the emphasis of his statement stressed private rights more
than public ones, a fact that caused Ferris to question Merrill
closely about the Vrecapture” clause. According to Ferris, this pro
vision, which granted licenses for fifty years and easy renewal terms
at the end of that period, tied the hands of the government.

Other

members expressed to Merrill a skepticism about such provisions as the
rate controls which were to be administered by the states, and the
determination of the real costs of the power plant investment.
Merrill took a corporation view on these matters, arguing that capital
required moderate terms to encourage its investment.
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The parade of corporation witnesses who followed Merrill agreed
with the Shields bill or suggested even easier terms for power com
panies.

When one company spokesman advocated the strengthening of

the renewal rights at the end of fifty years, a lively discussion
ensued.

Frank Doremus (D-Mich.) doubted if any city would grant

Historian, XXVII (May, 1965), 350-365, for a discussion of the basic
ideas behind water power development plans. See also James Penick,
Jr., Progressive Politics and Conservation: The Ballinger-Pinchot
Affair (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 185-88; and
Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, 238-40, 81. Hays notes
that the Pinchot conservationist school advocated a water power bill
based on the concept of multiple-purpose development, which meant the
development of power, flood control, and irrigation, all in the same
river program. The 1918 water bill, however, did not embody this
principle, and as such it represented, Hays writes, a partial defeat
for the Pinchot conservationists.
182

U. S. Congress, House, Water Power, Hearings on S. 1419,
65 Cong., 2 Sess., 14-18, 29-32, 51-52, 68-69, 87.
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fifty-year licenses to street car companies, while Miss Rankin ques
tioned the spokesman's concept of "just compensation" at the end of the
fifty-year period.

William LaFollette (R-Wash.) interjected that the

corporations' proposal would only enmesh the government in protracted
litigation over what was just.

Chairman Thetus Sims closed the ex

change with the observation that the public's position must be con
sidered, particularly since the government was granting the companies
an opportunity to make money that it need not permit at all.

The

Committee opposed liberalizing the bill in favor of the companies;
yet, the "just" compensation section remained too favorable to cor
porations for the tastes of some members, most notably Chairman
183
Sims.
Since all sides agreed to the necessity of power development,
discussion on the House floor continued to revolve around the balance
between public and private interests.

Sims, the bill's floor director,

argued that the House had improved the Shields bill by providing for
rate charges on the use of water sites and by clarifying the fiftyyear provision.

This latter provision now read "not to exceed" fifty

years, whereas before it had provided for a flat "fifty years."

Sims

added that the bill, in his opinion, still required more modification,
particularly on the recapture find compensation sectors.

President

183Ibid., 160, 167, 175, 199-207, 247, 427, 457. The bill's
basic provisions as reported out of committee included the following
points. Federal jurisdiction of hydroelectric power was established on
navigable waters. Leases were not to exceed fifty years. State and
local political units were given preference over private companies on
selection of power sites. A federal power commission was set up con
sisting of the Secretaries of War, Interior, and Agriculture. Recap
ture by the government of the lease was permitted under certain restric
tions. The federal government on recommendation of the commission was
allowed to develop water power sites on its own initiative.
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Wilson concurred with Sims, who likewise objected to the recapture
principle of "net investment," and instead favored a provision based
on the principle of "fair value not exceeding cost."184

Ferris summed

up the argument by claiming that the net investment principle meant
that the government would have to "pay back every penny" put into the
power site.

On the other hand, fair value would never exceed actual

cost and would best serve the public interest.

Supporters of the net

investment section, as reported by the Committee, maintained that the
provision was much different from that described by the opponents
since various items under the "net value" concept would be deducted
from total costs.

Representative Esch also pointed out to the House

that "net" investment was a clearly defined term in the courts.

In

contrast, the "fair value" concept was a poorly defined legal term.
The debate became highly technical but behind the details stood two
varying interpretations of development and conservation:

the supporters

of the fair value principle pictured the public as suffering too long
because of give-aways by the government; and the advocates of the net
investment section wanted to see rapid development of hydroelectric
power and failed to find danger in generous concessions to corpora
tions .185
When balloting began on the recapture section, House Democrats
rallied behind the Administration, and the Republicans united in favor
of the corporations.

The roll call, which would have permitted the

substitution of the fair value principle for the net investment
i fi4

Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 9037-38, 9042;
Pt. 10, 9657-58, 9799; and New York Times, August 30, 1918, 10.
185Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 10, 990, 9954-70.
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concept, found the Republicans victorious, 133 to 128.186

Handi

capped by the greater unity of the Republicans, who organized ninetytwo percent of their party in comparison to the eighty-seven percent
of the Democrats', the Administration lost this close ballot (Table
4-24).

When the roll call is analyzed from the geographical perspec

tive, no evidence of party disloyalty can be found that indicated the
influence of regional considerations.

By 1918, the controversy over

water power found both parties united on most details of water power
legislation, but the decided partisan division over the compensation
clause indicates differences over the role of the private and the public
sectors in water power development.

The Democrats urged greater pub

lic control, and the Republicans advocated increased incentives for
private enterprise.

187

Retrospect
When the second session ended in November, 1918, the House,
during a period of over eleven months, had considered a succession of
fundamental issues that often caused heated debate.

Whenever these

186Ibid., 9971, 1052.
187
Of the different historiographical perspectives on the
conservation movement, James Penick's viewpoint appears to best explain
the division over the condensation clause. Briefly, Penick rejects
the old view of conservation as a battle between one group favoring
conservation and the other opposing it. Rather, conservation issues
generated conflict between groups with different perspectives on con
servation, one with a scientific and regulatory viewpoint, the other
with a development and individualistic one. The Water Power Bill of
the 65th House did not spark one group opposing it and another in
favor of it. The division came from differing perspectives, one
favoring greater government control and the other advocating more pri
vate control. Both sides agreed to government involvement on the one
hand and corporate development on the other. The division came over
the balance between private and public sectors. See Penick, Pro
gressive Politics, 185-88.

TABLE 4-24
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. 1419:
WATER POWER BILL

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

Yea

NE
D

MA
R

D

8

—

Nay

R

1

3

19

25

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

SS
D

BS
R

D

MS
R

23

17

4

6

2

56

1

35

1

21

4

2

D

PS
R

D

TOTAL
D
R

R

2

4

1

3

2

117

11

5

1

3

1

9

17

119

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

Yea
Nay

NE
D

MA
R

R

73

—

100

D

100

27

100

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

94

10

86

9

86

6

90

14

91

14

D

SS
' R

100
100

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 10, 10052.

MS

BS
D

R

D

R

D

PS
R

TOTAL
D
R

29

80

25

75

18

87

8

71

20

75

25

82

13

92
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questions came to a roll call, the resulting voting bloc frequently
operated only on that issue.

Nonetheless, these individual coalitions

often expressed decided regional influences.

Neither prohibition nor

women's suffrage, two of the primary reforms of the Progressive Era,
enlisted coalitions that also operated on other measures.

In their

case, the most notable pattern was found among Southern Democrats,
who evidently were knitted together in support for prohibition and
against women's suffrage in part because of the race question.
Similarly, voting on farm, draft, and alien legislation created dis
crete blocs which often eclipsed partisan divisions:

special regional

interests, plus a decided element of partisanship, organized several
diverse voting blocs on the farm proposals of the session; the new
draft directives of the Administration aroused the opposition of
ideologically committed members along with some members made unhappy
over the mechanics of the draft system; and alien deportation legis
lation galvanized nativists into support and Northeastern Democrats,
who represented immigrant constituencies, into opposition.
Besides regional influences, partisan factors frequently operated
on roll calls.

At the level of fifty percent versus fifty percent, a

majority of Republicans rejected Democratic positions on forty percent
of all roll calls (Table 4-25).

At the highest level of partisanship

(ninety percent versus ninety percent), the second session displayed
what appeared to be a highly amicable state of affairs because only
three percent of the votes were recorded at that level.

In comparison

to other sessions, partisan voting increased slightly over the first,
but was markedly lower than in the third session.

In comparison

to other Congresses of the Progressive Period, the forty percent of
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TABLE 4-25
PARTISAN VOTING

First
Session

Second
Session

Third
Session

Average for
All Sessions

50 v 50

39

40

56

47

90 v 90

2

3

22

11

Level of
Partisanship
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partisan voting at the fifty percent versus the fifty percent level
was much below the normal average of sixty percent.

188

The obvious interpretation of this data would be that the
general wartime unity caused a decline in partisanship.

The second

session recorded thirty-one percent of its roll calls as unanimous,
a very high percentage.

The first session voted unanimously twenty-

four percent of the time, and the third session did so nineteen percent
of the time.

The large percentage of unanimous votes in the second

included roll calls of both procedural motions of small consequence
and votes over fundamental war measures.

In this latter category,

the War Finance Corporation and the Revenue Bill were agreed to by the
House without division.

The unanimous votes, then, would further

collaborate the interpretation that partisanship declined.
However, this thesis is only partially correct because it overlooks
afundamental fact about the roll calls.

When the unanimous votes are

removed, the data suggests that many measures of a non-war character
or even war nature did spark partisan voting.

Fully forty percent of

the remaining sixty-nine percent of the roll calls divided along
partisan lines.

In short, partisanship remained, but the high level

of unanimous votes effectively hid it from view.
Another analytical tool for the study of roll calls measures
the degree of unity within parties.

First, by use of the Rice Index,

the average score can be determined for the session.

Democrats

recorded a score of seventy-one while the Republicans posted a score

188See Allen and Clubb, "Party Loyalty During the Progressive
Era," 571-76; and see, also, Chapter two, table twenty-one for more
information on other Congresses.
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of sixty-eight (Table 4-26).

In comparison to the average cohesion

score for all sessions, the Democrats displayed less and the Republi
cans more.

Though in both cases the difference from the average was

slight, it indicated that issues tended to separate the Democrats
internally, even given the large number of unanimous roll calls on war
measures which should raise the cohesion average score.
licans this pattern was not as evident.

For the Repub

However, when some individual

issues are calculated for the Rice Index Score, Republicans at times
showed marked disunity.

Policy on aliens and wheat prices considerably

disrupted Republican cohesion, while railroad measures and to a lesser
degree economic and postal policy issues moderately fragmented them.
In the case of the Democrats, divisive issues were women's suffrage,
alien policy, and wheat prices.

When the cohesion of the two parties

is compared, the Republicans showed higher cohesion than the Democrats
on women's suffrage and prohibition, while the Democrats displayed
greater internal unity than the Republicans on wheat and railroad
policy.

Of course, despite these variations, it should be remembered

that both parties showed high levels of cohesion, as seen in the
table.

As in the first session, both parties were comparatively

united overall and on most issues, a fact that helps to account for
much of the House voting behavior during the second session.
Finally, a number of measures raised questions of progressivism.
In the case of labor issues with progressive implications, voting
patterns tended to show the Republicans more favorably inclined
toward labor than were the Democrats.

On the most important labor

votes, those on the Cannon amendment to bar labor "conspiracies,”
the House evidenced near total confusion as it first voted against

TABLE 4-26
SELECTED ISSUES BY PARTY
(Rice Index Score)

_______________DEMOCRAT______________
Second Session
All Sessions
Average Cohesion
Average Cohesion

REPUBLICAN_____________
Second Session
All Sessions
Average Cohesion
Average Cohesion

Overall

71

73

68

67

2 . Prohibition

52

52

68

68

1.

3.

Women

10

10

65

65

4.

Postal Tubes

69

69

61

61

5.

Aliens

31

31

37

37

6.

Strikes

77

77

75

75

7.

Wheat

42

42

25

25

8.

Railroad

85

85

51

51

9.

Labor

53

53

61

61

Progressive

58

63

64

56

11. War Legislation

73

73

65

64

12.

58

54

61

57

10.

Economic
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labor and then for labor.

A more clear-cut pattern emerged on the

railroad bill/ wherein the Democrats favored the progressive position
while most Republicans opposed it.

Again on price controls of minerals

and on greater public control of water power development, the Democrats
struck the more progressive stance.

But since most of the progressive

votes expressed a strong partisan or regional influence, the ideological
significance of the parties' stance can be questioned.

Overall, the

House formulated its roll call decisions in the context of partisan
ship, moderated by the extenuation of war circumstances, the demands
of regional interests, and the ideological requirements of particular
measures.
Apart from these influences shaping roll calls, House delibera
tions were also directed by a pattern of attitudes and emotions.
When the House reconvened in December, 1917, patriotic concern for
the war program initiated investigations and several proposals
for a partnership between the President and Congress.

While the

Republicans directed these thrusts, Democrats indicated their alarm in
more subtle fashions.

The Administration resolved the winter crisis,

which it also did when beset by several smaller ones later in the ses
sion; but the patriotic and partisan attutudes behind them were never
successfully channeled by the Administration into more productive direc
tions.

As a result representatives fixed their attention only on mili

tary victory and never turned to a fruitful discussion on the postwar
world.

Notably absent from House debates were clear and forward looking

speeches on a better national and international future.^®

IS^Many congressmen made war speeches of one type or another,
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Because of this failure to express generous sentiments, war
emotions more often found outlet in rancor and intolerance toward
minorities and dissenters.

Aliens, in particular "alien slackers,"

along with political radicals, received their share of verbal abuse.
More importantly, the House, with hardly a word of objection, nailed
down the final features of the repressive war program when it passed
the Anarchist Deportation Bill and the Sedition Act.

In such an

atmosphere, congressmen ceased being concerned with civil liberties
and, instead, became afraid that their own records might be cri
ticized by the press or by fellow members as insufficiently patriotric.

Nonetheless, partisanship continued to play the dominant role

even in the midst of emotions of intolerance.

In fact, the desire

to defeat the opposition party often turned patriotism and intolerance
to its own uses.

Criticism of the Administration, though based

on real conditions, ebbed and flowed more on the impulses of par
tisan advantage than on a clear-cut analysis of the situation.
Too much was at stake in the war for either side to allow the other
to reap the accolades of the public.

As the session dragged toward

the fall elections and adjournment, the dominant accent became not
war, patriotism, intolerance, or ideology but the partisan campaign
appeals.

but these did not rise above mere discussions of war accomplishments,
causes of the war, or banal generalities of war aims. Amazingly
only one congressman made a speech on Wilson's Fourteen Points for
months. See the following as evicences of typical war-related
speeches: Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 664,
984; Pt. 2, 1224; Pt. 5, 4745, 4436; Pt. 6, 5526, 5561, 5565, 5888;
and Pt. 7, 7267.
190por some evidences of partisan speech making late in the
session see ibid., Pt. 8, 7689, 8204, 8207; Pt. 10, 9601, 9606, 9615,
10125, 10257, 10572; Pt. 11, 10709, 11291, 11324, 1332.

CHAPTER V

THIRD SESSION OP THE 65TH HOUSE

In the final session the House confronted the new and demanding
problems of postwar reconstruction, which was similar in importance
to the war mobilization issue of the first session.

Several measures

were only partially completed when peace was suddenly declared.
Congress was forced to deal not only with these carry-over issues
but also with the complex questions of postwar reconstruction.

The

departure of President Wilson shortly after the beginning of the third
session for the Paris Peace Conference removed the main guiding force
for the development of reconstruction measures.

Cut adrift from

leadership but compelled by circumstances to confront the problems of
reconstruction, the House lost its direction and became entangled in
a web of partisan, ideological, and regional confusion.

Defeat of the Reconstruction Commission
Although peace had returned, members' tempers were clearly on
edge as the session opened.

Republicans, who were the victors in

the November, 1918, congressional elections, viewed Wilson with sus
picion because of his October 25, 1918, press release.

In this

statement Wilson had called for a Democratic Congress, had declared
the Republicans, though pro-war, anti-administration, and had charged
them with designing to gain control of the Executive.
341

Republicans,
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besides turning the statement ot their own partisan advantage, angrily
denied the validity of the statement.•*•
When the President failed to include Senators or important
Republicans in the delegation to the Parish Peace Conference, he
deepened congressional hostility toward himself and his program.

As

a consequence, Representative William A. Rodenberg (R-Ill.) introduced
a resolution which declared the Presidency vacated if Wilson, as was
rumored, decided to attend the Conference himself.

Although Minority

Leader Mann opposed such malevolent steps, congressmen were not in a
receptive mood when Wilson appeared before them on December 2, 1918,
to deliver the State of the Union Address.

2

After citing the military accomplishments of the nation, the
President in his speech praised .the organizational abilities and the
spiritual qualities of the soldiers and the people during the war.
Wilson then discussed his ambitions for the future, which he defined
as "justice and fair dealing."

As a first step toward the achievement

of these goals, he officially announced his decision to attend the
Peace Conference.

Since the Allies and the Central Empires accepted

his Fourteen Points as the basis for the conference's negotiations,
the President stated that his presence was essential to the proper
interpretation of the points.

Wilson was determined to influence

^•New York Times, October 26, 1918, 1; October 27, 1918, 10;
October 28, 1918, 1. See Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War
Congress, 220ff for an extensive discussion of the October appeal
and its implications.
^Washington Post, December 1, 1918, 1; December 3, 1918, 6;
and December 4, 1918, 6.
I
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personally the peace negotiations, and, for him this transcended all
other interests;^
Although Wilson took little interest in the home front, he did
note some problems stemming from postwar economic and industrial read
justment.

He rejected "any general scheme of reconstruction" because

business and labor would never be pliant enough to accept direction.
He, instead, proposed several pieces of legislation that would aid
the transition process. One such bill would fund a public works
program for veterans.

Entirely recommended by Secretary of the

Interior Frank Lane, this bill called for the employment of veterans
in the development^of arid, swamp, and cut-over lands.

Wilson claimed

that this proposal was necessary because business would not be able
to provide immediate employment for all returning veterans.
turned to industrial reconstruction.

He then

The government, he pointed out,

was already removing most controls over industry, but the shipping
and railroad industries still required government direction and
reorganization.

The war demonstrated that the railroads were not

capable of handling the immense transportation demands placed on
them.

Blaming this failure on the legally compelled competition be

tween railroads, he suggested both an extension of government manage
ment and an appropriation for improvements.

He also implied that

he favored long-termed plans which would increase government regula
tion while decreasing "wasteful" competition.

Finally, he advocated

that the Senate pass the House-approved tax bill, though iri a revised
form.

With the war's end, the need for revenue decreased; he

^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 12-15.
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recommended that the Senate slash the House1s tax proposals from
eight billion to six billion.4
Wilson's leadership of the third session largely ended with his
speech.5

While he became enmeshed in the details of international

reconstruction, the House was left to develop its own legislation for
domestic reconstruction.

During the second session Representative

Barton L. French (R-Idaho) had introduced a reconstruction proposal
that paralleled reconversion plans of some foreign countries.

Its

provisions established a minister of reconstruction in the President's
cabinet and a commission composed of congressmen to propose legisg
lation.

Other congressmen made similar suggestions,

and in the

Senate, John Weeks (R-Mass.) submitted a proposal for a special
congressional committee on reconstruction.

Since its sponsor was

known as a bitter anti-Administration Republican, Week's plan became
a highly charged partisan issue, particularly when a conference of
Senate Republicans endorsed it.

Seeing the design as one more

Republican effort to wrestle the direction of the government from
Wilson's hands, Senator Overman (D-N.C.) introduced a bill to provide
for executive predominance on a reconstruction commission.

7

4Ibid.
5

See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 48-52, for a discussion as to
the reasons why Wilson failed to provide leadership for domestic
reconstruction.
6Ibid., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4687-88; Washington Post,
November 8, 1918, 6; New York Times, June 12; 1918, 6; and Cong.
Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 2 Sess., Pt. 11, 11151, 11377.
^New York Times, September 28, 1918, 11; October 2, 1918, 12;
October 4, 1918, 12; and November 14, 1918, 1.
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After the November election victory of their party, Senate Re
publicans again agreed to work for the establishment of a reconstruc
tion commission.
their party.

They now proposed one strictly under the control of

When Wilson in his State of the Union address failed to

break the deadlock over proposals, reconstruction plans became hope
lessly tangled in partisan controversy and never emerged from congres
sional committees.

The House was left without a central committee for

reconstruction planning.8

"Benefits for the Doughboys"
The start of the House's piecemeal consideration of reconstruc
tion programs was prompted by the return of veterans from France.
Congressmen advanced plans for securing the veteran's financial
security.

During the first session, the Congress had authorized a

Bureau of War Risk Insurance.

Through the services of this agency a

soldier could gain protection in three different ways.

First, he was

required, if an enlisted man, to have half his pay deducted.

If the

enlistee had dependents, the Bureau then multiplied the soldier's
deduction by the number of his dependents.

This sum, along with the

original deduction, was sent by the Bureau to the enlistee's family.
If the enlistee had no dependents, the Bureau deducted half of his
pay for forced savings.

The allotment system ended at the close of

Q
Ibid., November 20, 1918, 1. Plans for reconstruction were
common after the war, but the failure to create a reconstruction
commission and Wilson's decision to remove himself to Paris never
permitted them to get off the ground. See Melvin I. Urofsky, Big
Steel and the Wilson Administration(Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1969), 152, 304-05; and Noggle, Into the Twenties, 31-34,
46-49. The House could have filled the gap, but in large measure
they failed to do so.

346

the war.

Second, a government insurance program paid premium to a

soldier's dependent's in case of his death, or, in the case of injury,
provided for the complete cost of his rehabilitation.

Third, the

soldier could increase his insurance by taking out a life-insurance
policy worth up to $10,000.

The

policy's attraction came from

its greatly lower premiums in relation to those of private companies.
If a veteran wished to continue the insurance after the war he could
,

pay premiums to a government-operated insurance corporation.

Q

The House praised the bravery of the troops and made plans to
implement the rehabilitation provisions of the War Risk Insurance Act.
The House's concern for the care of the injured and sick did not,
however, extend to a bill which would establish a tuberculosis sani
tarium at Dawson Springs, Kentucky.

Sponsored by a Kentucky Democrat,

David H. Kincheloe, and supported by the Democratic leadership, the
bill was rejected by the Republicans because they wanted a compre
hensive bill on hospital care for veterans.

They also complained that

it was a scheme pushed by a representative for his constituents, which
would benefit them much more than the veterans.

Democrats countered

that the Dawson Springs proposal was sanctioned by the Public Health
•>

Service.

Further, they noted that the government would save money

because at least 1000 acres had been donated to the government by the

^William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years; The Reminiscences of William
G. McAdoo(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931), 428; U.S. Congress,
House, To Amend the Bureau of War Risk Insurance Act so as to Insure
the Men in the Army and Navy, Hearings on H. R. 5723, 65 Cong., 1
Sess., 32-33, 39, 41, 126; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt.
7, 6754-60; Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 142. The War Risk Bureau
generated considerable criticism during the third session because of
operational failures. See New York Times, January 11, 1919, 6; Cong.
Rec.,65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 1110; and Pt. 2, 1405.
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Dawson Springs community for the hospital.

The bill barely passed,

as the House divided along strict partisan lines, ninety-nine percent
of the Democrats opposing ninety-five percent of the Republicans.3’0
Because Republicans opposed a piecemeal approach to rehabilita
tion, the House recorded a similar partisan division over a bill
transferring a sanitorium from the Public Service to the War Depart
ment.11

The developing partisan split over rehabilitation policy,

however, ended when the Democrats formulated and brought to the House
floor comprehensive hospital legislation for discharged veterans.
But agreement on a general hospital plan did not preclude controversy
over other aspects of rehabilitation policy.

For example, some

representatives advocated buying hotels and using old army camps and
converting them into hospitals, while others suggested that the
government ought to build new facilities.

In the case of the actual

rehabilitation programs for the disabled, several representatives
pushed training not only for manual labor but also for professional
education, a plan that Congress did not accept until after World War
II.

The final legislation incorporated provisions for a rehabilitation

program that called for building new hospitals, utilizing camp hospi
tals, and providing vocational training.12

10Ibid., Pt. 1, 45-46, 48-49, 159. The bill did not pass the
Senate. See Ibid., Index 254, on H. R. 12917.
11Ibid., Pt. 2, 1786.
*2U. S. Congress, House, Public Buildings and Grounds, Hearings
on H.R. 13026, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 1918, 1821, 29-30; Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 8, 7585-86; Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2,
2059; and Pt. 3, 2151, 2155.
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Representatives also aided the return of the veteran to peace
time activities by granting him a discharge bonus.

The original plan

involved a bonus equal to one month's pay, which for enlisted men
would have been thirty dollars.

George Huddleston (D-Ala.) protested

the "gross inadequacy" of the sum, and its "unfairness" to the en
listed men in comparison to the officers, who received a much larger
monthly salary.

Insisting that officers rendered no more service to

the nation than enlisted men, he proposed instead that all receive
six consecutive monthly payments of thirty dollars each.

He defended

his plan by claiming that it would help prevent revolution and the
spread of Bolshevism, a possible danger that increasingly loomed in
the minds of some congressmen.

That Huddleston himself was actually

haunted by the spectre of revolution can be doubted, but the sudden
cancellation of war contracts and the return of four million veterans
to the employment market had caused some congressmen to predict wide
spread unemployment and unrest.

Adding to their unease was the

Communist Revolution in Russia which some conservatives saw as a
possible forerunner of revolution in the States.

Huddleston seized

upon these anxieties and used them to support his claims that the
bonus would stimulate the veteran's gratitude toward the government
and render the work of the agitator more difficult.

Apparently,

not many congressmen agreed with Huddleston's "safety-valve" thesis;
instead, they believed that the Treasury could not afford the drain
of money.

On a non-roll call vote his amendment, a precursor of the

famous bonus schemes of the 1920's, failed to be adopted.

Later in
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the session the House, in a more generous mood, did raise the bonus
to sixty dollars.13
Another plan for helping unemployed veterans involved the simple
expedient of giving qualified veterans preference over other equally
qualified applicants for government positions.

The preference plan

passed without opposition,14 but the session's other major employment
scheme failed to pass.

Proposed by Secretary of the Interior Frank

K. Lane and-recommended by President Wilson, the plan sought to
establish veterans in organized farming communities.

Under this

scheme the government would grant veterans acreage in swamp, cut-over,
or arid regions which the soldiers would improve through the assistance
of government loans and advice.

Cost for the program was tagged at

$100 million by Lane during hearings on the proposal.

He told the

Public Lands Committee that it not only would decrease postwar un
employment but it also could help solve the problems of vice, poverty,
crowded cities, and unused lands.

Warming to his subject, the

Secretary also argued that land grants for veterans would increase
the numbers of property owners and would proportionately decrease the
number of tenant fanners.

In an appeal to the Jeffersonian tradition,

Lane concluded that farm-owning veterans would be better citizens.

15

Several members of Congress offered similar proposals such as
the one advocated by Dick Morgan (D-Okla.).

His plan eliminated the

13Ibid., Pt. 1, 955-57; and Pt. 3, 3010.
14Ibid., 2326-28; and New York Times, January 30, 1919, 3.
-*•5Ibid., January 11, 1919, 4. U. S. Congress, House, Work and
Home for Returning Soldiers, Hearings on H. R. 15993, 65 Cong., 3 Sess.,
3-14; and ibid., Farm Land for Soldiers and Sailors, Statement of the
Honorable Franklin K. Lane, Hearings, on H.R. 15993, 65 Cong., 3 Sess,
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communal features of the Lane proposal and established a corporation
to loan money for individual plots of land.

All such proposals

aroused the hostility of congressmen who opposed large scale recon
version schemes.

To these representatives Lane's plan seemed a

"cooddling" operation wherein the government would destroy the ini
tiative of young Americans by giving them handouts and telling them
what to do.

To some other members the plan was easily susceptible

to speculative purposes, for they feared it would benefit special
interests groups much more than the intended beneficiaries.

The

critics' anxieties were based on the fact that Southern marsh land
owners, land-owning railroads, the owners of cut-over lands were
conducting a well-organized lobby campaign for the measure.

Perhaps

the critics' main objection stemmed from a skepticism as to the sound
ness of the venture.

Bertrand H. Snell (R-N.Y.) voiced tiiis viewpoint

during hearings on the bill when he told Lane that he doubted the
ability of veterans with no prior experience to make a success out of
marginal lands.

Although the plan appealed to nostalgic sentiments

for a passing agrarian America, the Public Lands Committee still
refused to report the Lane proposal to the House floor.

Congressmen,

wearied by the increase in executive power, remained unaffected by
the postwar enthusiasm for government programs.
16

16

Ibid., 7-8, 11, 14. For a discussion of the land proposal and
for the reasons of its failure see, Bill G. Reid "Proposals for Soldiers
Settlement During World War I," Mid-America, XLVI (July, 1964), 172186; and ibid., "Agrarian Opposition to Franklin K. Lane's Proposal For
Soldier Settlement, 1918-1921," Agrarian History, XLVI (April, 1967),
167-179. Reid in the latter article stresses the role of Midwestern
and Northeastern farm organization, fearful of over-production, in
bottling up the measure. He, however, overlooks the bill's relation to
reconstruction and congressmen's adversion to government schemes.
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Military Policy
Although neither comprehensive legislation nor consistent voting
blocs emerged on veteran issues, the House's obvious solicitude for
the "doughboy" pointed toward its policy during the 1920's.

Similarly,

the House's action on military matters indicated congressional policy
for the twenties.

Foremost in the minds of many congressmen was the

desire for rapid demobilization of the army.

In part, their attitude

reflected the longings of parents and relatives and soldiers themselves
to return to civilian pursuits.1"^ Getting the "boys" home also en
compassed a deep strain of hostility toward the War Department and
its military leadership.

Though battlefield victories had brought

some praise to the military organization, the attacks of the earlier
sessions on inefficiency, waste, corruption, and general incompetency
continued unabated, and new charges in fact were added to the old
ones.

The military justice system was censured by Royal Johnson

(R-N.D.), a member who had served in the army as a private.

In his

condemnation of military justice, Johnson even dared to attack General
1O

John Pershing for "partial, lawless, and harsh" military sentences.
The system of military promotion also received a severe indictment
from James A. Gallivan (D-Mass.). He charged that regular army
officers were systematically excluding National Guard officers from

^Washington Post, January 3, 1919, 6; January 23, 1919, 6;
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 962; Pt. 4, 3229,
3560-61.
*8New York Times, February 28, 1919, 5; January 3, 1919, 14;
March 4, 1919, 10; March 5, 1919, 11; Washington Post, January 16,
1919, 6; February 16, 1919, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57,
3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1927-28; Pt. 3, 2247, 2303; Pt. 4, 3478-79, 5032;
and Pt. 5, 4502.
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the higher ranks and advancements.

Gallivan and other like-minded

congressmen believed that regular army officers formed a military
clique which utilized its power to abuse the rights of both the
National Guardsman and the enlisted man.19
Two roll calls pointed out the strength and the sources of
criticism toward the military.

The first roll call came over a

faux pas by Major General B. B. Buck, commander of the Houston
military post.

His office had issued orders that officers were not

to attend social functions to which enlisted men were also invited.
If officers, the order added, did inadvertently attend such a social
function, they were to leave immediately.

When this order came to the

attention of Representative Huddleston, he soundly denounced it on
the House floor.

Such an order would undermine, he maintained, the

very democracy that Americans had just secured, since it would create
an un-American caste system.

90

Although General Buck quickly rescinded

the order, Huddleston and like-minded colleagues wanted to prevent
similar orders in the future.

They demanded inclusion of an amend

ment in the Military Appropriation Bill which would prohibit payment
of salaries to officers who issued discriminatory orders.
a roll call on the proposal, which won, 191 to 71.

They forced

21

The vote mobilized an interesting coalition in support of the
amendment (Table 5-1).

Although it won bi-partisan support,a greater

19New York Times, February 2, 1919, 17; February 4, 1919,
2;
February 14, 1919, 8; February 16, 1919, 10; Washington Post, February
2, i919, 6; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 1408, 1409,
1410; Pt. 3, 2304, 2543; and Pt. 4, 3198, 3294-95, 3299.
20Ibid., Pt. 3, 2248; and Pt. 4, 3300, 3301.
21Ibid., 3735-36.

TABLE 5-1
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON THE
HUDDLESTON AMENDMENT

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

MA

NE
D

R

D

ENC
D
R

R

Yea

2

3

8

8

15

29

Nay

1

8

6

16

3

11

SS

WNC
D
R

3

D

BS
R

17

63

3

9

7

—

PS

MS

D

R

18

5

1

R

D

3

3

1

1

TOTAL
D
R

R

D

3
—

3

115

71

6

19

51

Region and Party (Percent)

NE
D

R

D

R

ENC
R
D

Yea

67

27

57

33

83

73

Nay

33

73

43

67

17

27

VOTE

MA

WNC
D
R

100

D

65

90

35

10

*Cong. Rec ., 65 Cong. , Vol. 57, i Sess., Pt

BS

SS
R

100

D

R

95
5

100

TOTAL

PS

MS
D

R

D

R

D

R

75

75

100

33

86

58

25

25

—

67

14

42

4, 3736.
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percentage of Democrats than Republicans cast their ballots for
Huddleston's amendment.

Eighty-six percent of the Democrats voted in

favor of the amendment while only fifty-eight percent of the Republicans
supported it.

Northeastern representatives (NE, MA) went against the

majority position, particularly the Republicans of that region.
Except for Pacific state Republicans, members of both parties in the
other regions lined up solidly for the Huddleston amendment.
The second roll call resulted from Representative Albert
Johnson's (R-Wash.) efforts to launch an investigation into the army's
treatment of Colonel E. L. Rice.

According to Johnson, Rice, who

had saved the army money by uncovering and reporting the misuse of
army supplies, had not been given just reward by the army.

Instead,

the military high command, Johnson told the House, had "outrageously"
abused Rice by assigning him to an isolated post and by ignoring his
findings.

A resolution had earlier been introduced to investigate

Rice's treatment, but the Military Affairs Committee had bottled it
up.

Johnson, in order to force action, proposed that the resolution

be withdrawn from the Military Affairs Committee and requested that
the War Department furnish records of the Rice case directly to the
House.

This maneuver in the form of a resolution won, 167 to 152

(Table 5-2).

The voting breakdown differed radically from the Huddle

ston vote since the roll call divided along strictly partisan lines.
One hundred percent of the Republicans voted for the resolution while
ninety-eight percent of the Democrats opposed the motion.

22

An ex

planation for the variation in the party voting over the Huddleston

22Ibid., Pt. 5, 4348-50.

TABLE 5-2
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON THE JOHNSON
RESOLUTION: H. RES. 541

Region and Party' (Numbers)

VOTE

Yea

NE

MA

D

R

—

21

Nay

5

—

D

ENC
R

D

—

WNC
D
R

18

—

SS
D

D

2
76

8

MS

BS
R

23

47

44
16

R

—

R

D

10

—

R

—

TOTAL
D
R

R

3.

5

6

20

PS
D

8

3

160

150

1

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE

MA

ENC

D

R

D

R

D

R

Yea

—

100

—

100

—

100

Nay

100

—

100

100

WNC
D
R

D

--

--

100

100

SS

BS

PS

MS

D

R

D

R

100

—

100

—

100

75

100

100

—

100

—

25

—

100

D

TOTAL

R

R

D

R

2

100

98

*Cong. Rec ., 65 Cong. , vol. 57, :) Sess., Pt . 5, 4349.
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and Johnson motions is readily apparent:

the first vote involved a

rebuke to officers for their status pretensions; the second vote
involved not only an attack on officers but also a slap at the opera
tions of the War Department.
Together the two votes clearly delineate the House's attitude
toward the military and the War Department and the voting groups
behind the attitudes.

During the war the Republicans had repeatedly-

attacked the military management of the war by the Administration
while the Democrats attempted to counter the GOP's assaults.
stances were largely dictated by partisan considerations.

Both

However,

segments of the Republican party, mainly from the Northeast, believed
that military failures came from a shackling of the military by the
Administration.

These Republicans upheld the military tradition and

opposed Huddleston's reprimand.

A number of other Republicans rejec

ted their colleagues' reverence for the military.

Although these

Republicans usually supported attacks on the Administration's war
management, they also gladly joined the Democrats in checking the
pretensions of the officer class.

Democrats supported the Administra

tion not because of any endearment for military officers but because
their party held the reins of power.

Given a discreet opportunity to

attack, they unanimously voted against the military.
Republicans agreed with Dan V. Stephens'

They and many

(D-Nebr.) comments to a con

stituent that "the military the world over, not just the German
military, was a threat to freedom.

23

23Stephens to Frank Dolezal, May 5, 1917, Box 27, Folder 189,
StephensPapers.
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In this frame of mind the House started the task of dismantling
the military machine.

Before the Armistice the House had been appro

priating vast sums for the army and navy.

The military's insatiable

demands were driving expected expenditures for fiscal 1919 upward to
twenty-four billion d o l l a r s h o w e v e r , the cessation of hostilities
put a brake on the upward thrust of appropriations.

Representative

Sherley, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, demanded that all
departments cut their future appropriation requests to the bone.

He

also wanted departments to stop the spending of money already appro
priated but not yet committed.

At the same time, Representative

Simon Fess for the Republicans advocated that the House should adopt
a resolution to block the ejq>enditure of the unspent funds.
Immediate savings were instituted by departments, but, according
to military witnesses appearing before Sherley's Appropriation Com
mittee, several factors slowed down a complete cut back to peacetime
levels.

The most important one was that the army and navy could not

be demobilized all at one time.

These officials told Sherley's Com

mittee that it would take months to transport the two million soldiers
in France back to the United States.

Committee members interjected

during the witnesses' testimony that they wanted prompt demobilization,
but added that they realized it would take time.

Another factor,

according to Secretary of War Baker, involved the technical qualities
of a military contract with a company.

If the production of the goods

^ New York Times, September 17, 1918, 17; September 20, 1918,
1; October 5, 1918, 17; October 17, 1918, 1; and December 3, 1918,
15.
^ Washington Post, November 24, 1918, 2; and November 27, 1918,

2.
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was nearly complete, the military favored honoring the contract
rather than cancelling it.

Sherley agreed with Baker's principle,

but the Committee often thought the military should have cut contracts
on specific items sooner.

Finally, Baker suggested that a judicious

cutback in government expenditures would help prevent economic depres
sion and high unemployment.

The country, he pointed out, was passing
**

through a transition period and the government had a responsibility
not to unsettle conditions any more than absolutely necessary.

Sherley

again concurred with Baker's idea but added that a quick return to
peacetime conditions would not engender massive disruption in the
economy.

Expressing an attitude frequently repeated in the months

ahead, Sherley stated that business could take care of itself during
the transition period.
The push for economy

27

and the desire for normal peacetime

conditions shaped House debates on the naval appropriation bill.
During the war Secretary of the Navy Daniels had proposed a naval
building program costing $600 million.

It duplicated the 1916 program

that built ten superdreadnoughts and six cruisers.

Similar to the

earlier program it was to be completed in a three-year period.

After

the signing of the Armistice Daniels continued to advocate the three20
U. S. Congress, House, Hearings Before Subcommittee of House
Committee on Appropriations on H. R. 15140 and H.R. 16187, 65 Cong.,
3 Sess., 504-05; ibid., Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill, 1917,
Hearings on H.R. 16187, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 3-7, 27-28, 48, 355-56,
589-90, 844-47, 1067, 1122-25.
27See Washington Post, February 16, 1919, 1; and Cong. Rec..
65 Cong., Vol. 57, Sess. 3, Pt. 1, 3198-3204, for discussions on
military and House cut backs in expenditures. The military appro
priation bill for fiscal 1920 was lowered from the astronomical
sum of $19 billion to $1.1 by combined action of the military and the
House.
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year program and even requested that appropriations remain at the
wartime level of over $2.4 billion.

28

The House Naval Affairs Committee reacted in disbelief that naval
plans were still the same in spite of peace.

Daniels argued before the

Committee that the United States required a navy second to none.

A

navy of that size, he elaborated, would enforce, with England, the
proposed League of Nations treaty provisions on the freedom of the
seas.

The Committee, however, rejected the Navy's plans for expending

$2.6 billion, and even reduced a revised Navy Department budget of
$903 million to $746 million.

Opposition to the battleship phase of

the naval program came mainly from Republicans Thomas S. Butler and
William Browning.

Nonetheless, when Wilson sent an urgent and secret

appeal from Paris requesting passage of the three-year program because
it was necessary to strengthen his hand in disarmament negotiations,
even these Republicans swung into agreement.

Consequently, the Com

mittee reported the bill to the House floor with greatly diminished
funding but retaining the three-year program.

29

Proponents of a small navy, who noted the incongruity between
Wilson working for disarmament in Paris while simultaneously demanding
more warships at home, sharply criticized the bill.

These members,

particularly the Republican element, were angered by Wilson's inter
vention into the debate.

Adding to their sense of outrage was the

28New York Times, October 23, 1918, 1; November 20, 1918, 4;
and November 21, 1918, 13.
29Ibid., December 13, 1918, 1; December 31, 1919, 1; January
26, 1919, 11; January 28, 1919, 1; January 31, 1919, 1; February 1,
1919, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 2674,
2680, 2682, 2685.
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fact that Wilson sent his appeal as a secret cablegram only to the
Naval Committee, and members of that Committee refused to divulge the
message's details.

From an anti-militarist viewpoint, Congressman

Huddleston could not understand the reasoning behind the program,
since America had entered the World War to end armament races.

While

he also called it imperialistic and militaristic, James A. Frear
(R-Wis.) described the bill as a drain on the Treasury.

The House

would not only have to appropriate $740 million for fiscal 1920, but
the program would, he stated, commit the government to spending $415
million more in the next two years.

Martin Dies, Sr., (D-Tx.) ended

the small navy argument with the contention that a large navy violated
the American tradition of isolationism.

30

Countering the arguments of the opponents, navy supporters,
voiced a desire to back up President Wilson at the Paris Conference.
Henry I. Emerson (R-Ohio) declared that he would vote for the naval
program because the President asked for it at a critical juncture in
the peace negotiations.

He noted that he did not want the responsi

bility for defeating it when Wilson agreed to accept all the blame for
any negative results.

Other supporters of the President's position

added that the bill carried a provision for cancellation of the pro
gram if the peace conference reached a disarmament pact.

But some

Naval proponents advocated a large navy on its own merits, without
reference to the President.

Patrick H. Kelley (R-Mich.) drew a

completely different lesson from the war than the anti-militarists,
namely that America had to arm herself fully for her own protection.

30Ibid., 2682-85, 2691, 2771, 2908-09, 2844, 3149, 3151, 3159;
and New York Times, February 7, 1919, 14; February 11, 1919, 1.
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Kelley's nationalism received support from Percy E. Quin (D-Miss.),
who argued that the United States should never again be unprepared.
He also added that a navy second to none was necessary to prevent
Great Britain or any other nation from "bullying" the United States
in the future.
The varying interpretations of the work of the peace conference
and America's naval role in the postwar world resulted in three roll
calls, all of which scale together (Table 5-3).

At the low scale

position eight percent of the Democrats and thirty-four percent of
the Republicans opposed all motions that favored the three-year
naval program.

Regionally, the only noticeable pattern of opposition

that developed was among Republicans from the interior states who
showed more signs of dissatisfaction with large naval expenditures
than their colleagues from coastal regions.

In the middle scale posi

tion representatives demonstrated only lukewarm support by voting for
passage of the bill after opposing the critical ballot on the three
"year building program.

Again the Republicans predominated as the

moderate supporters of the bill.. Regional factors had no discernable
influence on the voting pattern of this level.

At the highest level

of support for the naval bill, eighty-four percent of the Democrats
joined together and acceded to Wilson's appeal.

They were supported

by twenty-seven percent of the Republicans, who since they voted
against their party's majority, can be labeled big naval supporters.
No evident regional voting blocs existed at this level.

The Navy's

^ C o n g . Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 3080, 2686,
2682, 2690, 2782, 2718, 3143, 3152; and Washington Post, February 26,
1919, 2.

TABLE 5-3 :A
i

SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON THE NAVAL
BILL: H. R. 15539

Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE
POSITION

Low
Medium
High

NE

MA

D

R

D

R

ENC
D
R

—

3
14
7

1
1
17

5
23
10

2
1
17

5

18
22
10

WNC
D
R

1
8

11
13
3

SS
D

BS
R

7
6
72

1
1
1

D

MS
D

R

3
26

4
5
3

PS
R

1
—

D

4
2

2
2
6

2
2

5

TOTAL
D
R

R

TOTAL

14
14
152

45
82
40

180

167

Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE
POSITION

D

Low
Medium
High

—
100

R

D

MA
R

D

R

WNC
D
R

13
58
29

5
5
90

13
61
26

10
5
85

36
44
20

11
90

NE

ENC

41
48
11

SS

MS

BS

PS

D

R

D

R

D

R

8
7
85

33
33
33

10
90

33
42
25

17
—
83

67
33

TOTAL
R

D

R

D

50
50

20
20
60

8
8
84

34
49
27

The order of the roll calls is 254, 252, 253
Percent at each point on the scale 17, 24, 4, 55
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .995
362

363

TABLE 5-3:B
NAVAL BILL

Scale
Position

Variance

0

254

To pass bill H.R. 15539. 280-50; + = nay.
Cong. Rec. , 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 3,
3172.

1

252

To adopt bill H.R. 566, being a privileged reso
lution from Comm, on Rules for the consideration
of H.R. 15539 and providing that after adoption
of the rule it is in order to consider new legis
lation in the bill notwithstanding the general
rules of the House. 205-148; + = nay. Ibid.,
3152.

3

253

Motion

To amend bill H.R. 15339, by providing that
"enrolled men so transferred shall be entitled
to receive the same pay, rights, privileges and
allowances in all respects as now provided by
law for men regularly discharged and reenlisted
immediately upon expiration of their full four
years enlistment in the regular navy or marine
corps." 194-142; + = nay. Ibid., 3171.
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support showed definite weaknesses because most Republicans opposed
the naval program and significant elements of the Democrats undoubtedly
only voted in favor of the three-year program because of the appeal
from Wilson.32
While the Wilson Administration secured passage of the naval
bill/ it failed to win House approval of the Army Appropriation Bill
for fiscal 1920.

In his explanation of the bill to the House, Chair

man Dent of the Military Affairs Committee noted that Secretary of
War Baker had told his committee of the military's need for a peace
time army of 537,000 men, raised by voluntary enlistment.

Baker had,

Dent related, justified this force size, which greatly exceeded the
prewar army of 175,000, as necessary to carry out the peace treaty as
well as regular military duties.

Although Baker had described the

537,000-man a n y as a transitional force, most Military Affairs
committeemen feared that once sanctioned by law it would remain at
that level.

They inserted, Dent explained further, a clause which

stated their intention to restrict the 537,000-man force to one year,
after which the army would return to the prewar level. J
Dent had no fondness for the bill, and it soon became evident
that many congressmen wanted to establish immediately the size of the
peacetime army at a lower number.

The military's proposal, Democratic

32See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 29, for a discussion on
reduction of the Navy by future Congresses.
U. S. Congress, House, Army Reorganization, Hearings on H. R.
14560, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 13, 18-21, 64; Washington Post, February 16,
1919, 1; New York Times, January 17, 1919, 7; January 28, 1919, 1;
February 11, 1919, 2; February 13, 1919, 8; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3198-3205. For a discussion of Congress and
postwar military policy see Noggle, Into the Twenties, 27.
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critics argued, cost too much money.

Moreover, they disliked the whole

idea of a large peacetime army because they saw it as a threat to
liberty, and instead favored a small regular army which would be
supported by a strong National Guard.

A general assault on the bill

developed, and in a startling roll call vote ninety-six percent of the
Democrats voted against the War Department, thereby defeating the
proposal for a 537,000 man army (Table 5-4).
tuted the prewar limit of 175,000 men.

In its place they substi

Interestingly enough, ninety-

two percent of the Republicans found themselves in the peculiar
position of supporting the War Department.

Republicans voted this way

not out of a desire to support the Administration or necessarily
because they believed in a larger army.

Rather their stance, as

explained by Minority Leader Mann to the House, was dictated by a
desire to bring the troops home from Europe in the fastest way
possible.

Mann did acknowledge that some soldiers would necessarily

remain in Europe for some time after the war, but volunteers should
be substituted for draftees.

This changeover was now impossible

because the Democratic action, mann stated, cut the army's size so
severely that there were not enough troops for European and regular
army activities at the same time.

Since the reduction did not affect

the wartime army, the Administration, which Republicans distrusted,
would use this as an excuse not to bring the "boys" home.

Mann's

eaqplanation clarified the fact that the Republican majority had no
desire to maintain a 537,000-man army.34

Thus when the Democrats, who

34Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3287, 3296,
3711-14, 3716-18, 3720, 3724; Washington Post, February 19, 1919, 1;
February 24, 1919, 6; New York Times, February 19, 1919, 11; and
February 26, 1919, 2.

TABLE 5-4
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON THE ARMY
BILL: H. RES. 593

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

Yea

2

Nay

2

D

2

16
20

ENC
D
R

R

—

21

40

WNC
D
R

4

BS
R

D

3

79

—

22

23

3

6

48

SS
D

MS
R

D

3

3

PS
D

R

7

4

5

5

TOTAL
D
R

R

—

1

157

13

9

5

153

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE
D

Yea

50

Nay

50

MA
R

D

100
100

—

ENC
R

D

5
95

100

WNC
D
R

R

8
92

100

SS
D

BS
R

12

96

88

4

D

100
100

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3718.

PS

MS
R

D

38

100

62

—

R

100

D

TOTAL
R

R

D

100

10

97

8

—

90

3

92
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did not share the GOP's distrust of the Administration, voted for the
reduction, they were registering the long-range goal of the over
whelming majority of the House.

A direct appeal from President Wilson

on the naval bill did secure the assent of the House to a position
many did not in fact favor.

When no such appeal was made on behalf

of the Army bill, even the Democrats could revolt against the War
Department in their eagerness to check the power of the military.

35

International Affairs
President Wilson, who had allowed the reduction of the military
phase of the Great Crusade, actively attempted to guide the House from
isolationism to internationalism.

He first pointed out that the House

should respond to the plight of the European masses.

The aftermath

of the war in Europe left millions destitute, and the likelihood of
mass starvation, particularly in Russia, confronted the war-tom
European countries.

Revolution and civil war had also broken out in

Russia and appeared imminent in many other European countries as well.
With Europe on the verge of collapse and anarchy, Wilson cabled from
Paris that Congress should enact a bill appropriating $100 million
toward the purchase of grain for European food relief.

35The Army Appropriation
failed to make its way through
blocked its passage. The 66th
the subject. See ibid., March
Twenties,27-29.

36

Bill was among the many bills that
the Congress. A Senate filibuster
Congress thus would have to deal with
9, 1919, 1; and Noggle, Into the

36New York Times, January 5, 1919, 1; and January 14, 1919, 1.
See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 150-51; and Gary Dean Best, "Food
Relief as Price Support: Hoover and American Pork, January-March
1919," Agricultural History, XLW (October, 1970), for a discussion
of Administration motives behind food relief.
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Representative Sherley immediately introduced a bill and brought
it to the House floor on January 7, 1919.

Republicans blocked action

on it that same day, but Sherley soon secured a special rule from the
House Rules Committee which returned it to the floor.

He and fellow

supporters presented the bill as a humanitarian response to the plight
of the European pe'ople.

Christian charity, James C. Cantrill (D-Ky.)

told the House, demanded that the United States not be stingy with its
money in this crisis.
On a more pragmatic level, Sherley pointed out the benefit that
the bill would have on the price of wheat and other grains.

With

prices on the verge of collapse, the bill would, he argued, bolster
the grain market.

Some Democrats also perceived the measure as

upholding the President while he negotiated the peace treaty.

They

claimed that opposition to the measure wanted to discredit Wilson and
his proposed League of Nations.

Several Republican supporters of the

measure responded to the Democrats' implication of partisan rivalry.
These Republicans maintained that their party never wished to em
barrass the President; however, they did not like his high-handed
methods of ’cabling for action without supplying specific information.
Other Republican supporters, among them Minority Leader Mann and exSpeaker Cannon, who had often refused to join in the partisan thrusts
of some party members, argued that America had a moral responsibility
to feed the Europeans.

People were starving, said Mann, and action was

37New York Times, January 8, 1919, 3; January 10, 1919, 1; and
January 12, 1919, 7.

369

needed to relieve suffering.

Cannon also emphasized that "hungry

stomachs" caused riots and fostered the spread of bolshevism.38
J. Hampton Moore (R-Pa.) rejected such arguments, saying it was
time "to put a stop to this universal altruism."

Other opponents, who

were almost exclusively Republicans, insisted that the bill opened
up an entirely new area of public ejqpenditures.

The United States,

Bertrand H. Snell (R-N.Y.) argued, had already contracted a huge
public debt.

The taxpayers, he added, could not stand the extra

burden of feeding Europe.

But the Republican critics' main objection

stemmed from a basic dislike of Wilson find of his League of Nations.
James N. Good (R-Iowa) bitterly attacked Wilson for "usurpation" of
powers and claimed that since the bill contained no restriction on
how the President would spend the money, Congress was unfortunately
permitting the continued expansion of his authority.

The incoming

Speaker of the House, Frederick Gillett (R-Mass.), stressed that the
House needed to start acting the part of a legislative body and not
that of a rubber stamp.

Congress had no obligation, the Republican

leader implied, to enhance Wilson's standing at the Peace Conference.

39

Republican opponents forced two roll calls on the relief
measure.

In an effort to restrict the bill, they moved to give the

American Red Cross rather than the President the control of the relief
fund.

They failed to carry their motion by the margin of 202 to 117.

Seventy-six percent of the Republicans voted for Red Cross super
vision while the Democrats voted unanimously against it (Table 5-5).

38Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1339-43, 1345,
1349, 1358-59, and 1369.
39Ibid., 1340-43, 1351-52, 1359.

TABLE 5-5
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON EUROPEAN
RELIEF: H. R. 13708

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

Yea

NE

MA

ENC

D

R

D

R

—

18

—

20

Nay

6

3

17

8

WNC
R

D

34
18

16

SS
R

D

BS
R

D

20

1

1

4

82

1

9

MS
R

D

7
23

PS
R

D

—

2
5

—

TOTAL
R

D

11

3

5

R

D

1

113

—

165

35

D

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE

MA

ENC

D

R

D

R

Yea

—

86

—

71

Nay

100

14

100

29

D

WNC
R

D

68
100

32

100

SS
R

D

BS

MS

PS

TOTAL

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

100

—

40

—

100

100

60

100

83

1

50

—

17

99

50

100

R

1

76

99

24

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1373A.
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The twenty-four percent of the Republicans who aligned themselves
with the Democrats did not form any noticeable regional bloc.

Re

publican opponents also forced a roll call over passage of the bill,
which they lost, 242 to seventy-three.40

A majority of Republicans

(fifty-eight percent) voted with ninety-four percent of the Democrats,
which indicated that many Republicans did not oppose the principle
of the bill (Table 5-6).

The Republican opposition tended to represent

the West North Central and Border states in greater numbers than
other regions.

Because Democrats solidly supported their President

and significant numbers of Republicans recognized humanitarian and
political benefits in the bill, internationalism won over isolationalism.
President Wilson, who was much less able to direct the House on
other phases of his European policy, provoked angry and bewildered
remarks from several congressmen by his dispatch of American troops
to Russia in the summer of 1918.

Ernest Lundeen (R-Minn.) charged the

Wilson with hypocrisy because he violated his own doctrine of selfdetermination by attempting to dictate the type of government for
Russia.

According to William E. Mason (R-Ill.), the Bolshevik menace

was no worse than the Czar.

Even if the Bolsheviks were establishing

an undemocratic regime, the United States held no mandate to overthrow
them.

He concluded that Congress must reclaim its rightful powers,

and he introduced a resolution that called for the withdrawal of the
troops.

Although the resolution never reached the House floor,

40Ibid., 1373A and 1373B.

TABLE 5-6
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON EUROPEAN
RELIEF: H. R. 13708

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

Yea
Nay

6
—

MA

ENC

D

R

D

R

16

16

19

17

33

—

13

2

18

5

SS

WNC

R

R

D

9
—

D

BS
R

D

MS
R

D

8

73

1

23

2

14

6

1

1

5

PS
R

5

4

—

1

TOTAL
R

D

4
—

R

D

5

153

88

6

9

63

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

D

ENC

WNC

R

D

R

Yea

100

76

100

59

90

65

Nay

—

24

—

41

10

35

D

100

SS

BS

PS

MS

R

D

R

D

R

36

92

50

96

28

100

80

100

64

8

50

4

72

—

20

—

*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1373B.

D

R

D

R

TOTAL
D
R

46 •

94

58

6

42

54
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no members defended the Wilson Administration's Russian policy.41
In apparent contradiction to House sentiment that opposed in
tervention in Russian internal affairs, Representative Thomas Galla
gher (D-Ill.) won approval of a resolution that instructed the American
peace commissioners to work for Irish freedom.

Supporters of the

Gallagher resolution, however, saw no contradiction, claiming instead
that the Irish fitted perfectly the principle of self-determination.
They were, James A. Gallivan (D-Mass.) told the Foreign Affairs
Committee, an oppressed minority whose condition was very,similar
to that of the Czech people.

Gallagher presented the Committee a

massive petition of 600,000 names in support of Irish freedom, which
clearly demonstrated the political implications of the resolution.
Opponents, who most likely had only a small Irish-American electorate
to confront, thought the resolution meddled in the affairs of an
ally.

Though critics could not defeat the resolution, they did

secure a revision of it by the Committee.

As reported by the Com

mittee and eventually passed by the House, the resolution simply
requested that the peace conference "favorably consider the claims
of Ireland."

It passed without a roll call, 216 to forty-five.42

41Ibid., Pt. 4, 4066; Pt. 3, 2639, 2543. Criticism of Wilson's
Russian policy was bi-partisan since leading Democrats, among them
Edward Pou (N.C.), Chairman of the Rules Committee, called for the
troops' removal. See ibid., Pt. 2, 1876-80; Pt. 3, 2543, 2630, 3242.
See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 142-48, for a general discussion on
postwar American-Russian relations.
42U. S. Congress, House, The Irish Question, Hearings, on H. J.
Res. 357, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 3-4, 5, 9, 20, 31; Washington Post,
February 7, 1919, 6; and March 2, 1919, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 5, 5026, 5042.
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Although the House never took a roll call on the League of
Nations, Wilson's chief design for international relations was the
subject of several speeches.

Maintaining that a temporary alliance

of the victors would enforce peace better than the League, Richard
W. Parker (R-N.J.) compared it to the Articles of Confederation
government.

Each, he asserted, lacked any real mechanism to enforce

its decisions.

The League, consequently, would prove powerless to

make Germany pay an indemnity or prevent German and Russian Bolshevik
designs for conquest and revolution.

America, he concluded, had a

role in world affairs that a temporary alliance system, such as the
one suggested by ex-President William Howard Taft, could fulfill
better than the League.

Similarly, Representative Mason believed

that while the United States should become more involved in world
affairs, he rejected the League as the proper forum for American
participation.

Instead, he favored American membership in a world

court which would render impartial decisions for humanity.43
Another group of critics found the League objectionable because
of a belief that it restricted American sovereignty.

To these nationa

list congressmen the League threatened American freedom of action
because a majority of nations could out-vote the United States and
make binding decisions.

Simon Fess, Republican Congressional Campaign

Chairman, claimed that as a consequence the United States might lose
control over her own immigration policy and merchant marine.

Other

Republicans, among them J. Hampton Moore, singled out the League's
possible danger to the protective tariff, believing that the Democrats

43Ibid., Pt. 1, 209; and Pt. 2, 1416.
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were using the League to advance free trade.

But to many critics,

such as Charles H. Sloan (R-Neb.), the League simply violated America's
customary foreign policy.

As in many such traditionalist speeches,

Sloan quoted Washington's Farewell Address on the liabilities of
"entangling alliances."

In general the League's antagonists, because

of their nationalist, protectionist, or traditionalist sentiment,
demanded that the peace treaty in no fashion impair American
sovereignty.44
To the supporters of the League, the opponents' viewpoint
ignored the course of recent history.

Hatton W. Simmers (D-Tex.)

portrayed the war as drawing America out of its past isolationism
into world affairs.

He further emphasized that President Wilson had

not, as some claimed, manipulated the country into joining the maelstrom
of international politics; instead, the tide of human history had forced
a new direction.

Accordingly, Earl H. Beshlin (D-Pa.) maintained that

America should seize the league as a tool to bring together the world's
nations.

The League would, he claimed, extend to the world the Monroe

Doctrine's principle of the self-determination of nations.

The League

also offered the opportunity, Cordell Hull (D-Tenn.) said, of breaking
down trade barriers and the economic rivalries behind them.

Since

such a development, Hull conjectured, would bring world prosperity,
it thereby would help to promote world peace.

Other League proponents

spoke in similarly idealistic terms, advocating proposals such as a
people's referendum on all declarations of war.4^
44ibid., Pt. 4, 3801, 2845; Pt. 1, 221, 454; Pt. 4, 4942, 4948;
Nethers, "Simeon Fess: Educator and Politician," 232-33; and New
York Times, February 20, 1919, 3.
4^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1824-25, 1839-
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Although the exact position of House members found no formal
expression, it was clear that many Republicans and some Democrats
opposed the League of Nations.

The isolationist attitudes of most

congressmen did not easily facilitate agreement with the promptings
of Wilsonian liberalism.

Civil Liberties, Allens, and Un-Americanism
That the House's attitude was restrictive was starkly revealed
on questions concerning civil liberties, aliens, and patriotism.

Up

td the end of the session, when pressing business prevented off-thesubject remarks, representatives frequently referred to the Bolshevist
and the radical menace.

In the mind of at least some members,

radicalism confronted the nation with a real crisis and imperiled its
security.

William R. Green (R-Iowa), however, criticized his fellow

members for distorting the danger.

He implied that the word "Bolshe

vism" had become devoid of meaning and little more than a scare word.
Congressman Meyer London, the Socialist member, also dismissed the
Bolshevik danger.

The real threat, he argued, lay in the attempt

to repress supposed radicals by unconstitutional means.

But more

members apparently agreed with Percy E. Quin (D-Miss.) that radicals
existed in abundance and were seeking to stir up discontent.

He

advocated their suppression even now that the war had ended. °

40; Pt. 4, 3955-60, 3972; and Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 100-01.
Other actions of the House showed its general isolationist and hostile
attitude toward Europe. For example, even though Secretaries McAdoo
and Glass requested half a billion more for loans to the allies,
the Ways and Means Committee refused to grant it. See Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 5, 4273.
4^New York Times, January 31, 1919, 1; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3202-7, 3230-03; Pt. 2, 1667-68; Pt. 1, 761,
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Two bills that went far toward meeting Quin's desires reached
the House floor via the Unanimous Consent Calendar.

The first bill,

recommended by the State Department, amended the Espionage Act.

It

provided for the punishment of persons who "knowingly lied" to the
State Department.

J. Hampton Moore, who was not a noted defender of

civil liberties but who was always ready to stop the flow of powers
to the Executive, argued that the country already had too many restric
tive laws.

The bill's broad definition of falsehood, he added, could

readily be utilized by the government to jail those committing innocent
mistakes of memory.

The second bill, much wider in scope than the

first, declared unlawful those associations which proposed by the means
of physical force, violence, or injury to bring about any governmental,
social, or economic change in the United States.

Supporters pointed

out that several states had recently found it necessary to adopt
similar antisyndicalist laws.

Since both bills required unanimous

consent to pass, they were easily blocked by members who had retained
a sense of respect for minority views.47
Aliens were also the targets of several bills.

One bill,

introduced by the Justice Department, provided for the deportation of
aliens, usually enemy aliens, who had been detained during the war
for their supposed dangerous attitudes toward the United States.
Defenders of the bill claimed that the aliens had no political rights
under the Constitution; however, Harold Knutson (R-Minn.), during

961; Pt. 3, 2718, 2756; and Joseph W. Fordney to William B. Mershon,
April 23, 1918, Box 12, William B. Mershon, Michigan Historical Collec
tion. These references are not intended to be exhaustive. Other topics
will also note the influence of the Red Scare in congressional action.
47Ibid., Pt. 2, 1125.
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hearings before the Immigration Committee, showed a marked hostility
toward the internment policy, closely questioning the Justice Depart
ment's witness regarding the numbers and legal rights of interned
aliens.

John E. Raker (D-Cal.), who did not oppose the bill, wanted

the writ of habeas corpus included in it.4®

A second bill, also heard

by the Immigration Committee, pointed toward the restrictive immigra
tion laws of the 1920's.

It provided that immigrants, except in a

few cases, could not enter the country for four years.

Part of the

reasoning behind the bill flowed from the common fear that unemploy
ment was engulfing the country.

However, Adolph Sabath (D-Ill.)

described the belief in an oversupply of labor as false propaganda
disseminated by corporations in order to justify a cut in wages.

On

the other hand, the American Federation of Labor lobbyist Frank
Morrison believed that the boom conditions and the demobilization of
the troops foretold the arrival of depression and consequently an
over-supply of labor.

Several committee members agreed with Morrison,

but Benjamin F. Welty (D-Ohio) disrupted this seemingly mundane
discussion and insisted that the real reason for the bill did not
arise out of the labor problem.

Rather, he stated, "we have taken up

this bill because we are afraid of the spirit of bolshevism.. .We do
not want to be the recipient of that element here."

Later in the

hearings Albert Johnson's (R-Wash.) outburst against immigrants who
would "swamp" America with inferior blood indicated another phobia
of the Committee.

In fact, committee members were beset by a number

4®U. S. Congress, House, Deportation of Interned Aliens,
Hearings on H. R. 13965, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 3-17; and New York Times,
January 24, 1919, 8.
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of nightmares.

They envisioned an American society not only overrun

by radicals and degenerated by racial intermarriage, but also crowded
into polyglot cities and depressed economically by an oversupply
of labor.49
Political developments contributed to the House's repressive
attitude toward civil liberties.

During the 1918 congressional cam

paign the National Security League, a militant pro-preparedness and pro
war organization, had drawn up a list of eight "acid test" roll calls,
including several of the major war issues.

The League then compared

the voting records of congressmen with what they defined as the proper
position on the roll calls.

Those members failing to meet the League's

standards were labeled as pacifist or pro-German.

Since only forty-

seven congressmen had spotless records and many of both parties had
poor records, the House did not appreciate the League's impugning of
its loyalty.

Congressmen claimed that only two of the acid test

votes were straight issue votes, while the other six were complicated
parliamentary maneuvers that did not accurately reflect a congressmen's
final position on a subject.

Nonetheless, the League's computations,

which were published across the nation, apparently influenced voters,
thereby causing the defeat of several incumbents to close elections.
The victims of the "acid test" returned to Washington in a sour
mood and poured out their woe to a sympathetic House,
49

On October

Ibid., January 10, 1919, 4; January 31, 1919, 4. U. S.
Congress, House, Prohibition of Immigrant, Hearings on H. R. 13325,
H. R. 13669, H.R. 13904, and H.R. 14577, Cong. 65, 3 Sess., 5-6,
13, 23, 31-32, 46, 130, 139, 148, 168, 142, 216, 175, 189, 218,
269, 278, 287, and 296.
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4, 1918, the House ordered an investigation of the League but post
poned the start of the inquiry until the third session.50
Conducted by a special House Committee, the investigation
offered a possible opportunity to explore the true meaning of loyalty
and patriotism.

It, however, soon diverted into attacks on Wall

Street, quests for the economic interests of League contributors,
and occasions for the venting of anger toward the League.

Pat Harri

son (D-Miss.) questioned the League's President, Charles E. Lydecker,
if he represented as a lawyer any steel companies or munition makers.
The committee also questioned the proper interpretation of the eight
acid test votes.

Their questioning brought out the League spokesmen's

unfamiliarity and confusion over the parliamentary situation behind
the individual roll calls.

Consequently, C. Frank Reavis (R-Nebr.)

reprimanded League witnesses and told them that the manner in which
an issue came to a vote made a tremendous difference in interpretation.
The acid test issues, Edward W. Sanders (D-Va.) added, simply did not
reflect preparedness and war issues.

Frequently, the committee

turned the questioning to the League's financial backers.

They

found that the Carnegie Corporation, J. P. Morgan and Company,
munition makers, and large corporations had contributed to the League.
Because the League had these financial supporters, it was not sur
prising that S. Stanwood Menken, the League’s ex-President, deplored
criticism of large corporations.

With these discoveries the committee's

50Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 11, 10219-20,
10530-36, 10663-68, 10683-84; Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 97-100. See
Robert D. Ward, "The Origin and Activities of the National Security
League, 1914-1919," Mississippi Valley Review, XLVII (June, 1960),
51-65, and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 165-168,
for general discussions on the League's activities.
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questioning assumed a populist tone, which implied that the rich had
financed the League and had used the people's patriotism to promote
selfish interests.^
The committee's real concern, however, was neither the list of
acid test votes nor the names of financial contributors but the
charge of un-Americanism that the League leveled against Congressmen.
Committeemen heard League spokesmen charge that a congressman was
pacifistic, disloyal, and provincial if he failed to vote as the
League dictated.

A few congressmen responded to such charges by

trying to determine the League's definition of loyalty.

Sanders

asked a League witness whether a congressman who studied an issue,
consulted his conscience, and still voted wrong on an acid test
measure would be disloyal?

For most congressmen loyalty as a matter

of conscience was not as important as was the charge of disloyalty,
which they viewed as a personal insult and a threat to their political
careers.

Joseph Walsh (R-Mass.) expressed outrage at the League's

defamation of character when he argued that their criticisms of
congressmen actually helped to undermine the government.

In particu

lar, Reavis pointed to a League publication which attacked the House
for "pork barrel" politics as the type of material that the Bolsheviks
would print.

When several congressmen, who were defeated in the 1918

election partly because of League propaganda, testified, committee
members commiserated with their distressed colleagues and joined
them in condemning the pernicious political influence of the League.
Cl

U.S. Congress, House, National Security League, Hearings
on H. Res. 469, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 25, 30, 35, 39, 41, 45, 49, 84,
55, 81, 138, 258, 317, 927, 465, 721, 1085, and 2043.
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Their attitude cannot be construed as unusual because Edward W. Pou
(D-N.C.) had set a precedent for the hearings when he introduced the
resolution for the investigation.

To the applause of the House

he had said at that time, "I spit in the face of any man who impugns
my patriotism," and had added that "our patriotism has been attacked."
Although the hearings discredited a superpatriotic organization,
congressmen nonetheless failed to use the investigation as a means to
educate the public to a better understanding of what constituted
loyalty.

52

In fact, the members' anxious defense of their loyalty,

along with other attitudes and actions, created an atmosphere in
which others would also have to defend their Americanism.

53

Economic and Social Reconstruction
The House, besides proving itself unequal to the task of fostering
a healthy postwar political climate, showed itself unable to enact a
balanced economic and social reconstruction program.

That economic

conditions were unsettled and uncertain congressmen did not doubt.

They

knew that during the war the government had extended wide controls over
the economy, and businessmen now wondered if the regulation would con
tinue in peace.

The House had to determine which parts of the wartime

52Ibid., 82, 885, 1189-94, 378, 435, 775, 1753-54, 991, 1763,
1766, 1847; and Cong. Rec.,^65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 25960; and Pt. 5, 5035.
53
Historians have studied the origins of the Red Scare from
several different perspectives and, consequently, have suggested a
number of reasons for it. The role of Congress has been overlooked
by these studies, a failure which misses the importance of leadership
in creating mass psychological reactions. Congress' inability to forge
a constructive reconstruction policy and its negative attitudes toward
civil liberties had to operate as one of the early catalyst to the
panic. For a review of literature on the Red Scare see Noggle,
Into the Twenties, 160-64, 218-19.
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programs should be dismantled, what modified, and what left intact.
Above all, the House had to decide what was the proper role of the
government in the economic system.

In whatever direction the House

chose to go on these issues, they also had to consider the problem of
wartime inflation and the likelihood of postwar deflation, depression,
and unemployment.

However, the House's ability to respond adequately

to these difficulties was hindered from the first by lack of planning
and leadership and by the shortness of the legislative session.

54

Economically, the House started to "mop-up" war operations by
approving a bill on war contracts.

Shortly after the end of the war

the Comptroller of the Treasury had declared illegal all contracts
which the military had not formally completed with contractors.

Since

the Comptroller's action had stopped payment of the incompleted or
"verbal" contracts, contractors without agreements were often placed
in a precarious financial position.

They demanded special relief

legislation from Congress on the grounds that the military had requested them to start the projects without contracts.

55

Congressional apologists for the bill stressed that there was
nothing illegal about the contracts in a criminal sense.

The military,

in an attempt to cut red tape, had simply asked that contractors start
projects before written agreements had been completed.

Fair play,

they concluded, demanded that the contractors, who were often on the

5^New York Times, January 31, 1919, 1; and January 5, 1919,
II, 1.
^ Washington Post, December 18, 1918, 6; and U. S. Congress,
House, Relative to Contracts, Hearings on H. R. 13274, 65 Cong., 3
Sess., 4-6.
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verge of bankruptcy, received their pay from the government.

56

Critics of the relief proposal saw- the contractors not as innocent
and honest businessmen but as highwaymen presenting the government
with trumpted-up claims.

Underlying this attitude was a belief that

the war had allowed munition makers huge profits.

But the critics'

attitude also expressed a doubt as to the ability of the War Depart
ment to pass fairly on the appeals because of the overly friendly
ties between the contractors and the military.
of the opposition veered into partisan politics.

At this point, some
Republican J.

Hampton Moore, still up to his usual partisan antics, suggested that
a congressional board hear the contractors' appeals for relief.

He

thought that such a board would often discover criminal conduct on
the part of contractors and negligence on the part of the War Depart
ment.

Even Minority Leader Mann opposed Moore's latest assault, and

when his proposal came to a vote as an amendment, it was easily
defeated on a non-roll call vote.
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Once the contractor's relief bill passed the House, the Senate
added an amendment to the bill, which resulted in further opposition.
The Senate amendment provided for payment of mining operations begun
under the Rare Mineral Act of 1918.

The House conferees had rejected

the amendment because they believed that it allowed claims with no
real government obligation behind them.

Led by Chairman Dent of the

Military Affairs Committee, the conferees and likeminded congressmen

56Ibid., 9-11; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess.,
Pt. 2, 1136-40.
57
U. S. Congress, House, Relative to Contracts, Hearings, 34;
and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1141-42, 1183,
1187-91, 1209-12.
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expressed a deep distrust of private capitalists and government bureau
crats.

They first won a roll call to support the conferees' opposition

to the amendment; however, when the Senate insisted on it, some of the
original House opponents accepted a compromise that tightened up
procedures for deciding the mineral claims.

In this modified form

the amendment survived the two roll calls that the uncompromising
opponents demanded.58
In a scale of the three roll calls, the strongest supporters of
the amendment represented the two parties in nearly equal percentages,
though a slightly higher percent of Democrats supported the miners'
claim than the Republicans (Table 5-7;A ) .

Much more significant was

the regional alignment displayed among the strongest supporters.

Since

the bill favored Western mining interests, congressmen from the Pacific
and Mountain states supported the amendment.

The moderate supporters,

who voted against the amendment before it was altered and then switched
positions after its revision, represented the Republican party in a
slightly higher percentage than the Democrats.

The bipartisan pattern

of the voting continued among congressmen who refused to vote for the
amendment.

These strong opponents tended to represent the East and

West North Central states and the Democratic South more than the other
regions.

Although the opponents succeeded only in modifying the bill

rather than defeating it, they, nonetheless, expressed one of the
strongest motivations behind reconstruction, namely that the close ties
between business interests and government could spawn corruption and
therefore must be ended.

58Ibid., Pt. 3, 2760, 2770; Pt. 4, 3355-62; and Pt. 5, 4258,
4266.

TABLE 5-7sA
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON WAR
CONTRACTS: H. R. 13274

Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE
POSITION

Low
Medium
High

MA

NE
D

R

2
2
M
M

R

D

8
11
4

5
5
4

ENC
D
R

7
3
7

15
21
7

13
15
26

WNC
D
R

5
1
1

4
8
13

SS
D

28
20
37

MS

BS
R

D

2
1
—

R

10
9
5

D

4
5
1

PS
R

7
—

D

4
1

R

5

11

—

—

TOTAL

TOTAL
D
R

69
40
54

61
62
51

163

174

Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE
POSITION

LOW
Medium
High

NE

ENC

PS

MS

BS

R

D

R

D

R

WNC
D
R

D

R

D

R

D

R

D

R

50
50

34
48
17

36
35
29

35
49
16

41
18
41

23
29
48

61
14
15

33
23
44

67
33

41
38
21

40
50
10

100

80
20

100

100

M
M

MA

SS

D

16
32
52

—

—

—

D

TOTAL
R

42
25
33

35
36
29

The order of the roll calls is 248, 255, 262
Fercent at each point on the scale 22, 17, 30, 31
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .986
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TABLE 5-7:B
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON WAR CONTRACTS:

Scale
Position

Variance

H. R. 13274

Motion

248

To have the House instruct the conferees to agree
to the section of the Senate amendment to Bill
H.R. 13274 providing relief when formal contracts
have not been made in the manner required by
law, which section relates to contracts for war
supplies prior to Nov. 12, 1918, but if agree
ment does not comply with statutory requirements,
the Secretary of War is authorized to waive such
non-compliance. 71-226; +■ = yea. Cong. Rec. ,
65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 2770.

255

To recommit the conference report on Bill H.R.
13274, validating certain war contracts and pro
viding relief where formal contracts have not
been made in the manner required by law, to the
committee with instructions not to agree to the
section of the Senate amendment relating to
contracts for war supplies prior to Nov. 12,1918,
and creating a War Contracts Appeals Amendment.
214-117; + = nay. Ibid., 3361.

262

To amend a motion to instruct the managers on the
part of the House to concur in the Senate
amendment to Bill H.R. 13274, providing relief
in cases of contracts connected with the prosecu
tion of the war and for other purposes, which
amendment instructs managers not to agree to the
section of the Senate amendment relating to
contracts for war supplies prior to November
12, 1918. 118-215; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 5,
4266.
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When the Revenue Bill passed the House in September, 1918, it
provided for eight billion dollars in taxes, levied mostly on personal
income and on excess and war profits of corporations.

With the Senate

still debating the bill when the Armistice was declared, Secretary of
the Treasury McAdoo told the Congress that the return of peace reduced
government expenditures and the urgency for revenue.

Accordingly, he

suggested that the Senate cut taxes from eight to six billion dollars
for fiscal 1919; he further recommended that the bill apply also for
fiscal 1920, at which time taxes ought to be cut to four billion by
eliminating the excess profit tax.

In December, 1918, the Senate re

vised the bill, agreeing with McAdoo's recommendation for fiscal 1919
but rejecting his suggestion for fiscal 1920.

In addition, the Senate

adopted other changes, the most important of which was a tax on goods
produced by child labor for interstate commerce.

After the Senate

completed its revisions, the bill went to the conference committee,
where the Senate and House conferees eventually reconciled all dif
ferences.59

_...

When Majority Leader Kitchin presented the final bill to the
House, he described it as progressive legislation designed to halt
the growth of the national debt and to capture the excess gain of war
profiteers.

If congressmen voted against the bill, they would, he

claimed, be protecting the swollen profits of big corporations rather

5% e w York Times, November 14, 1918, 3; November 15, 1918, 1;
November 16, 1918, 1; November 19, 1918, 1; November 30, 1918, 1;
December 4, 1918, 10; December 7, 1918, 1; December 19, 1918, 17;
January 14, 1919, 4; January 28, 1919, 1; and February 7, 1919, 1.
The House conferees had to bring the bill back twice in order to
receive House support against some Senate amendments. See Cong.
Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 927; and Pt. 3, 2452-63.
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than helping individuals.

If the bill, he added, had shortcomings,

it came from its leniency toward business.

Kitchin then described

the tax on products produced by child labor as following the majority
viewpoint of the House, although some controversy existed over it.
Joseph Fordney, ranking Republican on the Ways and Means Committee,
next defended the bill as improved over the original measure passed
in September.

With Republicans and Democrats in agreement, the con

ference report passed 312 to eleven.

The token opposition consisted of

four Republicans, along with seven Southern Democrats who were unhappy
over the child labor tax.

60

Decisive leadership by McAdoo, Kitchin,

and Fordney helped to formulate the unanimity, but more fundamental
was the fact that public opinion and both parties had reached a tem
porary truce in favor of graduated taxation.61
Railroads legislation also did not generate significant divisions
on roll calls.

The reason, however, was not because of mutual accord

on policy but because of a decision by the House to postpone final
action until the 66th Congress.

In his December, 1918, address

President Wilson told the House that he had no plans for the railroads.
He did, however broadly sketch the main alternatives from which Con
gress could choose, namely government ownership, increased government
control, or return to prewar conditions.

Secretary of the Treasury

McAdoo, who was also Director General of the Railroads, held more
definite ideas regarding the immediate future of the railroads.

60Ibid., 3003-12, 3035; and New York Times, February 9, 1919, 1.
^ S e e Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 53-54, for a discussion of
tax policy during the 1920's— which was much different from the war
years.
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Writing to Thetus Sims, Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee,
he advocated that the government retain control of railroads until
1924.

During this five-year period Congress would have the opportunity

to evolve new legislation which would incorporate the lessons learned
from the war.

In conclusion, he told Sims that although the short

third session of the 65th Congress prohibited general legislation,
the House would have time to pass the five-year extension along with
a $750 million appropriation for the operation of the railroads.®2
The House Appropriation Committee agreed with McAdoo's recom
mendation to consider only the appropriation and extension aspects
of the railroad question.

However, this decision did not stop

congressmen from viewing McAdoo's recommendations in terms of their
implications on government control.®3

Consequently, in hearings on

the bill, Chairman Sherley argued that the $750 million appropriation
implied a failure on the part of the railroad corporations because
their profits were not large enough to finance improvements.

Accor

ding to Sherley, the long-term solution to capital investment problems
was to be found in consolidation, though not in government ownership.
Several committee members, who feared that the five-year extension
would lead to government ownership, defended the railroads and
reoriented Sherley's thesis.

Gillett's questioning of witnesses

suggested that the request for money showed that the government had

®2New York Times, December 3, 1918, 1; December 12, 1918, 1;
Washington Post, December 12, 1918, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol.
57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1.
®3See New York Times, November 23, 1918, 1; December 6, 1918, 14;
January 5, 1919, II, 16; January 8, 1919, 1; January 12, 1919, 18;
February 7, 1919, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt.
2, 1423-28 for various plans on the reorganization of the railroads.
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mismanaged the railroads.

Siding with Gillett's position on the

extension, the Committee rejected Sherley's, refused to revise the
twenty-one month provision already in the Railroad Act of 1918, and
agreed to the $750 million appropriation.®4
Since the appropriation for the railroads was never in doubt,
House floor debates focused on government control.

Republican opponents

seized the debates as another opportunity to attack the Administration.
Accordingly, William J. Graham (R-Ill.) asserted that the Administra
tion had managed the railroads poorly during the war; they would have
operated better had they remained under private control.

Led by Sam

Rayburn (D-Tex.), Democratic opponents joined the Republican critics
and proposed an amendment which stipulated that the railroads would be
returned to private control by December 31, 1919.

The split within

the parties over the issue became apparent when Democratic proponents
of strong government regulation countered by proposing a compromise
amendment for a three-year extension.
Republican advocates of regulation.

Increasing the confusion were
They advanced a third amendment

which prohibited the President from relinquishing control until July
1, 1920.

With the House divided into contending factions, the result

was the predictable defeat of all three amendments on non-roll call
votes.®®

At this point after the war, the House displayed marked

confusion on future railroad policy.

A desire for a modification of

railroad laws was evident, but whether this meant greater government

®4U. S. Congress, House, Appropriation for Federal Control of
Transportation Systems, Hearings on H. R. 16020, 65 Cong., 3 Sess.,
72, 132, 146, 3-6, and 129.
®®Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3890, 389596, 3900.
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regulation was still unclear.

In the meantime, the railroads would

continue to operate under the Railroad Act of 1918.
In the quest for the restoration of peacetime economic conditions,
the House reached a definite policy on wheat prices.

Before the

Armistice, President Wilson had issued a proclamation guaranteeing the
price of wheat at $2.28 a bushel and calling on the nation's farmers
to plant mo^e wheat.

In response, farmers sowed more wheat in expecta

tion of high prices, but when the Armistice was declared, doubts were
raised regarding government wheat policy.

As a consequence, many con

gressmen demanded that the government support wheat prices, predicted
a severe break in prices otherwise, and introduced bills to protect the
farmer.66
During Agriculture Committee hearings on the guarantee, Repre
sentative Gilbert Haugen (R-Iowa) pointed out that only farmers had
been governed by price controls.

As a result they were entitled, he

insisted, to good prices because laborers and munition makers and even
grain dealers had received handsome compensation during the war.
Haugen implied that the farmer had been unfairly treated, but some
witnesses rejected the idea of a guaranteed wheat price because they
favored lower bread prices for consumers and restoration of the free
market system.

A majority of Committee members, however, agreed with

Haugen, since they believed that the government had pledged its word
to the farmer.

Questions concerning methods by which the government

would guarantee the price, still protect the consumer, and

^ N e w York Times, January 1, 1919, 12; January 20, 1919, 4;
February 4, 1919, 4; and February 6, 1919, 14.
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stabalize farm markets remained unresolved when the hearings
closed.®7
The bill as finally reported by the Committee appropriated
one billion dollars to make up for any difference between the
guaranteed price and the market price.

It also conferred wide powers

on the Food Administration Grain Corporation to control markets,
establish corporations, and license grain dealers.

In this form the

bill gave the consumer the benefit of the market price if it happened
to be lower than the guarantee.

Chairman Lever of the Agriculture

Committee justified the two-price system on the grounds that many
poor people could not afford high wheat prices.

He also argued

that the government should accept the burden in order to prevent
civil disorder— a thesis often heard during House debates.

His

final observation was that the government probably would not expend
much of the one billion dollars because world demand for wheat would
remain strong through 1919.

Congressman George Huddleston, one of

the few critics of the bill, continued to voice populist sentiments
when he rejected Lever's arguments and charged that the bill utterly
failed to protect poor people from high prices.

It was much more

likely he asserted that the poor would actually suffer because the
Grain Corporation would manipulate market prices in order to avoid
paying the farmers the guaranteed price.

Since the consensus in

favor of giving the farmer a "fair share" of the economic pie overroad
such criticism, the bill passed on a roll call vote, 278 to fourteen.®®
®7U. S. Congress, House, Wheat Guaranteed by Congress, Hearings
on H. R. 12596, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 39, 48, 87, 136-37, 19, 140, 51,
62, 72, 84, 92, 107, 155, 193-96.
®8New York Times, February 7, 1919, 4; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
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Congressmen, who saw the wheat bill as a necessary obligation,
found that a number of wartime-initiated social measures entailed no
responsibility but instead impeded the return to peacetime conditions.
On one hand, the House rejected the perpetuation of non-statutory war
time programs in job placement, housing, and employment of women in
industry.

Even though they received a number of requests, particularly

in relation to the government-run Eirployment Service, for their continu
ance, members believed that postwar conditions demanded retrenchment.
Further, Chairman Sherely of the Appropriations Committee argued that
House rules did not permit the consideration of appropriations that had
no general or enabling legislation behind them.

Edward Keating (D-Col.)

tried to protest this narrow interpretation of House rules and attemp
ted to prompt a more humanitarian reconstruction.

However, the House

more readily agreed with the conservative position of Minority Leader
Mann, who maintained that the House would establish a dangerous prece
dent if it passed appropriations without statutory backing.

The

Sundry Appropriation Bill, consequently, passed without money for
these wartime social programs.®^
Similarly, the House failed to initiate new programs in the areas
of adult illiteracy, maternity hygiene, infancy care, rehabilitation
of victims of industrial accidents, and rehabilitation of the deaf and

Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3939-42, 3944, 3954, 3991, 4051.
S. Congress, House, Sundry Appropriation Bill, Heiarings on
H.R. 15140, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 210; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57,
3 Sess., Pt. 4, 4057-70; (Appendix) 229-30, 213; and New York Times,
February 22, 1919, 3. Joseph W. Fordney (R-Mich.) wrote that he opposed
the Employment Service because "it is aid to the I.W.W., anarchy, and
socialism and nothing else." Fordney to W. B. Mershon, April 23, 1919,
Box 13, Mershon Papers.
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dumb.

Congressmen advocated the literacy bill because immigrants

and others would learn to read English and thus become better citizens.
Jeannette Rankin (R-Mont.) advanced a humanitarian argument for the
maternity bill when she told a House committee that justice demanded
action to decrease the high infancy mortality rate among lower income
families.

But the most persistent theme which congressmen expressed.

during the hearings was a utilitarian concern that human resources
should be properly developed.

Although the war had likely created an

increased awareness of wasteful uses of resources, the committees
failed to report the bills addressing the problem to the House floor.

70

House rules, the shortness of the session, and the general attitude
which opposed innovation blocked action.
To many congressmen the war had disrupted commerce with foreign
countries and had increased competition between nations.

If America

was to restore prosperous and advantegeous trade conditions, Congress
needed first to enact a bill appropriating three million dollars for
the construction of consulates.

Advocated also by the Chamber of

Commerce and other business interests, the bill aimed to promote the
penetration of American goods into foreign lands.

However, the bill

70U.S. Congress, House, To Promote the Education of Native
Illiterates of Persons Unable to Understand and Use the English
Language, Hearings on H.R. 15402, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 3, 8; U.S. Congress,
House, To Require the Commissioner of Education to Desire Methods and
Promote Plans for the Elimination of Adult Illiteracy, Hearings on
H.R. 6490, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 9, 15; U. S. Congress, House, Hygiene
of Maternity and Infancy, Hearings on H. R. 12634, 65 Cong., 3 Sess.,
5, 37; U. S. Congress, House, Promotion of the Vocational Rehabilita
tion, Hearing on H. R. 12880, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 7-10; U. S. Congress,
House, Vocational Rehabilitation of Persons Disabled Industry, Hearings
on S. R. 4922, 41; and U. S. Congress, House, To Create a Bureau for
the Deaf and Dumb in the Department of Labor, Hearings on H. R. 244.
65 CongT, 3 Sess., 3-12.
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sparked an adverse reaction among economy-minded House members.

More

concerned with retrenchment than expansion of trade, they mobilized a
voting bloc large enough to defeat the proposal, 173 to 106.7^

Since

sixty percent of the Democrats and sixty-five percent of the Republi
cans voted against the bill, partisan influences did not shape the
House's opposition to the construction of consulates (Table 5-8).

Some

regional influences can be detected because coastal state representa
tives, particularly among the Democrats, voted in favor of the bill.
Undoubtedly, attitudes toward economy in government coupled with
calculations of regional benefit determined the voting pattern on the
consulate bill.
Another trade proposal was sent to the House by Secretary
McAdoo, who suggested that Congress extend the life of the War Finance
Corporation for six months, during which time the WFC would channel
up to one billion dollars of its funds into loans for the disrupted
export business.

Although favorably reported by the Ways and Means

Committee, the bill was assailed by Joseph Fordney, ranking Republican
on that Committee.

Another billion dollars used for exporting goods

would, Fordney maintained, increase the money supply by that much,
thereby adding to the already high rate of inflation.

Even though the

measure involved no restrictions on business, Fordney also objected
because it furthered direct cooperation between government and business.
Gaining the endorsement of several other Republicans, Fordney instead
desired to end these close ties and to restore the old separation.
opposition may also have been influenced by his support of the

7^Washington Post, October 27, 1918, 4; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1818-23.
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TABLE 5-8
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. RES. 504

Region and Party (Numbers)

VOTE

NE
D

Yea

MA
R

3

D

R

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

D

SS '
R

R

14

5

12

6

15

4

6

22

1

7

5

6

17

9

30

3

17

48

1

13

Nay

MS

BS
D

D

5
10

PS
R

D

—

1

5

TOTAL
R

D

R

2

2

54

50

1

6

81

91

Region and Party (Percent)

VOTE

NE
D

MA
R

D

R

ENC
D
R

WNC
D
R

D

R

D

R

D

R

SS

BS

MS

PS
*

TOTAL

D

R

D

R

Yea

100

74

46

41

40

33

57

26

31

50

35

—

83

—

67

25

40

35

Nay

—

26

54

59

60

67

43

74

69

50

65

100

17

100

33

75

60

65

*Cong. Rec ./ 65 Cong., Vol. 57, : Sess., Pt

2, 1822.
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protective tariff and, consequently, by a hostile attitude toward any
measure that might promote, even indirectly, free trade.

J. Hampton

Moore moved to strike the WFC provision from the bill, but in this
7?

case the advocates of an aggressive export policy won, 240 to 111.

Many congressmen saw the war-initiated ship building program as
another means to foster American trade.

Although the shortness of the

session prevented any comprehensive action, the House did have oppor
tunity to consider an appropriation of $660 million for the Shipping
Board.

This fund was to be used to complete contracts on partially-

built ships and to convert troop carriers into ships suitable for
peacetime trade.

Not wishing to lose the initial investment on the

partly built ships, representatives also hoped to use the ships to
create a merchant marine capable of competing in world commerce.

As

a result, it passed without a roll call as part of the Sundry Appro
priation B i l l . ^
Although the House had not followed a consistent trade policy,
the tendency pointed toward a more aggressive role for the government
in the export trade.

Similarly, the House moved toward greater activity

for the government in the field of highway construction.

Secretary of

Labor Wilson advocated to Congress "buffer legislation, in particular
a $200 million highway program, to prevent postwar unemployment and

72Ibid., pt. 5, 4273-78, 4283, 4288, 4342. All but two oppon
ents came from the Republican ranks, which indicates that antiAdministration and anti-free trade sentiments probably operated on
the ballot. See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 57, for a discussion
on the postwar evaluation of the WFC.
73New York Times, January 5, 1919, II, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65
Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 4058-61.
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the spread of radical ideas.74

Senators agreed with this reasoning,

attached an appropriation amendment to the postal bill, and gained
the concurrence of the House conferees to the amendment.

When the

conference report reached the House, economy-minded members, led by
"Uncle" Joe Cannon, opposed it.

Arguing that it was time, after a

period of huge government expenditures, to retrench, Cannon demanded
a roll call on the amendment, but his motion lost, 267 to seventy.

75

Among the economic reconstruction measures were two proposals
for government ownership.

During the War, Secretary of the Navy

Daniels had seized control of radio communications and had purchased
ship to shore wireless stations.

When peace returned, Daniels

recommended government ownership of wireless communication, mainly
because of a desire to develop radio for military and corporate uses.
In pursuit of this goal, Daniels proposed a bill before the House
Merchant Marine Committee which established a government monopoly of
radio.

His basic contention was that radio wave lengths could be

interferred with and thus a central agency had to monitor use of the
waves.

Minority leader Mann took a dim view of Daniel's actions,

particularly his employment of the Navy's uncommitted fund to buy
the ship to shore stations.

In a blistering House speech, Mann called

for Daniels' impeachment, whereupon the House deleted the radio
purchase money from a naval appropriation bill.

A few months later

74New York Times, January 31, 1919, 1.
75Ibid., February 18, 1919,
Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess.,
opponents, fifty-six, represented
that Cannon was able to influence

6; February 20, 1919, 19; and Cong.
Pt. 4, 3780-89. Most of the
the Republican party, indicating
a number of his colleagues.
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Daniel's last pleas for his plan fell on the unsympathetic ears of
the House.
The second plan for government ownership originated with another
cabinet officer, Postmaster General Burleson.

During the war, Con

gress had approved the control of the telephone, telegraph, and cable
systems by the government.

After the Armistice Burleson suggested

that the communication systems remain under government control for
two more years and then be returned to private ownership.

However,

Burleson actually wanted more, namely permanent goverr&tent ownership
of the wires.

In a letter to Representative John Moon, Chairman of

the Postal Committee, he argued that the Constitution necessarily
allowed government ownership under the defense and postal powers.
He also condemned private ownership for mismanagement and high rates,
claimed greater efficiency from government ownership, and denied
any danger of government invasion of privacy.

Although critics

immediately denounced the plan, Burleson had a sympathetic supporter
in Representative Moon.

As a result, his proposals for a two-year

extension and for the takeover went to Moon's committee for a
77

hearing.''
William H. Lamar, solicitor for the Post Office, presented the
bill to the Committee, first noting that the two proposals were
76

Joseph L. Morrison, Joseph Daniels; The Sroall-d Democrat
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1966), 109; New York Times,
November 25, 1918, 1; November 26, 1919, 3; December 13, 1918, 6;
January 30, 1919, 3; January 31, 1919, 3; February 8, 1919, 10; U.S.
Congress, House, Government Control of Radio Communication, Hearings
on H.R. 13159, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 5-30; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57,
3 Sess., Pt. 3, 23-2-03, 3172-73; and (Appendix) 32-37.
^ N e w York Times, December 10, 1918, 1; December 15, 1918, 7;
January 15, 1919, 10; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess.,
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separate.

He, however, closely connected the two ideas, since he

argued that the extension of government control would permit time for
the consolidation of the wire companies.

Under the present competi

tive economic conditions, the public received bad service while the
companies also were unable to turn a fair profit.

Lamar added that

a period of government control, though not ownership, was even approved
by most of the wire companies.

At this point in Lamar's testimony,

Martin B. Madden (R-Ill.) brought up the chief objection to continue
government management, namely that it was to the companies' interests
since the federal government granted their demands for increased
rates.

Rapid restoration of competitive conditions would, according

to Madden, lower rates as well as eliminate a number of people from
the government payroll.

The majority of the Committee agreed with

Madden, but since the companies and Burleson requested some time to
adjust affairs, the Postal Committee set the date for relinquishment
eleven months hence, on December 31, 1919.

As true in other similar

cases, congressional insistance on the restoration of prewar compe
titive conditions overrode desires for centralization, either through
government regulation or ownership.

78

In February, 1917, Congress had approved an investigation by the
Federal Trade Commission into the meat packing industry.

The purpose

was to discover the reasons for the high cost of meat and to determine

Pt. 1, 452, 462-64.
*^®U. S. Congress, House, Government Control of the Telegraph
and Telephone Systems, Hearings on H. J. Res. 368, 65 Cong., 3 Sess.,
3-5, 7-11, 18, 148, 392-94, 93, 306-07, 223, 125-27. New York Times,
January 22, 1919, 1; January 29, 1919, 1. Although the Postal
Committee reported the bill, the House never considered the bill.
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if the five leading meat packers controlled prices and markets in
violation of the anti-trust laws.

Directed by Francis J. Heney, a

colorful California progressive, the investigation lasted for over a
year, during which time it amassed a large quantity of evidence
against the packers.

At its conclusion, the FTC decided Heney's

findings warranted legislative action and prevailed upon Thetus Sims,
Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee, to introduce a bill.
Though the measure did not propose to nationalize the slaughterhouses,
it did aim to break the control of the packers by taking over their
rolling stock and cold storage plants.

Since these capital assets

served as the means to monopolize the packing industry, government
ownership would break the monopoly and restore competition.
Sims called hearings, which started in January, 1917.

Chairman

79

The hearings revealed that the five major companies controlled
the industry, set the prices, and divided up the purchase of cattle.
Also uncovered were further abuses, among them the employment of
marketing pools and the control of bahk credit.

William B. Colver,

Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, told the Committee that the
upshot of their practices was higher food prices for consumers.

In

response, Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.) indicated that he did not doubt the
findings, but he characterized the proposals as "drastic" and the
"very last thing to do" to remedy the situation.

What was implied by

many of the committee members' remarks, especially those of John S.
Snook (D-Ohio), was a fear that the "public may get carried away and
apply it (government ownership) to all industries."

Since the hearings

7Q

Washington Post, February 25, 1919, 4; New York Times, Decem
ber 21, 1917, 1; April 1, 1918, 1; and December 11, 1918, 17.
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dragged on to the middle of February, it became impossible to pass a
bill during the third session.

However, the attitude of the Committee,

though it pointed away from government ownership, suggested that the
FTC findings were valid and that some type of action should be taken
against the packers.80
In contrast to the House's reluctance to adopt proposals for
government control and ownership, it did, at times, accept schemes
which permitted private development of natural resources.8*

In one

case, the possible existence of large deposits of metalliferous min
erals on Indian lands caused Carl Hayden (D-Ariz.) to introduce legis
lation which would allow prospectors to lease land from the Indians.
Arguing that it would aid mineral development, Hayden also claimed
that Indians favored the proposition because they would receive a
five percent royalty on any finds.

Several members viewed Hayden's

bill as outrageous, maintaining that it would enable the Anaconda
Copper Corporation to grab all the land.

Other Congressmen, such as

Minority Leader Mann, contended that the House should also consider
how resources ought to be expended.

In the future, "our grandchildren,"

80Ibid., January 23, 1919, 5; June 24, 1919, 1; and U. S. Congress,
House, Government Control of Meat Packing Industry, Hearings on H. R.
13324, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 4-8, 14-28, 79, 35-45, 776, 834, 874, 97581, 1028, 2058. In the 1920's, the Packers and Stockyards Act passed
Congress which gave the Department of Agriculture substantial powers
over the meat packing industry. See John D. Hicks, Republican Ascen
dancy, 1921-1933 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), 55.
81

Some other bills, at least in the minds of individual legis
lators, raised questions of government ownership. For example, a bill
to establish a plant for the testing of lignite coal drew charges
from William H. Stafford (R-Wis.) that plans for government ownership
had "gone wild". Other legislators did not agree and approved the
bill. But Stafford's anxieties were widely shared on more clearcut
cases of government ownership. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57,
3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1114-19.
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Mann pointed out, "would also need some resources."

In reply to

Hayden's argument that the Indians would benefit, Mann insisted that
the bill, in fact, would adversely affect the Indians since they would
lose control over the leased lands.

Mann added that the five percent

net royalty was "sheer robbery” of the Indian by the "greedy" white
man.

Since the bill operated under a special House rule, it required

a two-thirds majority to pass.

Consequently, Mann and other represen

tatives concerned about Indian rights were able to mobilize enough
members against the Hayden bill, defeating it on a roll call vote.82
A much more controversial resource development bill sought to
encourage the exploration for coal, oil, gas, phosphate, and sodium
resources.

In particular, the bill provided, as explained by Scott

Ferris (D-Okla.), for the replacement of the old system of patenting
lands with government supervision and royalties.

Under the new system,

land would be leased to individuals or companies for different time
periods, depending upon the resource.
that

The bill also covered the claims

resulted from President Taft's 1909

oil exploration on

the oil reserve lands

order stoppingallprivate
of

the navy.Opposedby

Secretary of the Navy Daniels, this provision would allow oil men who
had lost oil claims because of the order to take out new leases, for
which they would pay the government royalties.
advantages to the bill:

Ferris claimed three

it would change the old give away system for

one that granted the government some rights; it encouraged the develop
ment of resources; and it cleared up the dispute over Taft's order.83

82Ibid., Pt.

3, 2634-38.

83Ibid., Pt.

4, 3698-3700; and Pt.

5,

4316.
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In agreement with conservation groups outside of Congress,®4
William Stafford (R-Wis.) described the bill as the "triumph....of
the exploiters of the public domain."

For him and other critics,

Ferris' contention that the government increased its rights by the
bill ignored its real results, which were to alienate large sections
of the public domain, allow sale of land to companies, and permit
payment of royalties on net profits after the deduction of production
costs.

James Frear (R-Wis.) closed this phase of the argument by

citing the opposition of Gifford Pinchot to the bill because it allowed
the plundering of the public.

In another phase of the critics'

argument, John M. Baer (D-N.D.), who rejected Ferris' contention that
development of resources was immediately required, insisted that the
bill would lead to the rapid depletion of the country's resources,
thereby robbing future generations of its potential for economic
well-being.

Winning some modifications in the bill by amendment, the

proponents of public rights and conservation were still unsatisfied
with its provisions.

They attempted to defeat it but could not, as

two roll calls on conference reports passes, 232 to 109, and 221 to
seventy-seven.85
Just days before the close of the session, the House considered
another resource bill, this one on water power.

Passed by the House

during the second session, the bill, Thetus Sims told the House, had

84

The New Republic severely criticized the bill. See Charles
Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic XIII (January 19, 1918), 349.
88Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3701-11; and
Pt. 5, 4489-90, 4497, 4717. The leasing bill did not pass the Senate,
partly because of Daniels' opposition to it. Also, Senator LaFollette
filibustered the bill. See Judson King, The Conservation Fight: From
Theodore Roosevelt (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), 54-55.
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been changed in two significant ways by the Senate and House conferees.
First, a "fair value" recapture clause had been added, thereby modifying
the original "net value" provision.

Second, the bill more clearly

defined "navigable waters," one of the types of water areas covered by
the legislation.

The first alteration recast the bill in the direc

tion of President Wilson's desires and thus silenced some critics of
it.

The second substitution, however, drew the objection of Minority

Leader Mann because the conferees had defined navigable waters too
narrowly.

Otherwise, little criticism surfaced, and only the action

of die-hard opponents forced a roll call on the conference report.
It passed easily, 263 to sixty-five.

86

None of the resource measures, it should be noted, were direct
responses to post war conditions since they had antecedents before the
war.

However, the resource bills in a real sense, reflected postwar

attitudes because they emphasized a return to normal profit-making
pursuits with only minimum government restraints.

That the House had

such viewpoints can be seen in their reaction to government-directed
measures.

Bills of this nature, among them the wire services proposi

tion, rarely emerged from committee or, if they did, they usually
failed on the House floor.

Yet, to say that this atmosphere reflected

absolute opposition to government direction would be a distortion.
The supporters of development, even though they opposed extensive
government roles in resource development, did recognize the right of
government supervision of development.

They also undoubtedly wished

86Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 5, 4630-40; King,
The Conservation Fight, 51-55; and Hays, The Gospel of Efficiency,
121, 238-40.
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to conserve some resources for future generations.

With these quali

fications, it was clear that the rapidly evolving House consensus
opposed centralized direction by the government and favored restora
tion of more traditional and competitive patterns of resource use.8 '
7
Since the four resource roll calls associate, it was possible to
scale congressmen as to their attitude toward the bills.

While fifty

percent of the Republicans supported efforts to defeat or to amend the
resource measures, only four percent of the Democrats voted against
them (Table 5:9).

East North and West North Central Republicans

voted in above average numbers for greater government control.

The

moderate members, who agreed to three of the four motions in support
of the bills, represented both parties in nearly equal numbers.

No

discernible geographical pattern developed except among Middle Atlan
tic Republicans.

The strongest supporters of private development were

the Democrats, since seventy-four percent voted for the measures while
only seventeen percent of the Republicans adhered to the same stance.
Both parties of the Western states supported the measures, indicating
that the Westerners saw advantages to private development.

Regional

factors helped to shape the ballot, but more surprising was the sup
port of the Republicans for greater government supervision of re
source development.
87

Normally, Republicans are pictured as advocates

The question of centralization and competition is one to which
the recent historiographical literature has given considerable atten
tion. The more general works, such as Wiebe's The Search for Order,
tend to argue that government was promoting greater concentration.
Several articles, among them Robert F. Himmelberg, "The War Industries
Board and the Antitrust Question in November 1918," Journal of Ameri
can History,LII (June, 1965), 59-74, take a different stance, claiming
that after the war government agencies moved away from the permanent
adoption of controls. See also Noggle, Into the Twenties, 57-65.

TABLE 5-9:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON
RESOURCE LEGISLATION

Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE
POSITION

NE
D

Low

Medium
High

MA
R

R

ENC
D ' R

WNC
D
R

1
2
11

33
9
2

—

14

44

3

5
7
3

3
2

7
18
6

4

15

5

31

1
—

TOTAL

D

SS
D

'

BS
R

D

MS
R

2
4

17
3
2

1
17
58

1
1
1

1
6
13

4
7
2

6

22

78

3

20

7

PS

D

R

—

—

TOTAL
D
R

R

D

8

3

3

4
4

4
32
102

8

4

3

8

133

1
—

68
45
23

134

Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE
POSITION

Low

Medium
High

NE

ENC

MA

MS'

BS

R

D

R

D

R

WNC
D
R

D

R

D

R

D

R

25
—
75

33
47
20

60
40

23
58
19

7
14
79

75
20
5

—
33
67

1
24
75

33
33
34

5
30
65

57
14
29

—

—

77
14
9

SS

PS

D

D

TOTAL
R

D

R

50
50

3
23
74

50
33
17

25
100

75

—

100

The order of the roll calls is 268, 236, 256, 245
Percent at each point on the scale 13, 14, 4, 23, 46
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .957
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TABLE 5-9:B
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON RESOURCE LEGISLATION

Scale
Position

4

Variance

Motion

268

To agree to the conference report on the dis
agreeing votes of the two houses on the amendment
of the House to Bill S. 1419, amending an act
entitled "an act to regulate the construction of
dams across navigable rivers," the report
recommending that a commission be created to be
known as the Federal Power Commission. 263-65;
+ = yea. Cong Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess.,
Pt. 5, 4640.

236

To amend H.R. 14746, making appropriations for
the current and contingent expenses of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs for fulfilling treaty stipula
tions with various Indian tribes for fiscal year
1920, by eliminating the words part of the appro
priation shall be expended for uncontested
"excluding oil and gas leases" from the provision
that no leases to the Secretary of the Interior
for approval, because the inspectors of the Indian
Department make investigations of such leases
and it is not necessary to include them in the
prohibition. 198-68; + = yea. Ibjd., Pt. 2,
2032.

256

To agree to the conference report on S. 2812,
encouraging the mining of coal, phosphate, gas,
and sodium on the public domain. 232-109; + =
yea. Ibid., 3710.

245

To pass Bill S. 385, authorizing mining on the
unalloted lands in Indian reservations. 168-90;
+ = yea. Ibid., 2638.
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of private initiative, but, at least in this case, Democrats played
that role.

Retrospect
Although the House had enacted no overall or bold reconstruction
program during the third session, a clear theme can be discerned from
its actions.

Undoubtedly aware of the veterans’ potential electoral

power, congressmen adopted several measures beneficial to them— al
though they, at the same time, refused to consider Secretary Lane's
comprehensive plan for employment of veterans.

When representatives

turned to military policy, they rejected the Army's plans and would
have similarly blocked the Navy's program except for a timely appeal
from Wilson.

Forced to consider, albeit only indirectly, matters of

international affairs, the House was divided as to America's role in
restoring peace; nonetheless, it was clear that many congressmen dis
trusted Wilson's peacemaking plans.

Economically, the House readily

agreed to the revised Revenue Bill and to several proposals which were
designed to increase American trade.

But the House preferred to post

pone railroad legislation and rejected implementation of plans that
involved government intervention in the economy and close business
and government relations.

When representatives did agree to active

economic programs, as they did on several resource development pro
posals, the bills largely envisioned a program of economic develop
ment directed not by the government but by competitive capitalists
seeking personal welfare under minimum government regulation.

Above

all, the House spurned the social implication of the war, rejecting
appropriations for housing, employment, and rehabilitation projects.
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In general, congressional attitudes favored retrenchment and restora
tion rather than reconstruction.
To find the sources for the House's attitude it is necessary,
first of all, to note the failure of partisan leadership and the
revival of partisanship.

When Wilson left for Paris, leadership

devolved directly to House Democrats Kitchin and Clark who had no
desire to develop a program.

Undoubtedly, they also thought that by

assuming the President's role for the party they would be exceeding
their authority.

Though Republicans did not suffer from absentee

leadership, the factional infighting for the speakership seat likely
diverted attention from reconstruction.

In any event, party leader

ship did not function for the creation of conprehensive programs;
yet, the parties were able to mobilize their cadres for a number of
highly partisan roll call votes.
. Such a development could have indicated the push for a recon
struction program by one of the parties and the ensuing battle over
it.

Clearly, this was not the situation, since both parties battled

for partisan advantage over often trivial measures, such as the bill
on the Dawson Springs sanitorium for veterans.

On more fundamental

matters, the parties' internal cohesion often broke apart, proving
them incapable of sustaining the strain of complex questions.

On

the significant issues of progressivism and internationalism, the
pO

Republicans recorded their lowest cohesion scores.00

Democrats were

more unified, but they were divided over government policy for
pp

Allen and Clubb found Republican unity lower "on more issues
that were clearly relevant to Progressive reform" than the Democrats
during the Progressive years. See Allen and Clubb, "Party Loyalty
During the Progressive Years," 574-75.
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railroads and nationalization of the wire services.

Civen the negati

vism of the partisanship, the failure of the House to draft bold
departures in policy was not surprising.
"Party Voting," defined as fifty percent or more of one party
in opposition to fifty percent or more of another party, significantly
increased from thirty-nine percent of the first session and from forty
percent of the second session to fifty-six percent (Table 5-10).
Similarly, party voting at the level of ninety percent in opposition
to ninety percent shot,up:.

In the first and second sessions extreme

partisan voting nearly disappeared as only two percent and three
percent respectively were recorded at that level.

In contrast, the

third session recorded twenty-two percent of its votes at this high
level.

As a result of the increased party voting the third session's

voting record returned to patterns more in line with those of the
first Wilson Congress, which registered seventy-four percent of its
votes at the fifty versus fifty level.

89

Internal cohesion of parties remained high, even with a greatly
reduced number of unanimous votes.

During the first and second

sessions, approximately thirty percent of all roll calls received
the complete support of both parties.

In the third session, the per

centage of unanimous votes declined to nineteen percent.

This lower

percentage of unanimous votes should have removed a basis for high
internal unity within the parties, since a roll call of this type gave
a party a high cohesion score.

Yet, the Democrats' cohesion score

went up from seventy-four and seventy-one in the first two sessions

®^Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty During the Progressive
Years," 571.
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TABLE 5-10
PERCENTAGE OP PARTY VOTES AND AVERAGE PARTY
UNITY SCORES BY SESSIONS

1st

Sessions
2nd

3rd

Overall

39%

40%

56%

47%

3%

22%

11%

Percentage "Party Votes"
50 v. 50
90 v. 90

2%*

Average Cohesion Score
Democrats

74

71

76

73

Republicans

66

68

64

67

*The score does not include the House organizing votes; with
them included, the percentage was sixteen.
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to seventy-six in the third.

The Republican’s cohesion score did

decline from sixty-six and sixty-eight to sixty-four.
Cohesion on selected individual issues varied significantly
between the Republicans and Democrats (Table 5 - 1 1 ) .

The Democrats

recorded Rice Index scores of sixty or above on war contracts,
veterans, progressivism, war, and European relief.

Only economy

issues divided the Democrats, as they registered a score of fortysix.

In contrast, the Republicans achieved high unity only on war

issues and average unity on war contracts, veterans, and economy
issues.

Two issues, European relief and progressivism, divided them

sharply, as their cohesion score fell below forty.

Clearly, the

Democrats during the third session maintained higher levels of unity,
both overall and on most individual issues:

their cohesion score

was more than ten points higher than that of the Republicans

on all

issues except war contracts and economy.
In the first two sessions the high cohesion partly resulted
from wartime-induced unity, as witnessed by the high percentage of
unanimous votes.

Although war related measures continued to influence

the high cohesion of the third session, cohesion was usually a function
of partisan voting.

That this is true is seen from the increase of

partisan voting, which jumped from forty to forty-six percent.

With

the return of peace, competitive desires of one party to defeat the
other resulted in high internal cohesion.90

90Ibid., 5 7 1 - 7 6 . Allen and Clubb discuss high cohesion as a
function of strong party competition. The first and second sessions
followed to a degree an unusual pattern while the third returned to
a more normal course.
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TABLE 5-11
AVERAGE COHESION ON SELECTED ISSUES,
3RD SESSION

Average Cohesion Score
Republican
Democrat

1.

War Contracts

55

61

2.

Veterans

58

71

3.

Progressive

37

72

4.

War

71

77

5.

Economic

50

46

35

84

6 . European Relief
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A second factor hindering the creation of a positive reconstruc
tion program was the absence of any ideological group supporting a
reconstruction program.

Cohesive voting groups that operated on more

than one bill rarely developed, particularly if they were not essen
tially a partisan grouping.

As such, a group that mobilized in support

of a progressive position, for example on taxation, did not perceive
a community of interests on other issues.

Underlying this failure were

the vague ideas that representatives possessed on the rationalization
of industry and economic planning.

At times, congressmen told their

colleagues of the virtues of efficiency and social welfare, but only
in the area of railroad legislation did advocacy for centralization
find wide currency.

Questions involving railroads had antecedents

long before the war, and few if any congressmen were ready to extend
principles of railroad regulation to new areas of social and economic
activities.

As Joseph Fordney told the House, the country could take

care of itself without centralized action and close business and
government relations.

In the absence of a coherent liberalism,

the tendency of the House was to replace government control for the
old competitive order.
Finally, the emergence of anti-radicalism, which would eventually
lead to the famous Red Scare, foretold the defeat of reconstruction
proposals.

In a counter productive fashion, advocates of recon

struction proposals attempted to suggest that radicalism could be
blunted by their schemes.

Such an appeal, however, only deepened

9^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 3015.
92Ibid., pt. 3, 2718, 2756, 3230 for examples of the House's
attitude toward communist radicalism.
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apprehensions which were relieved more easily by rejecting change
than in responding positively to the supposed danger of Bolshevism.
Of course/ an atmosphere of tension and anxiety was not favorable to
the passage of bills protecting the rights of dissenters and radicals,
and few representatives, in fact, did show any interest in the fate
of such extremists.

93

As the press of legislative business in the

last days of the session crowded upon the House, congressmen neglected
both the dangers of radicalism and the problems of reconstruction as
they attempted to complete the appropriation bills on the legislative
calendar.

Their failure to do so, along with the generally unimpres

sive record on reconstruction, left the country frustrated and unhappy with the third session's performance.

94

William E. Mason (R-Ill.) defended conscientious objectors
and decried the way the military treated them, but most congressmen
remained silent or spoke against un-American elements. For Mason's
speech and others, see ibid., (Appendix) 229-30, 131-34, 291.
QA

The House closed on a note of surface harmony as Uncle Joe
Cannon led the House in "God be with you till we meet again." Below
the surface tempers were not so placid. See ibid., Pt. 5, 4913, 4672,
4022-23; and New York Times, March 5, 1919, 1. Many critical comments
were voiced by the press against the third session. See February 28,
1919, 12; March 5, 1919, 1; March 9, 1919, III, 5-8; Washington Post,
March 3, 1919, 1; March 5, 1919, 1; Lindsay Rogers, "Short Session of
Congress," American Political Science Review, XIII (May, 1919), 251-63;
"Deeds and Misdeeds of Congress," Literary Digest, LX (March 15, 1919),
16-17; and "Editorial— Close of Congress," New Republic, XIII (March
8 , 1919), 162.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

To summarize the history of the 65th House presents many diffi
culties because the war spawned much confusion and many tensions.

Yet,

due to this very tension, it is possible to describe the House by the
word "paradox."

While institutional arrangements such as long tenure

and seniority increased stability, they also created independence
and conflict among powerholders.

The party system, the bedrock of

House decisions, united large numbers of representatives and yet
pitted groups of members against each other.

On some issues parties

voted together as evidenced by high cohesion scores and by low "party
voting."

But on other paramount issues, parties either split inter

nally or fought each other bitterly.

On taxation and reconstruction,

the House followed a consistent position.

Yet, on other issues, no

coalition stayed together for more than one or two bills, and the
parties struck no uniform conservative or progressive stance.

Having

entered the war under the guidance of President Wilson, the House
rejected his leadership immediately after the war.

Present at all

times in the 65th House was an undercurrent of emotion and anxiety
that flowed from the war and the postwar situation.

Bound together

by the feelings of patriotism and idealism, as well as fear and
bigotry, the House adopted bold war programs, then later rejected
progressive reconstruction plans.
418
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In light of these paradoxes, how can the interpretations of
historians on this period be evaluated?

It is evident from the com

plexity of House attitudes that the schools of interpretation on
American intervention have over-emphasized their particular theses:
German intrigue against American liberty, munitions makers' profits,
German submarine warfare, or German plots against world security.
Individually, these explorations fail to account for the conplexity
of representatives' motivations, but together they help to explain
why the House voted to enter the war.

Any history of American inter

vention written exclusively within the framework of defense of liberty
overestimates the idealism of congressmen and underrates their prag
matic orientations.

The munitions makers thesis as a general approach

captures the interest and economic motivation of some congressmen but
fails to consider properly the emotional and political climate in which
they reached their decisions.

The submarine theory is best, partly

because it recognizes the German threat to American rights and to
American prosperity created by the U-boat warfare.

But it is also

valid because it emphasizes the historical context for House actions.
Given the sinking of American ships, the mounting frenzy, and the
ringing appeal for war by President Wilson, representatives had to
vote "yea" on the war resolution.

And finally, all these theses over

look a significant factor shaping the vote for war.

Albert Johnson

(R-Wash.) told his House colleagues that America entered the conflict
to prevent "the pollution of American blood."

Other congressmen spoke

as though the war should purge American society of aliens, radicals,
and dissenters.

From the very beginning, motivations were confused
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and tarnished, even though Wilson tried to establish a noble purpose
for American involvement.
Since representatives supported intervention because of a
variety of motives, pro-war coalition soon broke apart.

Some.evidence

of the coalition can be found on the vote for the draftee army, but
throughout the rest of the sessions congressmen formed only single
issue voting blocs on war legislation.

For example, the coalition of

Republicans and Democrats which formed to pass the postwar European
food relief bill had no ties with the prewar interventionists and non
interventionists.

Likewise, the blocs that voted to demobilize the

army and reduce the navy represented different interests.

It is true

that a partisan influence can be found in these postwar decisions
since some Republicans supported isolationist and nationalist positions
by opposing food relief and favoring a larger navy and army.

Yet,

it is equally a fact that a consistent isolationist bloc can not be
delineated because different Republicans voted against European relief
and for larger armies.

The evidence demonstrates that a coherent

voting group did not operate on questions of intervention and inter
nationalism.
A corollary to this thesis is that voting between international
and domestic ballots followed no consistent pattern, a fact that has
definite implications for the historiography on the Progressive Move
ment.

Since William E. Leuchtenburg's pioneer article in 1952,

historians have conducted a lively debate over the stance of progres
sives toward intervention and non-intervention and postwar interna
tionalism.

In light of this study's quantitative evidence, a question

that historian William Trattner has asked is highly relevant:

is it
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not anachronistic to speak of progressivism and its relation to
foreign affairs?

Although this study agrees with his implication, it

nonetheless must be qualified because the non-interventionists later
voted for the progressive position on several non-foreign policy
issues.

Moreover, to expect consistency among progressive congressmen

on both international and domestic questions fails to recognize the
complexity of each issue, the often discrete events and ideas behind
it, and the different political and regional interests affected by
such issues.

As a result, progressivism could have been a real in

fluence on his roll calls and House attitudes on foreign policy, but
other factors overshadowed its influence.

Yet, to make these latter

comments only emphasizes the failure to find links between progressi
vism and international policy.

Even though the evidence is incomplete

— largely due to the paucity of roll calls directly on foreign affairs
— it still must be concluded that Trattner has correctly questioned the
soundness of the historiographic debate on foreign affairs and domes
tic progressivism.
Since no consistent voting bloc existed on foreign affairs, it
might be supposed that no definite ideological positions were arti
culated by congressmen.

John Milton Cooper, however, has cogently

argued that debates took place within the structures of very definite
ideological presuppositions.

He breaks these down into two main

positions, isolationism and internationalism.
divisions— idealism and nationalism.

Each has two sub

Congressmen such as Simon Fess

(R-Ohio), who favored American intervention and then opposed the
League of Nations, can be labeled, in Cooper's terms, international
nationalists.

Cordell Hull (D-Tenn.) pursued an idealistic
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internationalist course that led him from support of intervention to
vigorous advocacy of the League of Nations.

Cooper presumes that most

congressmen followed consistent courses similar to Fess and Hull, and,
as a result, ideological positions were held by distinct groups of
representatives.

But, as discovered by the roll call analysis, many

did not vote consistently, and instead changed their positions much as
did William Mason (R-Xll.).

Voting first against the war, Mason later

came to favor American membership on a world court, but not the League
of Nations.

This phase of Cooper's thesis also ignores the bundle

of conflicting, partisan, economic, and regional interests behind
debates on wartime policy, postwar army and naval policy, and
European relief.

Consequently, the flux of events and proposals

rendered the expression of an ideological position by groups of con
gressmen nearly impossible.
To note these points is not to deny Cooper's thesis altogether,
but, on the contrary, to emphasize the usefulness of his categories.
On the level of ideological expression he has brilliantly delineated
the viewpoints within which House debates revolved.

Throughout the

three sessions, foreign policy and its complement, naval and army
planning, were discussed within the context either of American ideals
or American self-interest.

From his description of conflicting

ideologies, a paradox develops that highlights the House's inability
to forge a postwar policy:

ideological consistency could exist on

the level of expression, but on the level of decision-making the
complexity of events caused the formulation of separate voting
combinations for each issue.*
*The apparent inconsistency of House voting patterns could
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Equally paradoxical was the fate of domestic and progressive
reform.

Until Arthur Link's article in 1959, historical literature

had assumed that progressivism disappeared before or during the war.
More recently, a series of articles has sketched a vibrant and crea
tive phase among laborers, social workers, and intellectuals, at least
in planning if not in actually achieving concrete goals.

Charles

Hirschfeld, in one of these articles, has pointed out that the war
experience generated a new awareness of the importance of planning.
This heralded the arrival of a new "liberalism."

That the Hirschfeld

thesis is correct in the sense that progressivism continued into the
65th House cannot be doubted.

Without this assumption, House debates

on taxation, natural resources and conservation, and govemmentbusiness cooperation become largely unintelligible.

In another sense,

evidence, however, does not support the thesis that a flowering of
progressive thought and plans occurred during the war or after.
During the first session the war forced the House into a new
and bold direction.

For some representatives the Revenue Act of

1917, which Democrats and Midwest Republicans passed against the

partly result from the deficiencies of the type of computer analysis
used by this study. It should be emphasized that computer programs
have definite limitations in pinpointing voting blocs. As a result,
the question of whether or not progressives were isolationists or
interventionists can not be absolutely determined. When the war
vote was taken only fifty members opposed intervention, and from the
analysis of that vote it appears that some of the opponents were
progressives. But it was difficult to trace the influence of this
group in later votes that had some implications for isolationism.
The European food relief bill and the navy bill did indicate a Mid
western regional connection between the war resolution ballot and the
isolationist position on food relief and naval policy. Although
computer analysis indicated that they were not the same representa
tives, a small element of congressmen could be consistent and computer
analysis still might not find them.

424

stubborn opposition of Northeastern Republicans, was the harbinger
of future reforms.

On the other hand, House Democrats adopted the

repressive Espionage Bill.

Overall, congressmen of both parties

agreed to the regimentation of the country as they enacted measures
to organize

the food supply, the transportation network, the financial

system, and

the industry and the labor of the nation for war.

Planning

and centralization slackened during the second session, but the House
now approved progressive issues when it passed the prohibition and
women's suffrage amendments.Advocates of both measures
the war had

claimed that

setin motion forces which would improve the nation and

held that prohibition and women's suffrage represented the ideals of
the war.

However, representatives, who also capped the loyalty

program begun by the first session with the Sedition Act, suggested
no new plans to achieve the democratic objectives of the war.

During

the third session the possibilities for progressive reform were again
present.

The House considered legislation for a reconstruction

commission, veteran benefits, railroads, natural resource development,
communications, and government social aid in housing and employment.
A few congressmen apparently had a new awareness of the government's
potential for action, believing that economic and human resources
ought to be better managed than they were before the war.

Moreover,

congressmen did not object to government help for foreign trade or
natural resource development, but their position on these issues was
neither progressive nor was it part of a design to stabilize and
rationalize capitalism (as Gabriel Kolko argues).

Rather the House

favored government intervention because it aided economic recovery
and restored prewar competition.

To the House membership the goal
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of reconstruction was not enacting new programs but dismantling war
time restrictions.
This study not only investigated postwar progressivism, but
also the very nature of progressivism.

Historians have gone in two

distinct and separate paths on this subject, some arguing the exis
tence of a unified movement and others claiming that the movement was
highly variegated with at best only a central desire for reform.

To

the first, the movement represented the struggle between the corpora
tions and the people, the revolt of the middle class, the design of
businessmen for a bureaucratic order, or the establishment of corporate
capitalism.

To the latter, progressivism was made up of politicians

seeking the votes of the disgruntled, high-minded social reformers
attempting to abolish poverty, and businessmen and laborers desiring
benefits for their particular interest groups.

This research does

nothing to lessen the emphasis on the many-sided complexion of
progressivism, arguing that no consistent ideological bloc formed.
Instead, groups supported only one progressive issue at a time and
then melted away.
On one level this thesis must apparently be qualified because
partisan groups tended to follow a consistent position on progressi
vism.

Howard Allen and Jerome Clubb note for earlier Wilsonian

Congresses that progressives tended to be split between parties.

Occa

sionally, reformers were able to overcome this division and pass legis
lation.

Although this thesis is valid for voting on some progressive

issues (a case in point is the Revenue Bill of 1917), Allen's and Clubb's
further contention that most progressives were in the Democratic
party is wrong for at least the 65th House.

It is true that many
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Republicans opposed the 1917 Revenue Bill, but they adopted the
progressive side on the second tax bill.

The progressive issues of

prohibition and women's suffrage found the Republicans more unified in
support than the Democrats.

While the GOP objected to several features

of the espionage laws and loyalty program, Democrats supported greater
restrictions.

Similarly, Republicans tended toward progressivism on

labor and conservation with Democrats opposing them.

Allen and Clubb's

thesis does not reflect the reversal of party positions on progressi
vism during the war years.
On another level, the parties' positions did not reflect a con
sistent ideological stance since statistical roll call analysis found
no uniform correlations over a number of separate issues.

Rather, the

parties' voting behavior demonstrated the pull of discrete stances,
events, and proposals.

Consequently, Republican support of progressive

positions cannot be construed as reflecting an ideological position,
but the result of seeking partisan advantage on a series of indi
vidual issues.
Contrary to the arguments of some historians, such as Dewey
Grantham, regional groups displayed weak progressive tendencies.
Occasionally, progressive ideals had some influence on the votes of
a region's representatives, but more normally economic and social
interests shaped their ballots.

As a case in point, Midwestern

Republicans broke from their party and voted with the Democrats on
the 1917 Revenue Act, not so much because of the influence of pro
gressive ideals as because of the distribution of the tax burden—
which fell more on the industrial Northeast than the agrarian regions.
In another instance, Northeastern Republicans struck a progressive
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pose on some conservation measures, mainly because the West stood to
gain from government payments to mining interests while their region
would not.

In truth, one of the weaknesses of progressivism was that

it was often dependent upon regional interests for its strength.

Only

when other interests merged with progressivism, which occurred on a
few individual issues, did it become a viable factor on roll calls.
Allen and Clubb noted the role of constituent influence on progressi
vism, but in their efforts to find indications of progressivism they
failed to pursue the ramifications of the thesis.
Another reason for progressivism's inability to forge a co
herent bloc was that many congressmen found much of the organization
for war reprehensible.

Historians (among them Allen Davis, Gabriel

Kolko, James Weinstein, and Robert Wiebe), who make much ado about
the consummation or the resurgence of progressivism, completely
misjudged the House's reaction to the war experience.

Since congress

men wrote the laws, their attitudes were more important than those of
social reformers or businessmen.

Doubtless, Idle forces of rationaliza

tion and centralization inherent in capitalism and war accelerated
rapidly in the crisis.

But, for many representatives the new regimen

tation contrasted too sharply with the prewar role of government in
economic and social spheres.

Robert Cuff, writing about the War

Industries Board, has pointed out that traditional methods continued
to have a strong influence in shaping attitudes against the bureau
cratic state.

Additionally, the House had other reasons for rejecting

planning and social programs.

They disliked the shift of power from

Congress to the Executive Branch, the overly rapid implementation of
government-business cooperation in less than two years, and the
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apparent radicalism of the plans.

In short, a progressive and con

servative stance is impossible to define because representatives
overwhelmingly favored the end of wartime economic management and
social programs.

Ironically, progressivism did not surge into a

dynamic phase of development during the war for progressive ideals.
The first and second sessions witnessed a sharp decline in
partisan voting from other Congresses of the Progressive Era, and,
at the same time, parties achieved near-record internal cohesion.
Some historians interpret such a trend as indicating the burial of
partisan animus.

However, Seward Livermore in Woodrow Wilson and the

War Congress has correctly described the bi-partisan voting as a
camouflage of the protracted struggle between the parties.

In the

first session Republicans began maneuvering against the determined
opposition of the Democrats to establish a congressional committee
on the conduct of the war.
session.

This conflict increased in the second

At the same time, parties battled each other over a number

of individual issues, although it is true that the voting divisions
were not as sharp as during earlier Wilsonian Congresses.

In the

third session partisanship dropped its covert characteristics.

With

all pretense gone, parties clashed over control of reconstruction and
party voting returned to higher prewar levels.
Historians and political scientists agree that parties are the
paramount influence on roll calls and in the creation of policy.

In

some ways, this magnifies the significance of parties during the 65th
House because partisanship often focused on trivial economic and
procedural measures.

With more substantial issues the parties fre

quently failed to pursue a clear policy.

For instance, on the water
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power bill, Democrats in the second session supported greater federal
control while the Republicans opposed it.

But during the third session

the parties reversed stances on federal regulation.

Even on the war

program, the parties usually followed the leadership of Woodrow Wilson
who directed the House on what measures to consider.

When the war

came to a halt, parties did not so much create reconstruction policy
as follow the general mood of the House, for almost all members,
irrespective of party, favored scrapping wartime innovations.
Yet, the truth is that the role of parties cannot be completely
dismissed.

For one thing, partisanship, even if regional and ideo

logical forces were combined, was the most inportant factor shaping
divisions on roll calls.

More significantly, partisanship embittered

House-Presidential relations and caused, for instance, much of the
hostile criticism of the War Department.

Also, during the third

session, partisan rivalry had much to do with the defeat of the recon
struction commission and the blockage of individual progressive
proposals for the postwar world.

Again paradox can be noted:

while

the war and the President overshadowed and shaped the parties' actions,
parties nonetheless frustrated the creation of postwar policy.
Viewing the 65th House from the perspective of paradox allows
an unusually fine opportunity to explore the evolution of the most
tragic of the wartime tensions, President Wilson's call for the
victory of democracy and his demand for the enactment of repressive
measures.

At first, the House— particularly Republicans who feared

that the laws would be used against their newspapers— hesitated to
adopt all the features of the espionage and loyalty program.

By the

second session, the mounting war hysteria overrode all opposition,
i
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and the Sedition Act and Alien Deportation Act passed with hardly
a word of opposition.

By the third session, the war-induced distrust

of aliens and dissenters had grown to include radicals.

The House did

not enact new and bold legislation, partly because of its anxiety
about subversive elements.
Historical research offers several reasons for the growth of
intolerance and each one is useful in understanding House acceptance
of restrictive measures.

A long tradition that demanded conformity

and objected to the presence of radicals, dissenters, and aliens in
American life is described by William Preston in Aliens and Dissenters.
Preston argued that these traditional forces of bigotry, combined with
the ever-increasing war tensions, overcame the few forces impeding the
advance of repression.

When the war drew to a close, congressmen's

attention shifted from pacifists and pro-Germans to political radicals.
H. C. Peterson and Gilbert Fite in Opponents of War pictured how the
government decided to mobilize the people for war by combining re
pression with education.

And finally, wartime anxieties and tensions

and the failure of executive leadership induced a postwar reaction,
a theme which Burl Noggle developed for the reconstruction period.
While it is clear that all these generalizations are useful
to account for postwar intolerance, it would be highly unsatisfactory
to let the matter rest there.

It is necessary to say a word about the

importance of congressmen in generating this anti-radicalism.

Atti

tudes favoring moderation in the House always had a weak base since
they often rested on Republican fears.

Once Republicans saw that

suppression held little danger to their interests, they also joined
the attack against radicals, thereby augmenting the already large
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forces working for restrictions.

The House, which was constantly

learning about the requirements of m o d e m warfare, came to realize
that the war would utilize not only material but also human resources.
Correspondingly, demands increased that no individual or group in any
fashion block the full equipment of the troops— a thesis that congress
men sold to the nation.

But most significant was their advocacy

of suppression and their defeat of a bold and generous reconstruction
program immediately after the war.

By so doing, the House added to

the nation’s postwar confusion of purpose and direction.

This helped

to generate the anxieties and tensions necessary for mass hysteria.
Historians should not only dramatize Wilson's role in the debacle of
progressive plans for the postwar world, but they should also empha
size the House's part in the postwar reaction.
When Congressmen heard President Wilson's war address on that
solemn night of April 2, 1917, they little realized all the tensions
which the acceptance of war would generate.

At the same time that

members fell to the task of mobilizing the nation for war, they also
longed to return to "normal" conditions.

Representatives became

supporters of measures that in peace time they would vehemently
oppose, and opponents of measures they normally advocated.

All the

while disliking the necessity of doing so, representatives voted for
centralization and planning and even social aid, but given the first
opportunity when peace returned, they promptly sought to reestablish
economic competition.

Congressmen employed progressive ideals for

the aims of the war, and supported repression in the name of democracy.
While the nation's history has been filled with paradoxical events,
there have been few times when generous values and repressive measures

have combined so forcibly to unleash hysteria and disillusionment.
The House fully shared in the tragedy of the war for democracy that
led initially to the Red Scare and eventually to "normalcy."
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APPENDIX

EXPLANATION OF THE BIOGRAPHICAL AND CAREER TABLES
OF UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES

The Table of Social Origins
The ranking of this table and most of the other tables is adapted
from David Rothman's Politics and Power.1

The key to defining the

social status of a person was the extent of aid the family could pro
vide for the success of their children.

The "elite" designation was

reserved for those whose fathers had wealth and position, whose status
made it likely that their children would some day enjoy leadership and
power.

The "substantial" category includes fathers who earned com

fortable livings and who could provide advantages for their children.
Still, success was chiefly up to the child.

Lastly, the "subsistence"

family was defined as one unable to provide social or economic advan
tages for their children.

It should be noted that these are not exact

categories, nor are they indicative of "class".

The interest centered

on aid that fathers could provide to their offspring.

Table of Educational Experience
Classifying educational experience proved difficult, mainly
because lawyers need not have gone to college or even conpleted high
school.

The scheme devised takes this into consideration.

Those

placed in the lowest category had no formal education, either by tutor
or schools.

Those ranked second had a primary education (grades

ranging from first to eighth).

In the third level are those who

•'■David Rothman, Politics and Power, The United States Senate,
1869-1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 271-73.
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attended high school, but need not have graduated.

The fourth level

includes members who graduated from a high school or similar institu
tion and then went on to read law in a law office.

In the fifth level

are the congressmen who attended college, perhaps graduating.

If they

did not graduate but went on to study law, they were counted on this
level.

The final level includes men who graduated and then went on

to graduate training and professional training.

If they studied law,

either by reading in a law office or through training in a law school,
they were counted at this level.

Table of Occupation
ttiis is a straight-forward scale, though deciding how to classi
fy individuals did pose some problems.

Representatives in ranks one

through seven were considered to have one predominant occupation.

In

this category individuals could have some other activity, but it would
be minor.

Categories eight and nine include individuals with two or

more main activities.

Lawyers with multiple occupations deserved a

special category (category eight).

The final category included a

variety of individuals, some with two main activities, while others
had multiple interests.

Hie Table of Extent of Political Experience
House members who served in key political offices for over six
years before coming to the chamber were designated as having consider
able experience.

Those who spent three to six years in key offices, or

over six years in secondary posts— state legislature, state cabinet,
or state supreme court— or over a decade in less significant positions,
such as prosecuting attorney, were considered to have average

experience.

Members with moderate experience served less than three

years in important posts or less than six in secondary posts.

Men

designated as having little or no experience had held office only
briefly or not. at all.

Congressmen who were elected before March 4,

1905, were given a one-level advancement over whatever their prior
experience would have otherwise entitled them to.

By 1917, the mem

bers elected before 1905 had acquired great experience in the ways of
the House and of parties.
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